Armchair General

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I did a bit more research last night and found a few things out about the historical role played by LAH in the battle

It began the battle with 22000 men attached, and about 5000 men in supporting units attached to it. It had a total AFV complemnent, including units of the 501st Hy Tank Bn with Tiger IIs (these figures are approximate, but neverrtheless acceptably accurate) of approximately 292 AFVs (this figure does not include the hundreds of Halftrack carriers and prime movers attached to the Division, but does include a few sdKfz 251 armoured cars attached to Knittels command, along with the other types.

The division and its supporting elements was divided into four major Battle groups

KG Peiper
Kampfgruppe Peiper was probably the most famous and controversial German formation of the Ardennes battle. It contained all the tanks from the division along with an attached battalion of King Tiger Tanks (however these heavy units straggled badly, and there is considerable debate about how many actually made it to battle. A good sccount of their battle can be found at this link... Tigers in the Ardennes . Perhaps 20 of the 45 vehicles were able to effectively contribute, the remainder either broke down (many as a result of crashes by inexperienced drivers on the very narrow winding roads), or running out of fuel). Ardennes was not a great battle for the tiger IIs....they just were not a good offensive tank, because of range and weight limitations, and Peiper was not that enthusiastic about them

Peipers formation was intended to be the "tip of the spear" in the drive to the Meuse River. Peiper was so unhappy at 3rd Fallshirmjager's engineers progress at building bridges that he sent his own engineers forward to finish the job. Fuming, he finally got his force moving almost 10 hours after the start of the battle. Peiper pushed his column forward relentlessly and his successes included capturing a 50,000 gallon fuel dump at Bullingen, which he used to refill his panzers. So in a tactical sense the unit was not short of fuel at least, although there was not enough fuel to retreat properly after the assault had failed. His opposition consisted of small scattered groups of Americans which he easily pushed aside. Unfortunately, Peiper experienced much trouble advancing his kampfgruppe on the narrow winding roads. What should have been a 10 mile column straggled out over 20 miles in length. Peiper eventually fought his way to Staumont, where he ran into serious trouble against the 30th Infantry and CCA and CCB of the 3rd Armored Division.

His kampfgruppe was cut off there and became desperately low on supplies, having been effectively counterattacked by three very well led and equipped US RCTs .

On Christmas day Peiper led about 1000 men on foot back to German lines, having abandoned all their vehicles and heavy equipment.

This group was also responsible for the massacre of 86 American prisoners near a crossroads outside of Malmedy as well as the murders of various groups of civilians during this campaign.

At the beginning of the battle this task group consisted of the following formations

II/1 SS Pz Rgt approx strength
48 MkIV, 48 MkV, 8 Ostwind, 8 Wirblewind

501st Heavy tank Bn
45 Tiger II (but see notes above)

III/1 SS PG Rgt, approx strength
9 x Infantry Companies, 10 x 120 mm mortars, 12 x 75 mm ATG (towed), 120 Htrks (mostly 251/1s) , and 24 AA Htrks (10/4s). Im not sure of the exact small arms availability, but it included something like 80 LMGs, and about 24x81 mm mortars. 6 x 75 mm IG. The Infantry was split about 60/40 between the old G-98 bolt actions and SMGs and assault rifles. The SMGs and the assault rifle guys were used greatly as tank riders. There were approximately 16 SIG-33 tracked 150mm IG attached

I/1 Pz Artillery Rgt
16 x Wespe, 8 x Hummel, 6-8 10/4 AA Htrk

I SS Pionere Bn, SMGs and stgs mostly, about 45 LMGs, 16 81 mm mortar, 6 x quad 20mm (towed), 30 Flame Throwers (man portable)

84th Flak Bn (attached)
16 x 88mm (towed), 12 x 37mm Lt AA (towed) 16 x sdKfz 7-1, 24 SdKfZ 8 HT

KG Hansen


Kampfgruppe Hansen contained a full regiment of SS troopers with a bit of artillery. Armor support consisted of Pz IV/70's in the PanzerJager Battalion. Their job was to advance on a road to the south of Peiper so as to broaden the front and protect the southern flank. Their progress was slow as they got stuck behind the horse drawn artillery of the 3rd Fallshirmjager Division at the beginning. The high water mark for Kampfgruppe Hansen consisted of a failed attempt to recapture Stavelot from the Americans, thus helping to seal the fate of Kampfgruppe Peiper.

I wont go into the full details of its TO&E, though I do have it for anyone interested. Its principal firepower was it 32 Jagdpanzer IV/70s, and 8 105 mm (towed artillery pieces. It had a Pionere detachment attached, and a reinforced PG regiment attached.

KG Sandig


Kampfgruppe Sandig contained two battalions of infantry and the heavy artillery of the regiment. This formation acted as a reserve and was to follow behind Peiper and Hanson (on both roads) and provide support where needed.

I dont know if it actually reached the battle area of La Gleize, which I am pretty sure now is the scene of this "fictional" scenario.

KG Knittel

Kampfgruppe Knittel consisted of a reinforced recon battalion. Its job was to loiter behind the spearhead until a breakthrough had been achieved and then to race forward and seize and hold bridges for the main force. In the end, the breakthrough was never achieved and this formation never got to achieve the glory they had hoped for.

This unit was very well equipped with Armoured cars, and the Infantry had a high proportion of autometic weapons. I am not sure if this unit actually made it to the battle


The following map shows a striking similarity to our friends original map, which is why I strongky suspect his scenario was anything but original. Final locations of Tiger tanks during the defense of La Gleize, 22-24 Dec 1944. Approximate fields of fire and ranges are shown. (from 1:25000 mapsheet Harzé - La Gleize 2-M834 49/7-8, Military Geographical Institute, Brussels) I took this from the Tigers webpage earlier posted
 

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Hello GrauGeist
Quote:" That's a good question and there is a possability that the Germans could have done it *IF* they moved quickly, in a "blitz" fashion. And the panzer units were no strangers to moving in the darkness, so why wait 'till 6 when they could have started a push at 3 a.m. or earlier?"

First of all, men needed sleep and equipment maintenance. Secondly, maybe Germans had learned something during 3½ years in East, at least in field command level, armoured units driving through forested terrain in dark could be easily ambushed by good quality infantry.

Quote:" Now I'm far from being an expert, but it seems to me that the Allied units had difficulties in responding to a fast counter-offensive. I'm not sure if this was because they weren't used to it, or simply not expecting it."

I'm really expert either, but for ex. survivors of PzBr 106 would surely disagree, there are several cases when Allied infantry units checked German armoured night counterattacks with heavy losses to Germans.

Juha
 

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