You are absolutely correct. Farm machinery is the closest example I can think of. A non-suspended solid-tired piece of machinery(a towed rotary bushhog is a great example) had a top speed on a paved road of about 15 mph. On an unpaved but maintained dirt road it drops to less than 10 mph without shaking the machine and the tractor both to death. Non-suspended pneumatic tired machinery(a large towed scraper) can be pulled pretty fast on a smooth paved surface, on a dirt road, speed is cut substantially,(down to about 15mph) again due to shaking the machinery to death. Suspended, pneumatic tired machinery has no speed limit except for rated limit of the tires.
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You are absolutely correct. Farm machinery is the closest example I can think of. A non-suspended solid-tired piece of machinery(a towed rotary bushhog is a great example) had a top speed on a paved road of about 15 mph. On an unpaved but maintained dirt road it drops to less than 10 mph without shaking the machine and the tractor both to death. Non-suspended pneumatic tired machinery(a large towed scraper) can be pulled pretty fast on a smooth paved surface, on a dirt road, speed is cut substantially,(down to about 15mph) again due to shaking the machinery to death. Suspended, pneumatic tired machinery has no speed limit except for rated limit of the tires.
Shortround6
Major General
- Thread starter
- #103
davebender
1st Lieutenant
Are you saying that modern day RAP artillery ammunition isn't accurate either?
M107 Self-Propelled Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
M107 Self-Propelled Gun - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
What type ammunition is this that increases the range of Israeli M107 SP guns by about 50%?
Shortround6
Major General
First, you believed Wiki again with out checking other sources.
Second, the phrasing is strange. If the original ammo could only reach 32.7km how could any type of ammunitionINCREASE the accuracy at 50km? there was no standard of accuracy to compare to since the older shell's didn't go that far.
Third, there is nothing in that quote that says anything about RAP ammunition.
Fourth, Increases of 40% or more in range have been made by using extended range, full bore ammunition in other guns. Longer shells with much more streamlined ogives and very little parallel body section (shells are stabilized in the bore by long but very short fins called nubs) are used, usually with boat tail sections and sometimes with base bleed units. Small pyrotechnic units (or junior rockets or propellant) that actually provide little or no thrust, they are gas generators that burn just fast enough to provide a gas to fill the low pressure area behind the projectile to reduce drag by providing the equivalent of a very long boat tail.
AS examples the standard American M198 howitzer could reach 22,100 meters with a M107 projectile. It could reach 26,000meters with the ERFB (extended range full bore) ammunition. It could reach 31,800 meters using base bleed.
There was also an ERSC (extended range sub caliber) round developed by Gerald Bull's Space Research Corporation for the 175mm gun. Range was at least 40,000 meters but being a sub caliber (and Discarding sabot round) the shell was lighter than a full bore 175mm round and carried roughly 1/3 the explosive.
Fifth, please note that none of the above are RAP projectiles and development of RAP projectiles has not been very widespread in the last 20-30 years.
Sixth, RAP projectiles have three major problems with accuracy. One is that the rocket doesn't ignite until a number of seconds after it has left the barrel. ANY difference in timing of the rocket ignition (even by 1/100 of a second) is going to affect the trajectory and impact point. Two is that you need absolute consistency in length of rocket burn and thrust. even a few tenths of 1% are going affect accuracy. Third, all shells wobble (yaw) in flight with nose describing a small circle around the flight path. Depending on where in the Circle the nose is pointing when the rocket kicks in greatly affects where the projectile lands.
If you can come up with a guidance package for artillery shells with pop out fins or some such then RAP shells a poised to make a comeback.
Second, the phrasing is strange. If the original ammo could only reach 32.7km how could any type of ammunitionINCREASE the accuracy at 50km? there was no standard of accuracy to compare to since the older shell's didn't go that far.
Third, there is nothing in that quote that says anything about RAP ammunition.
Fourth, Increases of 40% or more in range have been made by using extended range, full bore ammunition in other guns. Longer shells with much more streamlined ogives and very little parallel body section (shells are stabilized in the bore by long but very short fins called nubs) are used, usually with boat tail sections and sometimes with base bleed units. Small pyrotechnic units (or junior rockets or propellant) that actually provide little or no thrust, they are gas generators that burn just fast enough to provide a gas to fill the low pressure area behind the projectile to reduce drag by providing the equivalent of a very long boat tail.
AS examples the standard American M198 howitzer could reach 22,100 meters with a M107 projectile. It could reach 26,000meters with the ERFB (extended range full bore) ammunition. It could reach 31,800 meters using base bleed.
There was also an ERSC (extended range sub caliber) round developed by Gerald Bull's Space Research Corporation for the 175mm gun. Range was at least 40,000 meters but being a sub caliber (and Discarding sabot round) the shell was lighter than a full bore 175mm round and carried roughly 1/3 the explosive.
Fifth, please note that none of the above are RAP projectiles and development of RAP projectiles has not been very widespread in the last 20-30 years.
Sixth, RAP projectiles have three major problems with accuracy. One is that the rocket doesn't ignite until a number of seconds after it has left the barrel. ANY difference in timing of the rocket ignition (even by 1/100 of a second) is going to affect the trajectory and impact point. Two is that you need absolute consistency in length of rocket burn and thrust. even a few tenths of 1% are going affect accuracy. Third, all shells wobble (yaw) in flight with nose describing a small circle around the flight path. Depending on where in the Circle the nose is pointing when the rocket kicks in greatly affects where the projectile lands.
If you can come up with a guidance package for artillery shells with pop out fins or some such then RAP shells a poised to make a comeback.
The Waffen-traggers were based mostly on the a scaled up version of the Hetzer chassis with more width and length. It was to become the universal carriage that all weapons platforms were to be mounted on. It was also proposed for Grille , SP Flak and APC versions. The reason was to replace all the Zg semi tractors [ 5 different weight variants ranging from 1 ton to 18 ton] with a basic 'easy to manufacture' Waffentragger. The upper limit on production of Zg tractors was around 17,000 per year, while trucks converted with ¾ tracks and ¼ wheels [Maultiers] where easy enough that tens of thousands were being built every year by 1943-44, however they could only haul about 2-3 tons.
The basic armored Waffentragger weight in at 13 tons and could be made to mount 150mm howitzer and still make 35kph. The 8-12 ton un armored towing tractor which was needed for the 150mm howitzer, weight in at 11-12 tons and cost as much as a light tank.
BTW march speeds were rarely much more than 15kph. These Waffentragger SP Guns could function as SP Howitzers but with traverse of only +/- 30° for the bigger guns like 128mm gun and 150mm howitzer. The smaller guns like 88 Pak and 105Howitzer traverse was 360° when mounted on these AFVs. It gave the commander options to dismount some of the heavier artillery if he felt that could work.
The basic armored Waffentragger weight in at 13 tons and could be made to mount 150mm howitzer and still make 35kph. The 8-12 ton un armored towing tractor which was needed for the 150mm howitzer, weight in at 11-12 tons and cost as much as a light tank.
BTW march speeds were rarely much more than 15kph. These Waffentragger SP Guns could function as SP Howitzers but with traverse of only +/- 30° for the bigger guns like 128mm gun and 150mm howitzer. The smaller guns like 88 Pak and 105Howitzer traverse was 360° when mounted on these AFVs. It gave the commander options to dismount some of the heavier artillery if he felt that could work.
Just curious, how much did an anti-tank 88mm weigh when it was ready for a road march behind prime mover? Nevermind, found it, 16,000 pounds
Another thing, this thread has gone entirely German(which is fine, I don't care), with talk of weapons dropping down as far as 76 mm Russian and has seemingly settled on self propelled artillery now, and no one has yet mentioned the M7 Priest.
Would the M7 Priest qualify as the best all-round 105 of the war? A good 105 howitzer mounted on, arguably the most reliable, full tracked chassis of the war. What's not to like?
Another thing, this thread has gone entirely German(which is fine, I don't care), with talk of weapons dropping down as far as 76 mm Russian and has seemingly settled on self propelled artillery now, and no one has yet mentioned the M7 Priest.
Would the M7 Priest qualify as the best all-round 105 of the war? A good 105 howitzer mounted on, arguably the most reliable, full tracked chassis of the war. What's not to like?
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Hello Shortround
I know, but when Russians were on your heels, one didn't take too many breaks, so at least 18 hours driving per day and with appr 25km/h average driving speed one got 400 - 500km per day.
Juha
Hello Parsifal
I'd say cool down. During advance, German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day so it should be possible in retreat 40km per day in good conditions. Of course in good blizzard nobody moved much not even Soviets and when thawn set in Soviets had an advantage but it also hindered them, so IMHO at those conditions their advance speed was lower than max they achieved. And on Russian roads, I have experience on those and even tracks.
Juha
I'd say cool down. During advance, German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day so it should be possible in retreat 40km per day in good conditions. Of course in good blizzard nobody moved much not even Soviets and when thawn set in Soviets had an advantage but it also hindered them, so IMHO at those conditions their advance speed was lower than max they achieved. And on Russian roads, I have experience on those and even tracks.
Juha
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Shortround6
Major General
We do tend to wander off track
The US 105 was a good piece of artillery, towed or self propelled. It was not long range artillery. In fact the M-7 may have had slightly restricted range compared to the towed gun. It's maximum elevation was 35 degrees compared to the towed guns 65-66 degrees.
Max range usually being obtained with an elevation of a bit under 45 degrees.
While the M7 was good it was slated for replacement by the M37 or at least to be supplemented by the M-37 had the war gone on any longer.
While mounting a gun on a motor chassis certainly improves it's mobility (as long as you are not crossing a small bridge or river) and drastically changes it's 'into' and 'out of' action times. it does nothing to change it's ballistics (except in some cases to restrict range) and only lowers it's rate of fire for certain mission.
The US 105 may have been the best 105 Howitzer of the war even when towed ( since neither the British or the USSR built 105 howitzers it does tend to limit the competition).
Shortround6
Major General
A few questions on mobility of big guns.
Much has been made of the lack of mobility of the big guns in retreat. While this is true I am not sure there is any way to avoid it. Given the time to get the big gun out of action and hooked up to a tow vehicle it is never going to be at the head of a retreating column. Even if you give it a 400hp tractor and let it ride on 10 pneumatic tires it is not going anywhere if the only road out of Dodge has 2000 horse drawn wagons in front of it. (Ok a bit of exaggeration but still??)
how mobile is mobile enough?
For the British and American armies, which marched the least of all the armies, high speed motor traction was a must. For armored thrusts the SP guns were needed to keep artillery support in range of the forward tanks. While a long ranged heavy SP gun might have been a nice thing to have ( under 74 M12s in theater? not every unit that wanted them had them?), it may have been possible to give 155 support by leap frogging the towed 155 guns. from 10km behind the start line it could provide support 12km into the advance. Which is about the distance a 105 how could do sitting on the start line. By leap frogging a pair of 155 gun batteries one battery should be able to keep in range of the point most of the time. with support form the more numerous 105 SP guns and towed 155 how eigher filling or alternating with the 155 gun support.
An example (and it may be bad) both batteries start 10km behind the front line, once the penetration is made Battery A stays in place while battery B packs up and moves to where the front line was This takes 3 hours or so. Battery B no takes over the heavy support mission and can fire 22km into enemy territory. How far has the penetration gone in 3 hours? Battery A packs up and leap frogs past battery B 8-10km past the old start line. The packup and set up time are the same as battery B, only the travel time has changed. Is battery A ready to resume firing 7 hours after the attack has started? It can now provide fire support 30-32km from the old front line. While battery B packs up and starts it's move.
Please note that the above example makes no mention of enemy aerial attacks disrupting the advance and likewise none of our retreat scenarios mention it either. Many moves on the Russian front were only made at night which is going to slow things down considerably.
Is a particular gun a bad design because the supporting air force lost control of the air and the gun can only be safely moved at night? A big mobility restriction.
I think we may be confusing the actual abilities of the gun/howitzer itself with both the tactical deployment and "support" the gun/howitzer was given.
Abilities of the weapon include not only range and weight of shell but covered arc, ease of moving the covered arc and rate of fire. Ease of set up and coming out of action may be more accurately described as an an attribute or characteristic? as would be weight and size.
The capability of the tow vehicles assigned to a particular piece of artillery, while definitely impacting the mobility and usefulness of the weapon are IMO more related to the "support" given the weapon. As is the ammunition supply. If a gun/howitzer is limited by supply to only a dozen shots per day there is no way it can reach it's potential for impacting the battle field. Now perhaps this shows the foolishness of building guns you can't supply but does it mean the gun itself was a bad gun or a poor design? It may have been a poor choice for an army with limited production capability to back it up which is not quite the same thing.
I may have mentioned it before but the 21st army group fired off over 104,000 tons of 5.5 in shells from D-Day to V-E-Day. A good reliable gun with average performance and lots of ammo is going beat a good reliable gun with super performance and little ammo just about every time (never say always )
Much has been made of the lack of mobility of the big guns in retreat. While this is true I am not sure there is any way to avoid it. Given the time to get the big gun out of action and hooked up to a tow vehicle it is never going to be at the head of a retreating column. Even if you give it a 400hp tractor and let it ride on 10 pneumatic tires it is not going anywhere if the only road out of Dodge has 2000 horse drawn wagons in front of it. (Ok a bit of exaggeration but still??)
how mobile is mobile enough?
For the British and American armies, which marched the least of all the armies, high speed motor traction was a must. For armored thrusts the SP guns were needed to keep artillery support in range of the forward tanks. While a long ranged heavy SP gun might have been a nice thing to have ( under 74 M12s in theater? not every unit that wanted them had them?), it may have been possible to give 155 support by leap frogging the towed 155 guns. from 10km behind the start line it could provide support 12km into the advance. Which is about the distance a 105 how could do sitting on the start line. By leap frogging a pair of 155 gun batteries one battery should be able to keep in range of the point most of the time. with support form the more numerous 105 SP guns and towed 155 how eigher filling or alternating with the 155 gun support.
An example (and it may be bad) both batteries start 10km behind the front line, once the penetration is made Battery A stays in place while battery B packs up and moves to where the front line was This takes 3 hours or so. Battery B no takes over the heavy support mission and can fire 22km into enemy territory. How far has the penetration gone in 3 hours? Battery A packs up and leap frogs past battery B 8-10km past the old start line. The packup and set up time are the same as battery B, only the travel time has changed. Is battery A ready to resume firing 7 hours after the attack has started? It can now provide fire support 30-32km from the old front line. While battery B packs up and starts it's move.
Please note that the above example makes no mention of enemy aerial attacks disrupting the advance and likewise none of our retreat scenarios mention it either. Many moves on the Russian front were only made at night which is going to slow things down considerably.
Is a particular gun a bad design because the supporting air force lost control of the air and the gun can only be safely moved at night? A big mobility restriction.
I think we may be confusing the actual abilities of the gun/howitzer itself with both the tactical deployment and "support" the gun/howitzer was given.
Abilities of the weapon include not only range and weight of shell but covered arc, ease of moving the covered arc and rate of fire. Ease of set up and coming out of action may be more accurately described as an an attribute or characteristic? as would be weight and size.
The capability of the tow vehicles assigned to a particular piece of artillery, while definitely impacting the mobility and usefulness of the weapon are IMO more related to the "support" given the weapon. As is the ammunition supply. If a gun/howitzer is limited by supply to only a dozen shots per day there is no way it can reach it's potential for impacting the battle field. Now perhaps this shows the foolishness of building guns you can't supply but does it mean the gun itself was a bad gun or a poor design? It may have been a poor choice for an army with limited production capability to back it up which is not quite the same thing.
I may have mentioned it before but the 21st army group fired off over 104,000 tons of 5.5 in shells from D-Day to V-E-Day. A good reliable gun with average performance and lots of ammo is going beat a good reliable gun with super performance and little ammo just about every time (never say always
)
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parsifal
Colonel
Im fine, no need to cool down, but thanks for the concern. I would really like to know where your source for 50 km per day for an advance comes from and 40km for a retreat, and what good conditions represents. Are you saying that german Infantry, on a sustained basis, in engaged condition can advance 50km. Thats amazing, I never knew they were such invincible supermen.....that means they are marching at a rate of about of about 5kph sustained, as well as fighting...each and every day....even SAS can only advance at half that rate over broken terrain. Amazing........
My main source for my information is TM101-10, The US Army Staff officers Field Manual (1941). It was published by the Army as the "Bible" for the army, and provided Staff Officers with a Field Manual, for the Organization, Technical,
and Logistical Data on nearly all US Army field operations. In the preamble it says "This manual and FM 101-5, Staff Officers' Field Manual The Staff and Combat Orders, are compilations of information and data to be used as a guide for the operations in the field of the general staff or a similar staff group of all units in peace and war".
Chapter 2, pages 79-148, you will obtain the relevant data for field marches. The material is detailed and meticulous, and entirely consistent with how I was trained. In fact the computations and values are similar to the british model, as inferred in the British Army Regulations, entitled Infantry Training Manual -1937
However a basic summary is set out below, in the context of this discussion
According to US Army doctrine, the average rate of march for trained infantry under favorable weather conditions is 2-1/2 mph over roads and 1 mph cross country. A normal foot march covers 12-20 miles per day. But thats under conditions of disengagement, and assumes clear weather, and full visibility. For conditions of night, or if the formation is in contact with the enemy, or the terrain is more broken, or wooded, the march rates are about half that (typically). According to the US manual, infantry travelling on foot, over open country, which is what should be assumed for Russian conditions (and Ive been there too, incidentally) in an unengaged state, the expected sustained rate of movement for unengaged leg Infantry in 1941 was 12-15 miles per day, but for enaged Infantry, or wher difficulties might be expected, the average rate was about half that rate, or, in metric terms, about 10-15 kms per day. If you try to push your Infantry much above that your sickness rates will go up, typically for example, in unengaged conditions if you increase the march demands to say 20 miles per day (30km per day), you are statistically going to force onto the sick list, about 5% of your Infantry every day that that occurs....if the forced marching continues for more than three days, your attrition rate will double for every three day period after that. Since the situation is a retreat, with the enemy assumed to be applying maximum pressure on your forces, any men reported as unfit, will basically be lost.
I think the mistake you are making is that you are measuring performance on that applicable to a single man or small group on a hiking holiday, with regular rest stops, hot and/or regular meal stops and light loads to be carried. In wartime we are looking at large groups of men, irregular meal breaks, poor rest stops, intermittent combat, and relatively heavy loads being carried. These factors will all have an effect, and are worked out for us in TM101-10.
For the Germans, they did, on isolated occasions, achieve rates of advance of 30km per day for their Infantry. This happened in Belgium in the advance to Antwerp, but it was only over a two day period. By contrast, the leg Infantry following Gp Kleist through the Ardennes took (from memory) 5 days to cover the roughly 50 kms to the front, and that was unengaged. Similar examples can be found in 1941, in the East, but each time their Infantry performed those feats, they either needed rest or they accepted casualties from fatigue. Not as serious when you are atacking, but almost certain to lead to a more serious casualty list when retreating. After Smolensk, for example, the Infantry formations attached to AGC were reporting Infantry strengths of about 40%, on average.....German Infantry formations had fought so hard, and advanced so far, and were exhausted by that time.....it was reported the Heersgruppe to Hitler that it would take the Infantry 6 weeks to recover, so to keep the pressure on the Soviets, he ordered his panzers south in an ill-considered decision.
If we widen our search somewhat, the most celebrated sustained march rate that I know of comes from the napoleonic era, where in the lead up to Austerlitz (I think) the Guard is reported to have marched 70miles in two days,and then gone straight into battle. We do not know how many men had fallen out due to fatigue, or how long they were given to recover, but it does show that in isolatred instances in conditions of being unengaged, it might be possible for a few units, on a very tempoorary basis to reach the march rates you are suggesting
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parsifal
Colonel
I agree with your basic understanding of mobility for heavy guns. And your example of two batteries working together is exactly how artllery is meant to support a retreat....move back by stages, never leave the frontline without support.
Problem for German towed artillery was that it could not undertake this fall back by stages nearly quickly enough (different story completely for their SPGs). Besides the mobility issue, German artillery relied on wire rather than radio to a much greater extent than the Allies, and also had a much more meticulous method of achieving firing solutions. As I said, the time needed to get from unlimbered state to being ready for counterbattery condition was about 3 hours....far too long in a fluid situation. By comparison, British guns (field artillery) that had been unlimbered would be ready for counterbattery or fire support tasks within minutes....same for the US guns. But both the US and British plotting systems were a lot less accurate
But I still happen to think that the German guns compared to their allied counterparts at least were still slower and harder to move, mostly because of the carriage arrangments and wheels. Might be a different stoery once you get into the really heavy Allied gear like their 240mm guns and the like
Problem for German towed artillery was that it could not undertake this fall back by stages nearly quickly enough (different story completely for their SPGs). Besides the mobility issue, German artillery relied on wire rather than radio to a much greater extent than the Allies, and also had a much more meticulous method of achieving firing solutions. As I said, the time needed to get from unlimbered state to being ready for counterbattery condition was about 3 hours....far too long in a fluid situation. By comparison, British guns (field artillery) that had been unlimbered would be ready for counterbattery or fire support tasks within minutes....same for the US guns. But both the US and British plotting systems were a lot less accurate
But I still happen to think that the German guns compared to their allied counterparts at least were still slower and harder to move, mostly because of the carriage arrangments and wheels. Might be a different stoery once you get into the really heavy Allied gear like their 240mm guns and the like
Shortround6
Major General
I think that again, comparing artillery "systems" which are very complicated and interdependent on a number of factors and imposing the restrictions/penalties of the "system" on the equipment (guns) isn't a fair way of comparing the guns.
I don't know but I would guess that part of the German desire for more accurate plotting may come not only from the German characteristic of being more precise but from a chronic ammunition shortage. If you are going to fire a limited number of shells you had better make sure they are on target. And if you are going to revel your firing position to an enemy who has the ability to reply with a much larger "blanket" of shells to mask his imprecise plotting you had better get it right the first time before you are forced to move and start all over. Of course this starts to become a self perpetuating circle.
The US (allied) gear about hit the limit with the 155 M1 gun. The US 8in Howitzer on the same carriage was so good it out lasted the 155mm ( shell weight and variety of shells) and the British 7.2 howitzer that was mounted on the same carriage seemed to have potential but didn't get the development of ammunition that it needed to compete with the 8in howitzer. Anything bigger doesn't seem to show any advance or advantage over the German guns of the same size/performance. The American 8in gun being mounted on the same carriage as the 240mm howitzer. Taking 1/3 of day to emplace without extra construction equipment depending on soil. I mean, does it matter if it takes 9 hours or 12 hours to emplace? These are weapons that are lucky if they can keep up with the speed of the advance even in marching order and certainly cannot be emplaced or picked up to follow a fluid situation.
I don't know but I would guess that part of the German desire for more accurate plotting may come not only from the German characteristic of being more precise but from a chronic ammunition shortage. If you are going to fire a limited number of shells you had better make sure they are on target. And if you are going to revel your firing position to an enemy who has the ability to reply with a much larger "blanket" of shells to mask his imprecise plotting you had better get it right the first time before you are forced to move and start all over. Of course this starts to become a self perpetuating circle.
The US (allied) gear about hit the limit with the 155 M1 gun. The US 8in Howitzer on the same carriage was so good it out lasted the 155mm ( shell weight and variety of shells) and the British 7.2 howitzer that was mounted on the same carriage seemed to have potential but didn't get the development of ammunition that it needed to compete with the 8in howitzer. Anything bigger doesn't seem to show any advance or advantage over the German guns of the same size/performance. The American 8in gun being mounted on the same carriage as the 240mm howitzer. Taking 1/3 of day to emplace without extra construction equipment depending on soil. I mean, does it matter if it takes 9 hours or 12 hours to emplace? These are weapons that are lucky if they can keep up with the speed of the advance even in marching order and certainly cannot be emplaced or picked up to follow a fluid situation.
parsifal
Colonel
Gotta remember as well that from 1935 right through to the end, the Heer was forbidden to train or study techniques for retreat. These were standard studies for the allies. The Germans never really developed SOPs for their artillery whilst giving ground, as a result Germans tended to stand and fight, but when the time came to bug out (and the situation developed fluidity), didnt really have a procedure in place. My opinion is that their artillery procedures were designed to either hold ground (ie, a static situation) , or take ground (ie take out enemy position in a measured, meticulous and carefully planned way) but they were not so good when being pressured to give ground....they tended to accept a rout under those conditions, and their artillery was pretty well tailored in the same way.
- Thread starter
- #115
davebender
1st Lieutenant
The M7 was very capable but also very expensive.
Product prices
$46,465 M7 Priest.
$19,691 (49,228 RM) Pz II.
$6,560 (16,400 RM) 10.5cm leFH18 howitzer.
The German Wespe consisted of a 10.5cm howitzer mounted on a modified Panzer II chassis. Unfortunately I don't have a historical price for that vehicle. However it's probably safe to say it cost half as much as the U.S. M7 Priest.
Product prices
$46,465 M7 Priest.
$19,691 (49,228 RM) Pz II.
$6,560 (16,400 RM) 10.5cm leFH18 howitzer.
The German Wespe consisted of a 10.5cm howitzer mounted on a modified Panzer II chassis. Unfortunately I don't have a historical price for that vehicle. However it's probably safe to say it cost half as much as the U.S. M7 Priest.
Price really didn't matter to the US at that time. We were GIVING airplanes, tanks and trucks away as fast as we could build them.
Were the German machines you referred to being built by slave labor? (this of course has been widely discussed on the airplane forum) If so, that would certainly lower the cost.
Parsifal
if you would read what others write I wrote "German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day" so while FOLLWING the panzer and Inf. division (mot.), so along the roads which were first used by panzer divisions and their artillery and supply columns. And source is the Finnish translation of von Tippelskirch's history of the WWII. V. Tippelskirch happened to has been the CG of 4th A during the destruction of AG Centre in summer 44. And of course such forced marches were hard to infantry.
And pre-war western allies manuals are only that, not necessary apply to divisions fighting in the Eastern Front as seen for ex. the western rule of thumb that a div after 30% casualties was no more capable to normal combat operations, when in the East much more depleted divs had to fought and fought even successfully.
Quote:" I think the mistake you are making is that you are measuring performance on that applicable to a single man or small group on a hiking holiday, with regular rest stops, hot and/or regular meal stops and light loads to be carried. In wartime we are looking at large groups of men, irregular meal breaks, poor rest stops, intermittent combat, and relatively heavy loads being carried. These factors will all have an effect, and are worked out for us in TM101-10."
Really, IMHO you are totally lost, I'm thinking units doing forced marches and knowing that the speed is their only hope to avert death or very grim PoW camp in Siberia.
For example it seems that German 4th A would have made it if the Soviet flanking units would not have had 2 days – 3 days head start because of interference from higher up. And 4th A was retreating in very bad conditions, almost uncontested enemy air superiority (3 weeks after D-Day in Normandy which had attracted was majority of LW fighters in the West), using rather bad road network through swampy and forested areas with lot of partisans harassing them while especially north of them a Soviet pincer was advancing along the Smolensk – Minsk highway, and regular enemy forces attacking constantly their rear and flanks, but some of its divs could march 30-50 km per day, even 85km per day parts of 110. Inf Div on 3 Jul 44, source Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8
Juha
if you would read what others write I wrote "German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day" so while FOLLWING the panzer and Inf. division (mot.), so along the roads which were first used by panzer divisions and their artillery and supply columns. And source is the Finnish translation of von Tippelskirch's history of the WWII. V. Tippelskirch happened to has been the CG of 4th A during the destruction of AG Centre in summer 44. And of course such forced marches were hard to infantry.
And pre-war western allies manuals are only that, not necessary apply to divisions fighting in the Eastern Front as seen for ex. the western rule of thumb that a div after 30% casualties was no more capable to normal combat operations, when in the East much more depleted divs had to fought and fought even successfully.
Quote:" I think the mistake you are making is that you are measuring performance on that applicable to a single man or small group on a hiking holiday, with regular rest stops, hot and/or regular meal stops and light loads to be carried. In wartime we are looking at large groups of men, irregular meal breaks, poor rest stops, intermittent combat, and relatively heavy loads being carried. These factors will all have an effect, and are worked out for us in TM101-10."
Really, IMHO you are totally lost, I'm thinking units doing forced marches and knowing that the speed is their only hope to avert death or very grim PoW camp in Siberia.
For example it seems that German 4th A would have made it if the Soviet flanking units would not have had 2 days – 3 days head start because of interference from higher up. And 4th A was retreating in very bad conditions, almost uncontested enemy air superiority (3 weeks after D-Day in Normandy which had attracted was majority of LW fighters in the West), using rather bad road network through swampy and forested areas with lot of partisans harassing them while especially north of them a Soviet pincer was advancing along the Smolensk – Minsk highway, and regular enemy forces attacking constantly their rear and flanks, but some of its divs could march 30-50 km per day, even 85km per day parts of 110. Inf Div on 3 Jul 44, source Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8
Juha
- Thread starter
- #118
davebender
1st Lieutenant
I agree.
Historically most of the U.S. Army wasn't committed to combat prior to June 1944. Hence we could spend a relatively large portion of the military budget on new equipment rather then funding ongoing combat operations. If most American Army divisions had been committed to combat from 1939 onward it would be a different matter.
Historically most of the U.S. Army wasn't committed to combat prior to June 1944. Hence we could spend a relatively large portion of the military budget on new equipment rather then funding ongoing combat operations. If most American Army divisions had been committed to combat from 1939 onward it would be a different matter.
It is hard not to compare long range guns as a weapons system including their prime movers and associated equipment(such as the crane that traveled with the American 8inch gun and 240 mm howitzer) if you include mobility as part of the equation.
If we leave out mobility, then we need to just line them up side by side and see who shoots the farthest, fastest and most accurate, with the biggest boom at the target, which would probably leave us with the biggest guns such as the American 8 inch and 240 howitzer and all of their counterparts in other countries.
If we include mobility, which I think we should, then we HAVE to include prime movers and any other equipment that a particular army would send along. For instance, the US army sent a 6x6 crane along with its 8 inch gun and 240 mm howitzer. If the Germans did not posses such a vehicle, and it took them 10 hours to set up their weapon of equal size and it took the Americans 2 hours because they sent a crane, then that would definately sway the argument in favor of the US. If the Germans prime mover for their 105 howitzer is a team of 6 horses, and the US 105 is pulled by a halftrack or is an M7 Priest SP howitzer, again I would think that should weigh in on the argument.
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Shortround6
Major General
And the Wespe was of much less value than an M7. It had less than 1/2 the ammo needing extra vehicles to haul the ammo. It had fewer gunners and room to work so the rate of fire was slower and it had a smaller covered arc which meant that it had to be started and pivoted in place to cover targets on the edges of it's covered arc that the M7 didn't have to.
four M7s could carry 276 rounds of ammunition. four Wespes plus 1 ammo carrier had 218 rounds in the five chassis. The M7 had two extra gunners to adjust charges in propellant cases, pull transport plugs and fit fuses to projectiles and set fuses before loading.
so if you want to keep firing for more than a few minutes the M7s have a firing rate closer to the towed guns than a Wespe does. How many Wespes to equal 4 M7s?
Cheap is not always better.
four M7s could carry 276 rounds of ammunition. four Wespes plus 1 ammo carrier had 218 rounds in the five chassis. The M7 had two extra gunners to adjust charges in propellant cases, pull transport plugs and fit fuses to projectiles and set fuses before loading.
so if you want to keep firing for more than a few minutes the M7s have a firing rate closer to the towed guns than a Wespe does. How many Wespes to equal 4 M7s?
Cheap is not always better.
