Banzai!: General discussion of the Kamikaze and Ramming

[VBF-13]

And don't forget this - I bet there "would have" been a manual for ramming.

"The plan was simple: fly above enemy aircraft, then enter a high-speed dive and collide with an enemy's wing or vertical stabilizer. The XP-79B was designed to survive because of the heavily reinforced leading edges on the wings."

Hey, where's the front-half of that plane?

Reinforced-wings to ram with. They took that job seriously, didn't they?

 

[The Basket]

On 15 September 1940, Flight Sergeant Ray Holmes of No. 504 Squadron RAF used his Hawker Hurricane to destroy a Dornier Do 17 bomber over London by ramming. So its the value of a Hurricane and the pilot v the value of a Do 17 and its crew. Ramming was never a sanctioned practice and a Hurricane and a well trained pilot can be quite a cost.

Although would I happily serve for a military who would happily think my life is totally expendable? Hardly good for morale.

I wonder if once a Japanese Kamikaze has volunteered can he unvolunteer? If he is injured and unable to fight, does he have to commit suicide?

An aircraft is a very expensive machine and throwing them away is not very cost effective,

 

[stona]

Holmes did not initially claim to have intentionally rammed the bomber. He said after landing in Hugh Street,Chelsea that he "hit something during the attack".
It was only somewhat later that he said "His aeroplane looked so flimsy, I didn't think of it as solid and substantial. I just went on and hit it for six. I thought my aircraft would cut right through it, not allowing for the fact that his 'plane was as strong as mine!"
The Dornier had already been attacked by Hurricanes of 310 (Czech) Squadron and two of its crew had already bailed out so he was hardly the saviour of Buckingham Palace either. The BoB movie has something to answer for in this case.
None of this detracts from Holmes' heroism. He went on to serve in various theatres,including Russia,with considerable distinction.
Cheers
Steve

 

[tyrodtom]

How many big ships ( cruisers, battleships, aircraft carriers) were sunk by one bomb, or torpedo?
If you lose 10-20 aircraft and pilots to sink a carrier, you're way ahead. Aircraft may be expensive, but just a trifle in comparision to what a carrier cost, and the destruction it can inflict if it remains in service. Plus if the sinking of that carrier is swift, some of the crew and aircraft may go down with it.
If you're serving in any military during wartime, the mission comes first. You are expendable.

 

[VBF-13]

I wonder if once a Japanese Kamikaze has volunteered can he unvolunteer? If he is injured and unable to fight, does he have to commit suicide?

It's my understanding that some of those pilots shot themselves in the toe so they could no longer operate the rudder pedals and got out of duty that way. Just kidding!

An aircraft is a very expensive machine and throwing them away is not very cost effective

They weren't exactly throwing them away, given what was at stake.

 

[The Basket]

If you're serving in any military during wartime, the mission comes first. You are expendable.

One could say did the Kamikaze do more damage than conventional attacks would have done? Did they do what they were supposed to do and stop American invasion? I think there is a HUGE difference saying you may die in battle and saying you will 100% die in battle. And you will keep on trying until you are killed.

It may be a western thing but suicide missions are not our bag.

 

[VBF-13]

Basket, they were desperate, and they were brain-stuffed. What more does one need to know?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

I wonder if once a Japanese Kamikaze has volunteered can he unvolunteer? If he is injured and unable to fight, does he have to commit suicide?

An aircraft is a very expensive machine and throwing them away is not very cost effective,

Research more about Kamikaze - what drove this mission and who "volunteered." You may find some information on links posted on this thread....

 

[tyrodtom]

At that stage of the war any mission a inexperienced pilot would go on was likely gonna be one way. It takes experienced pilots in state of the art aircraft to have a any chance of a successful mission against a aircraft carrier group, with all the air support, and anti aircraft in the support ships surrounding it.
Japan was short of experinced pilots, short of fuel and time to train them, and short of aircraft suitable for a conventional attack.

The hope was that the Kamikaze would inflict so many causalties that the US would halt our advance on the home islands, it didn't, but maybe instead helped firm up the decision to use the A-bomb.

 

[stona]

The hope was that the Kamikaze would inflict so many causalties that the US would halt our advance on the home islands, it didn't, but maybe instead helped firm up the decision to use the A-bomb.

The decision to use a nuclear weapon was taken earlier than many appreciate.

From "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" by Louis Morton.

"On the military side, realization that a bomb would probably be ready for testing in the summer of 1945 led to concrete planning for the use of the new weapon, on the assumption that the bomb when completed would work. By the end of 1944 a list of possible targets in Japan had been selected, and a B-29 squadron was trained for the specific job of delivering the bomb. It was also necessary to inform certain commanders in the Pacific about the project, and on 30 December 1944 Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, head of the Manhattan District, recommended that this be done."

Even some,presumably senior,Commanders in the Pacific Theatre knew of the intention to use a nuclear device months before the wholesale use of Kamikazes at Okinawa (April-June 1945).

There were also geo-political considerations,particularly Soviet involvment in the Far East.

"Though responsibility for the decision to use the atomic bomb was the President's, he exercised it only after careful study of the recommendations of his senior advisers. Chief among these was the Secretary of War, under whose broad supervision the Manhattan Project had been placed. Already deeply concerned over the cost of the projected invasion, the political effects of Soviet intervention, and the potential consequences of the use of the atomic bomb, Stimson sought a course that would avoid all these evils. The difficulty, as he saw it, lay in the requirement for unconditional surrender. It was a phrase that might make the Japanese desperate and lead to a long and unnecessary campaign of attrition that would be extremely costly to both sides. But there was no way of getting around the term; it was firmly rooted in Allied war aims and its renunciation was certain to lead to charges of appeasement."

On July 4 the British had given their consent to the use of the bomb against Japan. Churchill certainly saw it as a deterrent to Soviet expansion in Europe and later wrote that there was now a possibility "fair and bright indeed it seemed,of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks."



Cheers

Steve

 

[VBF-13]

One thing that wasn't mentioned thus far was the reason for the Kamikazes. What was Japan hoping to gain by those ultimate sacrifices at that late stage in the War? In one word, it was "negotiations." They knew at that stage, they were finished. Their fleet was for the most part finished after the Philippines and Leyte, before we even went into Okinawa. Four months after those two campaigns, we caught and pounded the remainder of their heavy ships falling back on their heels to defend the Japanese homeland. The Japanese weren't thinking they were going to turn the tide of the War in those Kamikazes. They were rather deployed as a bargaining chip in the hopes of securing a negotiated end to the War. That's the only way that operation makes sense to me. What do you all think?

 

[stona]

From the Japanese point of view,maybe. On the Allied side,in the US,the so called "Interim Committee" reported to the President on 1 June 1945. It recommended unanimously that:

1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.

2. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other buildings.

3. It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon. (One member, Ralph A. Bard, later dissented from this portion of the committee's recommendation.)

It was going to be hard for Japan to dodge the bomb after this.

Stimpson wrote.

"The conclusions of the Committee were similar to my own, although I reached mine independently. I felt that to extract a genuine surrender from the Emperor and his military advisers, they must be administered a tremendous shock which would carry convincing proof of our power to destroy the empire. Such an effective shock would save many times the number of lives, both American and Japanese, than it would cost."

We must remember that the unconditional surrender of Japan was the announced objective of the war and the first requirement of all strategic planning.

There was already a non-atomic plan that was approved on June 18th 1945

1. Air bombardment and blockade of Japan from bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, the Marianas, and the Philippines.

2. Assault of Kyushu on 1 November 1945, and intensification of blockade and air bombardment.

3. Invasion of the industrial heart of Japan through the Tokyo Plain in central Honshu, tentative target date 1 March 1946.

At the same meeting there was discussion of the possibility of ending the war by political means. The President displayed a deep interest in the subject and both Stimson and McCloy emphasized the importance of the "large submerged class in Japan who do not favor the present war and whose full opinion and influence had never yet been felt." There was also discussion of the atomic bomb, since everyone present knew about the bomb and the recommendations of the Interim Committee. The suggestion was made that before the bomb was dropped, the Japanese should be warned that the United States had such a weapon. "Not one of the Chiefs nor the Secretary," recalled Mr. McCloy, "thought well of a bomb warning, an effective argument being that no one could be certain, in spite of the assurances of the scientists, that the 'thing would go off."

The Japanese might have hoped for some kind of negotiated settlement.The Suzuki Cabinet that came into power in April 1945 had an unspoken mandate from the Emperor to end the war as quickly as possible. But it was faced immediately with an additional problem when the Soviet Government announced it would not renew the neutrality pact after April 1946. The German surrender in May produced another crisis in the Japanese Government and led, after considerable discussion, to a decision to seek Soviet mediation. But the first approach, made on June 3 to Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador, produced no results. Malik was noncommittal and merely said the problem needed further study.
The Japanese government had accepted the inevitability of defeat and was seeking desperately for a way out but it was not willing even at this late date to surrender unconditionally, and would accept no terms that did not include the preservation of the Imperial system.
Many in the US wanted to make terms available to Japan,not for entirely selfless reasons either. One memorandum promotes the advantages to US interests of ending the war sooner.

"....before too many of our allies are committed there and have made substantial contributions toward the defeat of Japan."

In the view of the War Department these aims justified

"any concessions which might be attractive to the Japanese, so long as our realistic aims for peace in the Pacific are not adversely affected."

This was politically unnaceptable to the administration and obviously the US allies,particularly Britain,had they ever heard of it. It probably refers more to the imminent entry of the Soviet Union into the fray.
The military men had,earlier in the war considered Soviet intervention vital to any invasion,something that was becoming less palatable politically and militarily by 1945.

Meaningful terms would not be offered and the bomb would drop. Two bombs and hundreds of thousands of deaths later Japan did keep the Imperial system,at least in name.

Steve

 

[VBF-13]

I know. The Kamikazes didn't achieve a negotiated end of the War but that was Japan's objective in deploying them at a time when it knew the War was lost. That's what I was getting at.

 

[stona]

I'm not sure that their was any long term objective in Kamikaze attacks or any other Japanese military efforts after,say,late 1944 except to carry on fighting and inflict as much damage on her enemies as possible. Japan's capacity to wage war had been severely and terminally reduced. Kamikaze attacks and various other types of suicide missions were one of the few ways that Japan could continue to resist.
In 1945 japan was attempting to seek some form of conditional surrender and still had to be in the game to do that. To that extent I agree with you.
Cheers
Steve

 

[The Basket]

Research more about Kamikaze - what drove this mission and who "volunteered." You may find some information on links posted on this thread....

You don't mind if I cut and paste this as I intend to use it on every thread.

If one is being picky one could say the Japanese did conditional surrender as they were able to keep their Emperor.

Other countries were equally as desperate as the Japanese but suicide squads are unheard of within UK fighting forces. Although one can easily pick missions where survival was zero to non existant but it was never 'suicide'.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

You don't mind if I cut and paste this as I intend to use it on every thread.

Not at all if it turns your crank!

If one is being picky one could say the Japanese did conditional surrender as they were able to keep their Emperor.
Other countries were equally as desperate as the Japanese but suicide squads are unheard of within UK fighting forces. Although one can easily pick missions where survival was zero to non existant but it was never 'suicide'.

One way to look at it but....

"Just a month later the semi-divine Emperor, in striped trousers and a
morning coat, reluctantly handed his top hat to an aide and entered
General Douglas MacArthur's reception room at the refurbished
American Embassy to begin what amounted to his re-incarnation.
Accepting responsibility for the war, he offered to abdicate or do
whatever else was necessary. But MacArthur wanted him to stay. In
the first of 11 meetings between the Emperor and the new American
Shogun, the two men worked out an odd but intense collaboration.
The U.S. general flatly resisted colleagues who felt that Hirohito
should be tried as a war criminal. Above all he wanted a peaceful
occupation. The Emperor who finally stopped his generals from
continuing a last-ditch war was surely the man who could keep his
subjects peaceful. The Emperor agreed."

Emperor Hirohito

The Japenese were in no position to make demands based on this and other similar accounts; had MacArthur wanted the Emperor removed, he would have been hung along side his generals.

 

[stona]

Exactly. The Emperor was maintained but the Imperial system was dismantled. What was left was entirely at the victors' discretion and on the victors' terms. This is not the same as some form of negotiated settlement.
It was a small concession,agreed by all the Allies,to facilitate the end of hostilities.
Steve

 

[The Basket]

So if the Germans wanted Hitler then can that concession be made?

I can understand that Realpolotik was at work but the Emperor was part of any negotiated settlement. Nothing wrong with making it easier but the fact the Emperor was still there was certainly a sore point.

The Japanese were utterly defeated. Anything they got out of negotiation was a concession.

 

[stona]

So if the Germans wanted Hitler then can that concession be made?

The Emperor was reduced to a titular Head of State for the convenience of the occupiers and this was not what the Japanese had envisaged at all. As "Flyboyj" said,if the allies had wanted him gone they could easily have tried and hanged him and there's not a thing the Japanese could have done to prevent it. Keeping the Emperor was part of US plans for the future administration of Japan so it was an easy "concession" to make.
The Germans didn't want Hitler,they'd tried to assassinate him on several occasions and his position militarily,politically and constitutionally makes comparisons with Hirohito impossible anyway. Hitler was not part of the Allies' plans for the future of Germany.
Cheers
Steve

 

[FLYBOYJ]

So if the Germans wanted Hitler then can that concession be made?

That probably would have been up to Ike and Zhukov if Germany was in a similar postion Japan was in but I think its obvious what their choice would have been. The Japanese Emperor was just a figure head when you got down to it, Hitler was calling the shots and making policy.