Another P-38 "what if" thread...

[Koopernic]

In NA, perhaps the

The other "what if" questions? What if the only prototype hadn't been destroyed in a publicity stunt after only a few hours of flight testing? What if the issue of compressibility had been identified 2 years earlier and rectified before volume production? What if so much of Lockheed's production capacity wasn't tied up building British bombers and the focus had been on '38 development-getting the YPs built sooner?

Why didn't they have a second prototype in construction lagging the first by a few months? Seems very rash and risky to build only one.

 

[drgondog]

Why didn't they have a second prototype in construction lagging the first by a few months? Seems very rash and risky to build only one.

No funding to build two

 

[tomo pauk]

...
I would summarize the barriers to What If, to point to the lack of Manufacturing/Production nimbleness of a New airframe company (Lockheed) that for, example, did not have the equivalent talent in Production that NAA had in 1942-1943. The funding for the Prototype was immediately increased to 13 P-38s following the crash but look how long it took Lockheed to produce the fist one. Complicate that existing restriction to produce on-hand in 1939 with not getting near enough funding above the YP-38 to truly build for airframe mass production layout.
...

Lockheed got the contract for 13 YP-38s at April 27th 1939. Fabrication of the 1st YP-38 started in February 1940 - 10 months time span!! First YP-38 took flight on September 16th 1940 - some 17 moths after the contract was awarded for.
Thus Lockheed indeed squandered a major timing advantage vs. P-47 and P-51, timing being #1 priority for any wepon of war.

 

[IdahoRenegade]

Lockheed got the contract for 13 YP-38s at April 27th 1939. Fabrication of the 1st YP-38 started in February 1940 - 10 months time span!! First YP-38 took flight on September 16th 1940 - some 17 moths after the contract was awarded for.
Thus Lockheed indeed squandered a major timing advantage vs. P-47 and P-51, timing being #1 priority for any wepon of war.

Quite true. Just a year or so before however, Lockheed was a very small company, and only a few years before they nearly went under. I'm just starting to re-read Bodie's book now. At this critical time Lockheed was heavily involved in building a large order of Hudson bombers for the Brits, as well as greatly expanding their production facilities. They were struggling to hire and train a work force. They also redesigned the '38 quite heavily to make it more suitable for volume production, rather than a pure prototype. In short-they just didn't have the resources to build them quickly, given the priority on the bombers. Which is REALLY what makes the loss of the XP-38 so damaging. Given the redesign efforts that went into the YPs, it wouldn't have been that much more of an effort to incorporate the changes (including NACA inspired ones) at that point, before production designs were done, tooling built and assembly lines set up.

 

[tomo pauk]

Quite true. Just a year or so before however, Lockheed was a very small company, and only a few years before they nearly went under. I'm just starting to re-read Bodie's book now. At this critical time Lockheed was heavily involved in building a large order of Hudson bombers for the Brits, as well as greatly expanding their production facilities. They were struggling to hire and train a work force. They also redesigned the '38 quite heavily to make it more suitable for volume production, rather than a pure prototype. In short-they just didn't have the resources to build them quickly, given the priority on the bombers.
....

Design shop and production lines were not the same things. Kelly and his team worked in design phase, they did not have many things to do with production line churning out bombers for the RAF. It is not about churning out the YP-38s in quick succession, it is about producing the 1st YP-38 as fast and reliable as possible. The NAA rolled out the NAA-73X in less than 120 days after signing the contract, Lockheed needed 500 for the 1st YP-38. Republic, hardly a giant of pre-ww2 aircraft manufacture, delivered the 1st XP-47B some 240 days after the contact was signed.

 

[Shortround6]

NAA had also started out just a few years earlier but had designed and built the AT-6 series. Which started as the NA-16 with fixed landing gear. They also had designed the O-47 Observation plane, the XB-21 bomber, the NA- attack bomber (which lead to the B-25).
However the orders for the trainers, the 0-47 and the B-25 were substantial. Hundreds of aircraft if not thousands for the trainers.
First order for Mustangs was for 320.

Lockheed's bomber/s were modified versions of the their airliners, tooling already existed (although it may have been duplicated) and early orders for the P-38 were in dribs and drabs. After the 13 YP-38s the US orders 66 (?) P-38s but that order is split between P-38s and P-38Ds (and perhaps an XP-38A with pressure cabin?), US is still specifying 37mm cannon and two 50s and two 30s?

The P-47 time scale is a bit misleading as Kartveli was getting more than a bit worried that the Army would reject the small, Allison powered P-47A and started design work on the R-2800 powered "P-47" (nothing actually carried over except the number) in the spring of 1940 and presented the idea to the Army in June of 1940. Contract may not have signed until September but Kartveli and Republic knew the P-35-p-43-P-44 had reached the end of the line.
Later contracts for the P-43 were primarily to allow Republic to expand and train their work force rather than get actual combat aircraft for the AAF.

 

[blueskies]

This style center nacelle + bubble canopy + leading edge radiators