Best Long Range Artillery Piece

[davebender]

If you insist.

Schwerer Zugkraftwagen 12t Sd.Kfz.8

185hp Maybach engine.
51 kph Road speed.
$18,400 (46,000 RM)



M4 Tractor. Same chassis as the M2 light tank.

210hp Waukesha engine.
53 kph Road speed.
Cost ??
The M2 light tank was superceded by the M3 light tank which cost $55,244. An M4 Tractor probably cost less then the tank. However I'd hazzard a guess the American made towing tractor still cost quite a bit more then a German made Sd.Kfz. 8 towing tractor.

 

[pinsog]

I agree.

Historically most of the U.S. Army wasn't committed to combat prior to June 1944. Hence we could spend a relatively large portion of the military budget on new equipment rather then funding ongoing combat operations. If most American Army divisions had been committed to combat from 1939 onward it would be a different matter.

Most of the US army may not have been engaged, but we were fighting a 2 front war with the Navy and Marines starting on December 7, 1941, PLUS we were supplying everyone in the world that we weren't actually trying to kill with weapons. That being said, we had US dollars flying out like dust in a sandstorm. But, we, unlike Japan and early war Germany, commited our entire nation to total war once we had been brought in. We had all the material we needed, and cost simply wasn't a factor to us, at least at the time.

And again, how do you figure slave labor in on the cost of a piece of equipment?

Nice pics. I have always loved the look of the M4 HST. Don't forget, we also had the M6 high speed tractor also. As I recall it weighed, 65,000 pounds, and had 2 of the M4 HST engines, although they were only rated 190hp each instead on 210.

 

[Shortround6]

If you insist.

Cost ??
The M2 light tank was superceded by the M3 light tank which cost $55,244. An M4 Tractor probably cost less then the tank. However I'd hazzard a guess the American made towing tractor still cost quite a bit more then a German made Sd.Kfz. 8 towing tractor.

Armor plate is not cheap. it is a lot more expensive than mild steel, it is also a pain the As* to work with, running the labor costs way up. Rotating turrets (turret rings,etc) are not cheap.

German half tracks used a tracked steering system in addition to the front wheels. They could steer with wheels off the ground. This system was not cheap.

The German Mark was no more allowed to float to it's true value compared to the American dollar, even in the late 30s, than the Chinese yuan is officially allowed to float to it's true value against the American dollar in the last ten years. Comparisons of cost based on a bogus exchange rate are bogus.

 

[davebender]

I agree. The M4 artillery tractor was a nice vehicle.

I suspect Germany could have produced something similiar based on the Panzer II chassis and for about the same cost as the Sd.Kfz.8
half track. Perhaps they opted for the Sd.Kfz.8 because it offered more interior space for weapon crew, ammo etc.

 

[fastmongrel]

Armor plate is not cheap. it is a lot more expensive than mild steel, it is also a pain the As* to work with, running the labor costs way up. Rotating turrets (turret rings,etc) are not cheap.

As a spotty young recruit we were told the most expensive part of a Chieftain tanks hull to make was the turret ring because of the precision casting, forging and machining it took to manufacture. Dont know if that holds up for a WWII tank but I bet it was still a major cost.

 

[psteel]

The last thing the Germans should have been doing was to divert precious tank production into prime movers. A half track was always going to be cheaper to operate than any fully tracked tank chassis. More to the point was to turn the Paner II production into self propelled gun carriage, which is what happened. Infact the 1934 plans for the Panzer divisions included a Panzer Artillery Battalion. But lack of tank production meant they couldn't include these in the TOE for a decade.

BTW according to Tooze, the slave labor amounted to 10% of the labor force by 1944 and was going to be phased out since it was shown to be less cost effective than employing semi skill workers. I would guess that if this slave labor was averaged over the war effort, it would amounted to maybe a couple % of the output?

 

[psteel]

The German Mark was no more allowed to float to it's true value compared to the American dollar, even in the late 30s, than the Chinese yuan is officially allowed to float to it's true value against the American dollar in the last ten years. Comparisons of cost based on a bogus exchange rate are bogus.

According to Tooze, from Germany's POV , Hjalmar Schacht was correct in not devaluating the Mark in relation to World Currency.
Hjalmar Schacht - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

It was his policy of credit and strick control of monitory policy; that allowed the Reich to recover faster from the GD than any other power. He implimented these policy before Hitler came to power, so the recover would have happened with or without Hitler.

I don't know if Germany should be penalized for this advantage?

 

[pinsog]

The last thing the Germans should have been doing was to divert precious tank production into prime movers. A half track was always going to be cheaper to operate than any fully tracked tank chassis.

Normally I would agree with you on this, and you would be correct if you were referring to the American halftrack or the German trucks that simply added a bogie assembly where the rear axle used to be. But, the 3/4 tracked vehicles that we all recognize as German artillery prime movers were just as complicated as a light tank, having all of the steering mechanisms that a light tank does, with the added complexity of a non-driven front axle, which hindered mobility. Sd.Kfz. 7 and 8 are good examples of very complex halftracks.

As far as needing prime movers, yes, Germany needed prime movers, in fact, Germany needed alot of stuff that they didn't have. They needed trucks and prime movers as much as they needed tanks and fighters. Trying to bring fuel, ammo, food and water to a supposedly mechanized force by horse drawn wagons was rediculous in the extreme. Tanks and infantry without artillery support are dead meat, artillery without prime movers are stationary.

 

[parsifal]

if you would read what others write I wrote "German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day" so while FOLLWING the panzer and Inf. division (mot.), so along the roads which were first used by panzer divisions and their artillery and supply columns. And source is the Finnish translation of von Tippelskirch's history of the WWII. V. Tippelskirch happened to has been the CG of 4th A during the destruction of AG Centre in summer 44. And of course such forced marches were hard to infantry.

Why are you mentionng situations that would not apply and are of no benefit to the issue we are looking at???? A division following another is not in an engaged situation, and the original supposition that led to this little debate was what an unmotorized division could do if it began in an engaged condition with the enemy. So the question arises....are you (still) saying that in enagaged situations an Infantry division could retreat 40km. If not, what distances are you suggesting as an appropriate yardstick to estimate their capabilities.

I have not read your Von Tippelskirch, but it may well be a case of someone trying to cover their own behind, arguing it was all Hitlers fault and the army could have managed the situation if they had been given the opportunity. In other words, someone trying to cover themselves.

Whilst I havent Tippelskirch, I have read a series of articles put together into a single volume called "Fighting In Hell" The articles were by Erhard Raus, General Der Infantrie Dr Waldeimar Erfuth (considered by many to be the foremost Infantry specialist in the wehrmacht) and Franz Halder (who needs no introduction). I also have read Von Manteuffels book (the name of which I forget). All of these guys do not support the notion that 50km sustained marching by unmotorised infantry even in an unengaged situation is at all possible. And for the record, they make the point that units following a Panzer formation on a Rusian road had a hard time moving at all, because the roads system was so badly torn up,, so many bridges collapsed after the passage of the Panzer unit and the like. It generally took weeks of repair to restore a Russian Road network that had been torn up by German motorised forces, simply through usage

With regard to your last sentence, that strikes me as the classic understatement..."force marches were hard on the Infantry"....you think!!!!!. Out of roughly 800000 defenders, 680000 of them were killed or captured in the DAGC . Most of the survivors were generally rear area line of communications troops and the like. The average strength of those divisions that did survive was just 1000 men, no transport, no artillery, virtually no equipment. I guess you could say it was a little hard on the formation, given it was a deferat that led directly to the capitulation of both Rumania and Finland, and is recorded as the greatest defeat of the German army up to that time in the WWII.

And pre-war western allies manuals are only that, not necessary apply to divisions fighting in the Eastern Front as seen for ex. the western rule of thumb that a div after 30% casualties was no more capable to normal combat operations, when in the East much more depleted divs had to fought and fought even successfully.

Just to clarify, the US manual was updated in 1971, and again in 1993. With regard to calculating march speeds, it has not really changed. Evidently there were plenty of people who considered it to have value. Its still used at places like Duntroon, Sandhurst and West Point AFAIK, but in your little world these places arent worth the ground they are built on I guess.

I agree that German Infantry continued to fight past the point of 30% casualties. The usual strength for German Infantry on the Eastern Front was an average of 40% authorized strength, but given the greatest losses were in their transport and logistics areas this only makes their mobility problem even harder. by 1944 German Infantry Divs could no longer move in unison. They were so short of both MT and Draft animals, that divisions could only be moved by pooling transport and moving units in stages, or alternatively dropping their gear and running. this was particularly true in so called "static sectors" like AGC and AGN, wher the divisions were stripped out to provide transport to other more dynbamic sectors.

The British manual was updated during and after the war. I havent seen the post war manual, but I have seen the wartime revision. It makes no change with regard to mobility and march calculations.

So, either these Operations manuals are worth looking at, and are reliable, or Allied commanders were incredibly stupid to teach their armed forces procedur4es that were below the capabilities of the troops. And, if the operating procedures are accurate, why would they not be applicable, or at least comparable to German forces, unless you really do believe that the Germans were somehow the race of super soldiers, capable of things the allies could only dream of...


For example it seems that German 4th A would have made it if the Soviet flanking units would not have had 2 days – 3 days head start because of interference from higher up. And 4th A was retreating in very bad conditions, almost uncontested enemy air superiority (3 weeks after D-Day in Normandy which had attracted was majority of LW fighters in the West), using rather bad road network through swampy and forested areas with lot of partisans harassing them while especially north of them a Soviet pincer was advancing along the Smolensk – Minsk highway, and regular enemy forces attacking constantly their rear and flanks, but some of its divs could march 30-50 km per day, even 85km per day parts of 110. Inf Div on 3 Jul 44, source Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8

Really, this is the stuff fairy tales are made of Juha. AGC was incapable of rapid movement because of the crisis in their transport arm. And whilst orders were issued, or formations were just attempting movements of 40-80 km per day, how much was surviving. How much of the formations were actually falling out of formation and getting themselves captured???. At the end of the operation they had lost all of their artillery and transport, and rifle strengths were down to 1000 or less per division. If you call that surviving, well, you have a different concept of sustainable operations to me.

Perhaps I should qualify. Units in rout can save remnants of the formation if resistance is abandoned, and the personnel take to sheer flight. These elements are no longer a coherent defence, no longer in contact, and no longer a military organization. Under those conditions, the more determined individuals have a chane of survival, but the force as a coherent body is finished. I thought we were talking about the conditions needed to save a formations artillery, not the fact that a few ragged individuals made it out of a cauldron alive. The Soviets managed similar feats in 1941, but on a larger scale in the various cauldrons that developed around their armies during Barbarossa. Many of the personnel managed to escape such encirclements, but noit as formed military units.

It would have mattered very little if the germans had started moving 2 days earlier than they did. By the time of the offensive, AGC was a house of cards that simply was incapable of rapid movement at the same time. To save more of its personnel it would simply have had to abanadon most of its heavy equipment, and start running earlier than it did. Thats still not a retreat, its still a rout, and a big one.

And blaming Hitler or higher up...really, I thought you had a better grasp of the situation than that. Sure Hitler was stubborn, and at times his orders unrealistic, but in this instance, he didnt have a choice. Retreat as is generally (ie as formed military formations) was not possible for AGC in 1944, indeed retreat as an option was not possible on any front for the germans by that time, except for their mobile formations.

 

[parsifal]

Parsifal
if you would read what others write I wrote "German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day" so while FOLLWING the panzer and Inf. division (mot.), so along the roads which were first used by panzer divisions and their artillery and supply columns. And source is the Finnish translation of von Tippelskirch's history of the WWII. V. Tippelskirch happened to has been the CG of 4th A during the destruction of AG Centre in summer 44. And of course such forced marches were hard to infantry.

Juha

This comment made me chack back...

At Post 91 I stated

certainly not 100km, but reasonable to claim 40km per day. this is still beyond the capability horsedrawn artillery to avoid capture. Motorised artillery might retreat 40-50 km per day, provided it had fuel. Not sure if artillery is mechanised, whether retreat rates would be greater than that."


Your reply at post 93 was

I really cannot understand you claim, the maximum speed for 15 cm sFH 18 for motorised towing was 60 km/h, so I'd say that mot. artillery could easily retreat 400-500 km per day, provided it had fuel.


At post 108 you indeed said

German infantry was capable to march while following motorized troops 50km per day so it should be possible in retreat 40km per day in good conditions


However this post had been edited more than 12 hours after it had originally been posted, for reasons not altogether clear. Perhaps to include a statement later claimed, I suspect. However the statement is non-sequita, because it has no relationship to the issue being discussed in the first place prior to that point between us. Why did you raise it. Reason uncertain, but it tries to pass itself as a reply to my posts, which are to do with controlled retreats and the inability of german horse drawn artillery to move or react fast enough. If you are not addressing the point I made, why raise it as an issue at all in reply directly to me. Why not just post it as a general comment. Perhaps to cloud and confuse the issue and throw us off the scent of german failings and weaknesses I suspect, attack the chief critique, distract him, attack him. Bit like the Schleck brothers and Cadel Evans i suppose.....…

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal

Quote:" Why are you mentionng situations that would not apply and are of no benefit to the issue we are looking at????"

Simply because you claimed that a) even the vehicles of German infantry div put a Russian road on which they travelled nearly unusable conditions, how would they have looked after a / a couple panzer div(s) had used them and still the following inf div managed clearly longer marches on them than you calculated.
and b) because you referred US and British pre-war manuals that according to you calculated that only much shorter daily marches were possible in favourable conditions than German infantry units did during the war.

Quote:" Really, this is the stuff fairy tales are made of Juha. AGC was incapable of rapid movement because of the crisis in their transport arm. And whilst orders were issued, or formations were just attempting movements of 40-80 km per day, how much was surviving. How much of the formations were actually falling out of formation and getting themselves captured???. At the end of the operation they had lost all of their artillery and transport, and rifle strengths were down to 1000 or less per division. If you call that surviving, well, you have a different concept of sustainable operations to me."

All I can say, read more, as starters for ex Gerd Niepold's Battle for White Russia. The Destruction of Army Group Centre June 1944. it gives how the situation developed day by day and there are excellent maps in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg 8 (2007), the series happened to be as close you get the official history on Germany's side. And yes the divisions still had some figting power left when they arrived East of Minsk, Soviet units were in times hard pressed for a couple days while defeating their outbreaking attemps.

Quote:" However this post had been edited more than 12 hours after it had originally been posted, for reasons not altogether clear. Perhaps to include a statement later claimed, I suspect. However the statement is non-sequita, because it has no relationship to the issue being discussed in the first place prior to that point between us. Why did you raise it. Reason uncertain, but it tries to pass itself as a reply to my posts, which are to do with controlled retreats and the inability of german horse drawn artillery to move or react fast enough. If you are not addressing the point I made, why raise it as an issue at all in reply directly to me. Why not just post it as a general comment. Perhaps to cloud and confuse the issue and throw us off the scent of german failings and weaknesses I suspect, attack the chief critique, distract him, attack him. Bit like the Schleck brothers and Cadel Evans i suppose…"

And in the end conspiracy theories, hopeless, believe what you want, it's you business, but it was simply a correction of a grammar error on the last but one sentence, which gave the opposite meaning that I had meant.

Juha

 

[Njaco]

Lets keep this civil. This has turned into a very good thread. Lets not muck it up.

 

[Shortround6]

I think that we are drifting again.

Are we discussing the abilities and liabilities of one gun vs others of it's kind/class?

Are we discussing the abilities and liabilities of one gun 'system' (tow vehicles, support vehicles, etc) vs others of it's kind/class?

Are we discussing the abilities and liabilities of one nations entire Artillery system vs other nations 'artillery system/s'?

Keeping in mind that for many nations the overall "artillery system" changed during the years of the war in respect not only to guns and tow vehicles but in communications, supply, tactics and doctrine.

Going back to the start of this thread.

How does the 17cm K 18 compare to it's rivals?
we have yet to decide, for the purposes of this thread, what it's rivals were.

if comparing the guns and not the gun 'system' would the provision of 300-350 tractors of the equivalent of the M-38 and perhaps 3 times the ammo (with barrels to suit) had allowed for the just 300guns built by the start of 1944 to have a bigger impact than they did?
Or to sort of flip it, would the IDENTICAL gun in IDENTICAL numbers in western allied hands, given typical western allied tractors, ammo supply and engineering support have made a difference in the guns achievements/reputation?

The Germans did make their share of less than satisfactory artillery pieces and spent way too much time and effort on some really bizarre projects.
Not all German weapons were super weapons. Some were just plain, average, solid working weapons with no out standing abilities or faults.

 

[parsifal]

Fair point SR, but to understand the reason why the K18 had the shortcomings that I allege, one has to understand the "system" for which it was designed. The German artillery system had some glaring weakneses about it, not least of which was its distinct lack of mobility. But for the cirumstances that it was designed, namely to support formations on the attack, or to defend in static situations, the K-18 was perfect for the job. It was long ranged, with a heavy puch, and had a reputation for accuracy.

Its what it wasnt good at that i am harping about. It was not a good piece for a mobile fluid defence. It had a relatively slow rate of fire(mostly due to the way it was used, not so much because of its design) , could only relocate slowly, though to be fair, its great range meant that it didnt need to move as often. It, and guns like it were frequently overrun and captured, as were the unmotorized guns of Germany's opponents.

Its not that the K18 was worse than other guns of its ilk, quite the contrary. It was one of the best. But it came from a generation of guns where mobility and flexibility were not valued, hitting power and range were the determinants of a successful gun. You cannot escape that when considering nearly all of the german guns. We are basically back where we started. What are the qulaities that make the best long range artillery gun. Arbitrarily you have suggested a range of 20000 yds for long range, just to keep the issue simple. Well the issues we have to consider from that point is what are the ingredients of "best". My opinion is that "best" will encompass

1) Mobility - motorization and weight, as the particulars of the carriage and wheels

2) Range - self explanatory really

3) Firepower - weight of shell, ammunition types available and what could be fired

4) Accuracy

5) Durability/reliability

The K-18 IMO scores good marks in cats 2 and 4. It achieves an above average score for cat 3, but I would mark it down because it did not fire VT shells (it could have, but didnt....and in a comparison so arbitrary as this, its simply a case of coulda, shoulda, woulda, but did not). It also scores reasonably well in its durability and reliability, but once again, my opinion is that some of the materials used in its construction and usage failed, particularly in termerature extremes.

For the mobility issue, my opinion is that the K-18 scores poorly, for reasons I have previously mentioned.

So, if we were to apply a score for these 5 categories, I would give the K18 the following (1 is best, 0 is worst)

For Cats 2 and 4: max points (2)
For Cats 3 and 5, I would give it (1.5)
For Cat 1 I would give it a 0

That gives it a 3.5 out of 5

If we apply the same test to the US 155mm, I would give the following scores

Cat 1: 0.75
Cat 2: 0.75
Cat 3: 1.0
Cat 4: 0.75 (as a resulkt of the way it was used)
Cat 5: 0.75

That gives the 155 a score of 4, slightly better than the K-18

 

[Shortround6]

Before I can accept a "scoring" system we would have to see how it works on other guns and wither it leaves anything out.

I am also suspicious of scoring systems that include such things as VT fuses. They were only used at the end of the war, and while they did improve the effectiveness/utility of of western allied ground guns they were never part of the original gun specification.

try comparing the German 105 howitzer (with and without muzzle brake or 'averaged') to the American 105 howitzer. Both used the same weight of shell and both used a considerable variety of shells. The American 105 has an attribute the German howitzer does not have and the German howitzer has a slight advantage in a sightly different area/direction.

try comparing the major models of the American 1897 field gun. same tube and same ammo but considerable differences in other attributes.

The American 155gun may very well be a better long range gun than the 17cm K 18 but claiming it so because it had VT fuses seems to be stretching things quite a bit. One source says the VT fuse was first used for ground fire 18 December 1944.
Now I could be quite wrong but do you have examples of the 155mm gun firing VT fused shells? The VT fuses were usually longer than standard fuses and shells intended for their use had deeper fuse well that could, at times, be fitted with more explosive or a booster if a normal fuse was fitted. The 155mm gun did NOT use the the same projectiles as the 155mm howitzer.

 

[Juha]

Hello
IMHO 17cm K18 was an excellent LR gun, probably technically the best WWII LR gun. But maybe a bit too specialized weapon. Long Tom and ML-20 were shorter ranged weapons but handier and cheaper, especially ML-20 which weighted less than 2/3 of even Long Tom's weight. SU and USA seemed to have understood better the economical points of war production and the economy of scale even if one must admit that Heer didn't continue to produce all those excellent LR guns which German industry offered to, for ex 21cm K 38 and 24cm K 3.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

How can you assess the value of a piece of hardware except if you consider how it was used, how it was made, what ammunition was available to it, whether it tended to be motorized, whether it was mounted on tracks etc etc. Tie enough aspects of a gun behind its back, and you will get the answer that you are expecting. By excluding all these other aspects, we really do reduce the equation to just gunpower and shell weight. We come away from the exercise concluding "wow, that K18 was easily the best gun" not realizing we have coralled the assessment to parameters that maximise the german guns good points, and smother everything thats bad about it. The exercise becomes far too fanciful for my liking unless we consider how it was used and all those other aspects. If this were a rifle for example, we would, I think not just look at the wood and steel aspects of the design, we would unhesitatingly look at the ammunition, the carry sling and any other aspects of the gun that are not really part of the "main" design".

As far as VT fuses, they were first used operationally on ships in April 1943, on cruiser Helena I believe. They were not introduced to ground artillery until December 1944, during the Germans Ardennes offensive. Whilst that is indeed late in the war, it is still only about half way through the US Army's principal land campaign, from Normandy to the Elbe (June 1944-May1945). Before that less than 10% of US ground forces had been engaged, and in North Africa it had been less than a Corps strength. At Sicily (july43) it had been a smallish army, changed to a largish army in Italy, and finally an Army Group in Northern France and a reinforced Corps in Southern France. Moreover it was not until 1945 that the majority of Divs of the US army were finally engaged. Up to Septmber 1944, only something like 28 Divs had seen any frontline action at all, and the majority of action had been witnessed by less than 10 Divs. From September 1944, the amount of combat time by US forces ramped up sharply, it was easily the most combat intensive time for the US. They finished up with something like 75 divs engaged. So in terms of combat hours, or rounds expended or casualties inflicted/sustained, this final period of the war was in fact the main operational period for the US army. It is entirely appropriate to consider the ammunition types used by the guns being considered, and for the US, entirely approparite to give a lot of weight to the VT fuse, because it was deployed at a time when the US Army was atits maximum extent of combat exposure.

 

[pinsog]

The 17cm K18 weighed 51,000 pounds ready to travel, and only had 4 solid steeltires, with a little strip of rubber around them.

The US 155 Long Tom weighed 30,000 pounds ready to travel and rolled on 10 pneumatic tires. The difference in mobility must have been tremendous. The 155 was quicker to set up and quicker to load up and move. I show emplacement and removal times as little as 30 minutes.

Looks like the 17cm K18 should probably be compared to the US 8 inch gun instead of the Long Tom.

 

[Shortround6]

"How can you assess the value of a piece of hardware except if you consider how it was used, how it was made, what ammunition was available to it, whether it tended to be motorized, whether it was mounted on tracks etc etc. Tie enough aspects of a gun behind its back, and you will get the answer that you are expecting."

And if you include enough things like "how it was used, how it was made, what ammunition was available to it, whether it tended to be motorized, whether it was mounted on tracks etc" depending on how much weight you give each factor and you can get the answer you want, too.

I guess the Germans made NO good artillery pieces, not a one. I can justify this because they lacked enough tractors or motor transport, they lacked VT fuses for the last 5-6months of the war, they were often short of ammo and their response time for fire support was slower than the western allies.

Not a single thing to do with any individual gun or howitzer but we can use these reasons to down grade any German gun or howitzer to get an answer that pleases us.

I asked about the German 105 howitzer and the American 105 for a reason.

The German 105 had a problem with range early in it's career, this was solved (sort of) with the provision of a new HE shell and a new propelling charge. Of, course none of the other shells ( smoke, etc) or their propelling charges where changed so the increase in range is only for HE. The German weapon had another problem. It would only elevate to 40 degrees or just a shade over. The American 105 howitzer would elevate to about 65 degrees (in towed guns) which allowed it to fire in upper register. This means that for most ranges less than maximum there are TWO elevations that will give the same range but with different times of flight with EACH zone charge. This makes it easier to arrange ToT fires, it also makes it easier to lob shells over obstructions like mountain ridges or to fire out of forests/built up areas. The Germans were working on several differetn designs to solve these problems but never got them into production.
The American gun also used semi-fixed ammunition. The fuse could be fitted and the powder charged adjusted to the zone range desired and the shell fitted into the mouth of the case. The round was loaded in one piece unlike the German gun which was loaded separately except for the anti-tank ammunition. This means the American 105 How could be fired faster for short periods of time than the German 105 How.
Now the German Howitzer was a solid workman like design that did all that was asked of it the majority of the time but it did lack those margins of performance/ useablility that the American Howitzer had. It did have one small advantage, it had more traverse in the carriage. 56 degrees instead of 45 degrees which meant it could cover a slightly bigger arc without having to be shifted. At 10,000yds it could cover about 900yds either side of what the American howitzer could cover. How often this was used I don't know. Perhaps the better American communications and easier ammunition supply meant they could swing the guns and get fire on the target just as quick despite the traverse limit. Perhaps the Americans had more guns per per mile of frontage and had less need to use the extremes of the traverse to bring the weight of fire they wanted.
But this points to the difference between attributes of a gun's design and how it was used. Some attribute's increase a gun/how's flexibility and usefulness while other characteristics limit it or force work arounds.

As for using this reasoning
"If this were a rifle for example, we would, I think not just look at the wood and steel aspects of the design, we would unhesitatingly look at the ammunition, the carry sling and any other aspects of the gun that are not really part of the "main" design".

Ammunition can be changed much more easily that the rifle, the sling is a throw away extra.

Is rifle "A" a better combat rifle because it has a better oil can in the buttstock recess than rifle "B"? Of course not.
The Mauser was made in a variety of calibers. Some were better than others (although the differences were not as great as many people would like to believe) but changing from 7.63X53 to 7.9X57 to 7X57 made what difference to the loading, rate of fire, safty, ease of aiming, manufacturing difficulty, mobility etc,etc??

The Johnson semi-automatic was made in 3 different calibers, did changing the round it was chamber for really make it better or worse than the Garand? or did it's advantages/disadvantages stay the same?

Is changing the sling going to make any difference in the rifles chances of jamming, in speed of reloading, in ease of cleaning, it the firer's ability to see the sights or to adjust them? And if by some miracle it does, how hard is it to re-equip the rifle with a different sling vs fitting new sights, or a new magazine or clip arrangement (try fitting stripper clip slots to bolt rifles that don't have them) or getting access to forward locking lug recesses to clean dirt debris out of them.

 

[Shortround6]

The 17cm K18 weighed 51,000 pounds ready to travel, and only had 4 solid steeltires, with a little strip of rubber around them.

The US 155 Long Tom weighed 30,000 pounds ready to travel and rolled on 10 pneumatic tires. The difference in mobility must have been tremendous. The 155 was quicker to set up and quicker to load up and move. I show emplacement and removal times as little as 30 minutes.

Looks like the 17cm K18 should probably be compared to the US 8 inch gun instead of the Long Tom.

One source says the 24cm K 3 could be emplaced by 25 men in 1 1/2 hours. it weighed about 121,000lbs in action and traveled in SIX loads. weight on the road was 83 tons. The Germans didn't like it because they thought it took too long and took too many men to set up. They built 10? We don't have a set up time of the 17cm K18 so far but I doubt that it was as long. We also have the fact that the American 155mm gun had 60 degrees of traverse while the 17cm had 16degrees on the carriage but after jacking down the trail castoring wheel the entire gun was supposed to able to be swung through 360 degrees by two men. This may depend on clearance and ground surface but it is an ability the US gun does not have.

I am getting mixed feelings on mobility. How much (how fast) is needed?
Obviously being able to move when horses can't do the job is a huge advantage.
Obviously being able to move at 3-5 times the speed of horses is a huge advantage.

If you are stuck in a column of vehicles doing 10-15km/h I am not sure that being able to have a top towing speed of 50kp/h is much of an advantage over having a top towing speed of 25kp/h (or whatever the speed is for those solid rubber tires).