Best Fighter III

The RAF didn't want to engage the bombers further out, they lost too many pilots in the Channel that way. And warning of raids was rarely early enough to enable interceptions at sea, anyway.

Longer range for the German fighters would have meant they could have loitered around waiting the the RAF to get to the bombers and then fight them without having to go home early.

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They didn't have to go home early. The problem with the German fighters is that they didn't have an escort doctrine, they saw the bombers as bait, and if they weren't in a favourable enough position for an attack, they didn't. (hence the eventual, after the battle was lost, tying of the fighters close to the bombers)

But again, the point is the combats were close to the German bases, and fuel wasn't really an issue. Only when the battle switched to London did it become so, and even then the 109s had as much combat time over London as the USAAF allowed over Berlin.

And it wasn't a case of the fighters going home, and the bombers getting slaughtered. The Luftwaffe was suffering unsustainable losses of fighters. It wasn't a case of the fighters not getting to the battle, the fighters were getting into heavy combat all the time, hence the thousands of claims they made, it was that they weren't shooting down enough RAF fighters, and losing too many of their own.

Once again, as the point seems to get ignored, in the Channel phase of the Bob, 10th July to 11th August, when the battle was over the channel (which is only a few miles from German bases), the RAF beat the Luftwaffe. 10th July - 11th August the RAF lost 115 fighters in combat, the Luftwaffe lost 88 fighters and 216 aircraft in total in combat. For the RAF, which was focusing on the bombers, it was a success rate of nearly 2 to 1, despite being heavily outnumbered.

Ok I see what you mean Gnomey, but like Adler said if the Germans kept on bombing the aircraft factory's and airfields would forced the RAF on there knees.

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Only if the Luftwaffe had unlimited fighters and pilots. They didn't, their numbers were more limited than the RAF's, and they were always closer to defeat than the RAF. At no stage of the battle, no matter what the targets, were the Luftwaffe actually "wining". At one stage they managed to inflict unsustainable losses on the RAF, but only at the cost of incurring even more unsustainable losses themselves.

The Luftwaffe was shooting down plenty of Spitfires and Hurricanes.

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Never quite enough.

Stephen Bungay in The Most Dangerous Enemy has a couple of tables showing the most successfull days for the Luftwaffe, and the days of heaviest fighting. First the best days for the Luftwaffe:

Date RAF loss Luftwaffe loss Ratio
19 July - 10 - 4 - 2.5:1
7 Aug - 4 - 3 - 1.3:1
11 Sept - 27 - 21 - 1.3:1
14 Sept - 11 - 8 - 1.4:1
28 Sept - 16 - 4 - 4:1

As you can see, on these days the Luftwaffe managed to down more RAF aircraft than they lost. But all these days were fairly quiet, with only small losses. The Luftwaffe could not win with days like these, they needed to inflict much higher losses on the RAF.

Now on to the 5 days of heaviest fighting:

Date RAF loss Luft loss ratio
15 Aug 32 - 75 - 2.3:1
18 Aug 34 - 69 - 2:1
31 Aug 37 - 33 - 1:1
15 Sept 28 - 56 - 2:1
27 Sept 29 - 57 - 2:1

On all but one of the heaviest days fighting, the RAF won by a large margin. It's days like these that decided the battle, because the casualties were so high.

On the quiet days, with only a few combats, the Luftwaffe could sometimes do well. On the days of heavy fighting, the Luftwaffe almost always did badly, losing twice as many aircraft as the RAF.

The Luftwaffe lost the BoB because of a change in strategy from bombing strategic sites such as airfields and factories to bombing cities such as London.

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No, they lost it before they switched to London. They started the battle with far more fighter pilots than the RAF, and greater front line strength. By September, they had frittered away that advantage, and had about the same front line fighter strength as the RAF, with fewer reserves and a much worse replacement rate.

Well syscom3 I will agree with you there.

Well the fact that the RAF was losing aircraft in a material sense was not too big of a deal, Britain had factories that were sh**ting out planes every day, it was the loss of pilots and the difficulty finding replacements for them that was hurting them.

They didn't have to go home early.

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The -109's were always short legged. I dont think 20 minutes endurance over England is exactly benificial.

Just think if the -109's had up to an hour of endurance. They could have hunted the RAF all over England.

i think the main point that every one seems to be missing is that with the exception of the Kriegsmarine all of the german armed forces were geared up for blitzkriege.
There simply was no way that an airforce designed (and it was designed) to be used as ground support could've carried out any strategic bombing campaign. The german tactics required the airforce to bomb the **** out of the enemy positions and let the armoured and mechanised divisions roll over them. Unfortunately tanks don't float (ok some do but not these ones).
Loss of men was the biggest limiting factor for the RAF but why should that be any different from Germany, besides britain had the whole commonwealth and america to call upon for volunteers.
Another reason that the Germans were doomed to fail was their meddleing leader. The BoB wasn't lost over London or the Channel it was lost over the steppes of Russia. Britain was defending a small corner with a concentrated force. Germany was stretched over most of the europe.

[waiting for the axes to fall on the outstreched neck]

U make some valid key points, but the bottom line is that if the Luftwaffe and Goring had kept up with their systimatic destruction of Englands airfields and aircrcraft manufacturing facilities, air supremacy would have been accomplished and the BOB would have been decided... A HUGE what if....

Granted, the German Army was in no posistion to make a Channel crossing, but the RAF would have been elimated as a threat....

Atleast for the time being.

I'm with syscom3 on this one.

Many 109's were shot down as result of its short range, simply being chased down by RAF Spitfire's with plenty of fuel which allowed them to catch up with the now cruising 109's.

Fact is if the 109 entered any kind of combat situation during its stay over Britain, even if it occurred as early as Dover, it would seriously cut down its stay over England if it was to be able to return to home base. Hop doesn't seem to want to recognize this however...

People have been talking about the destruction of the RAF during the BOB alot, well I read somewhere that the objective was not to destroy the RAF, but more simply force the RAF further north more towards Scotland, if that was the case I think an invasion of England was as propable as a Allied Invasion of Normandy, of course the Germans had nowhere near as many ships, but during D-day the Luftwaffe was never actually destroyed it was moved forced further in land

You all seem to be forgetting that all of the RAF wasn't in the Battle of Britain. A simple rotation of squadrons would have brought the RAF numbers against the Luftwaffe up again, in any stage.
The Bf-109 has 20 minutes over London, but most of the combat took place before London. The Luftwaffe was attacking bases, and ports on the south coast which is many miles away from London. Dover is 26 miles away from Calais! If the Luftwaffe attacked Dover, they would have plenty of time over target. But they would have still been shot down in droves, as they were.

The Luftwaffe lost the fight for far more reasons that because the Bf-109 had short legs. Even if the Bf-109 had longer range, it would still be escorting the bombers up-close which would force the fight around the bomber formation. Bad idea ! Once you let the interceptors into the formation, you're going to lose bombers. And the RAF wanted the bombers, getting the fighters was a bonus.

The -109 was still marginally better than the Spit, and a heck of a lot better than the Hurricane.

If the -109's had longer legs, then they could have had all the more time to chase after the RAF. Not to mention provide all the time required for the bombers to do their work.

That I will agree with fully. In my opinion that was really the only downfall the 109 had.

The Bf-109 was not better than the Spitfire, especially not in the situations it found itself in where the combat was taking place around the bombers. The Spitfire pilots would often out-turn the Bf-109 because the slats on the Bf-109 were faulty and even if they worked would scare the pilots not to turn that tightly again.
More often than not, when the Luftwaffe was attacking British shipping and southern air bases the Bf-109 provided escort there and back. But the bombers were still being shot down due to the fact that the Luftwaffe lacked the escort doctrine, the escorts allowed the fight to take place in and around the bombers.
The twisting and turning Hurricanes, would out-turn the Bf-109s and find themselves on the tail or in a shooting position against the bombers. No matter how long the Bf-109s had in the air, if they stuck next to the bombers like they did in reality the battle would have still been lost.

The Hurricane and Spitfire went up against the German formations that were often ten times their size. They attacked the formations and achieved greater kills than losses, against a foe that was near it's base and coming straight at them. If the Spitfire and Hurricane were both marginally and considerably inferior to the Bf-109 respectively, each British pilot deserves a VC for beating the sh*t out of the Luftwaffe and sending them back to the Continent each and everyday.

The shortcomings of the Bf-109 are far beyond lack of range. And the failure of the Luftwaffe to achieve victory go far beyond the Bf-109s lack of range.

The Bf-109 and the Spitfire were pretty much equals throughout the war however at the time of the BoB the 109 had the edge.

Theoretically, but not practically. In combat, the faults of the Bf-109 brought it down to equal when it could have easily been a superior. The major fault was the leading edge slats that jammed when deployed, which meant the Bf-109 would not out-turn the Spitfire as it theoretically could on paper. On top of that, the slats put fear into a lot of young of the Bf-109 which would make them avoid tight turns as they thought the loud bang of the slat deploying was something bad.
The Bf-109 had the speed advantage, but the Spitfire would out-climb and out-turn it's opponent. In the turning fights that often ensued around the bomber formations, this gave the Spitfire an equal playing field. And the Bf-109s often only got the real edge with an experienced pilot in the cockpit that knew not to fear the slats deploying.

I believe the 109 would outclimb the Spitfire as well and the problem with the slats was fixed later.

The advantages the 109 had during the BoB were speed, rate of climb, and fuel injection.
The advantages of the Spit was maneuverability (but not much at the time of the BoB) and radar vector.

In 1940, the moment the Spit went into inverted flight, the engine quit. Plus the -109's armorment was far superior to the .303's the Spit had.

The problem with the leading-edge slats was not fixed until the Friedich and the problem with novice pilots being scared of the sound was never fixed. Although I'm sure it was greatly improved.

The two tactical advantages worth mentioning were the superior armament and fuel injection. Although, syscoms, claim that "...the moment the Spit went into inverted flight, the engine quit." is wrong. The engine would cut out during sustained inverted flight.

In August, 1940, the Bf-109E-7 began to arrive at fighter units. This plane could carry 66-Imp gal drop-tank on the center-line. This would have been more than enough to solve the terrible range of the Bf-109. When the Bf-109s were allowed free-roam (freie Jagd) over southern England they had considerable success. The flexiable formations and tactics of the Luftwaffe pilots allowed them to take a considerable toll on the rigid formations of the RAF, albeit when the RAF adopted the finger-four formation results for the RAF improved.
This period of freie Jagd for the Bf-109E proved that range was, in fact, not a problem. But the problem lay in the tactical error of forcing the Bf-109 to escort the bombers. The Bf-109 was then forced to become tied to the bombers, and lost it's tactical flexability. Now the Bf-109s were being out-turned in and around the bombers by both the Hurricane and Spitfire, and instead of being the hunters, had become the hunted. The Bf-109 was designed to use slash attacks from a great height to get the opponent, but the tactical error of close escort left the Bf-109 vulnerable to them.

I have changed my mind, however, and have come to the conclusion that the Bf-109 had the slight edge because of it's fuel injection and cannon armament. As the Spitfire armament was unacceptable. Howver, the tactical role played by the Bf-109 as a close escort made this superiority unimportant as they were left to become bait for the Spitfire while tied to the bombers.

Fact is if the 109 entered any kind of combat situation during its stay over Britain, even if it occurred as early as Dover, it would seriously cut down its stay over England if it was to be able to return to home base. Hop doesn't seem to want to recognize this however.

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The problem with this theory is that the RAF had it's best exchange rate during the convoy battles phase of the BoB, when the fighting was taking place over the channel (and closest to German bases). It did a bit worse during the airfields campaign, and a bit worse again during the London phase. In short, the RAF's losses got higher, and the Luftwaffe's lower, as the fighting progressed further from the coast. There are good reasons for that, of course, but it indicates that fuel wasn't a major contributor.

You all seem to be forgetting that all of the RAF wasn't in the Battle of Britain. A simple rotation of squadrons would have brought the RAF numbers against the Luftwaffe up again, in any stage.

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The RAF fighter numbers in 11 Group (the one that directly opposed the Luftwaffe) never fell. The Luftwaffe fighter numbers fell almost from the start of the battle.

If the -109's had longer legs, then they could have had all the more time to chase after the RAF.

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That's the point. They didn't "chase" the RAF. The RAF chased them. The biggest constraint on the 109 was lack of ammunition capacity. They had only 6 seconds of cannon ammo, after which they were reduced to 2 mgs.

I believe the 109 would outclimb the Spitfire as well and the problem with the slats was fixed later.

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Depends on altitude. At lower alts, the Spitfire had a large speed and climb advantage, thanks to the Merlin's power (1310 hp vs less than 1,100 for the Db601). At higher altitudes, the Spitfire still held a speed advantage, although I believe climb went narrowly to the 109.

The later E7 was faster at altitude, but they only served in tiny numbers during the BoB.

In August, 1940, the Bf-109E-7 began to arrive at fighter units. This plane could carry 66-Imp gal drop-tank on the center-line. This would have been more than enough to solve the terrible range of the Bf-109. When the Bf-109s were allowed free-roam (freie Jagd) over southern England they had considerable success. The flexiable formations and tactics of the Luftwaffe pilots allowed them to take a considerable toll on the rigid formations of the RAF, albeit when the RAF adopted the finger-four formation results for the RAF improved.
This period of freie Jagd for the Bf-109E proved that range was, in fact, not a problem. But the problem lay in the tactical error of forcing the Bf-109 to escort the bombers. The Bf-109 was then forced to become tied to the bombers, and lost it's tactical flexability.

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Luftwaffe memoirs tend to put the blame for their defeats on Goering, in the same way army generals blamed Hitler. The truth is, close escort was not enforced by Goering until some time in September, after the Luftwaffe had lost. It was ordered because the Luftwaffe fighters had proved incapable of defending bomberws whilst using frei jagd tactics.

In fact, as late as 19th August, Goering was still suggesting more frei jagds, and stressing that the tactics be left to the 109 gruppen commanders:

In the actual conduct of operations, commanders of fighter units must be given as free a hand as possible. Only part of the fighters are to be employed as direct escorts to our bombers. The aim must be to employ the strongest possible fighter forces on free-lance operations, in which they can indirectly protect the bombers, and at the same time come to grips under favourable conditions with the enemy fighters. No rigid plan can be laid down for such operations, as their conduct must depend on the changing nature of enemy tactics, and on weather conditions.

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The Luftwaffe bombers suffered a 7.5% casualty ratio in August. To put that in perspective, the 8th AF suffered about 6.5% losses in October 1943, when they tried unescorted deep penetrations into Germany.

I have changed my mind, however, and have come to the conclusion that the Bf-109 had the slight edge because of it's fuel injection and cannon armament.

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One thing most people don't realise about the BoB is that 40% of the 109s in the battle were E1s, with no cannon and only 4 rifle calibre machine guns, half the firepower of the Spitfire or Hurricane.

Hop said:

One thing most people don't realise about the BoB is that 40% of the 109s in the battle were E1s, with no cannon and only 4 rifle calibre machine guns, half the firepower of the Spitfire or Hurricane.

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That means 60% were not.