B-29's versus Luftwaffe

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No, it would've just let to a lot of B-29's shot down because of a lack of escorts capable of properly defending them.[/QUO I am not debating the fact that more than one B-29 would had been shot down under the cannons of Me-262s but in the long term the Luftwaffe could had not been able to keep up with growing numbers of B-29s as it couldn't with B-17s and B-24s given the fact that its resources were decreasing rapidly and since the P-51 performed superbly at high altitude it would had been an effective escort fighter protecting B-29s as it was with B-17s and B-24s.
 
As for the the Allies having anything to combat a bomber like the B-29, well as far as I can tell they had nothing besides the P-47, and it would need to be rearmed.

What about the P-38? It had high altitude performance and a fast climb rate and decent concentrated firepower.
 
Folks there too much speculation and "what ifs" in this scenario. As far as the Me 262 shooting down the B-29 in droves? Well they didn't do that against B-17s and B-24s so if deployed in the name numbers under the scenario that played out in 1945, the outcome "would of" probably been similar, or at least the war ending at least 6 months earlier than it did IMO.

Provided the B-29 would of been developed several years earlier and deployed in the numbers seen with the B-17 and B-24...

Don't forget the B-32 which "should have" been deployed in the spring of 1944. It carried the same normal bomb load as the B-29.

Now lets say the B-29 was in the ETO in the same numbers as the B-17s and B-24s in early 1944 - there probably "would of" been some problems with deployment and tactics, but make no doubt out it - the Luftwaffe would of been dealing with an aircraft which, in an overloaded configuration "could of" been carrying up to a 24,000 pound bomb load with under half the distance it had to fly in the Pacific. Multiply that by the numbers of B-17s and B-24s fielded during the same period and I think its obvious Germany would of probably gotten double the pounding.

Also remember what LeMay did - send out a few hundred B-29s at night. low level, stripped of all guns loaded with incendaries - and again, look at the distance between England and Germany and compare that with Saipan, Iwo or Okinawa and mainland Japan.

Now, should one want to speculate the same scenario with the Me 262 deployed a year earlier in significant numbers, well then I could see the B-29 having its hands full, even with escorting fighters.

Again, too many "what ifs."
 
Provided the B-29 would of been developed several years earlier and deployed in the numbers seen with the B-17 and B-24...

That's the main problem I have with this scenario - availability.

The B-29 was not only much superior to the B-17 and B-24, it was also twice the size of an aircraft, and generally representing much higher technology. It reads that it will take at least 2 times (if not even more!) the effort to build a B-29 than a B-17/24.

At the same time, its not twice as hard to shoot down for the enemy. With - realistically - half the size of a bomber fleet with B-29s, the attrition the Luftwaffe interceptors will cause can be more sensitive. Fewer bombers flying means less massed formations providing mutual fire, less seperate raids that can divide up the defensive force or even even completely evade being intercepted.

To that are also added the lower serviceability rates, the much higher supply train and maintenance and (I think) runway requirements for the larger aircraft.

In brief, I think that because of realistic operational and production reasons, half or third the number of B-29s are not a good alternative for B-17s/24s, even if the overall tonnage that could be potentially delivered in a single raid is equal or greater, even if individual aircraft are more likely to survive. These are IMHO are outweight by the greater sensitivity to attrition, and offering the defending interceptors some very considerate advantages. The high flying height can be of course beneficial for reducing losses, but it will also reduce the accuracy of bombing, and in the end, the effective destruction brought to enemy targets.
 
depending on when in the air war theater in a most case scenario the LW would of pushed for the development of ground to air rocket system interception
 
From what I can find, the cost in manpower and resources required for construction of a B-29 was something on the order of 2.5-3 times that of a B-17 and about 2 times that of a B-24 (which, at the time of its first flight, was the most technically complex bomber in existence).

Ah, the USAAF has some prices for various bombers:

Cost of a B-17 goes from $301,221 in 1941 to $258,949 in 1942, $204,370 in 1944 and $187,742 in 1945 (1943 is blank).

B-24 does something quite similar: $379,162 in 1941, $304,391 in 1942 and $215,516 in 1944 (1943 and 1945 blank)

B-29 cost plummets as production ramps up. From a cost of $893,730 in 1942 (no earlier figure) to $605,360 in 1944 (ie, almost 50% price drop over two years) and $509,465 in 1945 (1943 blank again).

So, in 1944 a B-29 cost 2.95 times that of a B-17 and 2.8 times that of a B-24. By 1945 this would be some what lower, but not substantially so. Cost multiple is down to 2.7 times that of a B-17, no data for B-24, but averge yearly cost reduction is about $40,000 so guesstimation is about 2.5 times multiple).

To put this in comparison, in 1944 a P-47 cost $85,575, a P-51 cost $51,572 and a P-38 cost $97,147.

Meaning that in 1944, you could buy almost a squadron of P-51s for the price of a single B-29 :shock:

The other thing about the B-29 in Europe scenario is what use is it?

Seriously, its a Very Long Range/Very Heavy bomber. Why bother, when bases in England and Italy are at most a 1200 mile round trip from any potential target that the Allies could wish to strike? The B-29 makes much more sense in the vastness of the Pacific.

The British are fulfilling the Very Heavy Bomber role with their Lancasters and Halifaxes anyway. 10-14,000 lbs bomb loads are nothing to be snorted at.
 
Little addenum to my last post.

I always wondered if the performance figures for the He 277 weren't somewhat inflated.

At loaded weight it has higher wing loading and lower power to weight than the B-29, and (according to commonly published data) cruises faster, with a heavier bombload and has a 50% higher ceiling, all without the benefit of turbosupercharged engines.

I understand that the high wingloading will help with speed, but surely something is a little wrong here. Just how much flight testing was actually done?

Also, anyone know just what type of DB 603s it used? Critical alt for the 603A was about 5,700 m, and about 7000 m for the 603 E. Can't see either of those pushing the 277 to 15,000 m
 
Folks there too much speculation and "what ifs" in this scenario. As far as the Me 262 shooting down the B-29 in droves? Well they didn't do that against B-17s and B-24s so if deployed in the name numbers under the scenario that played out in 1945, the outcome "would of" probably been similar, or at least the war ending at least 6 months earlier than it did IMO.

Provided the B-29 would of been developed several years earlier and deployed in the numbers seen with the B-17 and B-24...

Don't forget the B-32 which "should have" been deployed in the spring of 1944. It carried the same normal bomb load as the B-29.

Now lets say the B-29 was in the ETO in the same numbers as the B-17s and B-24s in early 1944 - there probably "would of" been some problems with deployment and tactics, but make no doubt out it - the Luftwaffe would of been dealing with an aircraft which, in an overloaded configuration "could of" been carrying up to a 24,000 pound bomb load with under half the distance it had to fly in the Pacific. Multiply that by the numbers of B-17s and B-24s fielded during the same period and I think its obvious Germany would of probably gotten double the pounding.

Also remember what LeMay did - send out a few hundred B-29s at night. low level, stripped of all guns loaded with incendaries - and again, look at the distance between England and Germany and compare that with Saipan, Iwo or Okinawa and mainland Japan.

Now, should one want to speculate the same scenario with the Me 262 deployed a year earlier in significant numbers, well then I could see the B-29 having its hands full, even with escorting fighters.

Again, too many "what ifs."

Good post. Pretty much dead on.
 
Folks there too much speculation and "what ifs" in this scenario. As far as the Me 262 shooting down the B-29 in droves? Well they didn't do that against B-17s and B-24s so if deployed in the name numbers under the scenario that played out in 1945, the outcome "would of" probably been similar, or at least the war ending at least 6 months earlier than it did IMO.

Agreed on the attrition based on same tactics and altitudes. Escorts as effective, faster cruise in and out, much larger bomb loads, better fire control systems..

Also remember what LeMay did - send out a few hundred B-29s at night. low level, stripped of all guns loaded with incendaries - and again, look at the distance between England and Germany and compare that with Saipan, Iwo or Okinawa and mainland Japan.

QUOTE]

The last point/question is one to ponder. LeMay switched from unsuccessful ETO doctrine because the Japanese had a much less proficient night fighter and anti aircraft artillary capability - as well as largely distributed industry in urban areas - with a crappy fire control capability.

Exploitng the B-29 capability suggests to me that either the same high altitude tactics but step up to 30K, step up cruise speed to make it tougher to climb and intercept, and perhaps mix daylight with night bombing. On the latter - give the ships to the Brits who had the tactics and the crews.

In early 44 through fall 44 the deployment of the 262 probably would not change materially so the 51s would serve as well or better in escort role and even the 47 rabge for escort should increase (faster B-29, less 'essing', faster cruise settings imply longer legs for the 47D-10 through D-25.

When the 47M and N come into inventory, the Ta 152 still isn't there and the 47 performance at 30K starts to exceed the 51D. The Fw 190A8 is almost an non factor at 30K and the D-9s are way late.

Meanwhile the Brits have a very fast low and/or medium altitude 'bomber stream' capability at night further stretching and taxing the performance of their night fighters to catch and shoot down the 29s.

The introduction of the 262 was the only hope of causing enough attrition - which was always the case anyway.

The problems were of course the engines.

The advantages were a 5 to 6x increase in load capability over the B-17, much better defensive capability forward and aft along with advanced fire control systems, 50% better cruise speed, higher load ceiling and much longer range - all putting incremental pressure on the LW to anticipate and react to inbound force.

The numbers of 29s available as is suggests that night bombing would be better tactics initially under RAF control, then gradually replace the B-17 wings as the operational numbers increased.
 
Folks there too much speculation and "what ifs" in this scenario. As far as the Me 262 shooting down the B-29 in droves? Well they didn't do that against B-17s and B-24s so if deployed in the name numbers under the scenario that played out in 1945, the outcome "would of" probably been similar, or at least the war ending at least 6 months earlier than it did IMO.

Provided the B-29 would of been developed several years earlier and deployed in the numbers seen with the B-17 and B-24...

Don't forget the B-32 which "should have" been deployed in the spring of 1944. It carried the same normal bomb load as the B-29.

Now lets say the B-29 was in the ETO in the same numbers as the B-17s and B-24s in early 1944 - there probably "would of" been some problems with deployment and tactics, but make no doubt out it - the Luftwaffe would of been dealing with an aircraft which, in an overloaded configuration "could of" been carrying up to a 24,000 pound bomb load with under half the distance it had to fly in the Pacific. Multiply that by the numbers of B-17s and B-24s fielded during the same period and I think its obvious Germany would of probably gotten double the pounding.

Also remember what LeMay did - send out a few hundred B-29s at night. low level, stripped of all guns loaded with incendaries - and again, look at the distance between England and Germany and compare that with Saipan, Iwo or Okinawa and mainland Japan.

Now, should one want to speculate the same scenario with the Me 262 deployed a year earlier in significant numbers, well then I could see the B-29 having its hands full, even with escorting fighters.

Again, too many "what ifs."
i agree to much variables and what not
 
A bomber operating from a ceiling of 30K would likely encounter the same problems over europe as had the B-29 over Japan. The by then unknown jet stream effect would either lead to a reduced bombing altitude or a greatly reduced bombing accuracy from 30K, something which couldn´t be cured given the period knowledge of the phenomen and weather forecast methods.
That´s a very important concern with strategic consequences esspeccially for the oil bombing campaign of 1944, where precision bombing is a very important consideration for success. Poor accuracy from high altitude bombing eventually compromised the B-29´s effectiveness over Japan and led to the adoption of low altitude bombing with increased bombload.
The P-47 would have been extremely effective and a very tough opposition for any of the Luftwaffe fighters, particularely the Fw-190A without GM-1 injection but on the other hand the B-29 conditions (high ceiling, high cruise speed) are more to the taste of some of the historically more unsuccefful interceptors fielded by the Luftwaffe in mid 44, the Me-163B. -Given that they had have a good ground controller to vector them with their radars to the bomber stream. It´s also more likely that the Me-262 would be pressed into the interceptor role operating from central Germany instead into the bomber / recon role operating from France and northern Germany, esspeccially if other Luftwaffe fighters are found to be ineffective versus the B-29.
Flak would have to improve to FALK/41 standarts and the liklyhood that SAM missiles will be considered for mass produced increases, too.
The B-29 in operations over Europe may turned out to be very different from operations over the Pacific for bomber escort operations, resulting perhaps in a different charackter of aerial bombing than those experienced by all sides.
 
A bomber operating from a ceiling of 30K would likely encounter the same problems over europe as had the B-29 over Japan. The by then unknown jet stream effect would either lead to a reduced bombing altitude or a greatly reduced bombing accuracy from 30K, something which couldn´t be cured given the period knowledge of the phenomen and weather forecast methods.

I agree the potential problems. Both 50% increase in cruise speed and altitude would have diminished bombing CEP.

Something to consider is the ability of the B-29 to carry nearly as many 4,000pound bombs as a B-17 could carry 1,000 pound bombs. Even a modest increase of CEP would probably be offset by the destructive power of fewer hits with the much larger bombs. Flak would certainly be much less effective - forcing SAM technology - but where was that technology? and if possible to deploy it in 1944 why wasn't it deployed against the 8th AF?

Question - what exactly are the comparisons of jet streams over Germany in contrast to Japan? I have never heard of ETO comparisons approaching the Pacific conditions


That´s a very important concern with strategic consequences esspeccially for the oil bombing campaign of 1944, where precision bombing is a very important consideration for success. Poor accuracy from high altitude bombing eventually compromised the B-29´s effectiveness over Japan and led to the adoption of low altitude bombing with increased bombload.
The P-47 would have been extremely effective and a very tough opposition for any of the Luftwaffe fighters, particularely the Fw-190A without GM-1 injection but on the other hand the B-29 conditions (high ceiling, high cruise speed) are more to the taste of some of the historically more unsuccefful interceptors fielded by the Luftwaffe in mid 44, the Me-163B. -Given that they had have a good ground controller to vector them with their radars to the bomber stream. It´s also more likely that the Me-262 would be pressed into the interceptor role operating from central Germany instead into the bomber / recon role operating from France and northern Germany, esspeccially if other Luftwaffe fighters are found to be ineffective versus the B-29.
Flak would have to improve to FALK/41 standarts and the liklyhood that SAM missiles will be considered for mass produced increases, too.
The B-29 in operations over Europe may turned out to be very different from operations over the Pacific for bomber escort operations, resulting perhaps in a different charackter of aerial bombing than those experienced by all sides.

I believe the most likely success scenario against everything the LW fielded (as contrast with 'what if') would have been an introduction into night bombing role initially because of few numbers and disparate performance characteristics in formation flying with B-24/B-17s... until the force built up to Division level of 10+ wings where they presumably could be tasked individually and escorted more effectively.

The wildcard is USAAF leaders were absolutely dedicated to daylight bombing and shifting tactics would have been inconceivable, politically.

Only Curt LeMay's reputation as a problem solver and direct chain of command to Joint Chiefs enabled the change to low level night raids over Japan. Would that have occurred in ETO? Would daylight raids have to reach a prohibitive level to force the change - and what would be different to make the B-29 more vulnerable to LW. It would have started at 28-30K and tested ability of LW to effectively stop them.

Hard to figure out just how fast the LW could have changed course with any effective measures to adapt to B-29 performance.

The 163 had such short range that it was almost a point defensive capability and would have to be deployed much closer to individual and critical targets.

The 262 was a more promising answer but why would Hitler change his focus - even when the 8th AF with only B-17s and B-24s was systematically dismantling German industry? The B-29 was evolutionary not revolutionary. It's primary benefit was speed, range and ceiling. With the huge increase in load and speed it would be more effective per aircraft by far than a B-17 at the same altitudes.
 
Had the B-29 entered service in the ETO then I see the Germans completely prioritizing the production of a/c like the Me-262, Ta-152 He-162. Fw-190A production would'v probably been completely haulted and all resources given to the contruction of the Ta-152, while Bf-109 production will be haulted in favour of the Me-262. The Ta-152H would've undoubtedly proven a true menace, esp. at high altitudes, the Allies having no a/c to effectively combat it. In 10min it was already at 10km height, and it could easily cruise up above the escorts maximum ceiling and come screaming down on the bombers without fear of reprisals.

So I think it would've been a wise move not to introduce the B-29 to the ETO to replace the B-17 B-24's. Sure it has a higher bombload, but its bombs will be scattered significantly more, and all hopes of effectively attacking key production areas will be lost.

In Japan in worked because the Japanese had nearly no a/c to effectively intercept the B-29, but in Germany its an entirely different matter. And because of the expense of the B-29 not as many would've been deployed, and for every B-29 shot down, you've lost the equal to 3 B-17's.
 
Little addenum to my last post.

I always wondered if the performance figures for the He 277 weren't somewhat inflated.

At loaded weight it has higher wing loading and lower power to weight than the B-29, and (according to commonly published data) cruises faster, with a heavier bombload and has a 50% higher ceiling, all without the benefit of turbosupercharged engines.

I understand that the high wingloading will help with speed, but surely something is a little wrong here. Just how much flight testing was actually done?

Also, anyone know just what type of DB 603s it used? Critical alt for the 603A was about 5,700 m, and about 7000 m for the 603 E. Can't see either of those pushing the 277 to 15,000 m

The performance figures are quite true and all thanks to a/c engine design. The wings were long and slender, the engines were fitted with the GM-1 boost system and geared for high alt flight. This allowed a ceiling of 15km, nearly as high as the Ta-152H's 15.1 km ceiling.

I believe the 15km ceiling was reached without a bombload though by one of the prototype a/c.
 
Weight of course has a big influence on B-29 speed as well - I chose 90000 lbs as a reference because that simplified reading the diagram, but that might not turn out to be the most typical operational weight if you decide on a specific scenario.

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

i think that 90000 are too light, maybe good for return fly but it's best intercet the bomber in go fly
 
the Ta 152H was designed to face the P-51D/K not as a bomber killer, the He 163 was out of the question as a bomber destroyer, masses of Me 262's with R4M's and the steps upwards in rocket design would have been used, indeed the facement of a more advanced US high alt. bomber type would of pressed towards jets of swept wing variety

am not sure where this thing is going as a huge what-if, we already talked about this last year or the year before
 
Had the B-29 entered service in the ETO then I see the Germans completely prioritizing the production of a/c like the Me-262, Ta-152 He-162. Fw-190A production would'v probably been completely haulted and all resources given to the contruction of the Ta-152, while Bf-109 production will be haulted in favour of the Me-262. The Ta-152H would've undoubtedly proven a true menace, esp. at high altitudes, the Allies having no a/c to effectively combat it. In 10min it was already at 10km height, and it could easily cruise up above the escorts maximum ceiling and come screaming down on the bombers without fear of reprisals.

So the introduction of the B-29, in contrast to the EXPECTATION of the B-29 (Germans believed it was on the way) would have altered the priority? They were 'waiting to see if we were bluffing'?? In the meantime they had the B-17s and B-24s and Mustangs under control so there was no sense of urgency to alter production plans??

As to Ta 152 it was a null factor in 1944 (and 1945), ditto 190D, ditto He 162 ditto, Me 163, etc.


So I think it would've been a wise move not to introduce the B-29 to the ETO to replace the B-17 B-24's. Sure it has a higher bombload, but its bombs will be scattered significantly more, and all hopes of effectively attacking key production areas will be lost.

Same point as above. Bigger CEP-yes at 30K but faster ships, huge bomb load and the LW fighter force deployed against the B-17s were not very effective when the Mustang achieved critical mass. If the LW could have re-prioritized and deployed advanced capabilities to defeat the B-17s and B-24s why didn't they? By your argument why even resist the B-29 because it was a.) vulnerable, b.) less accuracy at 30,000 feet?

In Japan in worked because the Japanese had nearly no a/c to effectively intercept the B-29, but in Germany its an entirely different matter. And because of the expense of the B-29 not as many would've been deployed, and for every B-29 shot down, you've lost the equal to 3 B-17's.

Maybe 2x on cost and same as B-17 on crews but 3x bigger bomb load.

Soren - It's all speculation but the biggest flaw in your argument is that the Luftwaffe EXPECTED the B-29, feared its additional capabilities and yet failed to deploy anything to effectively resist it (i.e more effective than what they actually put up against B-17) had it actually arrived in ETO in 1944.
 
Had the B-29 entered service in the ETO then I see the Germans completely prioritizing the production of a/c like the Me-262, Ta-152 He-162. Fw-190A production would'v probably been completely haulted and all resources given to the contruction of the Ta-152, while Bf-109 production will be haulted in favour of the Me-262. The Ta-152H would've undoubtedly proven a true menace, esp. at high altitudes, the Allies having no a/c to effectively combat it. In 10min it was already at 10km height, and it could easily cruise up above the escorts maximum ceiling and come screaming down on the bombers without fear of reprisals.
Speculation...
So I think it would've been a wise move not to introduce the B-29 to the ETO to replace the B-17 B-24's. Sure it has a higher bombload, but its bombs will be scattered significantly more, and all hopes of effectively attacking key production areas will be lost.
Why would its bombs be "scattered" if it was bombing at the same altitudes as the B-17 or B-24 using the same bombsight?
In Japan in worked because the Japanese had nearly no a/c to effectively intercept the B-29, but in Germany its an entirely different matter. And because of the expense of the B-29 not as many would've been deployed, and for every B-29 shot down, you've lost the equal to 3 B-17's.
Remember what was said in the beginning here - "the same amounts of B-29 deployed as B-24s and B-17s." It's only speculation if the Luftwaffe "would of" made more of an effort to field more aircraft like the Ta 152 or aircraft that could counter the B-29. Possibly.

IMO the quantity of bombers deployed would not of been a factor. In fact for every B-17 and B-24 deployed in the ETO it was planned to replace them with the B-32.
 

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