Battle of Germany= Could LW have done better?

Erich said:

I personally think that there was more than 12 B-24's of the 492nd lost due to chatting several times with the bomb group historian of the outfit who also wrote a book on the unit A. Blue. 50 bombers were conseded by both the 8th and the 15th AF in the official losses listing which I need to pull for the resource document heading.

Erich - I have no problem with your thesis, but as I noted to Dan there ain't no lyin in the Macr's. That will tell the tale on ships that did not return. I have done random samples, and while I find errors in MAWD and M8CC the NUMBER of losses if not the Reason is close to the number of MACR's

Where do you find gross errors?

As to 15th I wasn't discussing 15th because they weren't in the Halle/Mersburg/Leipzig fight and they aren't the ones I was referencing in Woods/Butler - there are separate listings altogether for 15th AF related stuff (and 9th re; Luftflotte 3 totals for 7 July)

Some 25-30 bombers were shot down by IV.Sturm/JG 3 alone one reason of the unusual visit by Geschwader Kommodroe Walter Dahl and stab to congratulate the pilots of JG 3 upon their return of their first organized Sturm attack from the rear. we still do not have all the details from the US official losses as some are being mislead as to the true details as there are more than what have been released. Literally the US bomber crews really never had seen anything so organized and massive the 492nd was cut through like hot kniofe to butter while the Fw 190's went straight ahead and tore through the other B-24 pulks ahead of the 492nd doing the same damage until US escorts woke up to what was going on. The Me 410's tried to make an attack but failed having to fight it out with US P-51's, Is official sources state that at least 5 Bombers fell to Me 410 guns..........actually none fell to the twin engines they were cut off and shot to pieces, all bombers were s/e kills, when the Sturms of JG 3 and JG 300 left the 8th they went an attacked the 15th AF bombers which is really another story altogether and little if anything has been written about this portion of the monster air battle

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E- I would be interested regarding another solid reference for 8th AF losses. So far I rely on:

Mighty 8th War Diary, Mighty eighth combat chronology, fighter units and pilots of 8th AF, the Macr database on armyairforces.com for combat losses plus different historical references including my own. Once again all have errors but not 2x errors by any stretch..and my primary LW is Woods and Butler plus all the Prien and Caldwell etc sources plus you and Leo Etgen, etc.

I have found that the 8th AF Mission Summaries also coincide with the M8WD and M8CC pretty closely so I suspect Roger Freeman depended heavily on 8th AF records. Wish he was still around

Regards,

Bill

I'm always looking for 'truth' (whatever the hell that is)..

a couple of brief notes Bill and others Les Butler/tony Woods claims listing and even the losses listing for day/night fighters - many errors, transcribing from copies and even the originals has not been good for years nor real good for those of us wishing to have sensible copies and readable ones at that, this from Tony Woods mouth to me on two separate occassions by email(s).

I cannot remember in the past 10 years whom the contact person is for the lists of MACR's but was told as I was looking for in fact a list of MACR's for the 491st bg complete of the B-24's shot down by the JG 301 unit, was told they were not all there ! ah ok how about...............sorry it is not included.

have found because of this the best source and is it ever tedious, but the best source of all is the historians of the individual US fighter/bomber units and hopeful they will share what they have database wise through complete mission reports..............if they are complete and that is a big what-if covering the individual missions which you know full well Bill.

E ~

Erich said:

a couple of brief notes Bill and others Les Butler/tony Woods claims listing and even the losses listing for day/night fighters - many errors, transcribing from copies and even the originals has not been good for years nor real good for those of us wishing to have sensible copies and readable ones at that, this from Tony Woods mouth to me on two separate occassions by email(s).

I cannot remember in the past 10 years whom the contact person is for the lists of MACR's but was told as I was looking for in fact a list of MACR's for the 491st bg complete of the B-24's shot down by the JG 301 unit, was told they were not all there ! ah ok how about...............sorry it is not included.

have found because of this the best source and is it ever tedious, but the best source of all is the historians of the individual US fighter/bomber units and hopeful they will share what they have database wise through complete mission reports..............if they are complete and that is a big what-if covering the individual missions which you know full well Bill.

E ~

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E ~ don't have a clue relative to individual bomb groups (other than sources I have cited) but Maxwell AFB ought to have them. I 'll contact Rich Mueller and Lynn Gamma and see what they can pull for 7 July.

Thinking it through however implies that all that is available through three separate source coinciding with each other implies (not proof) that the data presented is as complete as is available? Doesn't make it so.

On the other hand I have often found conflicting info from one Squadron History to each other as well as to Group. I have resorted to 'tie breakers' - lol!

Bill we may never really get to the bottom of all the claims and losses it probably means in effect gaps with both some never recorded, a fact for the LW on a definate basis during 1945 when nobody actually cared nor had the time to make out the paper run as the LW was on the move.

I'm going to insert on this day of the anniversary of the terrible battle on 26 Nov. 44 my cousins little article about his grave and old cross that was replaced. geez 63 years ago today hard to believe, JG 301 lost some 40 pilots an air battle with these losses the JG never got over.........

Erich said:

Bill we may never really get to the bottom of all the claims and losses it probably means in effect gaps with both some never recorded, a fact for the LW on a definate basis during 1945 when nobody actually cared nor had the time to make out the paper run as the LW was on the move.

I'm going to insert on this day of the anniversary of the terrible battle on 26 Nov. 44 my cousins little article about his grave and old cross that was replaced. geez 63 years ago today hard to believe, JG 301 lost some 40 pilots an air battle with these losses the JG never got over.........

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RIP for him and all the '17-20 something' guys that never had a family or lived to see their grand kids.

from both sides of the conflict and that was a horror story often repeated as the war drew to a close

Yea, real bad times... Thanks for the article Erich...

Glider said:

Also I believe the US did send out units to try and distrupt the GAF fighters before they struck the bombers. The chances of these escorts actively seeking and finding these smaller German units, efffectively outnumbering those in the combat, while the Germans are trying to form up into the larger units needed to make effective attacks seem high.

This tactic, while employed often by RAF and 8/9th AF with P-47s in 1943 was useful but not highly productive along the Coast, until enough Mustang units were in ops to enable one to range out front deep into Germany where the LW was concentrating.

When the 8th AF planned a single target strike like Berlin on 6 and 8 March or 19 April, a single Fighter wing might be detailed to enter the bomber track some 50 miles out in front in what was called an Area Sweep. These often were productive as the Luftwaffe had developed better prediction capability for a target and were trying to mass up fighters at a particular point, climb to higher altitude and search for weak points in the bomber stream.

There were some spectacular results but even those rarely engaged all of one Group against Gaggles of 50 to 100 local German Fighters in the air.




In these combats the GAF will be on the defensive and as often pointed out, those attacked tend to have an exagerated view of the strength of the attackers. Often its the impression of being outnumbered as opposed to the actuality that counts. Even if you are not outnumbered, if you believe that you are, then you will react one way, normally evade, if you believe that the numbers are even then you will react in a different way.

I don't disagree but feel the primary issue was standing orders existed to 'ignore fighters' - if that is what you had to do your only remaining choice is to try to escape - even with better numerical advantage

In other words by being aggressive the escort would have broken up many of the attacks before they fully formed and basically gained local air superiority in those individual combats.

This is the essence of my argument.

I hope I explained where I was coming from.

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Yep

just in researching todays date 63 years ago, Nov. 27, 44 there is a ton of action with bad losses ............ gag. All in all November 44 was a terrible month for the LW day fighters

Yea Erich, November was really bad... I really think the severe bleeding they took in quality leaders during that month was one of the downfalls of the dayfighter arm...

They just could recover.... Even having 50 former bomber pilots with the Knights Cross couldnt help...

November 29, 1944. Following relief of Escort duties to Hannover, Lt. Col. Marshall led the 355th on a low level sweep for tagets of opportunites. After destroying two trains inbound to a marshalling yard a third train on a hidden parallel track dropped sidings on its flak cars and blasted WR-B 44-14799 "Jane IV".

Lt. Royce Priest, flying Marshall's wing escorted his smoking and shot up Mustang away from the target area and back toward England. When they reached Allied lines over Belgium they talked about making an emergency landing there but pressed on.

Royce Priest was also flying with Marshall on August 18 when a German flak train shot him down North and East of Paris, then landed next to him to pull off the first Piggy Back Rescue.

Marshall lost all hydraulics over the channel and Priest noticed that the smoke drom the aft fuselage was heavier, then finally stopped.

At Steeple Morden, Marshall pulled the canopy back and made a 140kt belley landing with relatively little additional damge. Despite over 200 holes including one 40mm hole (unexploded) through the aft fuel tank and several 20mm hits in fuselage and tail, the aircraft was repaired and brought back to service with the 358FS of the 355th FG.

Marshall kiddingly told Priest that he wasn't gonna let him fly wing anymore - ever again. This was Priest's and Marshall's last mission of their first tour. Royce Priest went home to become an instructor and Bert Marshall came back in late February for his secound tour and I was born in September.

I owe my life to Royce Priest.

well Bill and I could write up quite a story on the 26 November 44 mission and please continue to add Bill, am going to try and think clearly after taking my meds on Monday I hope to add to this thread, right now little girls getting in all the Christmas decorations today and over the weekend......ah grandkids

In brief, my summary of reasons -extratcted from other threads- which might have had the Luftwaffe in a far stronger position to confront the -fundamental- allied aerial threat in the form of the 8th, 9th and 15th Air Forces:

(i) Gradual disbandment of ALL Zerstörergruppen and MOST Kampfgruppen, commencing in late 1943.

This would have represented the following:

- A more efficient allocation of human and material resources for producing MAINLY -if not only- the type of plane that was needed the most at the front lines: Single Engined Fighters. (Late Bf 109s and Fw 190s, Ta 152s, and even more jets).

- A greater number of pilots and airmen become available for either conversion for single engined fighter pilots or screening prior to admittance into fighter plane schools.

- Also efficiency is brought in with regard to the following issues: (a) an easier program for producing and handling spare parts for planes in the Jagdgeschwadern; (b) ground crews; and (c) FUEL.

(ii) By the second half of 1943, no more funding nor any other type of help, assistance, or support from the RLM to any of those numerous German aerial designers who were still trying to develop ships that would never be ready for combat in the near future. During this period of time every pound of raw materials, every single facility, every worker represented valuable items Germany could not afford spending in ventures that would never represent any true and measurable help for confronting the enemy.

Germany´s situation demanded a more cohesive and unified effort of brains, arms and raw material administration, and not that lose scenario, where every rower seemed to row in whatever direction he thought i´d be cool to, with a direct negative impact on the direction of the boat.

Do not pretend you are still the rich guy in the Neighborhood when the family´s finances are on the verge of collapse.

(iii) A different type of strategy to confront the allied aerial menace; with the measures described on (i) implemented, the Luftwaffe becomes stronger in numbers; perhaps more fully equipped Jagdgeschwadern are formed and brought forward to welcome the allied aerial fleets.

Udet said:

In brief, my summary of reasons -extratcted from other threads- which might have had the Luftwaffe in a far stronger position to confront the -fundamental- allied aerial threat in the form of the 8th, 9th and 15th Air Forces:

(i) Gradual disbandment of ALL Zerstörergruppen and MOST Kampfgruppen, commencing in late 1943.

This would have represented the following:

- A more efficient allocation of human and material resources for producing MAINLY -if not only- the type of plane that was needed the most at the front lines: Single Engined Fighters. (Late Bf 109s and Fw 190s, Ta 152s, and even more jets).

- A greater number of pilots and airmen become available for either conversion for single engined fighter pilots or screening prior to admittance into fighter plane schools.

- Also efficiency is brought in with regard to the following issues: (a) an easier program for producing and handling spare parts for planes in the Jagdgeschwadern; (b) ground crews; and (c) FUEL.

(ii) By the second half of 1943, no more funding nor any other type of help, assistance, or support from the RLM to any of those numerous German aerial designers who were still trying to develop ships that would never be ready for combat in the near future. During this period of time every pound of raw materials, every single facility, every worker represented valuable items Germany could not afford spending in ventures that would never represent any true and measurable help for confronting the enemy.

Germany´s situation demanded a more cohesive and unified effort of brains, arms and raw material administration, and not that lose scenario, where every rower seemed to row in whatever direction he thought i´d be cool to, with a direct negative impact on the direction of the boat.

Do not pretend you are still the rich guy in the Neighborhood when the family´s finances are on the verge of collapse.

(iii) A different type of strategy to confront the allied aerial menace; with the measures described on (i) implemented, the Luftwaffe becomes stronger in numbers; perhaps more fully equipped Jagdgeschwadern are formed and brought forward to welcome the allied aerial fleets.

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Udet - all excellent points. Criteria necessary? eliminate Hitler and replace Goering.

On the USAAF and RAF side. Start the oil campaign and ball bearing campaign in mid to summer 1943 and bomb them out of existance - take whatever losses are necessary to destroy those two industries. In the case of Schwinfurt particularly, heavier bombs and repeated attacks. The USAAF would have taken far heavier losses but the RAF could have made a huge contribution by allocating 25-40% of its strength to support the daylight raids.

Whether we could take those losses politically speaking is another question... but that campaign at that time would pre-empt at of German options.

Of course it depends on when you can start implimenting changes.

The biggest reasons why the Battle of Germany was lost or would be lost is the quality of the pilots. Of course you have a group of super pilots but that will only go so far.
In Britain and the US it was only natural to look at pilot training before implimenting production increases. When the US got in the war, the first thing they did was raise the number of trained pilots.

This takes time. By 1944 the Germans were doomed. No matter what aircraft you build, if you don't have well trained pilots, you're already dead and buried before you know it.

The German officials were complete idiots when it came to assessing pilot training. As soon as they needed extra pilots or aircraft they stripped it from the training squadrons and often didn't return them afterwards. It's a surprise it got them as far as it did. Training should always remain first priority. Just look at Finland for instance: more superpilots than aircraft, and those without aircraft simply stayed in training.

Given that you'll need a year to train a good pilot, the last chance Germany had was in early 1943, in time for Big Week in 1944.
Had other circumstances changed like a failed invasion of Normandy, it would have bought the Germans time for another year. Maybe. Certainly a capable leader instead of Hitler would have allowed the Germans to perform better at the Eastern Front where needless troops and materiel were lost due to Hitler's irrational decisions. The moron...
In that case late 1943 would have been the last chance. This coincides with the surrender of Italy and the capture of one or two thousand (depends on source) Italian trainer aircraft. Though the real problem is instructors, and by midd 1944 fuel. That last bit could be partially overcome by installing training centres in Romania, closer to the oil source. I would also order Caudron to start mass production of the C.690M. This was a light fighter training aircraft which could be powered by the Argus As 10. This engine used 80 octane fuel and this would be more available than the high grade aviation fuel which was so badly needed by the Luftwaffe combat units.

Training and tactics should be adapted to the new situation. As there's no way of coming up with new aircraft by February 1944, unless one starts implimenting changes before 1944, the Bf 109s and Fw 190s will suffer high losses against the Mustangs and Lightnings with their well trained American pilots.
Existing tactics definitely fell short against the American escort. Going for the escorts leads to nothing and going for the bombers lead to a turkey shoot and even more shooting practice for the flyboys. A combination of both tactics soon proved to be the best option. Two Gruppen formed escort for one Gruppe that attacked the bombers. This doesn't seem to be the right tactic to me. First, I wonder why this happened with Gruppen. Why not within Staffeln? Anyway, using only one out of three fighters to attack the bombers is insufficient. And yet, even then many German fighters fell to American guns. This was mainly because of badly trained fighter pilots. So why waste those fighters for escorts? Instead I would reserve the best pilots for the escort aircraft such as the Bf 109G-6/AS and give the other pilots the Bf 109G-6/R6 'gunboats'. (According to Kurfürst's document this configuration only resulted in a 8 kmh speed decrease.) These pilots would have to be given adapted fighter training. There's no need for them to learn all combat manoeuvres. Simply make them decent pilots (decreasing non-combat losses) specialized in gunnery and evasion manoeuvres.
The top pilots should not be used against bombers as bomber gunnery fire is just as effective against them as against novice pilots. No need to lose them like that!

I already mentioned leadership. This should be brought through all ranks in the Luftwaffe. Many were politically appointed. A internal or external audit could weed out the incapable ones. Milch as head would be a good choice. (Now you know who the guy in my avatar is.) Luftwaffe doesn't have to be an independent branch of the military but at least the Reichsverteidigung department has to be autonomous so it can develop itself to a well lead streamlined organisation.

I strongly oppose converting all aircraft production to fighter production. First, I already explained that more aircraft won't solve the problem. Second, it would mean the end of the Luftwaffe as a tactical air force, thereby only delaying the inevitable and that would be defeats on the battlefield. Instead, I would continue production of tactical bombers and restart production of the Hs 123. Emphasis should however go to fighter aircraft and they should get priority for the fuel reserves.
As a side note I would also increase deliveries to the allies like the Croats, Slowaks, Hongarians, Romanians and Finnish as they at least still had good pilots in reserve. Especially the Finnish and Croats were excellent!

Production of aircraft and other military equipment should be rationalized so more could be build with less resources. Fighter aircraft were already quite rationalised as there were relatively few in production: the Bf 109, Fw 190, Me 410 and later the Me 163 and Me 262.
Another major problem of the Luftwaffe was its serviceability of its aircraft. People like Hitler only cared for production figures and didn't understand that tanks and aircraft need spare parts and qualified personnel to operate. Better to produce two aircraft with spare parts than three aircraft without spare parts or technical crews. So no 14,000 Bf 109s in 1944: 10,000 with spare parts would come down to exactly the same number of operational aircraft.

(...)

Kris

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As the Fw 190A was rather bad at higher altitudes I would only use them as Sturmbock. Also for every Fw 190A two Bf 109s could be build (in terms of manhour). As such I would not increase production of the Fw 190 but only of the Bf 109.
But Tank should have been given to go ahead on the Fw 190C-1 with the DB 603 engine. This bird already flew in late 1943 and the DB 603A was sooner available than the Jumo 213A. I see no reason why the Fw 190C couldn't have been in service half a year before the Dora. The Fw 190C would have been slightly inferior to the D but still good enough. Plus, it could carry an extra cannon through the spinner. The Sturmbock versions could also be replaced by an up-armoured Fw 190C with 5 cannons! Sweet...

The Ta 152 was a great fighter but by 1945 it would have been inferior to the jet fighter and not much better than the Fw 190D-12. The Ta 152H was designed for high altitudes in anticipation for the B-29 which didn't turn out to be a high-altitude bomber (sic!). No reason to stop production of the Fw 190 for this version. Only a small production would suffice.

The Bf 109G was far from outdated. The G-6 was no match for the P-51 but with the arrival of new engines in the Spring (the AM, AS and combined the ASM) the Bf 109 found its breath again. But only with the arrival of the Bf 109K at the end of 1944 did the Bf 109 become superior to the allied escort fighters. As such the Bf 109 would have been in trouble for most of the year. The only thing which could remedy this was better training or higher numbers. As already explained, a combination of both would have been the best option.

Zerstörer were on the way out. However the Fw 190 Sturmbock and Bf 109G-6/R6 basically took over their role as heavy fighter, and later the Me 262.
But to me, the Bf 109Z would have been the best stopgap measurement. This aircraft was a Zerstörer like the Me 110 or Me 410 but faster then the P-51 or any other fighter at the time! Armed with up to 5 cannons it could have been highly succesful, and still a cheap option as it would be much cheaper than the Me 410 and have about the same manhours and the Fw 190.

Me 262 was a good fighter aircraft but needed time to get operational in numbers. Full priority should be given to this aircraft. Or ... another option would be to go for another jet aircraft. A jet aircraft build out of cheap material, easy to fly, decent armament, easy to maintain, and with a single jet engine, a Volksjäger, but then a year earlier. Also not with that dramatic time frame of a couple of months. Let's give it a year. There were several single-engined jet designs in 1943, like the Focke Wulf P II and P II projects, the Messerschmitt P 1095, the Arado E ??? and perhaps the best choice of all, the Lippisch P 20. Based on the Me 163 but with a landing gear and a turbojet engine, and with 4 guns, it would have been an excellent yet cheap jet interceptor! Best option would be to power it with the more reliable and cheaper BMW 003 which was availabe in the latter half of 1944.

Messerschmitt Me 163 was used in a wrong way in which its limited endurance limited its operations. It should have been placed in areas which saw the most air combat. Place it close to the Ruhr area and that way it can intercept every bomber which bombs this industrial area. Another option are the Hamburg-Bremen-Kiel zone, the München-Nürnberg-Schweinfurt zone and the Northwestern Italian industry zone (Milan, Turin). Instead of building a new Me 163C and Me 263, a standard Me 163B should be used with the new dual-chambered HWK 109-509C engine which at least would have increased endurance by 50%! This version could have been in service before the end of 1944.

The real Wunderwaffe would have been the Natter though this would have appeared much later. The main advantage is that it didn't need trained pilots at all. Its aircraft were expendable and so were their pilots. And yet their rockets would have been very effective (as proved by the JV 44). Thousands could have been produced and placed near all major cities and industrial zones. Their real value is that they would have freed up the other fighter aircraft of the Reichsverteidiging which could then be redeployed to regular frontline units.

Then my notion of continued bomber/attack aircraft comes into play. These could then be equiped with the Panzerblitz or guided bombs and rockets. Now escorted by well trained and experienced fighters they could be used to turn the tide on the front. It would have been the only chance to come out of the war in favorable terms.

Finally, a word on Flak guns. They proved to be very ineffective until the arrival of new ammunition and improved guidance. The biggest problem was that they used an excuberant amount of shells, plus the fact that those guns and personnel could also have been used on the frontlines.
They were mainly used in such high numbers because of Hitler and their popularity among the civilian population. Their main use was to keep the allied bombers from spending more ToT and often disrupting their formations and accuracy.
However, production should be limited in favour of field artillery.
Later Flak guns could be replaced by the Taifun and guided missiles.

Kris

important thoughts Kris, good post some interesting info that I should like to comment on once my migrane disappates.

now let me clear the air once and for all you have brought up the myth about the TA 152H and the B-29. Nowhere in factual history of the Ta and JG 301 or any other unit that was to fly the hot rod is there mention of facing the US B-29 in Europe. 1st it was not considered to fly in Europe, # 2 and the most important JG 301 veterans had never heard of the B-29 during the war so how could it even be remotely possible the a/c was designed for use against the high flying 4 engine when the crew piloting the Ta as well as the design team never even heard nor knew of the B-29 ???

sometimes you just need to more factual evidence that the net especially and some books do not provide. I had answered another persons posting on this very same matter last year and he was adamant that several web-site included this erroneous information and it had to be true since so many sites indicated this...................nope ~ the design was for a creation against the US P-51 D and K

I am sorry Kris but most of your posting is I believe a fantasy. As for saying that the Natter is some sort of ace in the hole is unbelieveable. A one shot scatter weapon, with a range that made the Me163 look like a long range fighter, that has to be replaced after every flight, clogging up what few transport links the Germans had. That is your wonder weapon?
You may be able to build them, but getting them to where they are needed is another thing.

It also ignores the aircraft that the allies had in production or development that matched planes that you mention, some of which only existed in mock ups.
As for relying on guided missiles. With all the pressures of the cold war these didn't become reliable until the 60's at best and even that is being kind. The concept of reliable working models in the late 40's just isn't on, despite what the scientists say with their carefully controlled test samples.

Hi Erich,

>Nowhere in factual history of the Ta and JG 301 or any other unit that was to fly the hot rod is there mention of facing the US B-29 in Europe. 1st it was not considered to fly in Europe, # 2 and the most important JG 301 veterans had never heard of the B-29 during the war so how could it even be remotely possible the a/c was designed for use against the high flying 4 engine when the crew piloting the Ta as well as the design team never even heard nor knew of the B-29 ???

Though I'd not expect the story of the Ta 152H having been conceived as a B-29 interceptor to be true, here is an interesting quote from Ethell/Price, "The German Jets in Combat" (German Edition):

"On an armament conference in Berlin on 19th of January [1944], he [Milch] stated with regard to the newly developed aircraft of the enemy that were to be expected: 'In this year, the new types B-29 and B-32 will arrive. These machines attack at an altitude of 11 to 12 km. There is no flak gun that reaches these heights. The only antidote we have is the fighter programme. If we don't proceed with it to reach these heights at all ... currently our fighters are not capable of fighting an enemy at these altitudes.'"

Regards,

Henning (HoHun)

Erich, the Germans very much believed the B-29 was to be used against them, there are several documents which can attest that. One of them I have even gives the altitude of 10 km at a cruising speed of 600 kmh. This is what the Germans thought the new bomber would be capable of. But they were looking ahead, and also projected the possible use of bombers flying even higher than that. For that reason they started developing Höhenjäger like the BV 155.

The Ta 152H was very much designed to be a Höhenjäger as you know. This was with the B-29 in mind. Of course the JG 301 pilots didn't know this because by the time of its arrival the Ta 152H was no longer intended to fight against the B-29 which also turned out to be flying at regular altitude.

Or perhaps I'm mistaken. Why do you think the Germans thought they needed a Höhenjäger so badly?


Glider, you say that most of what I'm writing is fantasy. Yet you only pick out just the last bit about the Natter and the SAMs.
I'm more than willing to discuss the Natter if you want me to. Just open a new thread. You also need to do some reading up on the subject as they were not intended to be single shot weapons. It was far from operational but the concept is fully workable and their armament would have been devestating to enemy bombers. I also don't understand what you mean by problems of getting them to where they are needed. They will be used as pinpoint defences like the Ruhr areas. These are small, detachable and light aircraft and I don't see any reason why they wouldn't get to the areas which they are supposed to defend, or not any more than other weapons which are being sent to the front.

Also, don't forget that this scenario only applies if the allies are stopped on their way to Germany. As soon as the allies enter Germany as they did in late 1944, it's no longer possible to regain air control over Germany because of the vicinity of allied aircraft over Germany and the collapse of an effective radar system.

As to the SAMs, I only said that they could replace Flak guns 'later'. I base my information on the more modeate German claims as to when these would have been operational. Also, with more resources these could have become operational much sooner. There's no doubt about the Taifun and either the Enzian or the Schmetterling becoming operational by 1946. How effective they would have been, is another thing. But these SAMs are hardly the core of my propositions as I merely said they would 'later' replace Flak guns.
Kris