Battle of Midway.

[Lucky13]

The shock from the submarine torpedoes and from Hammann's depth charges was severe. No . 3 auxiliary elevator carried away. Numerous fixtures on the overhead of the hangar crashed on to the hangar deck, and the landing gear of two planes on deck collapsed. All rivets in the starboard leg of the foremast sheared. The list was reduced to 17 degrees. Personnel were thrown in every direction, many sustaining minor injuries and broken bones. Since all destroyers had to be employed in searching for the attacking enemy submarines, and in rescuing Hammann survivors and Yorktown personnel who were thrown overboard by the explosion, no further salvage work could be attempted at that time. Accordingly, it was decided to postpone further attempts to salvage for the time being, to remove the salvage party to destroyers, and to return aboard Yorktown the following morning when the assistance of a large salvage tug was expected. Vireo was directed to come a! longside the starboard side, and all personnel then on board went down lines to the Vireo from which all except eight seriously wounded were transferred to destroyers for the night.

Prior to leaving Vireo, the Commanding Officer, Yorktown conducted burial services for two officers and one enlisted man from Hammann who had been picked up and brought to Vireo by destroyer boats.

About 0530 on the morning of June 7 the list of the Yorktown was noticed to be rapidly increasing to port and, at 0701, Yorktown turned over on her port side and sank in about 3000 fathoms of water with all battle flags flying. Her position at the time of sinking was Latitude 30°-46' North, Longitude 167°-24' West.


AIR

1. Organization of Yorktown Air Group:

Group Commander - Lt.Comdr. Oscar Pederson, USN.
VB-3 - 18 SBD's - Lt.Comdr. M.F. Leslie, USN.
*VF-3 - 25 F4F-4's - Lt.Comdr. J. Thach, USN.
VT-3 - 12 TBD's - Lt.Comdr. L.E. Massey, USN.
**VS-5 - 18 SBD's - Lieut. W.C. Short, USN

*VF-3 was composed of 16 VF-42 pilots and 11 VF-3 pilots.
**VS-5 was composed of 10 VB-5 pilots, plus 8 from the Saratoga group.

2. Attack Group.

(a) At about 1045 commenced launching the Attack Group composed of 17 VSB, 12 VTB and 6 VF. The torpedo planes were directed to proceed immediately towards the objective; and the VSBs ordered to circle overhead for 12 minutes and then proceed to overtake the VT before reaching the enemy. In order to conserve fuel for the VF, they were launched at 1105 with orders to rendezvous enroute. Due to the slow speed of the TBD's and the small fuel capacity of the F4F-4's, the above procedure was deemed expedient and worked out very well. At 1145 all three squadrons were rendezvoused and the group took the following formation: VT-3 at 1500 feet (just below the cloud base), 2 VF for low coverage at 2500 feet, 4 VF at 5000-6000 feet to protect the VT and low VF, and VB-3 at 16,000 feet. At about 1200, the enemy force was sighted bearing 345°, distance 30-40 miles, headed on an easterly course, speed about 20 knots. It consisted of 3 or 4 carriers, 2 BB's, 4 CA's, 1 or more CL's and many DD. The formation appeared scattered; apparently the CV's had just previously landed their planes on board after their attack on Midway Island. Insofar as could be seen, the enemy CV's appeared undamaged. At about 1220 VB-3 lost contact with the torpedo planes and was unable to communicate with them by radio. At 1225, the order to attack was given by VB-3. Enclosure (C) position of enemy CV's.

(b) Torpedo Attack.

The torpedo attack group consisted of 12 TBD's of VT-3, each armed with one MK 13 torpedo. VT-3 approached the enemy force on course 345° and when about 14 miles from the objective were attacked by Zero fighters. The squadron maneuvered to avoid the fighters and decreased altitude to 150 feet to avoid attacks from below. When about one mile to the Eastward of the target (enemy CV), the squadron commander turned towards the CV and commenced his attack. At this point he was shot down in flames by enemy VF, the remainder of the planes continued the attack. Only 5 VT dropped their torpedoes, as 7 were shot down during the approach and 3 more after the attack. The Fighter Squadron Commander stated that he saw 3 torpedo hits on the large CV to he Eastward and one on the small CV in the middle of the formation. It is estimated that the VT squadron was attacked by at least 8 Zero fighters and shot down at least one Zero fighter.

(c) Dive Bombing Attack.

The dive bombing attack group consisted of 17 SBD's of VB-3, each armed with 1-1000 pound bomb, fused with Mk 21 and 23 fuses. At about 1220, VB-3 was in position to attack the enemy CV, located to the North Eastward in the formation. The dive bombers commenced their approach from 14,500 feet out of the sun upon a large CV believed to be of the Akagi Class. Its flight deck was covered with planes spotted aft. Upon sighting our aircraft, the CV turned right to a Southerly course in order to launch planes. The sides of the carrier turned into a veritable ring of flame as the enemy commenced firing small caliber and anti-aircraft guns. There was no fighter opposition at altitude. The attack signal was executed and individual planes of VF-3 took interval for diving as the first enemy planes was being launched. Diving from the South, all pilots had a steady dive along the fore and aft line of the target. The first bomb exploded directly in the midst of the spotted planes, turning the after part of the flight deck into a sheet of flame. A fighter was blown over the side as it was being launched. Five direct hits and three very near misses were scored immediately thereafter. 3-B-14 and 3-B-15 upon seeing the carrier so heavily hit and burning furiously, shifted their dives to the light cruiser plane guard, scoring a near miss and hit on the fantail. 3-B-12 and 3-B-16 likewise shifted to a nearby battleship and scored a direct hit on the stern and a near miss.

Release altitudes averaged 2,500 feet and withdrawal was made to the Northeast with radical maneuvering at high speed close to the water amidst heavy anti-aircraft fire. On retirement, 3-B-8 reported being attacked by a twin-float bi-plane, possibly a Kawanishi 95 with no damage resulting.

The carrier was an inferno of flames and undoubtedly a total loss, the battleship was smoking from the stern, the light cruiser attacked was stopped and had settled slightly by the stern, but was not afire.

All Bombing Squadron Three aircraft returned undamaged to U.S.S. Yorktown by 1315. Two of our torpedo planes were also observed returning. At 1407 while in the landing circle the Yorktown directed over voice radio that all planes get clear as she was about to be attacked. As the squadron had broken up into sections for landing, section leaders took their sections Eastward into the area midway between Task Force 17 and Task Force 16 to await the completion of the attack. Jettisoned enemy bombs were observed falling well clear of surface vessels and several Japanese planes fell in flames.

When the attack on the Yorktown was completed, all section leaders took their sections over to Task Force 16 and landed aboard the U.S.S. Enterprise except for two planes which landed in the water due to lack of fuel. The pilots and rear seat men were rescued uninjured by a CA.

The CV attacked was described as being larger but narrower than the Yorktown and having a full length flight deck with a small island about 1/3 of the length aft of the bow. It had vertical smokestacks encased in one (similar to the Saratoga) on the starboard side adjoining the island. While proceeding towards the objective, four bombs were released prematurely when the gun and bomb electrical switches were turned on. This squadron reported also that the windshields and telescopes fogged up during the dive. This serious defect has been previously reported. It is estimated that VB-3 obtained at least 7 bomb hits which resulted in either the sinking or disablement of the CV as it was left dead in the water and completely aflame, and the damaging of 1 BB and CL.

(d) Fighter Escort Group.

The fighter escort group consisted of 6 F4F-4's of VF-3 squadron, their mission being to protect the torpedo planes' attack. Two VF were placed at 1000 feet above the torpedo planes and the other four VF 3000-4000 feet above them to furnish further protection. When about 4 miles from the Jap outer screen., which in turn was about 10- miles out from the CV's, two AA bursts were fired by a Jap ship. These bursts were used evidently to direct the enemy Combat Air Patrol to our planes, for almost immediately afterwards our VT and VF were attacked by about 18-20 Zero fighters. Our VF formed a line astern formation in order to stay together and give the leader an opportunity to turn and fire at the attacking planes. Soon after this the rear fighter was shot down. The formation twisted and turned to prevent the Zeros from getting on their tails and also to obtain firing position. During the engagement our remaining 3 VF were able to shoot down 5 Zeros. The Zeros concentrated most of their attacks on the rear plane, making beam and astern runs and pulling clear after each run.

The two VF planes directly over the torpedo planes were able to furnish considerable support to the VT during the first part of the approach when there were only 4 Zeros attacking. But later they were joined by 6 more Zeros, and the 2 VF were too heavily out-numbered to be of much help. They shot down one Zero and possibly another, and saw one Zero shot down by the TBD rear seat men. Soon thereafter, they became separated from each other and from the torpedo planes. One of these fighters was badly damaged and crash landed on board the Hornet. The 4 remaining planes of the escort group landed on board. They lost one pilot and two planes and shot down 6 and damaged two Zeros in the engagement.

 

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3. Search Group

The search group consisting of 10 SBD's of VS-5 squadron, each armed with 1-1000 pound Mark 113 bomb, was launched at about 1330 to search the area from bearing 280° T. to 020° for a distance of 200 miles.

At about 1630 Lieutenant S. Adams, USN, made contact with an enemy force consisting of 1 CV, 2 BB's, 5 CA's, and 4 DD's on course North speed 20 knots in position latitude 31-15 N.. longitude 179-05 W. Due to he very accurate and precise information furnished by Lieutenant Adams, the Enterprise and Hornet were able to make a successful attack on this force. The scout was attacked by one Zero fighter but managed to drive him off. Contact was also made in sector 340-360° with a type 95 seaplane which was damaged by machine gun fire from the scouts. In sector 320-340° sight contact was made with an enemy force of 6-8 planes. As the Yorktown was disabled, one section of scouts landed on the Hornet and 4 sections landed on the Enterprise.

4. Combat Air Patrol

At about 1100 a CAP of 6 planes was launched. Although Fighter Director Control was assigned to the Enterprise, the Yorktown Fighter Director took over control of his own fighters when the two task forces lost sight contact. Fighters were continually being vectored out to contact bogies which later were identified as friendly. At about 1330, a relief Combat Air Patrol of 12 VF were launched and the CAP of 6 planes plus the 4 VF of the Escort Group were landed on board. At about 1359, a large group of planes was picked up approaching from 250° distance 46 miles. The CAP was vectored out in two waves and intercepted a large group of enemy dive bombers about 15-20 miles from the task group at an altitude of 8000-10000 feet. The enemy formations were broken up by our fighters and many of the dive bombers shot down before they arrived at the attack position. The Radar Operator stated he believed there were at least 5 groups of enemy planes and estimated that there was a total of at least 40-50 planes in the attack group. The pilots that took part in the action reported that they counted at least 18 dive bombers and about 18 fighters. Only 7 bombers were able to get through and make an attack, obtaining three direct hits and several close misses. Many of our fighters ran out of ammunition even before the attack was over. Because of the condition of the Yorktown, the CAP was told to land on the other CV's and a relief CAP of 4 planes was obtained from the Hornet. These in turn were relieved by 6 Yorktown VF which had been refueled and rearmed on board the Enterprise. This Combat Air Patrol shot down a total of 13 VB and 2 VF and damaged 7 VB and 3 VF.

At about 1555, a large group of planes was picked up on the screen bearing 340°, distance 33 miles, and the Radar Operator reported that they appeared to be climbing. 4 VF were immediately vectored out and a few minutes later the remaining two. The first group over-ran the enemy planes and had to be turned around, since our fighters were at 10,000 to 12,000 feet and the enemy planes were at about 5,000 feet. The second group intercepted the enemy planes at about 10-14 miles and reported them as Jap torpedo planes protected by Zero fighters. At this point the ship had built up speed to 18 knots and was able to launch 8 more fighters before the attack developed. It is definitely known that at least 5 Jap torpedo planes were shot down before they dropped their torpedoes. The Combat Air Patrol shot down 8 VT and 2 VF and damaged 2 VT and 2 VF. It is important to note that the Japanese planes on these two attacks came in at a low altitude presumably to avoid Radar detection, and then commenced climbing; as a result, they were not picked up on the Radar Screen until they were well within 50 miles of the fleet.

5. Resume of Enemy and Own Losses

(a) Damage Inflicted on enemy by Air Group.

1 large CV sunk or very badly damaged.
1 BB damaged
1 CL severely damaged
7 VF shot down
13 VB shot down
8 VT shot down
7 VF damaged
7 VB damaged
2 VT damaged

(b) Planes lost by Air Group.

9 VF lost (5 shot down, 2 crashed on deck and two lost on Yorktown pilots missing two.
2 VSB landed in water, no pilots missing.
8 VSB lost on Yorktown, no pilots missing.
10 VT lost in vicinity of enemy fleet, Pilots missing 10; rear seat men 10, killed one.
2 VT landed in water.


GENERAL REMARKS

6. Japanese Tactics

(a) Zero Fighters

It was noted that the Jap fighters made runs from all directions against our torpedo planes. This is the first time that we have had any Zero fighters make beam runs on our planes. They appeared to allow insufficient lead. However, it is important that this point be remembered for it shows that the Japanese are quick to learn. In the Coral Sea Battle, they made all their approaches from the rear or high side and did relatively little damage because of our armor. It also is desired to call attention to the fact that there was an absence of the fancy stunting during pull outs or approaches for attacks. In this battle, the Japs dove in, made the attack and then immediately pulled out, taking advantage of their superior climb and maneuverability. In attacking fighters, the Zeros usually attacked from above rear at high speed and recovered by climbing vertically until they lost some speed and then pulled on through to complete a small loop of high wing over which placed them out of reach and in position for another attack. By reversing the turn sharply after each attack the leader may get a shot at the enemy while he is climbing away or head on into a scissor if the Jap turns to meet it.

(b) Approach of Jap Dive Bombers and Torpedo Planes

In the two attacks on June 4th, the Japanese planes apparently came in at low altitude to avoid Radar detection until they were within 40-50 miles and then commenced climbing. This is quite different from the Coral Sea Battle when the Jap Attack Group came in as a unit at high altitude and were picked up 68 miles out. This time we picked the two attacks up at 46 and 33 miles with the Radar comment that they appeared to be climbing.

(c) F4F-4 Airplanes

The fighter pilots are very disappointed with the performance and length of sustained fire power of the F4F-4 airplanes. The Zero fighters could easily outmaneuver and out-climb the F4F-3, and the consensus of fighter pilot opinion is that the F4F-4 is even more sluggish and slow than the F4F-3. It is also felt that it was a mistake to put 6 guns on the F4F-4 and thus to reduce the rounds per gun. For the opposition now being encountered the combination of 4 guns and 450 rounds per gun is much superior to the 6 guns with 240 rounds per gun. Many of our fighters ran out of ammunition even before the Jap dive bombers arrived over our forces; these were experienced pilots, not novices. It is strongly urged that the Navy be supplied with a fighter that is at least equal of the Zero fighter. It is believed that 4-50 caliber fixed machine guns give sufficient fire power for carrier based fighters, especially in view of the loss of performance involved in adding two additional guns.

(d) Torpedo Airplanes.

It is believed that this engagement showed clearly the vulnerability of TBD's, for out of 12 TBD's sent into attack, only two are known to have left the vicinity of the battle. It is recommended that remaining TBD's be immediately replaced by TBF's. It is further recommended that the fire power of torpedo planes be greatly increased. It is believed that the minimum fire power for a torpedo plane should be two 50 caliber fixed machine guns firing forward and two 50 caliber free machine guns mounted in a turret aft. This recommendation is based on the belief that we never will be able to furnish adequate fighter protection to our attack groups and that they must be equipped with sufficient fire power to protect themselves. It is realized that this will mean some sacrifice in speed and range, but this loss would be more than compensated for by the ability of a torpedo squadron to protect itself from excessive losses when attacked by fighter aircraft.

A. COMBAT AIR PATROL

It is believed that the Combat Air Patrol should be placed at such an altitude that the pilots are not required to use oxygen while on patrol. It is felt that 10,000 feet is a satisfactory altitude, for from there they can be vectored out satisfactorily to intercept either low or high flying bogies. It has the additional advantage of being less tiring on the pilot, as he is more comfortable at a lower altitude and is not inconvenienced by having to wear an oxygen mask. In addition, too much time is wasted in having a CAP come down from 18,000 feet by the controlling fighter director. A low flying bogey was picked up and part of the CAP had to be brought down to investigate. By the time they got down the bogey had disappeared off the screen. The Yorktown maintained her CAP at 10,000 feet and successfully intercepted all bogies except for the one mentioned above.

 

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B. GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

At 1359 Radar reported enemy planes bearing 250° true. When this group was about 17 miles away they were attacked by our fighters. Several were shot down and as the dog fight approached, it could be seen that the attack group was broken up. However, one at a time, seven planes were seen to break away and approach the ship, altitude about 12,000 feet, slant range about 8,000 to 10,000 yards. The forward director took control of the starboard 5" battery and opened fire on these planes. This fire was ineffective since the planes circled or approached their diving points by a curved path. On two occasions, when busts appeared close to a plane he was seen to circle away for another approach. These planes were not in formation so it was necessary to shift target continuously as planes circled to turn away. On reaching a point sufficiently low, individual planes were seen to go into shallow glide until they had reached a position angle of about 60° at an altitude of 6,000 to 8,000 feet, then go into a steep glide or dive toward the ship. As the first plane dove, Group III shifted to local control using 1 second fuse (800 yards). Immediately after the first dive Group III shifted back to director control for the rest of the action. The director followed 3 planes in on their approach and preliminary glide, then shifted to planes reported by lookouts as making a torpedo attack on the starboard bow.

Three planes approached at an altitude of about 100 feet as for a torpedo attack from the starboard bow. When bursts appeared near them at a range of about 8,000 yards, they turned away. At from 12,000 to 15,000 yards, they turned again for another approach. This was reported about three times after which two of these flew away and third took a position on our starboard beam, and circled between 15,000 and 20,000 yards at an altitude of about 2000 feet. This plane remained here for about 30 minutes then disappeared. About the same tactics were employed by three planes which approached once on the starboard quarter and twice on the port quarter. These planes were fired on by the port 5" battery in control of the after director and all disappeared upon the completion of the bombing attack. None of these planes on either side pressed home an attack nor was any seen to drop torpedoes.

As the first bomber started his dive, fire was opened with all automatic guns on the starboard side (10-20 mm, 4-1.1 mounts, 12-50 caliber, 2-30 caliber). This plane was cut into at least 3 large pieces before he reached the bombing point. The bomb was released, however, and was seen to tumble as it fell. It struck the flight deck about 15 feet inboard and about 20 feet aft of 1.1 mount number 4, killing 12 men in mount 4 and 5 men in mount 3 instantly and wounding 4 men on mount 4 and 14 on mount 3. The uninjured and some wounded men immediately replaced the others and continued fire on their mounts through the remainder of the action. This fire of course was at a much reduced rate. The pieces of this plane fell close aboard on the starboard quarter.

The second plane to dive was cut to pieces as he reached the bomb release point. His bomb was released, tumbled down to miss close astern and exploded on contact. The pieces of the plane fell in the wake of the ship. Splinters from this bomb killed or wounded the crews of the 50 caliber machine guns by the after port corner of the flight deck and on the port side of the 1st superstructure deck aft, wounded some men on the fantail guns and started several small fires on the fantail. These fires were quickly extinguished by the remaining men under the direction of the Battery Officer.

Three planes dove from the port beam, only one of which dropped a bomb. This bomb exploded in the stack, and heavy black smoke soon covered the after director, the after starboard automatic gun batteries and Group III 5" guns. This plane crashed in the water close aboard on the port side.

A sixth plane circled forward and dove from ahead under considerably lessened fire. His bomb struck number one elevator and exploded above the 4th deck, starting fires in the sail locker and rag stowage. Water used in fighting this fire leaked into the forward 5" handling room thorough the reach rod stuffing boxes. Heat from the fire made it necessary later to evacuate and flood the forward 5" magazines.

The bomb from the seventh plane missed on the starboard beam. Of these 7 planes which dove on the ship, 3 were definitely shot down by automatic guns; a fourth plane was damaged by gunfire and it is believed to have fallen less than a mile from the ship.

Prior to the torpedo attack casualties had been restored, ammunition replaced, and killed or wounded personnel replaced from handling crews. All guns were in full operation except one barrel of each gun of the two after 1.1 mounts.

At about 1555 Radar reported a group of planes approaching from 340° true, 35 miles. At first report it was not definite whether these were friendly or enemy. The ship picked up speed and commenced launching fighters. The forward director picked up a group of 5 torpedo planes at about 19,000 yards. As the fourth fighter was launched the port 5" battery opened fire at about 15,000 yards. A pattern of bursts appeared to straddle the formation in range and deflection but seemed unusually large. No hits or damage appeared to result from 5" gun fire from either the Yorktown or screening vessels. The torpedo planes continued to approach our port bow in a loose V formation with planes in the formation varying in altitude from 50 to 2000 feet. Individual planes changed altitude and swerved from side to side to avoid AA fire.

Our fighters just launched circled and dove on the planes at about 5,000 yards.

One torpedo plane was shot down on the port bow. The wakes of several torpedoes were seen; two passed just under the bow and appeared on the starboard side; two struck the ship about abreast the bridge on the port side. Two more torpedo planes went into the water close aboard on the starboard bow.

Other planes participating in the attack were either shot down or driven away by fighters or by AA fire from screening vessels.

After the first torpedo struck, power on all fire control circuits except battle telephones went out. No other casualties are known to have occurred to he gunnery department as a result of this attack.

2. The following observations may be worthy of note:

(1) Two of the bombs that hit, one by 1.1" machine gun mount 4, the other close aboard off the port quarter, exploded on or near contact. Both of these dropped from planes badly damaged in the air, and both were seen to tumble in their fall. Examination of some fragments of one of these indicated that they were of about the same construction as those with delayed action. It is believed possible that these may have been detonated in the air.

(2) At the time of the dive bombing attack, torpedoes were being place don the hangar deck for rearming. Some splinters from the bomb that struck near 1.1" machine gun mount pierced the flight deck and caused several fires among planes being rearmed on the hangar deck in the near vicinity of these torpedoes.

(4) All water cooled guns were placed out of commission or had rate of fire reduced by loss of water pressure from central water cooling systems due to loss of power. Water jackets were punctured by splinters on two 1.1 mounts and 4-50 caliber machine guns. This caused considerable difficulty in keeping otherwise uninjured guns in firing condition.


Gunnery Casualties

Location Casualty Action Taken

Fire Control Intermittent loss of power to control circuits, director and guns during attack. Causes Unknown. Used hand follow ups and matched pointers as necessary.

5"38 cal. guns. #1,2,3,4,5,7 Power failed to rammer. Used emergency power.

#5 Plug failure Closed with rawhide Mallet.

#2 Misfire. Powder case was unloaded but unable to reload against seated projectile. Crew was unable to force projectiles out of the breech. (A similar casualty occurred in the Battle of the Coral Sea, but the gun crew on that occasion was able to knock the projectile out of the gun.) Gun remained out of commission.

#8 Pointer, fuse setter and 1st loader wounded by splinters from near miss on port quarter. Replaced by stand-by crew.

1.1 Batteries All cooling water was lost after early bomb hit. #4 gun on each mount froze and jammed. Continued fire at reduced rate. Later holes were plugged to retain water in jackets.

Mount #3 35 men killed, 14 wounded by 1st bomb hit. 4 men continued fire at reduced rate. Remainder replaced from reserve.

Mount #4 12 men killed, 4 wounded by 1st bomb hit. Entire crew replaced from reserves.

50 cal. m.g.
Battery #9
4 guns Splinters from 1st bomb hit caused following damage. Receiver jammed on one gun. Firing lanyard broken on one gun. Water jackets punctured on 4 guns. Two men killed, 4 men wounded. Replaced all guns from spares.

Batteries 11 and 12 Three men killed, 3 wounded. Replaced from reserves.

 

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C. ENGINEERING

1415 -- Steaming at full power, 30.5 knots, 284 r.p.m., with main steam line cross connection valves closed in superheater firerooms; the engineering plant in battle operating status, standing by for air attack.

1420 -- (about) -- Bomb exploded just above third deck level in the uptakes leading from the forward group of firerooms (#1, 2, 3 firerooms). See sketch. [not attached] Main steam dropped steadily to 200 pounds; closed throttle, finally checking main steam pressure at 180 pounds, reducing speed to 6 knots, 60 r.p.m. Firerooms 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were filled with dense black some and gases, fires in boilers 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 were extinguished by shock and concussion. The uptakes from boilers 1, 2, and 3 were badly ruptured. Boilers 2 and 3 were completely disabled, casing and tubes ruptured, brick work torn loose dropping into firebox. Although the casings in boiler number 1 were red hot and ruptured, and the fire brick was loose and broken, this boiler continued to operate using two burners and was able to maintain the auxiliary steam pressure at 200 pounds. Boiler rooms 4, 5, and 6 were filled with heavy smoke and gas and crews were partially overcome. These fire rooms had to finally be secured and abandoned. It was impossible to clear these firerooms of smoke, and on investigation it was found that the gases from #1 boiler were discharging through bomb hole into 2nd boiler group intakes, thence to firerooms 4, 5, and 6. With only #1 boiler furnishing auxiliary steam, the forward generators were secured. And entire electrical load shifted to after generators.

Superheater boilers number 7, 8, and 9 were steaming with cross connection valves opened.

1440 -- (about) -- Stopped engines.

With frequent changes of personnel, #1 boiler continued to operate with two burners in use, furnishing steam to auxiliary machinery. Sent crew into #4 fireroom with gas masks, (these proved more effective than rescue breathing apparatus) and lighted fires under #4 boiler. Speeding up #1 blower slightly alleviated heavy smoke condition, and #4 boiler was cut in about 1520. Crews with gas masks lighted off #5 and #6 boilers and cut boilers in at about 1540. Secured #1 boiler, eliminating discharge of flue gases; this put six boilers on the line. Repair parties were working during this period to blank off bomb holes in uptakes.

1540 -- All engines ahead, working up to 15 knots.

1550 -- Reported ready to make 20 knots or better.

1600 -- Ahead 19 knots. Received word to standby for air attack. Ahead emergency full speed on all engines -- closed main steam line cross connection valves in superheater firerooms. Steaming at maximum speed, 23 knots, 210 r.p.m.

1620 -- (about) -- Torpedo hit port side at approximately frame 90. Heavy jar felt throughout machinery spaces, lost lighting when main circuit breakers went out on after board, steam dropping rapidly. Ship took decided list to port. Emergency diesel generators cut in, but circuit breakers failed to hold, evidently due to short circuits. Approximately 30 seconds later second torpedo hit about frame 75 port. Main and auxiliary steam pressure had now been lost, ship continued to list heavily to port. With list fast approaching 30°, word was received to standby to abandon ship.

D. COMMUNICATION

Communications functioned normally through the bombing attack except that several antennas carried away and there were several intermittent transmitter failures due to the jarring out of relays; these casualties were repaired immediately. Between the time of the bombing attack and the torpedo attack intermittent transmitter trouble was experienced in two aircraft circuits, possibly from partially grounded antennas.

The repairs made to damage received by the Radar and YE antennas in the battle of the Coral Sea stood up very well during the bombing attack, and both Radar and YE continued to function until the torpedo attack.

When it was decided to abandon ship, it was further decided that the best disposition that could be made of Secret and Confidential Registered publications was to leave them in the safes and vaults to go down with the ship. Before leaving the ship, the Communication Officer inspected the Code Room, through the escape hatch leading to the deck above, and noted the safes to be closed and publications to be cleared from the desks.

Upon return to the ship, with the salvage party, the mass of files and other papers which, from force of the torpedo explosions, had been thrown to the deck of the Communication Center and Code Room was gone through carefully, and all matter of a confidential or secret nature was secured in safes except for the secret and confidential dispatch files of Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN (Commander Cruisers, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET). These were taken from the ship and transported to Pearl Harbor where they were turned over to the shore office of Commander Cruisers, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET.

All secret and confidential files of Yorktown were left secured in various safes and offices and went down with the ship.

E. MEDICAL

Prior to the air attacks on June 4, all battle dressing stations were manned and first aid articles were distributed throughout the ship. When the word was passed, "Standy for air attack", all dressing station personnel below decks lay down in their flash proof clothing, pulled the hoods over their heads, and covered their faces with their arms. In the bombing attack, battle dressing station No. 5, in the wardroom annex, was put out of commission by a bomb hit immediately adjacent to it. The explosion set the station on fire and filled the surrounding vicinity with heavy smoke. All personnel there were badly shaken but were not otherwise injured, as all were lying down and were covered with flash proof clothing. These personnel proceeded to the flight deck and hangar deck to assist wounded there.

Battle dressing station No. 4 was flooded and destroyed by a torpedo during the torpedo attack.

As result of the bombing attack many seriously wounded were treated at the dressing stations, the majority coming from the fantail and flight deck. The wounds were principally shrapnel wounds, many of them being penetrating, and requiring blood transfusions and blood plasma. The more serious ones required immediate surgery.

While those requiring immediate surgery were being transferred to the operating room, word was passed to standby for torpedo attack. Within a few minutes we were struck by torpedoes and listed heavily to port. All lights and communications were out. The ladder leading up from the vicinity of the sick bay was damaged, hanging loose on one side, making it very difficult to get patients up.

When word was passed to abandon ship, and wounded were being evacuated, it was found that the process was very difficult because due to the slippery decks and heavy list, it was impossible to carry stretchers across the deck. In some cases stretchers were dragged across, and in other cases patients were carried bodily.

Due to the fact that we were unable to launched our boats, the wounded were lowered over the side in boas from other ships or onto life rafts or into the water alongside rafts or rubber boas and were later picked up. All such wounded were equipped with life preservers.

The Medical Officers in rescuing destroyers and cruisers, assisted by surviving medical personnel from Yorktown, set up improvised operating rooms on those vessels and worked throughout the night on wounded men.

Among those rescued there were 55 men requiring hospitalization. Among these there was but one case of serious burns, practically all of the others being shrapnel wounds. About 60 men were treated for minor shrapnel wounds, and for rope burns incurred as result of sliding down ropes into the water.

With the salvage party which returned to the Yorktown, there was one Medical Officer and six hospital corps ratings. This group proceeded with attempts to identify the remains of those dead who were still on board and in the preparation of them for immediate burial. 35 were found, and all but 10 were identified. Finger prints of all were obtained. These men were buried at sea after burial services conducted by the Captain. When the torpedo attack occurred in mid-afternoon the identifications, finger prints, and valuables of these men, which had been placed on the hangar deck, all slid down the sloping deck and were lost over the side.

When the Yorktown was torpedoed, a number of men were knocked over the side and were in the water when the Hammann's depth charges were exploded. Many of whom were seriously injured. How many fatally is not known. There were some injuries sustained by men in the ship consisting principally of fractures from the shock of the torpedo explosions. These were transferred to the Vireo and later to destroyers for transfer to Pearl Harbor. Upon arrival at Pearl Harbor ten of these were transferred to the Naval Hospital for X-rays and treatment of injuries.

 

[Lucky13]

Screening Vessels

1. In the action on June 4, 1942, the actions of the accompanying cruisers and destroyers of Task Force 17 in screening this vessel and in furnishing anti-aircraft defense against both bombing and torpedo attacks were carried out efficiently and smartly. Although the Yorktown maintained an irregular zigzag a high speed, screening vessels maintained positions in formation and put up heavy anti-aircraft fire.

2. All the accompanying vessels of the salvage group which returned to the Yorktown performed their duties in an outstanding manner. It is felt that the success of the Japanese submarine attack against the Yorktown and Hammann was due solely to the extreme difficulty of screening a carrier dead in the water, and to the additional fact that conditions for supersonic sound detection of submarines were especially poor. After the attack, destroyers in the attack group pursued and attacked the enemy submarine vigorously and relentlessly. In rescuing and affording accommodations to survivors from the Hammann and to the Yorktown salvage party the work of the destroyers was highly praiseworthy.

The performance of duty of Commander Arnold E. True, Commanding Officer of the Hammann, in placing and maintaining his vessel alongside Yorktown, in the open sea, and in making possible the salvage operations which, up until the time of the submarine attack in mid-afternoon were so successful, is worthy of the highest commendation.

Captain Sauer, Commander Destroyer Squadron SIX, Commander Holcomb, Commander Destroyer Division TWENTY-TWO, the commanding officer of each destroyer, and the commanding officer of the Vireo, each exerted himself to the fullest extent of the capabilities of his command toward the rescue and comfort of survivors.


Comment and Recommendations

5. A. Air


1. It is patent that the loss of the Yorktown was due to the fact that all attacking enemy planes were not shot down prior to the delivery of their attack. It is believed that the employment of the fighters available to the Yorktown fighter director on each of the two attacks on June 4th was correct and timely, and that the results obtained by the Combat Air Patrol in each of those attacks were excellent.

It is essential for the defense of carriers against air attack, that the maximum fighter umbrella be maintained over those carriers at all times. In order to accomplish this it is necessary that carriers assigned to a mission be concentrated as closely together as the tactical and strategical situation will permit. When the strategical or tactical situation appears to require separation of carriers acting on a single mission the advantages accruing from such separation should be most carefully weighted against those of fighter concentration which must be sacrificed by separation of the carriers.

2. It is strongly recommended that a conference be held on the earliest possible date, of all carrier Air Officers, Air Plot Officers, Air Group Commanders, and Fighter Director Officers for the purpose of the complete standardization of carrier operations in so far as flight deck procedure, fighter director procedure, methods and means of dissemination of navigational data and other information to pilots, landing circle and approach procedure, etc. is concerned. At the present time there exists in each carrier certain individual ways and means of accomplishing the common results toward which we are all striving. Such variation in methods leads to delays, annoyances, and even confusion when squadrons are landing on carriers other than their own. In action this lack of complete standardization, if it causes any delays and confusion, is unacceptable.

B. Gunnery

1. The following listed alterations should be installed.

(a) A workable hand-powered ammunition supply for 5"38 caliber guns.
(b) A hand-operated cooling system, as an auxiliary, for the water-cooled automatic guns.
(c) Automatic fuse setters for 5"38 caliber guns not already so equipped.
(d) Automatic parallax control for 5"38 caliber fire control installations not already so equipped.
(e) Replacement of 5"38 caliber guns, 1.1" guns and 50 caliber machine guns, by a large number of 40mm automatic guns. While smaller caliber automatic guns have proven effective at short ranges, their range is too short to offer effective opposition to attacking planes prior to delivery of their attack. 5"38 caliber guns are very effective at long ranges and should be retained in ships which are used as anti-aircraft screening vessels.
(f) Replace a considerable percentage of the present 20mm explosive projectiles with A.P. projectiles. Observations in this and preceding actions indicate that the present 20mm projectiles seldom reach vital spots, and carry too small a charge to cause serious damage to surfaces against which they explode.

2. It is proposed that a special rating designation "automatic gunners" be created, and the designation to carry extra pay.


Engineering
The recommendations made under Engineering in my report of action of May 8, 1942, in the Coral Sea are hereby reaffirmed.

Damage Control

In addition to the recommendations made in the report of damage (Enclosure C) it is recommended that:

(1) Protected stowage for fully ready torpedoes be provided at the hangar deck level, readily accessible to the hangar, for the reaming of torpedo planes.

(2) More complete splinter protection be provided around exposed gunnery, fire control, and other vital control stations.

(3) All offices, principle control centers, and practically all officers' staterooms on board ship contain large quantities of papers, books, and records which are of little value. For example, intra-ship correspondence, letters concerning matters long since accomplished, and long range administrative matters which are of no immediate concern to active operations. It is recommended that all files be thoroughly inspected at least once a quarter and that all papers which are not necessary for the conduct of active operations be removed from the ship by burning or, in the case of papers having permanent value, by sending them to some shore stowage place. Type commanders' administrative offices on shore might offer a place of stowage and for filing of such papers.

3. It is believed that most ships carry too great a quantity of consumable stores of an inflammable nature. Examples: Stationery, canvas, light clothing, drill and other textiles, rags, etc. It is recommended that ships be restricted to 2 months' normal supply of all such items which are not or real military necessity.

4. All officers' civilian clothing, with the exception of such as in needed for athletic used (including golf, tennis, or hiking on shore) should be required to be removed from ships.

5. Light weight inflatable life belts should be provided for all hands.

All kapok life jackets retained should be provided with a crotch-strap to prevent the life jacket from slipping up around the neck.


Navigation
When electric power was lost during the torpedo attack the rudder was left jammed about 15° left. Even if motive power had been available, the ship could not have been steered because there was no means of actuating the hydraulic steering rams. It is recommended that some means of steering the ship by hand be provided.


Communications
The recommendations for the immediate procurement of super-high frequency radio communications for use between carriers and their aircraft and among fighter directors, made in my report of action of May 8, 1942, in the Coral Sea, are hereby reaffirmed.

6. The Commanding Officer can not praise too highly the aggressive fighting spirit of the entire complement of the Yorktown and her Air Group, not only in the Battle of Midway but in all the actions of the present war in which they have participated. These are:

(1) The attack against the Marshall and Gilbert Is., on Jan 31, 1942.
(2) The attack against Salamua and Lae on March 10, 1942.
(3) Three attacks against enemy forces at Tulagi on May 4, 1942.
(4) The attack against enemy carriers off Misima I., on May 7, 1942.
(5) The night action against attacking enemy aircraft on May 7, 1942.
(6) The battles in the Coral Sea on May 8, 1942.
(7) The battles north of Midway on June 4, 1942.
(8.) The fighting actions of the salvage party up until the time the ship was fatally wounded by submarine torpedoes on June 6, 1942.

During all these actions and the many weeks at sea in preparation for them the fighting spirit of Yorktown was peerless; that fighting spirit remains alive even though the ship herself has perished gloriously in battle. The wish closest to the hearts of all of us who were privileged to serve in that gallant ship is that she might be preserved not only in memory but by the crew's being kept together to man, commission, and return against the enemy a new aircraft carrier, preferably another Yorktown.

signed
E. BUCKMASTER.

 

[Njaco]

Lucky, this is awesome! Loved reading it.

 

[Lucky13]

Just as much as I enjoy to look around for it I hope... Here's some more.

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON SIX, PACIFIC FLEET

A16-3
Serial 094
June 12, 1942.

From: Commander Task Group 17.4
(Commander Destroyer Squadron SIX.)
To: Commander Task Force SEVENTEEN.
(The Commander Cruisers, Pacific Fleet).

Subject: Japanese Torpedo Plane Attack on U.S.S. Yorktown
During Battle of Midway, June 4, 1942 -- Report of.

Reference: (a) U.S. Navy Regulations, 1920, Art. 712.

Enclosure: (A) Copy of War Diary of Commander Destroyer
Squadron SIX for Period June 4-8, 1942.


1. At 1434, June 4, 1942, Commander Task Force SIXTEEN directed Vincennes, Pensacola, Balch (Commander Destroyer Squadron SIX), and Benham to proceed to he aid of Task Force SEVENTEEN which shortly before had been under a heavy Japanese dive bombing attack. Heavy smoke (oil fire) and A.A. bursts, bearing 315° (T), distance about 12 miles, had been previously sighted in vicinity of Task Force SEVENTEEN. At 1522 the above unit joined Task Force SEVENTEEN and augmented screening circle around Yorktown, distance 2000 yards at speed 20 knots. Commander Destroyer Squadron SIX assumed temporary command of Task Group 17.4 (Balch, Benham, Morris, Anderson, Hammann, Hughes, and Russel). Yorktown, steering various courses at speed 5 knots, was smoking heavily from forward section of stack.

2. From 1449 until the torpedo attack numerous reports of "bandits" were received over the warning net from various units of Task Force SEVENTEEN and Task Force SIXTEEN. At 1624 Task Force SEVENTEEN formed cruising disposition Victor on course 090° (T), speed 15 knots, Yorktown guide at center of a circular anti-aircraft screen.

3. At 1641 a group of five enemy planes (later identified at TB) were sighted in line abreast or in a broad Vee formation on bearing 350° (T), distance about 10 miles, position angle 10° heading toward port beam of Yorktown. Shortly thereafter at least four planes, believed enemy, shot down by our fighters, were sighted falling in flames bearing about 10° to left of above planes. Vincennes and Benham opened fire on enemy planes with 5" A.A. battery. Immediately thereafter ships on attack side of formation (port flank) commenced firing with A.A. weapons, medium and close range. Our fighters followed torpedo planes in to the screening circle of cruisers and destroyers and then sheered off to pick them up after torpedo release. One friendly fighter was seen to crash in a vertical dive and one additional Jap plane was brought down in flames before the first torpedo bomber reached the screening circle. The Jap planes at this point were converging singly toward the carrier over an arc of about 45° in a shallow glide and a slow zigzag course at a speed approaching 200 knots. While A.A. fire was heavy, no plane was observed brought down by surface ship fire prior to reaching the torpedo release point.

4. At least four planes, of an estimated ten to twelve Jap planes in the attack group, reached the torpedo release point. Of this number, only two were observed to drop torpedoes -- the remaining two sheered off due possibly to Yorktown A.A. fire and to crowding of a third Jap plane which was slightly ahead and between the two. Two torpedoes are believed to have hit the Yorktown about amidships on the port side following which, she took a heavy list to port.

5. Of the estimated four Jap planes which reached the carrier, three were observed shot down during retirement: one by own VF, one by Balch short range weapon fire (1.1 and 20 MM battery), and one by Balch 5" battery firing a 2.0 second barrage using A.A. common projectile fitted with the Mark XVIII time fuze.

6. No further attacks were made on the formation. Yorktown stopped as a result of the torpedo hit(s) and the cruisers and destroyers of Task Force SEVENTEEN commenced circling, distance 2000 yards, speed 20 knots. Preparations for abandoning ship were being made on the Yorktown and actual abandonment commenced in an orderly fashion at about 1700. Balch, Benham, Anderson and Russell were directed by Commander Destroyer Squadron SIX to close carrier and rescue personnel in water. The large number of personnel in the water immediately surrounding the Yorktown prevented any destroyer from going alongside the listed ship. All destroyers participated in the rescue operations -- each destroyer being ordered to clear and rejoin screening circle when it was considered that sufficient survivors had been taken on board. A total of about 2270 survivors were rescued by the destroyers. Rescue operations were completed at 1846, June 4, 1942, when Balch completed a slow, close circular search of the Yorktown for survivors.

Survivors recovered:

SHIP and SHIP NUMBER
Benham 721
Balch 544
Russell 499
Anderson 204
Morris 193
Hammann 85
Hughes 24
Total 2270


7. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS AS A RESULT OF THE ACTION.

(a) The 5" battery and close range weapons of surface ships are only partially effective in repelling a determined torpedo attack because of the low rate of fire of the 5" battery and fuze failures; short effective range of the 20 MM guns; and the failure of short range weapon gunners to lead the target sufficiently.

(b) Japanese torpedo plane pilots pressed home their attack against strong fighter opposition and heavy anti-aircraft fire and released their torpedoes at ranges under 1000 yards.

(c) Japanese torpedo planes are highly maneuverable and fast (about 200 knots loaded).

(d) Japanese planes appeared to pierce the screen between adjacent ships. This gave a difficult high bearing rate problem for close range weapon gunners.

(e) Effectiveness of VF protection -- insufficient number of VFs but excellent work was performed by those engaging the enemy.

(f) Screening vessels must close the carrier to not more that 1500 yards and all available CAs and DDs should be on the same circle.

(g) Rescue cargo nets should be held off ships sides by distance pieces (4" x 4" timber) to facilitate climbing.

(h) Rescue hoisting lines should be fitted with a hook to permit of quick fitting about the body. Oil soaked lines can not be tied properly.

(i) Ring life buoys should be painted yellow.

(j) Thorough instruction and stationing of officers and men for rescue work is essential.

8. The conduct of officers and men was satisfactory. The exemplary conduct of certain men during the rescue operations is covered in the reports of the ships concerned. The outstanding conduct of Doctor Claude m. Lee, Jr. (Lt. (jg) M.C., U.S.N.R. U.S.S. Balch) in caring for the 544 survivors rescued by the Balch, his all night occupation with the operative and surgical care of injured men, his forethought in providing adequate and special medical supplies and in training of personnel to handle this particular emergency will be made the subject of a special letter in which he will be recommended for advancement to the rank of Lieutenant.

[signed]
E.P. Sauer.

DISTRIBUTION:

ComTaskFor 17 (7)
ComTaskFor 17.5 (1)
ComTaskFor 16 (2 less enclosure A)
ComDesPacFlt (1)
CDS 2 (1)
Hughes (1)
Anderson (1)
Russell (1)
Morriss (1)
Balch (1)
Benham (1)
Hammann (1)

 

[Lucky13]

DD412/P6-1

Serial 2 U.S.S. Hammann, (DD412),
C/O Fleet Post Office,
Pearl Harbor, T.H.

June 16, 1942.

From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Via: (1) ComTaskGroup 174. (Comdesron Two).
(2) ComTaskFor 17.

Subject: Action Report; 4-6 June, 1942.

Reference: (a) Art. 712, U.S. Navy Regulations.

1. In view of the fact that the Hammann was sunk about 1600 on June 6, with total loss of all records, this report must be made entirely from memory. Consequently, no record of the ship's track is included and times and locations given are only approximate. However, the Hammann was at all times in company with other vessels and comparison of this report with their records should indicate times and places accurately. The Hammann was operating under Commander Taskforce 17 consisting of Yorktown, Astoria, Portland, Morris, Russell, Hammann, Anderson, and Hughes. The destroyers were designated as Task Group 17.4 under administration and tactical command of Commander Destroyer Squadron Two.

2. On the night of June 3, reports were received by radio of scouting plane contact with two AKS accompanied by two small vessels 450 miles West of Midway and a group of eleven or twelve ships containing two or three BBs, two or three CAs, one CV, and destroyers 700 miles west of Midway on course 090, speed 20. Taskforce 17 at this time was about 300 miles NNE of Midway. Taskforce 16 was in the same area. During the night both taskforces moved in a Southeasterly direction.

3. On the morning of June 4, contact was made by scouts from Midway with another enemy force containing two BBs, two CAs and 4 CV with destroyers located about 200 miles SW of the taskforces. Taskforce 16 flew off air attack groups about 0900 (LWT) and taskforce 17 launched air attack groups about 1000. Taskforce 17 then took a closing course. The taskforce took antiaircraft disposition "V" with the two cruisers twenty five hundred yards on relative bearing 060 and 300 and DDs on relative bearings 020, 120, 180, 240, and 340. Hammann was on 020. About 1300 the first planes of returning attack group approached and two or three fighters landed. At this time the OTC broadcast over TBS that a large group of unidentified planes was approaching from Westward, distant 26 miles. Planes in the landing circle were signaled off and preparations made to repel attack.

Fighters picked up the enemy bombers about 5 miles out and shot down a large number, eight or ten as a rough estimate. It seems probable that there were 18 planes in the attack group. The remainder came on through and attacked the Yorktown, obtaining two or three hits. This vessel definitely shot down one enemy plane with 20mm as he was escaping after dropping his bomb and got probably hits on others. The entire attack lasted only a few minutes. Hammann fired 120 rounds of 5" and about 900 rounds of 20mm. Yorktown began smoking heavily and slowed to a stop. DDs and cruisers in screen began circling. This continued for about ten minutes while Yorktown was fighting fire. At this time one of our own bombers returning circled close aboard the Hammann and threw a note on deck stating that one of our torpedo bombers was down 8 miles distant, bearing 240° Did not take any action as it appeared there were still some unidentified planes in the vicinity and Yorktown required full support. About 5 minutes later another plane crashed in the water about 2 miles ahead of Hammann. As there were now no further indications of enemy planes in the vicinity, proceeded to pick up pilot and radioman from this plane, slightly injured. Plane proved to be from Enterprise. Upon completion, sighted the rubber boat of the torpedo bomber previously reported to us about five miles Southward and proceeded at 30 knots to pick them up. Pilot was rescued only slightly injured but radioman was dead. Returned at 30 knots and rejoined Yorktown screen. Yorktown shortly increased speed to ten knots and then to fifteen.

4. About 1430 enemy planes were reported approaching from the West. Yorktown appeared to have damage well under control, making 15 knots, and launched all fighters on deck. Shortly afterward a group of 12 to 18 torpedo planes made a direct attack on Yorktown from her port quarter. Hammann was able to fire a barrage on a line passing just astern of Yorktown to path of incoming planes. It appeared that six or eight enemy planes were shot down during their approach but it could not be determined by whom. Hammann shifted fire to a plane on Yorktown's bow and definitely shot him down with 5". The attack was pressed in to close range and several torpedoes struck the Yorktown. Several more enemy planes were shot down by gunfire at close range after torpedoes were dropped. Hammann shot down two definitely and possibly three with 20mm as they were retiring.

5. After the torpedo attack Yorktown listed heavily and slowed gradually to a stop. Screening vessels formed a circling screen. Three destroyers were ordered to stand by Yorktown. About 1700 Yorktown began abandoning ship. As the first three destroyers began to fill up with survivors, Hughes and then Hammann were ordered by Comdesron Two to leave screen and assist in picking up survivors from the water and life rafts in vicinity of Yorktown. Twice during the rescue operations, unidentified planes were reported in the vicinity but no enemy planes were sighted. Hammann went close astern of Yorktown and picked up the last of the survivors including the commanding officer, Captain BUCKMASTER. Total survivors rescued by Hammann was 87.

6. Upon completion of rescue work, cruisers formed column, screened by destroyers. Hammann went alongside Astoria, as directed by CTF-17, and transferred Captain BUCKMASTER and two of his officers. Resumed station in cruising disposition on Easterly courses. Hughes was directed by CTF-17 to return and standby Yorktown. The two cruisers from Taskforce 16 left the disposition to rejoin their taskforce. At sunrise the following morning, destroyers were directed to transfer all Yorktown survivors to Portland and to fuel from Portland during the transfer. While Balch and Benham were transferring survivors, Hammann went alongside Astoria, as directed by CTF-17, and received Captain BUCKMASTER and a salvage party of Yorktown officers and men. About 1500, Hammann followed Anderson alongside Portland. Transferred Yorktown survivors to Portland and received additional Yorktown officers and men for salvage party. Fueled to 90% capacity. Upon completion, Hammann, Balch, and Benham, designated as Taskgroup 17.5, Captain BUCKMASTER, set course 285° T. speed 16 knots to return to Yorktown.

7. About 0400, sighted Yorktown, screened by Hughes, Gwin and Monaghan, about 8 miles on starboard beam. Changed course to join this screen and continue screening till daylight. At 0615, Hammann went close aboard Yorktown and transferred salvage party consisting of Captain BUCKMASTER, 29 officers, and 130 men to Yorktown. Hammann rejoined screen. About 0800, CTF-17.5 directed Hammann to lie off, close on starboard bow and provide hoses and water for fighting fire. It was found impossible to lie clear of Yorktown and maintain position accurately enough to permit effective assistance, so Hammann came in and moored alongside Yorktown forward. The ship rested against Yorktown's bilge keel but splinter mattresses and large fenders dropped between prevented any damage other than to bottom paint. While coming alongside, a piece of Manila line was sucked into the port main circulating pump freezing the pump. This engine was secured temporarily while the circulator was opened and the line removed. Two hoses were led to Yorktown with foamite and one water hose led to flight deck to attack to Yorktown's foamite system to fight fire. One hose was rigged aft to pump in salt water for counterflooding and an oil suction hose to remove oil from Yorktown's port tanks to correct list. Other services were furnished as practicable, including coffee and food for the salvage party. By noon, the fire was reported under control and two or three degrees of list had been removed.

 

[Lucky13]

8. About 1536 (Zone plus ten time) emergency signals were made by destroyers in the screening circle and simultaneously four torpedo tracks were sighted about 600 yards on starboard beam. Hammann signalled for full speed astern on inboard engine in the hope of pulling clear but apparently the torpedoes struck as the signal was being answered. Both forward and after 20mm guns fired at the tracks as the torpedoes had been seen to broach some distance from the ship and they hoped to explode them. General Quarters was sounded when the tracks were first sighted, and though less than one minute lapsed before the torpedoes arrived. Many men reached their battle stations. The first torpedo appeared to pass under the Hammann in the vicinity of No. 2 gun and exploded against the side of the Yorktown. The second torpedo struck the Hammann in #2 fireroom. This torpedo apparently broke the ship's back as a pronounced sag was noted in this vicinity. The forward bulkhead of forward engine room was carried away. Large quantities of oil, water, and debris were blown high into the air coming down on both Hammann and Yorktown. The Hammann was blown out from the Yorktown and aft parting all mooring lines and hoses. The commanding officer received a heavy blow in the solar plexus by being thrown against a desk in the pilot house, which rendered him temporarily unable to breathe or speak and later proved to have broken a rib. The ship began to settle immediately and the Executive Officer, who was on the bridge passed the word "All hands abandon ship." By the time the Commanding Officer was able to walk from the Pilot House to the starboard wing of the bridge, the main deck forward was awash and the ship was settling rapidly by the head. Life rafts had been launched and a great number of men were on the rafts or in the water. As soon as all personnel were clear of the bridge, the Gunnery Officer, Executive Officer and Commanding Officer climbed down the outside ladder to the forecastle deck. The forecastle deck was just submerging and all three swam clear of the ship. It is estimated that the ship sunk within three to four minutes from the time of the first torpedo explosion. Based upon interviews with survivors, it is believed that not more than a total of twelve to fifteen men failed to get clear of the ship and into the water. About one minute after the ship submerged there was a heavy explosion underwater, judged to be either a depth charge or one of the Hammann's torpedoes. The cause of this explosion is unknown. All depth charges had been set on safe when the Hammann went alongside Yorktown in the forenoon, and all safety forks were in place. The safety settings of depth charges had been checked again by Ensign C.C. ELMES, Jr., and James W. THOMAS, Metalsmith first class about half an hour before the ship was torpedoed. At least two survivors noted a torpedo apparently running in it's tube as the ship was sinking.


9. The underwater explosion apparently killed a large number of men in the water and injured about eighty five more of whom twenty six died on board U.S.S. Benham enroute to Pearl Harbor. Of a total of 13 officers and 228 men on board, two officers were known dead and seven missing, twenty five men were known dead and forty seven missing. Of the remainder all were rescued by U.S.S. Benham and returned to Pearl Harbor excepting the Commanding Officer and one man picked up by U.S.S. Balch and later transferred to U.S.S. Gwin for transportation to Pearl Harbor.

10. During the action with enemy aircraft, all officers and men of the Hammann performed their duties with coolness, calmness, and efficiency. Every man's conduct was above reproach. One of the enemy torpedo planes strafed the ship with .30 Cal. machine gun but no personnel were hit. Several machine gun bullets passed through ventilators into the fireroom and were preserved but were later lost with the ship. The strafing plane was shot down by 20mm gun crews. During the phase when survivors were being removed from the Yorktown, all hands exerted themselves to the utmost in getting the men on board and in caring for them after they were on board.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S.S. Hammann
Pearl Harbor, T.H.
June 16, 1942.

From: The Acting Executive Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.

Subject: Action Report; 4-6 June, 1942.

Reference: (a) Article 712, U.S. Navy Regulations.


1. During the action from 4 to 6 June, 1942, I was Gunnery Officer of the U.S.S. Hammann. All of my records having been destroyed, this report is made up from memory.

2. The Hammann was operating with Task Force 17 about 120 miles northeast of Midway Island. On June 4, 1942, at about 1145, enemy planes were reported coming in. These were sighted at a range of 18.000 yards. Our fighters engaged the enemy and the first four or five planes that the director got on were knocked down by our own fighters. The next one was tracked for about 1,500 yards to a range of about 9.000 yards before opening fire. The bursts seemed to indicate at least 50 percent duds and fire was made s till less effective by the ship's maneuvers. This plane flew over the Hammann and jammed the director, for a second, in elevation. Fire was then sifted to a barrage over the Yorktown. The 20MM machine gunners assisted in knocking down a few planes and definitely downed one dive bomber. At about 1430 more enemy planes were reported and sighted coming in on the Yorktown's port side. The Hammann being on the off side of the attack laid a barr! age over the Yorktown's port quarter. The torpedo planes appeared to split up and fire, after maneuvering, picked up a torpedo plane on the Hammann's port bow. He was tracked in and knocked down when still about 3,500 yards from the Yorktown. It is believed and recommended that destroyers be allowed to get off station more in order to permit 100% operation of the 5" AA battery. Radical changes of own ship's course and speed introduced large errors into the fire control problem. Volume of fire was greatly reduced because most of the time only two guns would bear. This is not using an excellent AA battery to the best advantage.

3. The final action of the Hammann occurred at about 1530 on June 6, 1942. The Hammann was moored portside to the Yorktown. At this time four torpedoes were reported on our starboard beam. I was on the bridge at the time. General quarters was sounded and I ran up to the director. I had barely got on top of the director when I sighted 4 torpedo wakes about 500 yards on the starboard beam of the Hammann coming in at about 30 knots. I ordered the forward machine gunner, Willie Virgil Allison, GM3c, 295 72 66, U.S.N. to open fire on the torpedoes with the 20MM machine guns hoping one would broach and possibly be detonated. The after machine gunner, Roy T. Nelson, Sea2c. V-6, 662 20 89, took up the fire immediately. They continued fire until the ship was struck by two torpedoes and their magazines were emptied. When the first torpedo struck the director was severely jarred. Immediately following the first torpedo the second torpedo hit. The jar was very great and I was knocked off the director to the lookout platform. Upon regaining my senses a few second later I saw that the forecastle deck was awash and ordered the director crew and lookouts to put on their life jackets and lay below. They all did so in a very orderly manner. None were left when I left this area. When I got down to the bridge, the executive officer was going down the vertical ladder which parallels the mast and the Captain was the only man on the bridge. We inspected the pilot house, chart house, and radar room and found no one. We then went below. Upon arriving at the break of the forecastle, the Captain, Executive Officer, Engineer Officer and myself all jumped into the water and swam clear of the ship. The Captain pointed at a Mess Attendant, Raby, Edward Wesley, who had been struck in the head and was holding onto the forecastle life line. I swam back to get him and just before I got there the ship went under. Raby, having a life jacket, floated free. At about this time a terrific underwater explosion went off which all but knocked me out. I remember grabbing a life jacket and hanging on. Later I saw the bow of the Yorktown with lines hanging down into the water. I swam over to the Yorktown and hung on to one of the lines until Dr. J.H. Peterson, Lieut. (jg) (MC) USNR, Hendricks, John Rodney, 320 53 16 CTM(PA), U.S.N. and Kline, Lawrence J. 311 46 30, F2c. U.S.N. came along in the Hammann's gig and picked me up. The above three men did wonderful work in picking up survivors and I believe they deserve great credit for their work.

Kimbrel, Barlyn M. 355 91 31, TM1c. U.S.N. sacrificed his life for his shipmates. He rechecked the depth charges after the torpedo hits. He then made men put on life jackets and pushed them into the water. He was the last man to leave the fantail and was apparently killed by the underwater explosion.

Crawford, Alonza Jr., 274 39 37, MAt1c. did wonderful work on board the U.S.S. Benham in taking care of wounded. He stayed up all the first night and worked almost continuously the first day.

signed
C. C. HARTIGAN, Jr.
Lieut.(jg), U.S. Navy,
Executive Officer.

 

[Lucky13]

Bombing Squadron 6 Action Report, Battle of Midway, 4 June 1942

U.S. AIRCRAFT - ACTION WITH THE ENEMY

INSTRUCTIONS

(a) To be filled out by unit commander immediately upon landing after each action or operation
in contact with the enemy.

(b) Do not "gun deck" this report--if data can not be estimated with reasonable accuracy enter
a dash in space for which no data is available.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Date 4 June 1942 Lat. 30-00N Long. 179-00W Time 1230 Zn plus 10

2. Weather Clear - Visibility, good - Ceiling, unlimited.

3. Unit Reporting BOMBING SQUADRON SIX (Enterprise) Type planes SBD-2 and -3
_______________________________________________________________________
4. Nature of Operation: Air Group attack against Japanese Force of four carriers and supporting ships. _______________________________________________________________________
5. Specific Objectives: Japanese carriers _______________________________________________________________________
6. Forces Engaged (include models and markings): Own Enemy
7 SBD-2 4CVs, 2 BBs, 3CA, many DDs
8 SBD-3 Type Zero Fighters Type Kawanishi 95 single float seaplane

_______________________________________________________________________
7. Type of Attack (Own/xxxxxxx(scratch one): Dive bombing with 1000# Bombs. ________________________________________________________________________
8. Enemy Tactics: Enemy ships scattered and circled at high speed attack. General course southerly. Enemy fighters concentrated on VT, made no attacks on VB at altitude, engaged our planes on pull-out. _______________________________________________________________________

9. Brief Description of Action (include altitudes and range of contact. Altitudes and directions of release and withdrawal) enemy disposition sighted to northward, dist. 40 mi. Own altitude 21,000 ft. Reduced altitude to 15,000 during approach. Attack made westerly direction enemy course southerly. Retired to NW swinging around enemy disposition through N to course for Midway (120 deg) thence to ship. _______________________________________________________________________
10. Weapons Employed:
Own Enemy
1000# bombs, twin mound .30 cal.flex.guns. Fighters used .50 cal. and cannon of about 20mm.
_______________________________________________________________________

11. Evasive Action Employed:
High Speed.
Low altitude retirement. _______________________________________________________________________

12. Ammunition Expended (include types and fuse settings. Indicate number of duds.)
15 - 1000# bombs with 1/100 sec. Fuses - No duds. ________________________________________________________________________
13. Results (certain): CVs hit; each by several bombs; huge fires on both; one of these
first hit by VS-6; a third CV hit by VB-3.
________________________________________________________________________
(Estimated): -----
________________________________________________________________________

14. Damage to own aircraft; Effectiveness of leak-proofing and armor.
Ten SBDs lost after pull-out from dives; several becsue gasoline tanks badly shot up,
others for same reason or because of fuel exhaustion. Leak-proof tanks not proof
against heavy small caliber AA and fighter 20 mm fire. Armor effective. One SBD-3
badly shot up - elevators, elevator torque tube, fuselage, and wings.

15. For attack on submarine. ----

16. Remarks: Additional information in sketch.

J. R. PENLAND
Lieutenant, U.S. Navy,
Commander, Bombing Squadron Six

 

[Lucky13]

This remarkable photo shows all fifteen of Torpedo Eight's TBDs as they depart for their attack on Kido Butai on 4 June 1942.

SBD "Dauntless" dive bombers from USS Hornet (CV-8.) approaching the burning Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma to make the third set of attacks on her, during the early afternoon of 6 June 1942.
Mikuma had been hit earlier by strikes from Hornet and USS Enterprise (CV-6), leaving her dead in the water and fatally damaged.

A Douglas SBD-3 "Dauntless" scout bomber warming up on USS Yorktown, in the late morning of 4 June 1942.
It is Number 17 of "Scouting" Squadron Five (the temporarily redesignated Bombing Squadron Five), piloted by Ensign Leif Larsen, but was apparently not one of ten "VS"-5 planes launched on a scouting mission shortly before noon on 4 June. Another of the squadron's SBDs succeeded in locating Hiryu, the only Japanese aircraft carrier of the Midway striking force that was still operational.
The next plane, at right, is "VS"-5's Number 4, which did fly the scouting mission, piloted by Lieutenant John Nielsen.

A Douglas SBD-3 "Dauntless" scout bomber (Bureau # 4542), of USS Enterprise's Bombing Squadron Six (VB-6), is parked on board USS Yorktown (CV-5) after landing at about 1140 hrs on 4 June 1942. This plane, damaged during the attack on the Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga that morning, landed on Yorktown as it was low on fuel. It was later lost with the carrier. Its crew included Ensign George H. Goldsmith, pilot, and Radioman 1st Class James W. Patterson, Jr.
Note damage to the horizontal tail and dual stripes painted on the fin.

A Douglas SBD-3 "Dauntless" scout bomber (Bureau # 4542), of USS Enterprise's Bombing Squadron Six (VB-6), on USS Yorktown (CV-5) after landing at about 1140 hrs on 4 June 1942. This plane, damaged during the attack on the Japanese aircraft carrier Kaga that morning, landed on Yorktown as it was low on fuel. It was later lost with the carrier.
Its crew, Ensign George H. Goldsmith, pilot, and Radioman 1st Class James W. Patterson, Jr., are still in the cockpit. Note damage to the horizontal tail.

A Grumman F4F-4 "Wildcat" fighter (Bureau # 5244) takes off from USS Yorktown (CV-5) on combat air patrol, during the morning of 4 June 1942.
This plane is Number 13 of Fighting Squadron Three (VF-3), flown by the squadron Executive Officer, Lieutenant (Junior Grade) William N. Leonard.
Photographed by Photographer Second Class William G. Roy, from the ship's forecastle. Note .50 caliber machinegun at right and mattresses hung on the lifeline for splinter-protection.

 

[syscom3]

65 years later, Midway is for the birds
By Jackie Main
Article Launched: 05/29/2007 01:00:00 AM PDT


Iwo Jima ... Omaha Beach ... the Battle of the Bulge. These are some of the great and famous battles of World War II. But military historians say the most significant of that war's battles was fought 65 years ago this week - not between vast and bloodied armies but over four days between American and Japanese airplanes flying off carriers near a tiny Pacific atoll of only two square miles called Midway.

The American victory, almost exactly a year and a half after the Japanese seized domination of the Pacific by devastating the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, enabled the United States to control the Pacific sea routes.

Some historians say Midway was the most important battle, not only of World War II, but of the entire military history of the United States. Fought June 3-June 6, 1942, it was certainly the turning point of the last world war.

Recently, I was privileged to be among 12 rarely permitted visitors who were allowed by the United States Navy to pay a two-day overnight visit to this remote island, at the northeast tip of the Hawaiian Archipelago, 1,250 miles northwest of Honolulu. Normally, the island is closed to overnight visitors except VIPs, like Laura Bush and her entourage, who shortly before our April trip were personally given the same thorough tour as we were by Barry Christensen, the Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refugee manager who is helping put together an eco-tourism plan for the protected area.

With him on this atoll, which once held 5,000 residents, was a population only 60 people - who live in historic quarters that used to house Navy pilots and are now home to wildlife experts, scientists and support staff who go sleep to the sounds of beak-clacking, moaning, gull-like sounds and bird cage odors (if their windows are open).

But there is hardly a lack of life on Midway - except now Midway is strictly for the birds. At peak season in spring, almost 2 million make their home here, including some rare species hardly found anywhere els! e in the world.

I was there with a special delegation from the Traveler's Century Club, an organization of people who have visited more than 100 nations. My former boss at newspapers in Southern California, Post columnist Lowell Blankfort, is a member. Remembering my passion for birds and for photography, he offered me his place providing I offer my pictures and story first to the Post.

***

Midway, which after World War II briefly became a postal air station linking the Far East and the United States, and still is an emergency stop for planes flying the Pacific to and from the United States, is home to 75 percent of the world's Laysan albatross-more than a half million nesting pairs. Among the world's Laysan duck population of about 100, Midway has 34.

Other memorable birds include the magnificent frigate with the male's puffy chest when in full plumage, fairy tern, red-footed and masked boobies, Christmas shearwater, black-footed albatross, Pacific golden plover and short-tailed albatross (sometimes called the golden gooney). Descendants of canaries brought to Midway by early settlers also are here, along with predatory myna birds which threaten white terns, sooty terns and black noddies by feasting on their eggs.

In April, a big bird season, no piece of ground seemed untouched by some sort of bird - in the road, on the sidewalks, on the grass and plane runway, Fuzzy Laysan albatross chicks were everywhere.

We were warned about stepping off pathways because the Bonin petrel makes its nest under the ground, which can collapse if stepped on. But the birds aren't the only wildlife. Along the coast are Hawaiian spinner dolphins, endangered green sea turtles and Hawaiian monk seals. Planes defer to the birds.

Commercial flights are totally banned from Midway and special planes, like our Air Services Hawaii turbo-prop, only are allowed to fly at night, lest in daylight their windshields and engines clog up with bird fodder, obscuring pilot vision, endangering the plane and putting in danger stray birds out for some exercise in the skies.

Our group stayed in two-room suites with a bath in refurbished officer bachelor quarters built in 1957-58 for pilots and crew who made sure the Soviets did not sneak through the north Pacific and attack the United States.

We ate in the cafe where we chowed down great American and Thai food prepared by the mostly Thai crew yumm.

Oh, yes. When, upon returning home, I happen to mention Midway I usually get a puzzled look or something like "I've been there, just passing through years ago when in the Navy."

I remind them that some famous historians have claimed it the site of the most important battle in the history of the United States (and some say the world). In World War II, after the U.S. broke the Japanese code, the battle at Midway allowed America and its allies to reverse their course, prevail and the rest is history.

Midway is worth visiting for its immense historical significance, artifacts and memorials-a former home to a population of more than 5,000 people-now a haven of wildlife, migrating birds and sea life.

 

[Lucky13]

USS Yorktown (CV-5) is hit on the port side, amidships, by a Japanese Type 91 aerial torpedo during the mid-afternoon attack by planes from the carrier Hiryu, 4 June 1942. Photographed from USS Pensacola (CA-24).
Yorktown is heeling to port and is seen at a different aspect than in other views taken by Pensacola, indicating that this is the second of the two torpedo hits she received. Note very heavy anti-aircraft fire.

Japanese Type 97 shipboard attack aircraft from the carrier Hiryu amid heavy anti-aircraft fire, during the torpedo attack on USS Yorktown (CV-5) in the mid-afternoon, 4 June 1942. At least three planes are visible, the nearest clearly having already dropped its torpedo. The other two are lower and closer to the center, apparently withdrawing. Smoke on the horizon in right center is from a crashed plane. It is possible that the object very close to the horizon, in center, is another attacking aircraft.

USS Yorktown (CV-5) under attack by Japanese dive bombers from the carrier Hiryu, shortly after noon on 4 June 1942, as seen from USS Astoria (CA-34). One Aichi Type 99 carrier bomber is falling ahead of the ship, with its tail shot off. A bomb has just hit a few hundred feet astern.

Two Type 97 shipboard attack aircraft from the Japanese carrier Hiryu fly past USS Yorktown (CV-5), after dropping their torpedoes during the mid-afternoon attack, 4 June 1942. Note heavy anti-aircraft fire. Photographed from USS Pensacola (CA-24). The destroyer at left, just beyond Yorktown's bow, is probably USS Morris (DD-417).

Two Type 97 shipboard attack aircraft from the Japanese carrier Hiryu fly past USS Yorktown (CV-5), amid heavy anti-aircraft fire, after dropping their torpedoes during the mid-afternoon attack, 4 June 1942. Yorktown appears to be heeling slightly to port, and may have already been hit by one torpedo.
Photographed from USS Pensacola (CA-24). The destroyer at left, just beyond Yorktown's bow, is probably USS Morris (DD-417).

USS Yorktown (CV-5) dead in the water and listing heavily, shortly after being hit by two Japanese Type 91 aerial torpedoes during the afternoon of 4 June 1942. This view was taken prior to the ship's abandonment. Section of catwalk jutting above the flight deck, port side amidships, is directly above the place where the torpedoes struck the ship's hull.

View from above the signal station of USS Yorktown (CV-5), 4 June 1942, during the mid-afternoon Japanese aerial torpedo attack. This view looks forward and to port, with the port leg of the tripod foremast at right. Barrels and gun training limit rails of the .50 caliber machinegun battery atop the island are in center, with the flight deck beyond. At the flight deck edge are the port forward 20mm and 5"/38 gun galleries, with gunsmoke visible outboard of them.

A Japanese Type 97 shipboard attack aircraft (upper right) approaches USS Yorktown (CV-5) during the mid-afternoon torpedo attack by planes from the carrier Hiryu, 4 June 1942. Photographed from above Yorktown's signal station, immediately aft of her tripod foremast, looking forward and to starboard. Note mast leg with radar wave guide at left and signal halliards across the field of view. A .50 caliber machine gun, one of several mounted atop the island, is at bottom, with gun training limit rails above it.

A Japanese Type 97 shipboard attack aircraft flies near USS Yorktown (CV-5) during the mid-afternoon torpedo attack by planes from the carrier Hiryu, 4 June 1942. This plane, which has already dropped its torpedo, is trailing a thin stream of grey smoke from its port wing. Photographed from one of Yorktown's gun positions, with the shield and barrel of a 20mm gun visible at right.

Scene on the flight deck of USS Yorktown (CV-5) shortly after she was hit by two Japanese aerial torpedoes, 4 June 1942. Men are balancing themselves on the listing deck as they prepare to abandon ship. This view looks aft from alongside the island. F4F-4 "Wildcat" fighter visible in the background is Fighting Squadron Three's Plane # 6 (Bureau # 5165), which had been flown by Ensign Brainard T. Macomber during the morning attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. Insufficient fuel prevented it from being launched to defend Yorktown from the afternoon torpedo plane attack.

Looking forward on the flight deck of USS Yorktown (CV-5) shortly after she was hit by two Japanese aerial torpedoes, 4 June 1942. Men are preparing to abandon ship. Island's port side is at right, with the curved supporting structure for the Primary Flight Control booth at top. Knotted lines in the foreground were apparently used to evacuate the island's upper platforms.

Looking to port, amidships, on the flight deck of USS Yorktown (CV-5) shortly after she was hit by two Japanese aerial torpedoes, 4 June 1942.
View shows the damaged port side catwalk at between about Frames 83 90, which was broken and bent upwards by the explosion of an aerial torpedo on the hull below. Arresting gear wire visible is that located at about Frame 91.5. This appears to be a partial double-exposure, with the second image, at bottom, showing the tail of an F4F aircraft.

USS Yorktown (CV-5) dead in the water after being hit by Japanese bombs on 4 June 1942. The ship was hit shortly after noon. This view was taken about an hour later, with fires still burning in her uptakes but other immediate repairs well advanced. F4F-4 fighters that had been parked at the forward end of the flight deck during the attack have been respotted aft, in take off position. Two SBD-3 scout bombers can be seen through the open sides of her after hangar bay.

Scene on board USS Yorktown (CV-5), shortly after she was hit by three Japanese bombs on 4 June 1942. Dense smoke is from fires in her uptakes, caused by a bomb that punctured them and knocked out her boilers.
Taken by Photographer 2rd Class William G. Roy from the starboard side of the flight deck, just in front of the forward 5"/38 gun gallery. Man with hammer at right is probably covering a bomb entry hole in the forward elevator. Note arresting gear cables and forward palisade elements on the flight deck; CXAM radar antenna, large national ensign and YE homing beacon antenna atop the foremast; 5"/38, .50 caliber and 1.1" guns manned and ready at left.

USS Astoria (CA-34) steams by USS Yorktown (CV-5), shortly after the carrier had been hit by three Japanese bombs on 4 June 1942. Dense smoke is from fires in Yorktown's uptakes. Taken by Photographer 2rd Class William G. Roy from the starboard side of the flight deck, just in front of the forward 5"/38 gun gallery. Both guns are manned and ready. Projecting bars beyond the gun barrels are aircraft parking outriggers. Note open sights on the guns and splinter shield plates, fastened together with bolts.

Repairing bomb damage on board USS Yorktown (CV-5), shortly after the carrier was hit by Japanese bombs on 4 June 1942. This hole, about twelve feet in diameter, was caused by a 250 Kilogram bomb that exploded on contact with the flight deck. Its explosion killed and injured many men on nearby guns and set fires on the hangar deck. Two of the dead are under a cover in the top center, by a battery of .50 caliber machine guns.
Photograph looks aft and slightly to starboard from the rear edge of the midships aircraft elevator. The hole was quickly repaired with a timber and steel plate cover, allowing resumption of flight deck activities. This hole, minus the repair, was clearly visible when Yorktown's wreck was examined in May 1998, and looked much as it does in this view.

 

[Lucky13]

Corpsmen treating casualties on board USS Yorktown (CV-5), shortly after the carrier had been hit by Japanese bombs on 4 June 1942. The dead and wounded were members of the crew of 1.1" machine gun mount # 4, in the center background. They were struck by fragments from a bomb that exploded on the flight deck just aft of the midships elevator. This view looks directly to starboard from the front of the midships elevator. The aircraft crane is at left, with 1.1" gun mount # 3 visible in the upper left corner.. Note bearded Chief Petty Officer walking by, flight deck clothing worn by some of those present and fire extinguisher in the lower left.

Scene in the hangar of USS Yorktown (CV-5), 4 June 1942, shortly after fires there from Japanese bomb hits had been extinguished. This rather fuzzy time exposure looks directly aft, with the sloping inner uptake sides at left. One bomb, which detonated on the flight deck just aft of the midships aircraft elevator, set fires in the area seen in the left distance. Note fire hoses on deck, and spare TBD-1 "Devastator" torpedo plane (with obsolete markings) hung under the hangar overhead.

Firefighters at work on board USS Yorktown (CV-5), after the ship was hit by three Japanese bombs shortly after noon on 4 June 1942. This view was probably taken in the hangar as crewmen were extinguishing fires set by a bomb that detonated on the flight deck just aft of the midships elevator.

Bomb fragment damage in the hangar of USS Yorktown (CV-5), 4 June 1942.
This damage was caused by a bomb that detonated on the flight deck just aft of the midships elevator, sending fragments into the hangar and setting fires that were quickly extinguished. Note water on the deck; also ordnance carts and chain fall mechanism stowed in the area.

Scene in the hangar of USS Yorktown (CV-5) during salvage operations on 6 June 1942. A Douglas TBD-1 "Devastator" torpedo plane is being prepared for jettisoning, as part of efforts to lighten the listing ship. Photographed by Photographer 2nd Class William G. Roy. This view looks to port, out the forward hangar bay opening, with the sea visible beyond.

USS Hammann (DD-412) sinking with stern high, after being torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-168 in the afternoon of 6 June 1942.
Photographed from the starboard forecastle deck of USS Yorktown (CV-5) by Photographer 2nd Class William G. Roy. Angular structure in right foreground is the front of Yorktown's forward starboard 5-inch gun gallery.
Note knotted lines hanging down from the carrier's flight deck, remaining from her initial abandonment on 4 June.

USS Hammann (DD-412) disappears beneath the waves, after being torpedoed by Japanese submarine I-168 in the afternoon of 6 June 1942.
Photographed from the starboard forecastle deck of USS Yorktown (CV-5) by Photographer 2nd Class William G. Roy.

An SBD-3 scout bomber, probably flown by the Bombing Squadron Three (VB-3) Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Commander Maxwell F. Leslie, ditches alongside USS Astoria (CA-34) at about 1348 hrs on 4 June 1942. This was one of two VB-3 planes that ditched near Astoria after they were unable to land on the damaged USS Yorktown (CV-5). Photographed from atop Astoria's after superstructure. Note her port aircraft crane, and an SOC floatplane on her port catapult.

A Bombing Squadron Three (VB-3) SBD-3 scout bomber, probably flown by Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Paul A. Holmberg, ditches near USS Astoria (CA-34) at about 1342 hrs on 4 June 1942. This was one of two VB-3 planes that ditched near Astoria after they were unable to land on the damaged USS Yorktown (CV-5). A PBY is flying nearby, in right center.

 

[syscom3]

Great Pics!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

 

[R Leonard]

The vast majority of the on-board shots taken on Yorktown were taken by Bill Roy, one of the ship's company photgraphers mates. His diligence in preserving his equipment and film in two abandonments of Yorktown made these view possible. Bill is still alive and with us.

Thanks for posting his picture of my father's plane taking off for morning CAP duty. Below is a shot of him taken aboard Hornet around 8 June by that ship's company photographers. What you don't know is that the F4F used in this shot aond other shots, as well as some film later incorporated into John Ford's documentary was the same F4F over and over. They took a VF-8 F4F, slapped a rising sun victory flag under the cockpit and shot every pilot with one credit. Then, slapped on a second rising sun and shot all those with two; a third rising sun and those with three, and so on. I have a picture of my father after the battle (actually I've quite a few pictures of quite a few VF-3-42 pilots, before and after the battle) sitting in the cockpit of this particular airplane with four rising suns dancing down the side. He was credited with two enemy planes near Tulagi on 4 May 42, one at Coral Sea, and one at Midway. But that was not the plane (b/n 5244/white 13) he flew during the Battle of Midway, it was the photo prop plane from VF-8.

Below the airplane photo are photos some of the surviving VF-3 paperwork. These are recaps of VF-3 aircraft, scores, pilot status, etc. I have the originals, err, actually carbon copies (hey old timers, remember carbon paper in the pre-zerox days) of the originals.

Regards,

Rich

 

[Lucky13]

Great stuff Rich! Please keep it coming....

 

[R Leonard]

This is the tactical organization of VF-3 drawn up as of 31 May 1942 after the Exec, Lt Cdr Don Lovelace, was killed in a flight deck crash. Each section is assigned a color and that color along with the nominal side number was the official radio call sign for that individual and plane. The document shows, for example, my father as leader of the 3rd Division in 3-F-13, having moved up to Exec to replace Lovelace. His call sign was Blue-13. The reality was that the ship would communicate only with the division leader using his call sign. Within and between divisions communications were usually by first names. There were a few exceptions to that. Thach told Tom Cheek, for example, in 3-F-5 that he (Thach) would call him "Sam" as his fellow Machinist pilot, DC Barnes, was already called "Tom". RAM Dibb, of course was called "Ram". Years later, in the Pentagon, Cdr Tom Cheek would run into Admiral Thach in a hallway and was greeted with a "Well, Sam, how have you been." Tom once remarked, "I guess I was 'Sam' forever."

As another note, although each pilot was assigned a particular plane, one actually took what was available in the launch spot. That's why you see in the histories that Thach flew 3-F-23 in his morning strike escort mission; that plane was first in line and ready to go. Of course, later, when he also went to add his greetings to the incoming Japanese torpedo planes, he was in his assigned mount, 3-F-1; one, because it was ready and, two, because my father, as Exec/Flt Officer, ordered 3-F-23 struck for battle damage repairs. Of twenty-five VF-3/42 pilots flying at Midway only four, Thach (in 3-F-1 b/n 5171 in the afternoon), Leonard (3-F-13 b/n 5244), DC Barnes (3-F-17 b/n 5142), and Bass (3-F-22 b/n 5050) actually flew their assigned aircraft. Also, for all you purists, I use the convention "3-F-x" to identify specific aircraft because I like to, in actuality, only the plane number itself was painted on the airplane, thus the number one would have seen on the side of Thach's plane in the morning strike was plain white 23; my father's was plain white 13; the "3-F" part was eliminated early in the war for security reasons.

Anyway, my father snatched this document (a mimeograph) from the VF-3/42 ready room and shoved it in the pocket of his flight jacket before taking off from the ship to greet the incoming Japanese torpedo planes. It is, perhaps, the only original, surviving, pre-battle, document from VF-3 at Midway. As far as I know, there is only one surviving, battle time period related, document for VF-3, an aircraft operations and maintenance report (the ubiquitous "yellow sheet") for b/n 5165, 3-F-6, flown in the dawn CAP by John Bain and, then, in the morning strike escort by Brainerd Macomber. I believe the document is retained the crew chief for this plane. 3-F-6 was struck for battle damage repair and was lost when Yorktown sank.

Rich

 

[R Leonard]

This is one of the maps issued to Yorktown fliers prior to the Battle of Midway showing Midway and surrounding atolls.

R

 

[syscom3]

Thanks Leonard!