Banzai!: General discussion of the Kamikaze and Ramming

[VBF-13]

I'm not sure that their was any long term objective in Kamikaze attacks or any other Japanese military efforts after,say,late 1944 except to carry on fighting and inflict as much damage on her enemies as possible.

No, I'm sorry, I disagree. They were pursuing an overall objective, and a very distinct one, IMHO. It just wasn't the type that was aimed at a victory but at getting them a say in the terms of the defeat. That's the whole reason they kept on fighting even though they knew they were licked. Again, they fell short of achieving that objective, that's no news. Once they experienced those A-bombs, that drove home the futility of the pursuit of the objective. That's why they immediately gave it up. They didn't have to do that, they could have kept on fighting. They gave it up because those bombs told them they were going nowhere with the objective, we weren't going to be compelled to deal, not on any issue.

What happened, after, and what concessions they extracted, those were the result of politics, they weren't in the Instrument of Surrender. FWIW, we agree, it was a totally unconditional surrender.

 

[tyrodtom]

We'll never know if they would have gave up or not even after both A-bombs were dropped. The Emperor made that decision for them.
There were a strong faction that though Emperor Hirohito was under the influence of bad advisors, tried to steal the recording of Hirohito's surrender anouncement, and had plans to kidnap the Emperor in the hope of convincing him to fight on, but their plot failed.

You're talking about a military, that as they saw it, had never lost a war in Japan's entire long history. Most would rather die that live with the shame of defeat.
Endure the unendurable might be just words to us, but they had a deeper meaning to the Japanese.

 

[VBF-13]

We'll never know if they would have gave up or not even after both A-bombs were dropped. The Emperor made that decision for them.
There were a strong faction that though Emperor Hirohito was under the influence of bad advisors, tried to steal the recording of Hirohito's surrender anouncement, and had plans to kidnap the Emperor in the hope of convincing him to fight on, but their plot failed.

You're talking about a military, that as they saw it, had never lost a war in Japan's entire long history. Most would rather die that live with the shame of defeat.
Endure the unendurable might be just words to us, but they had a deeper meaning to the Japanese.

Well, conceded, Hirohito, or somebody on his behalf, was necessary to made the decision "official." And, while we're at it, let's also concede there was that faction of extremists who wanted to undermine that official decision and hold out to the death. And let's finally concede that culture, right down to the last citizen in the street, had much of those same, extremist, die-hard leanings bred into them since birth. Let's stop and look at what was happening. In as early as March of that year we were bombing military targets in the Japanese homeland to throw them off that we were getting ready to take Okinawa. Throughout the Okinawa campaign and even more so towards the end of it we were escalating those bombing missions in the homeland. In July we were pounding the daylights out of many more of those homeland cities. Before the A-bombs and even before the Soviets got involved, millions of Japanese citizens had enough and wanted to throw in the towel. They had it with that War. That's why their government was trying real hard at that time to "sue for peace." But that wasn't in our plans, because we were holding all the cards. And, that's why we dropped those A-bombs.

Now, a bunch of extremist crackpots undermining the decision of the Japanese Emperor, OK. But they're going to undermine the will of the Japanese citizens, too? And, even so, for how long are they going to do that? Do you see? They were done after those A-bombs. The citizens were done. And, that's all that counted. As I see it.

 

[GrauGeist]

As a little known fact, Bulgarian pilots were known to intentionally ram Allied bombers, the first recorded incedent occurred on 20 December 1943 over Sofia. A flight of U.S. B-24s escorted by P-38s were intercepted by Bulgarian Bf109G-2/4 and D-520 aircraft and during the particularly savage fight, Lt. Dimitar Spisarevsky rammed a B-24, taking it down but costing him his life in doing so. They referred to him as a "human torpedo".

Another account, was on "Black Easter", 17 April 1944 during an Allied raid consisting of U.S. B-24 bombers escorted by P-51B fighters (the Bulgarians at first mistook these P-51Bs as Messerschmitts), Lt. Nedelcho Bonchev rammed a B-24 with his aircraft, and was able to successfully bail out and parachute to safety.

 

[stona]

According to US intelligence reports (G-2), the Japanese leaders were fully aware of their desperate situation but would continue to fight in the hope of avoiding complete defeat by securing a better bargaining position. Allied war-weariness and disunity,or some miracle, they hoped,would offer them a way out. "The Japanese believe,"declared an intelligence estimate of 30 June 1945 "that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction,and there are as yet no indications that they are ready to accept such terms."
It appeared also to the intelligence experts that Japan might surrender at any time "depending upon the conditions of surrender" the Allies might offer. Clearly these conditions,to have any chance of acceptance,would have to include retention of the imperial system.

(From G-2 Memorandum prepared for OPD and quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post and Karl T. Compton in an article entitled "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Dropped," Atlantic Monthly (December, 1946))

It is also worth remembering that an invasion of the Japanese Islands was not favoured by all US Commanders. Admirals Leahy and King were strongly opposed to the plan. Trumann eventually supported a compromise based on the invasion plans as proposed by Marshall and MacArthur. The invasion of Kyushu would go ahead on 1 November 1945 and preparations for the Honshu assault would continue, but no final decision would be made until preparations had reached the point "beyond which there would not be opportunity for a free choice." (McCloy, "Challenge to American Foreign Policy")

That's why the Japanese carried on fighting.

Cheers

Steve

 

[VBF-13]

According to US intelligence reports (G-2), the Japanese leaders were fully aware of their desperate situation but would continue to fight in the hope of avoiding complete defeat by securing a better bargaining position. Allied war-weariness and disunity,or some miracle, they hoped,would offer them a way out. "The Japanese believe,"declared an intelligence estimate of 30 June 1945 "that unconditional surrender would be the equivalent of national extinction,and there are as yet no indications that they are ready to accept such terms."
It appeared also to the intelligence experts that Japan might surrender at any time "depending upon the conditions of surrender" the Allies might offer. Clearly these conditions,to have any chance of acceptance,would have to include retention of the imperial system.

(From G-2 Memorandum prepared for OPD and quoted in Cline, Washington Command Post and Karl T. Compton in an article entitled "If the Atomic Bomb Had Not Been Dropped," Atlantic Monthly (December, 1946))

It is also worth remembering that an invasion of the Japanese Islands was not favoured by all US Commanders. Admirals Leahy and King were strongly opposed to the plan. Trumann eventually supported a compromise based on the invasion plans as proposed by Marshall and MacArthur. The invasion of Kyushu would go ahead on 1 November 1945 and preparations for the Honshu assault would continue, but no final decision would be made until preparations had reached the point "beyond which there would not be opportunity for a free choice." (McCloy, "Challenge to American Foreign Policy")

That's why the Japanese carried on fighting.

Cheers

Steve

That's what I've been saying from the outset, but, citations omitted. Your citations will do just fine, though.

As a footnote, the transition in the aftermath let them preserve much of their system, customs, and so forth. But, that was on our terms, not theirs. That's what that unconditional surrender was. It was to our advantage in the aftermath that Japan not be turned completely upside-down (and, actually, from a broader political standpoint, that it be cultivated as an ally, going into the future). It was to their advantage, too, sure, that much of their system, customs, and so forth, be preserved. However, the point is, their advantage was relevant only to the degree it was consistent with ours.

 

[stona]

It was to their advantage, too, sure, that much of their system, customs, and so forth, be preserved. However, the point is, their advantage was relevant only to the degree it was consistent with ours.

Indeed,I absolutely agree with that. In fact I think we are in broad agreement on the whole "surrender" conundrum. Maybe just two different ways of arriving at the same result

Cheers

Steve

 

[VBF-13]

Yup, Steve, we were on the same track the whole way in!

 

[steve51]

GrauGeist,
Thank you for those details about those Bulgarian pilots. I've read elsewhere that Bontchev was credited with a total of 2 kills. I'd love to find an English language book about the Bulgarian AF. All I know is what I've read in " In The Skies Of Europe " by Hans Neulen.

 

[steve51]

GrauGeist,
I just pulled the book I mentioned off the shelve, and both those ramming incidents you mentioned are in there. I read that book years ago and forgot those details. So, thanks for reminding me.

 

[GrauGeist]

Steve, look for the book titled: "Air Power of the Kingdom of Bulgaria" by Dimitar Nedialkov (2001, ISBN: 954-90587-7-8)
It's part 4 (the time period of 1940 - 1946) in a series covering the history of Bulgarian air power with 60 pages and over 80 photos, some are unique to the book, and it's in both English and Bulgarian.

 

[steve51]

GrauGeist,
Thanks for that title. I'm becoming interested in the history of the East Europe air forces but have not come upon many books that concentrate on them in great detail.