FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Because you can still cause airframe damage as you're approaching Vne rendering the aircraft uncontrollable wasting plane and pilot for completing its primary mission.
Banzai!: General discussion of the Kamikaze and Ramming
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You sure can.
Setting the elevator trim tabs I'd imagine would help with the control, there. I don't know what level of training many of these kamikaze pilots had, though.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
I remember reading somewhere where later in the war the average time was 15 hours. They did teach them to take off and land should they have to abort because of weather.
kettbo
Senior Airman
Just remembered this. CPT Hara of the IJN cruiser Yahagi claims loss of speed during maneuvers allowed the USN planes to hit his ship. He regretted not straight and fast as he had done in his prior destroyer command that he and the ship survived
With this in mind, any idea on the USN ship speeds for most of these actions discussed?
Any research showing Kamikaze hits compared to ship speed or maneuvers?
With this in mind, any idea on the USN ship speeds for most of these actions discussed?
Any research showing Kamikaze hits compared to ship speed or maneuvers?
They would only stand for so many aborts though.
One pilot came back 7 or 8 times, they shot him.
The pilots who did abort was put themselves under such a strong suspicion, and were usually treated so bad on return, that I would bet many just flew into the sea instead of returning.
One pilot came back 7 or 8 times, they shot him.
The pilots who did abort was put themselves under such a strong suspicion, and were usually treated so bad on return, that I would bet many just flew into the sea instead of returning.
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
that should go under the ww2 myths....i had heard when i was a boy that the Kamikaze pilots werent trained in landing since they werent supposed to return. i would think you would still need a fair amount of maneuverability...not going so fast your flight controls become ineffective....if you were flying stright in full bore you are an easier target. if you were able to jinx around a little you present a harder target and have a better chance of success...
found this years ago and was able dig it up again...
Interrogation Nav 6, Captain Mitsuo Fuchida
18 Oct 1945
Biography
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Captain, I.J.N.
FUCHIDA served 25 years in the regular Navy. An aviator with 3000 hours in the air, FUCHIDA aboard Akagi, was in command of the air groups of CarDiv 1 from August 1941 until July 1942. Wounded during the Battle of MIDWAY, he was hospitalized for approximately one year, then in June 1943 senior staff officer, 1st Air Fleet at KANOYA, and, subsequently, when 1st Air Fleet moved to the MARIANAS, at TINIAN. In April 1944, FUCHIDA transferred to OYODO as Staff Officer (Air Operations) of Combined Fleet. When Fleet Headquarters moved ashore to HIYOSHI in September 1944 he continued as Staff Officer (Air Operations) until the end of the war. FUCHIDA answered questions frankly and carefully. He was considered one of the most lucrative sources of information and a reliable witness.
Commanding Officer, Air Group CarDiv I August 1941-July 1942
Hospitalized August 1942-May 1943
Senior Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet June 1943-March 1944
Staff Officer (Air Operations), Combined Fleet April 1944-August 1945
Interrogation
INTERROGATION NAV NO. 6
USSBS NO. 40
THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
THE KAMIKAZE CORPS IN PHILIPPINES AND OKINAWA
TOKYO
18 October 1945
Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN, a naval aviator since 1928. As air group commander of the AKAGI he led the attacks on PEARL HARBOR, DARWIN and CEYLON. In April 1944 he became Air Staff Officer to CinC Combined Fleet and held that post for the duration of the war.
Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. R. P. Aiken, USNR.
Allied Officers Present: Col. Philip Cole, AUS; Captain W. Pardae, AUS; Lt. Robert Garred, USNR.
Summary:
Captain FUCHIDA discussed the attack on PEARL HARBOR, and the organization of the Kamikaze Corps during the PHILIPPINE Campaign. He also furnished information relating to suicide attacks during the OKINAWA Campaign, and Japanese Naval and Army Air Forces plans to resist an invasion of JAPAN proper.
Transcript:
Philippine Kamikaze Operations
Q. Were the CV Air Groups, that left the EMPIRE in October, 1944 being sent to the PHILIPPINES for Kamikaze action?
A. No. Part of the 601 Air Group was embarked in October 1944. From the remainder of the Air Group pilot personnel, 30 VF pilots were selected in November 1944 for Kamikaze operations and were sent to LUZON, to join the 201 Air Group.
Q. Were any of the 601 Air Group, embarked on carriers in October 1944, being sent to the PHILIPPINES defense as Kamikaze pilots?
A. No.
Q. How were the 30 fighter pilots selected for Kamikaze operations?
A. They were all volunteers.
Q. How did they rank in flying experience with the other pilots in the Air Group?
A. They were the best.
Q. Regarding Japanese plans for the defense of the homeland against Allied landings, how were Kamikaze aircraft to be employed?
A. According to plans, all Kamikaze planes were to be expended when Allied forced attempted landings on KYUSHU.
Q. Were any kamikaze planes to be held back for the defense of the KANTO PLAIN area?
A. On paper, all aircraft (both Army and navy combat and trainer types) were to be used to resist Allied operations against KYUSHU. Actually, I believe that some Army Air Units would have been held back to repel an invasion of the KANTO PLAIN.
Q. At OKINAWA, what was the ratio of ships hit to aircraft expended in kamikaze attacks?
A. I think about 1/6 of the total aircraft used hit their target.
Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were expended during the OKINAWA operations?
A. About 900 in all.
500 Navy Aircraft from JAPAN
300 Army Aircraft from JAPAN
50 Navy Aircraft from FORMOSA
50 Army Aircraft from FORMOSA
These figures are approximations.
Q. Of the 900 that were expended in the OKINAWA Area, how many hit their target?
A. Although it was widely publicized that 400 had been successful, I think that 200 would be more accurate figure.
Q. What percentage of hits did the JNAF expect in the KETSU Operation?
A. We expected about the same percentage as during the OKINAWA operation.
Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were to be used during KETSU Operations by JNAF?
A. 2500, of which 500 were combat aircraft and 2000 were trainers. We had about 2500 remaining combat aircraft which would be used during KETSU Operations for search, night torpedo, and air cover.
Q. What were the plans for the use of Kamikaze aircraft during KETSU Operations?
A. 500 suicide planes were to be expended during the initial Allied landing attempt. This force would be supplemented by other kamikaze units brought in from SHIKOKU, SW HONSHU, Central HONSHU, TOKYO Area, and HOKKAIDO.
Q. How were JNAF Kamikaze aircraft deployed throughout the Empire?
A.
500 in KYUSHU
500 in SW HONSHU
500 in TOKYO Area
300 in HOKKAIDO
200 in SHIKOKU.
Q. What was the size and deployment of the JAAF Kamikaze Force?
A. Approximately the same as the JNAF. 2500 aircraft deployed similarly.
found this years ago and was able dig it up again...
Interrogation Nav 6, Captain Mitsuo Fuchida
18 Oct 1945
Biography
FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, Captain, I.J.N.
FUCHIDA served 25 years in the regular Navy. An aviator with 3000 hours in the air, FUCHIDA aboard Akagi, was in command of the air groups of CarDiv 1 from August 1941 until July 1942. Wounded during the Battle of MIDWAY, he was hospitalized for approximately one year, then in June 1943 senior staff officer, 1st Air Fleet at KANOYA, and, subsequently, when 1st Air Fleet moved to the MARIANAS, at TINIAN. In April 1944, FUCHIDA transferred to OYODO as Staff Officer (Air Operations) of Combined Fleet. When Fleet Headquarters moved ashore to HIYOSHI in September 1944 he continued as Staff Officer (Air Operations) until the end of the war. FUCHIDA answered questions frankly and carefully. He was considered one of the most lucrative sources of information and a reliable witness.
Commanding Officer, Air Group CarDiv I August 1941-July 1942
Hospitalized August 1942-May 1943
Senior Staff Officer, 1st Air Fleet June 1943-March 1944
Staff Officer (Air Operations), Combined Fleet April 1944-August 1945
Interrogation
INTERROGATION NAV NO. 6
USSBS NO. 40
THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR
THE KAMIKAZE CORPS IN PHILIPPINES AND OKINAWA
TOKYO
18 October 1945
Interrogation of: Captain FUCHIDA, Mitsuo, IJN, a naval aviator since 1928. As air group commander of the AKAGI he led the attacks on PEARL HARBOR, DARWIN and CEYLON. In April 1944 he became Air Staff Officer to CinC Combined Fleet and held that post for the duration of the war.
Interrogated by: Lt. Comdr. R. P. Aiken, USNR.
Allied Officers Present: Col. Philip Cole, AUS; Captain W. Pardae, AUS; Lt. Robert Garred, USNR.
Summary:
Captain FUCHIDA discussed the attack on PEARL HARBOR, and the organization of the Kamikaze Corps during the PHILIPPINE Campaign. He also furnished information relating to suicide attacks during the OKINAWA Campaign, and Japanese Naval and Army Air Forces plans to resist an invasion of JAPAN proper.
Transcript:
Philippine Kamikaze Operations
Q. Were the CV Air Groups, that left the EMPIRE in October, 1944 being sent to the PHILIPPINES for Kamikaze action?
A. No. Part of the 601 Air Group was embarked in October 1944. From the remainder of the Air Group pilot personnel, 30 VF pilots were selected in November 1944 for Kamikaze operations and were sent to LUZON, to join the 201 Air Group.
Q. Were any of the 601 Air Group, embarked on carriers in October 1944, being sent to the PHILIPPINES defense as Kamikaze pilots?
A. No.
Q. How were the 30 fighter pilots selected for Kamikaze operations?
A. They were all volunteers.
Q. How did they rank in flying experience with the other pilots in the Air Group?
A. They were the best.
Q. Regarding Japanese plans for the defense of the homeland against Allied landings, how were Kamikaze aircraft to be employed?
A. According to plans, all Kamikaze planes were to be expended when Allied forced attempted landings on KYUSHU.
Q. Were any kamikaze planes to be held back for the defense of the KANTO PLAIN area?
A. On paper, all aircraft (both Army and navy combat and trainer types) were to be used to resist Allied operations against KYUSHU. Actually, I believe that some Army Air Units would have been held back to repel an invasion of the KANTO PLAIN.
Q. At OKINAWA, what was the ratio of ships hit to aircraft expended in kamikaze attacks?
A. I think about 1/6 of the total aircraft used hit their target.
Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were expended during the OKINAWA operations?
A. About 900 in all.
500 Navy Aircraft from JAPAN
300 Army Aircraft from JAPAN
50 Navy Aircraft from FORMOSA
50 Army Aircraft from FORMOSA
These figures are approximations.
Q. Of the 900 that were expended in the OKINAWA Area, how many hit their target?
A. Although it was widely publicized that 400 had been successful, I think that 200 would be more accurate figure.
Q. What percentage of hits did the JNAF expect in the KETSU Operation?
A. We expected about the same percentage as during the OKINAWA operation.
Q. How many Kamikaze aircraft were to be used during KETSU Operations by JNAF?
A. 2500, of which 500 were combat aircraft and 2000 were trainers. We had about 2500 remaining combat aircraft which would be used during KETSU Operations for search, night torpedo, and air cover.
Q. What were the plans for the use of Kamikaze aircraft during KETSU Operations?
A. 500 suicide planes were to be expended during the initial Allied landing attempt. This force would be supplemented by other kamikaze units brought in from SHIKOKU, SW HONSHU, Central HONSHU, TOKYO Area, and HOKKAIDO.
Q. How were JNAF Kamikaze aircraft deployed throughout the Empire?
A.
500 in KYUSHU
500 in SW HONSHU
500 in TOKYO Area
300 in HOKKAIDO
200 in SHIKOKU.
Q. What was the size and deployment of the JAAF Kamikaze Force?
A. Approximately the same as the JNAF. 2500 aircraft deployed similarly.
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bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
i made no claims otherwise....just posted what i found.
That doesn't surprise me. You'd know better than most here I'm sure that 15 hours is hardly "aircraft familiarity." As an aside, I had the honor of sitting in on some of my Dad's flight club meetings in his "golden years." These were former War pilots from all over, but primarily Navy. They'd say about the younger Kamikaze pilots who came in at the War's desperate end, those novices should have known something was up when all they were taught to do was take off. It was somewhat of a joke, of course, but it underscores what you said on their hours logged on those aircraft.
Was that 15 hours total flight time? Or 15 hours in fighters?
Some articles seem to confuse the two terms, and sometimes i'm not sure what they mean.
If it's 15 hours total flight time, then flying a high performance fighter at that level of experience is pretty close to a suicide mission just by itself.
Some articles seem to confuse the two terms, and sometimes i'm not sure what they mean.
If it's 15 hours total flight time, then flying a high performance fighter at that level of experience is pretty close to a suicide mission just by itself.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
15 hours total. I would guess 10 hours in primary and then a solo is done, and remainder in fighters.
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
By comparison, for a private ticket here in the states, I can't remember whether there is a regulatory minimum time to be logged before a student does his/her solo. IIRCM, in practice, I've heard about 7 or 9 hours as a minimum and 10 or 12 is about average. In ordinary training, the first hours are typically heavily devoted to pattern work and flying straight and level and basic aircraft handling in a variety of situations, stalls, slow flight etc. So, although some of this wouldn't be necessary, I am still quite astonished that 15 hours was possible. Over-land pilotage isn't that easy and over-water nav is a considerable level above that. Evidently there was a pathfinder aircraft? Did I miss that earlier in the thread?
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My understanding (and, I'd welcome backup on this, or refutation, as the case may be) is that towards the end it wasn't unlike what we saw out of Germany in their troops. That is to say, some of those Kamikaze pilots were barely into their teens, Japan was that desperate for them. I'm talking, 15, 16, 17 years old.
Getting back to the hours behind the stick at that late stage in the campaign, I can contrast the U.S. Navy pilots. Before they even stepped into the SNJ, they had 100 hours under their belts in the N2S, the bulk of that, solo. The "crash course" (no pun intended) nature of the Kamikaze pilot training at that stage has to be factored into the fate of those missions at that stage. I've heard over and over of ailerons or what have you blowing off those planes or those pilots just plum missing their targets. I can't back that up, so, think what you will. Certainly, though, as the campaign progressed, the skill-level of those pilots receded. I think we can at least say that.
Getting back to the hours behind the stick at that late stage in the campaign, I can contrast the U.S. Navy pilots. Before they even stepped into the SNJ, they had 100 hours under their belts in the N2S, the bulk of that, solo. The "crash course" (no pun intended) nature of the Kamikaze pilot training at that stage has to be factored into the fate of those missions at that stage. I've heard over and over of ailerons or what have you blowing off those planes or those pilots just plum missing their targets. I can't back that up, so, think what you will. Certainly, though, as the campaign progressed, the skill-level of those pilots receded. I think we can at least say that.
CobberKane
Banned
- 706
- Apr 4, 2012
What, so the major limiting factor on the kamikaze's speed was the structural strength of the aircraft? I dont think so. Again, to quote the kamikaze training manual: 'Beware of over-speeding and a too-steep angle of dive that will make the controls harder to respond to your touch'.
That seems pretty clear to me; go in to fast and and steep and your controls will lose responsivness, as so many tests on zeros concluded, and you risk missing the target. Nothing there about the aicraft falling to bits - that would come later. Long before the pilot of a light aircraft with low wing loading had to worry about the wings comming off, he would be compelled to limit his speed in order to retain enough control to ensure he hit the target. The limiting factor for airspeed would not have been the integrity of the aircraft but the degree of control retained by the pilot, as inferred in the manual.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Do know what Vne is? If you exceed Vne you can and will start bending the aircraft and eventually it will come apart!!! The Zero, like many other aircraft can have it's Vne speed exceeded in a terminal dive. As stated, the Zero's AILERONS become stiff and unresponsive at high speed but one can still control flight with elevator trim and rudder. Again if the aircraft is allowed to come apart BEFORE reaching the target, the whole mission is a failure - that simple!
It seems the injunction to pilots not to over-speed was to enable them to retain the ability to move the control surfaces. Everyone agrees that the ailerons in particular became very heavy at high speeds.
How well a pilot with minimal hours experience and zero experience in a high speed dive could control an aircraft using elevator trim and rudder after the usual controls were locked up is debateable.
A more experienced pilot would be more likely to ignore the advice anyway,like those Bomber Command crews arriving home well ahead of schedule having flown straight home at low level completely ignoring official routing. He'd also be more likely to actually hit his target.
Which comes first,inability to control the aircraft or Vne at which point there is a risk of the aircraft coming apart (definitely uncontrollable then)?
I suspect the inability to effectively control the aircraft and hit a target comes long before Vne for the Japanese types.
I say "suspect" as my knowledge of Japanese aircraft is pretty minimal
Cheers
Steve
How well a pilot with minimal hours experience and zero experience in a high speed dive could control an aircraft using elevator trim and rudder after the usual controls were locked up is debateable.
A more experienced pilot would be more likely to ignore the advice anyway,like those Bomber Command crews arriving home well ahead of schedule having flown straight home at low level completely ignoring official routing. He'd also be more likely to actually hit his target.
Which comes first,inability to control the aircraft or Vne at which point there is a risk of the aircraft coming apart (definitely uncontrollable then)?
I suspect the inability to effectively control the aircraft and hit a target comes long before Vne for the Japanese types.
I say "suspect" as my knowledge of Japanese aircraft is pretty minimal
Cheers
Steve
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
It seems the injunction to pilots not to over-speed was to enable them to retain the ability to move the control surfaces. Everyone agrees that the ailerons in particular became very heavy at high speeds.
How well a pilot with minimal hours experience and zero experience in a high speed dive could control an aircraft using elevator trim and rudder after the usual controls were locked up is debateable.
A more experienced pilot would be more likely to ignore the advice anyway,like those Bomber Command crews arriving home well ahead of schedule having flown straight home at low level completely ignoring official routing. He'd also be more likely to actually hit his target.
Which comes first,inability to control the aircraft or Vne at which point there is a risk of the aircraft coming apart (definitely uncontrollable then)?
I suspect the inability to effectively control the aircraft and hit a target comes long before Vne for the Japanese types.
I say "suspect" as my knowledge of Japanese aircraft is pretty minimal
Cheers
Steve
Don't be too illusioned about controls "locking up," a low time pilot can be taught to stay out of Vne and maintain control of his aircraft, this is not that hard and can easily be demonstrated during initial training.
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FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
An aggressive flight training syllabus with the right student can have one soloing in about 7 hours. If you blow off the normal pattern work and concentrate on take offs and landings, the transition to a higher performing aircraft is very doable, especially if the initial training is done in a higher performing training aircraft to begin with.
