Best Pacific Fighter II

[vikingBerserker]

Perhaps you will explain why, on May 16, 1944, well before the war is over, the Navy concludes that the F4U1D is the best available all round Navy fighter available and recommends that carrier fighter and fighter bomber units be converted to that type.

To be honest surprised. According to the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum the F4U was not cleared for US carrier use until late in 1944. Vought F4U-1D Corsair - Long Description


IIRC it was the British that first used the F4U successfully from a carrier in April-43 which in turn sparked the idea for the USN.

 

[renrich]

VB, when you get that copy of Dean's book, you will find that a USN squadron got the Corsair ready for operations on carriers well before the FAA started operations on carriers. The story that the FAA taught the USN how to operate Corsairs off of carriers is a myth. 88171, you might be interested to know that the Corsair had less operational losses in WW2 than did the Hellcat. Corsair-230, Hellcat-340. A word to the wise. When first joining a forum, sometimes it pays to stick a toe in to test the water rather than wading right in and perhaps getting in over one's head.

 

[JoeB]

I just read an excert from this book, and it talks about the 67th Sqd of the RAF shooting down 4 x Ki21's on 12/23 and another 6 on 1/24 - all of which were confirmed.

I'm sorry, I did leave out three dates in that period in Burma, because my notes didn't correctly flag Buffalo in addition to AVG P-40. The counts you gave OTOH entirely ignore the presence and competing claims of the AVG P-40's (and Hurricanes in the 1/24 case). The fairest way to count IMO is to just prorate the opponent's real losses by the claims made by all friendly units and types in the same combat. Later on, the AVG fought mainly by itself and its claims in those cases weren't noticeably less accurate compared to reported Japanese losses than other Allied fighter units in SEA in 1941-42.

I left out, for Burma:
12/23 67th Sdn and the AVG intercepted Type 97 bombers escorted by Type 97 fighters and claimed 3 and 10 bombers respectively, the 98th Sentai lost 2 and the 62nd lost 5, see p. 245. The AVG also claimed a Type 97 fighter but none were lost. 4 P-40's were lost, 2 or 3 to bomber return fire per the description in Shambles and "Flying Tigers" by Ford. On a prorated basis, 67 sdn would be credited with 3/13*7=1.6 bombers.
12/25: Buffaloes claimed 1 bomber and 3 fighters, AVG 15 and 9. The Japanese lost 4 Type 97 bombers, and 2 each Type 97 and Type 1 fighters, p.250. The AVG lost 2 P-40's one to bomber return fire, 67 sdn lost 4 Buffaloes all apparently to fighters. Prorated score of Buffaloes was 1/4 bomber and 1/2 each Type 97 and Type 1 fighter.
1/24: Buffaloes claimed 4 as I read it, Hurricanes another, and the AVG 4 bombers and 6 fighters, for no Allied loss. 6 Type 97 bombers were actually present and 5 were lost, along with 3 Type 97 fighters, p. 265. Prorated, the Buffaloes would get credit for 2.2 bombers.
I did include Buffalo combats in Burma 1/20 and 1/23 already, and after the 1/24 combat, the RAF fighters in Burma were Hurricanes.

Altogether my previous omission would add ~4 prorated victories over Type 97 bombers for Buffaloes, so a big % addition to the 5 total non-fighters I quoted, but I don't think it dramatically changes the answer to whether Buffaloes downed a lot or few Japanese bombers: pretty few. And a reason I don't like that kind of measure, absolute number of bombers downed by fighters, so didn't' quote it originally (on the previous thread) and probably shouldn't have at all, is that omissions affect an absolute number in only one direction. Same thing with a few other cases where the Japanese result isn't clear (eg. Buffaloes claimed a single engine bomber 1/13 over Burma, combat just not mentioned in Japanese accounts).

OTOH in case of fighter-fighter result as a ratio, if you omit a few combats by accident at random, it shouldn't affect the ratio much, as my omission of the 12/25 fighter-fighter case doesn't affect the ratio much. Likewise if a combat isn't mentioned on the Japanese side it's just thrown out of the ratio along with any Allied losses in that combat. There's no apparent tendency for more successful Allied combats not to be mentioned on Japanese side: it seems random based on missing records.

I could see Buffalo results v bombers being highly important if they went 10:46 in 22 known, two side documented, fighter combats but downed dozens of bombers, but clearly we're talking a relatively small number of bombers, and not outstandingly more than other Allied types managed.

Joe

 

[syscom3]

....When first joining a forum, sometimes it pays to stick a toe in to test the water rather than wading right in and perhaps getting in over one's head.

Hey, he stirred up a hornets nest right away. Not many people get to do that, LOL.

He's OK by me!

 

[88l71]

VB, when you get that copy of Dean's book, you will find that a USN squadron got the Corsair ready for operations on carriers well before the FAA started operations on carriers. The story that the FAA taught the USN how to operate Corsairs off of carriers is a myth. 88171, you might be interested to know that the Corsair had less operational losses in WW2 than did the Hellcat. Corsair-230, Hellcat-340. A word to the wise. When first joining a forum, sometimes it pays to stick a toe in to test the water rather than wading right in and perhaps getting in over one's head.

Grrr! I had a long post going but then I lost it because I got logged out while typing.

The short version:

In response to your post, the Hellcat was mainly a carrier based fighter so I'd imagine ops losses would be higher for carrier aircraft for obvious reasons. Do you have a breakdown of Hellcat vs. Corsair ops losses comparing land-based Hellcats to land-based Corsairs, and CV Hellcats to CV Corsairs?

As far as the Solomons and South/SW Pacific campaigns...well, Hellcat was a carrier fighter and after the USN had lost several carriers in the Solomons campaigns that weren't replaced until Essex and Independence class carriers arrived to refill the ranks - I've got VF-9 aboard Essex as the first operational F6F squadron in Feb 43, but the Hellcat not seeing action until September of that year and the first major battles being the attacks on the Marshalls. There was no such shortage of airfields on the other hand and the Corsair got into the action earlier, and it didn't hurt that the Corsair went into production first either.

What I don't get is how if the F4U was such a superior design why the blazes didn't any of the designers think about the landing gear being too stiff or that maybe not being able to see over the nose or low-speed-low-altitude handling issues just might be a problem for an airplane that was supposed to operate on a carrier where the landing profile is low, slow, and nose-up? I mean, isn't one of the criteria of a truly great airplane design be that it accomplishes the mission for which it was originally intended, preferably with a minimum of modifications?

Hellcat had the same engine and was essentially ready to go as a carrier fighter "out of the box" and while performance was lower than the F4U was still plenty good enough to shoot down the enemy in large numbers, not to mention while 3 different companies (Chance-Vought, Goodyear, and Brewster) produced the Corsair Hellcats all came (except for prototypes and a few very early -3's) from *one factory*

I'm not saying the Corsair wasn't impressive, or I think it was a turkey, or anything of the sort, but I think it's rather unfair to sell the Hellcat short as some sort of second-rate aircraft when it was obviously a very successful fighter in its intended role with a minimum of modifications.

I'd say the Corsair is a better peacetime aircraft if you are like the prewar IJN and want a small number of elite pilots emphasizing quality over quantity, but since this is a thread about WWII aircraft I'd give the Hellcat the nod since in wartime you need LOTS of "good enough" planes RIGHT NOW instead of having a "uber" plane with lots of bugs waiting to be ironed out.

Kinda how the Panther was an awesome tank with good armor and excellent gun, but had lots of problems early on because it was a somewhat radical design, whereas the T-34/85 was less armed/armored (though still a very good tank) based on evolutionary upgrades of a proven design and was more reliable and easier to produce. There's many debates on many forums about which one is better.

As for upgrades there was the F6F-6 (same engine as F4U-4, 4-bladed prop) with significant performance increase over the -5 but it was cancelled when the war ended, whereas the Bearcat was a whole different animal from the F6F's design philosophy.

And part (though not all, admittedly) of the reason Kamikaze attacks were developed in the first place was to counter the effectiveness of Hellcats + USN radar and fighter control/direction tactics, which made conventional attacks against US carriers virtual suicide missions anyway.

 

[Catch22]

Couple things.

not to mention while 3 different companies (Chance-Vought, Goodyear, and Brewster) produced the Corsair Hellcats all came (except for prototypes and a few very early -3's) from *one factory*

What does that have to do with anything? It was for greater production numbers, it has nothing to do with the airframe. If you're going to use that argument, you may as well say that the Avenger wasn't a good aircraft because it was also made by General Motors...

I'll give you the stiff landing gear problem, Vought should have recognized that. But the nose allowed the center of gravity to remain balanced while giving it the long internal range, something the Hellcat didn't have. The Hellcat did have good range, but the Corsair had better, and having to turn into the landing really isn't a huge problem.

Basically the Corsair had better everything than the Hellcat except landing qualities. It was quite capable of operating from carriers, and did during the late part of the war, so it DID do what it was designed to do, and then some, as it wasn't originally designed to do ground attack.

And nobody's saying the Hellcat wasn't a good plane. All people are saying here is it wasn't quite as good as it's made out to be, and that the Corsair was a better aircraft. The Hellcat was a very good plane, its combat record shows that, but it's not the be-all end-all as some claim (not saying you are, I'm just saying some people do).

 

[vikingBerserker]

VB, when you get that copy of Dean's book, you will find that a USN squadron got the Corsair ready for operations on carriers well before the FAA started operations on carriers.

I don't believe I said anything about this. I merely stated I am surprised that the USN recommended that all fighter fighter bomber sqds converted over to the F4U before the USN had approved the plane for carrier use based on information from the Smithsonian. I do find it interesting that according to Combat Aircraft of WWII by Bookthrift, the USN still took delivery of 3,578 Hellcats from Jan-Nov 45.

The story that the FAA taught the USN how to operate Corsairs off of carriers is a myth. [/i] Actually I've never heard of this myth. In regards to the FAA I only stated:

IIRC it was the British that first used the F4U successfully from a carrier in April-43 which in turn sparked the idea for the USN.

The part that I did not mean to state was it gave the USN the idea of using on the carriers, what I meant to say was it gave the USN the idea to re-examine the idea of using it from carriers. I read that somewhere and could not remember where and had nothing to back up the statement, hence the "IIRC". If I'm wrong then I'm wrong.

you might be interested to know that the Corsair had less operational losses in WW2 than did the Hellcat. Corsair-230, Hellcat-340.

Of those losses 321 of the Hellcats were based on carriers (flying 62,240 action sorties) vs 48 for the F4U (flying 6,488 action sorties). NACS pages 22 23 I charted the data based on the NACS (which actually shows 11 fewer Operational Losses for the F4U then the number you quoted)

Without knowing additional data behind the numbers, it can be deduced that landing on carriers is more dangerous then on land - twice as bad for the F4U while slightly more for the F6F (which I find interesting). Does it really mean anything? Not sure but I think it needs to be looked at per sortie versus in total.

A word to the wise. When first joining a forum, sometimes it pays to stick a toe in to test the water rather than wading right in and perhaps getting in over one's head.

As long as I am being respectful of other's opinions and not attacking anybody personally I'm not sure what the issue is. I may give an opinion, but I try to back it up with the facts and data I used to get there. I certainly have no issue with admitting that I'm wrong, as I've learned far more in life being wrong then I ever have being right. I'm really not sure of your point.

 

[JoeB]

The Corsair had less operational losses in WW2 than did the Hellcat. Corsair-230, Hellcat-340.

But the F4U flew a lot fewer carrier missions. In carrier ops the F4U's operational loss *rate* per sortie was around 50% higher than the F6F's. NASC Table 9, in 1944-45 operations from CV's, F6F operational loss rate was .50 per 100 action sorties, USN F4U squadrons .74, USMC F4U squadrons .79. To review the AA statistic, from NASC Table 29, the F4U loss rate to AA, 1945 carrier operations was 2.3 per 100 sorties which met AA, the F6F rate in the same period and operations was 1.4. NASC Table 11 gives tons of bombs per attack sortie (from carriers) for Nov 44 Jan 45 was .10 for F6F, .11 for F4U; Feb-Jun 45 .14 and .15; Jul-Aug 45 .19 and .18. From same table rockets per strike sorties Nov 44-Jan 45 1.5 and 0; Feb-Jun 1.94 and 2.9, Jul-Aug 2.76 and 3.04. The claimed kill ratio by F4U and F6F v Japanese fighter types in Sept 1944-Aug 1945, was 15.09 and 15.53 respectively (NASC Table 28 ).

Again I think the May '44 decision v NASC evidence breaks down as somebody else said: expert opinion believed the F4U-1 to have an advantage over F6F series as of 1944, but once F4U-1's reached carriers in 1945, this perceived advantage did not pan out in any clear advantage for which there's quantifiable evidence. The F4U had notably higher loss rates to accidents and AA in carrier ops (which together comprised the bulk of losses) without much corresponding increase in ordnance delivered per strike sortie, and it had almost identical results v Japanese fighter types in the same period. Also some trials showed the F6F-6 considerably faster than its official stats, so the F4U-1's advantage in the interceptor role probably wasn't as big as is sometimes supposed. By mid 1945 the F4U-4 appeared, w/ much better performance than F6F-5, and further F6F improvements had been canceled. But during the war the F4U-1 did not prove itself a better carrier fighter than the F6F, probably not as good all around.

Joe

 

[Doughboy]

Couple things.



What does that have to do with anything? It was for greater production numbers, it has nothing to do with the airframe. If you're going to use that argument, you may as well say that the Avenger wasn't a good aircraft because it was also made by General Motors...

I'll give you the stiff landing gear problem, Vought should have recognized that. But the nose allowed the center of gravity to remain balanced while giving it the long internal range, something the Hellcat didn't have. The Hellcat did have good range, but the Corsair had better, and having to turn into the landing really isn't a huge problem.

Basically the Corsair had better everything than the Hellcat except landing qualities. It was quite capable of operating from carriers, and did during the late part of the war, so it DID do what it was designed to do, and then some, as it wasn't originally designed to do ground attack.

And nobody's saying the Hellcat wasn't a good plane. All people are saying here is it wasn't quite as good as it's made out to be, and that the Corsair was a better aircraft. The Hellcat was a very good plane, its combat record shows that, but it's not the be-all end-all as some claim (not saying you are, I'm just saying some people do).

Well said.

 

[vikingBerserker]

I'm sorry, I did leave out three dates in that period in Burma, because my notes didn't correctly flag Buffalo in addition to AVG P-40. The counts you gave OTOH entirely ignore the presence and competing claims of the AVG P-40's (and Hurricanes in the 1/24 case). The fairest way to count IMO is to just prorate the opponent's real losses by the claims made by all friendly units and types in the same combat. Later on, the AVG fought mainly by itself and its claims in those cases weren't noticeably less accurate compared to reported Japanese losses than other Allied fighter units in SEA in 1941-42.

I left out, for Burma:
12/23 67th Sdn and the AVG intercepted Type 97 bombers escorted by Type 97 fighters and claimed 3 and 10 bombers respectively, the 98th Sentai lost 2 and the 62nd lost 5, see p. 245. The AVG also claimed a Type 97 fighter but none were lost. 4 P-40's were lost, 2 or 3 to bomber return fire per the description in Shambles and "Flying Tigers" by Ford. On a prorated basis, 67 sdn would be credited with 3/13*7=1.6 bombers.
12/25: Buffaloes claimed 1 bomber and 3 fighters, AVG 15 and 9. The Japanese lost 4 Type 97 bombers, and 2 each Type 97 and Type 1 fighters, p.250. The AVG lost 2 P-40's one to bomber return fire, 67 sdn lost 4 Buffaloes all apparently to fighters. Prorated score of Buffaloes was 1/4 bomber and 1/2 each Type 97 and Type 1 fighter.
1/24: Buffaloes claimed 4 as I read it, Hurricanes another, and the AVG 4 bombers and 6 fighters, for no Allied loss. 6 Type 97 bombers were actually present and 5 were lost, along with 3 Type 97 fighters, p. 265. Prorated, the Buffaloes would get credit for 2.2 bombers.
I did include Buffalo combats in Burma 1/20 and 1/23 already, and after the 1/24 combat, the RAF fighters in Burma were Hurricanes.

Altogether my previous omission would add ~4 prorated victories over Type 97 bombers for Buffaloes, so a big % addition to the 5 total non-fighters I quoted, but I don't think it dramatically changes the answer to whether Buffaloes downed a lot or few Japanese bombers: pretty few. And a reason I don't like that kind of measure, absolute number of bombers downed by fighters, so didn't' quote it originally (on the previous thread) and probably shouldn't have at all, is that omissions affect an absolute number in only one direction. Same thing with a few other cases where the Japanese result isn't clear (eg. Buffaloes claimed a single engine bomber 1/13 over Burma, combat just not mentioned in Japanese accounts).

OTOH in case of fighter-fighter result as a ratio, if you omit a few combats by accident at random, it shouldn't affect the ratio much, as my omission of the 12/25 fighter-fighter case doesn't affect the ratio much. Likewise if a combat isn't mentioned on the Japanese side it's just thrown out of the ratio along with any Allied losses in that combat. There's no apparent tendency for more successful Allied combats not to be mentioned on Japanese side: it seems random based on missing records.

I could see Buffalo results v bombers being highly important if they went 10:46 in 22 known, two side documented, fighter combats but downed dozens of bombers, but clearly we're talking a relatively small number of bombers, and not outstandingly more than other Allied types managed.

Joe

Joe, are you looking at Vol 1? It's been a number of years since I have read perts of it so I really cannot debate you on the bok very well until I can go back through it - which should be hshortly. Thanks

 

[renrich]

VB, my remark about new member testing the water was not directed at you. My apology, as I was not clear. 88171, I think your observation about operational losses being higher for Hellcat is on the mark. They had a lot more carrier launches and recoverys than Corsairs and would probably have more accidents as a result. However, I think the operational losses deal with the Corsair is a little overdone. In an earlier post, I quoted the sorties, losses, etc for both AC and the numbers are not that startling. It would be interesting to compare operational losses of all US fighters in WW2. Incidently, the operational losses for Corsairs includes 24 Corsairs that took off on a ferry flight, got lost over the Pacific, and 23 ditched. That skews the numbers some. LOL The Corsair design was really pushing the envelope in 1938. The Vought engineers were getting into territory they had never explored before. The Corsair was the first US fighter to exceed 400 mph in level flight and that was in May, 1940, after the protoype had crashed earlier that Spring. Vought was a relatively small company. The F4U1 was quite a bit different than the XF4U. The AC was longer and the cockpit was shoved about 3 feet further back so that fuel could be relocated from the wings to the fuselage. That caused visibility problems at high AOA. The prototype had better visibility. At the same time, the Corsair was dealing with the issues caused by the high performance of the Corsair, they were dealing with the problems associated with a new engine, the R2800 and a new propellor. There were a lot of those problems. Vought was attempting to do something revolutionary, at that time, and that was to design a carrier fighter that could equal the performance of land based fighters. The Hellcat was a later design and somewhat of an evolution of previous Grumman fighter designs. They did not have to cope with the engine and propellor teething problems Vought had to. All they really needed to do was design a fighter that could exceed the Zeke's overall performance. The Corsair problems of visibility, leaky actuators on cowl flaps, left wing drop in stalls, tail wiggle on landing, aileron performance, relocation of CO2 bottle for landing gear blowdown, etc were all problems one could anticipate for a revolutionary new airplane design. I still don't understand why the oleos in the landing gear took so long to adjust. Vought had a reputation for pushing the envelope in AC design, Flying Pancake, Cutlass, Crusader, Corsair. Sometimes their efforts were less than satisfactory, in the case of the Corsair they hit a home run.

 

[vikingBerserker]

VB, my remark about new member testing the water was not directed at you. My apology, as I was not clear.

Nope, that was my fault, I misread it.

 

[renrich]

Following is an interesting quote from John Lundstrom's second book, "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign." which I think sheds some light on the relative performance of US fighters in the PTO. " Due in no little measure to the severe losses inflicted during the Guadalcanal Campaign by Marine, Navy and USAAF fighter pilots, the number of experienced Japanese pilots declined greatly. Replacements proved to be inadequately trained and the worsening war situation forced the Japanese to commit masses of green pilots to battle with disastrous results. BY MID 1943 MOST OF THOSE THROWN INTO COMBAT WERE LITTLE MORE THAN STUDENTS WITH MINIMUM FLIGHT TRAINING. ( my caps) After the defeats in the Marianas and the Philipines, Kamikaze tactics became the Imperial Naval Air Force's only alternative to surrender." The Hellcat went into combat at the end of August, 1943, and unless unlucky, the pilot of the Hellcat would face an IJN pilot with little experience, poorly trained and in an inferior aircraft.

 

[Doughboy]

Following is an interesting quote from John Lundstrom's second book, "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign." which I think sheds some light on the relative performance of US fighters in the PTO. " Due in no little measure to the severe losses inflicted during the Guadalcanal Campaign by Marine, Navy and USAAF fighter pilots, the number of experienced Japanese pilots declined greatly. Replacements proved to be inadequately trained and the worsening war situation forced the Japanese to commit masses of green pilots to battle with disastrous results. BY MID 1943 MOST OF THOSE THROWN INTO COMBAT WERE LITTLE MORE THAN STUDENTS WITH MINIMUM FLIGHT TRAINING. ( my caps) After the defeats in the Marianas and the Philipines, Kamikaze tactics became the Imperial Naval Air Force's only alternative to surrender." The Hellcat went into combat at the end of August, 1943, and unless unlucky, the pilot of the Hellcat would face an IJN pilot with little experience, poorly trained and in an inferior aircraft.

That is the thing, the Hellcat faced the inexperienced pilots(in outdated aircraft might I add), so how can it be considered the best plane in the pacific?

 

[88l71]

Couple things.



What does that have to do with anything? It was for greater production numbers, it has nothing to do with the airframe. If you're going to use that argument, you may as well say that the Avenger wasn't a good aircraft because it was also made by General Motors...

My point being the Hellcat was easy to produce quickly in large numbers. The # of Hellcats and Corsairs built is very close, with a slight margin to the Corsairs, but the Hellcat was made over a much shorter period in a single factory by a single company. From what I understand the gull wing assembly of the F4U was somewhat complicated to produce.

As for quality of Hellcat opposition, it's interesting that Warrant Officer Toshiyuki Sueda, with 9 kills, was one of the first Hellcat victims. At any rate the fact remains that had the F6F been introduced earlier it would still have been a superior aircraft to the Zero and Oscar. I suspect had the roles been switched and Corsairs been on carriers while the Hellcats were land based the Marianas, Leyte, and Truk would still see a very good kill ratio by USN pilots while the fighting around Rabaul would also see Hellcats racking up plenty of kills and the overall pace of the Pacific war would have changed essentially not a whit.

As for kamikaze tactics and pilot quality, part of the reason Japanese kamikaze tactics developed was the combination of Hellcats and US fighter direction had made conventional attacks against US carrier TF's virtual suicide missions anyway.

I don't see the F6F as being the "be all end all" as someone said but it always seemed to me like the Corsair has gotten most of the credit despite shooting down fewer enemy aircraft and having a rocky development history. For whatever reason while the Corsair had high profile aces like Boyington and Kepford, strangely the F6F is about the only fighter I know of where none of the top aces in the type ever published their memoirs. Film and TV have largely ignored the Hellcat and the battles she fought in, while the Corsair is something of a pop culture icon.

 

[vikingBerserker]

If you take that stance, then you can say that about any allied fighter flying during that tim - not just the Hellcat.

 

[syscom3]

88l71

The Hellcat was a great plane being at the right place at the right time.

But a look at its performance and combat record says a little more.

Both the P38 and F4U were superior in most categories.
Both the P38 and F4U fought among the best (remaining ones at least) Japanese pilots in 1943.
Both the P38 and F4U were more versatile than the Hellcat.

And one thing is for sure, both the P38 and Hellcat were at the end of their development potential by spring 1945.

 

[JoeB]

The 'better Japanese pilots in 1943' thing would make sense if we were only trying to compare F6F success in 1944 (or 45) to F4U success in 1943. But that's just not the case.

There are figures available for both a/c types in each year. In 1943 F4U's (all landbased) claimed 636 of which 83% were fighters, for 94 losses, 6.8:1. Or assuming all losses were to enemy fighters (probably close to the truth), fighter-fighter ratio 5.6. Landbased F6F's in 1943 claimed 71 (also 83% fighters) for 17 losses, 4.2:1, but carrier based F6F's in 1943 claimed 251 (though only 59% fighters) for 18, 13.9. Combined land/carrier based the F6F's claimed ratio in 1943 was 9.2. Assuming all losses were to fighters (which is a harsher assumption when such a high % of kills were non-fighters, they probably scored some kills v F6F's in fact) then fighter-fighter ratio 5.9, v 5.6 for F4U in same year under same assumption. See NASC Table 21. For the late war operations as already noted from NASC Table 28,which gives claims and losses v fighter types only, Sep '44-Aug '45, the two ratio's were again almost the same (15.09 for F4U, 15.53 for F6F). The land based ratio in 1944 (mainly the climax of the Rabaul campaign early that year*) was 10.0 for F4U, 10.8 for F6F both against similarly high % of enemy fighters. The fighter combat results of these two types in the Pacific in comparable situations and periods were consistently similar. It's not a matter of comparing apples to oranges to give the F6F an unfair advantage.

*there were almost as many land based claims for each type '44 as 43, early 44 featured very intense combat in the Solomons.

Joe

 

[Vincenzo]

Many times is told the accuracy of claims can have a very large range, so imho the claims/loss has a little reliability. Other, a best fighter would put on more hard missions/campaigns.
Corsair performances are superior to Hellcat in near all points.
With this i don't want tell that Corsair it's the best in Pacific, i need more know.

 

[renrich]

JB, would not it be true to assume that in the six months or so the Corsair served in the Pacific without the Hellcat being present the quality of IJN pilot in all types would be better than later in 1943. A lot of the Corsair missions flown in early 1943 were escort missions with AAF bombers and the IJN fighters probably would strive not to accept combat with the escort fighters unless the conditions were favorable to them. All those factors would, it seems to me, place a little higher value on the Corsair kills then than later in the war. 88171, there were more Hellcats built during WW2 than Corsairs and the Corsairs were more expensive. There were three companies building Corsairs since Vought had smaller facilities than Grumman.