yes Udet............
major bummer for the Allies !! so much for rocket attacks and all the scores put in by the US 9th AF Jugs for ground kills.
If the work on heavy bomber targets could not be immediately applied it nevertheless provided a foundation for other studies of the battlefield. Schonland had long been anxious to know something concrete about the effectiveness of fighter and fighter bomber close support. This was an issue which was causing much difficulty between the army and air force and 21 Army Group badly wanted to know what was going on.
Major Pike had already studied one Typhoon attack on a German column near La Baleine in the American sector. Together with a young RAF Pilot Officer, Pike had surveyed the aftermath of the air attack and had noted that only one tank had actually been hit by a Typhoon rocket projectile. This report was not well received by Second Tactical Air Force (2 TAF) and the Pilot Officer was sent back to do the investigation again.99
On August 8th word came that the team was to proceed to the town of Mortain in the American zone. Here, the RAF proclaimed, the tactical air force had been "a decisive battle winning factor" in stopping the German counterattack to cut off the American troops south of Avranches. According to Air Marshal Coningham, the commander of Second Tactical Air Force, rocket firing typhoons claimed to have destroyed 89 tanks, probably destroyed another 56 tracked vehicles, set on fire 104 motor vehicles and saw 47 motor vehicles smoking. These claims do not include 56 enemy tanks damaged and 81 motor vehicles damaged. 100 It had been, the air force insisted, "The Day of the Typhoon."
The army OR section was not the only group interested in the Mortain battlefield. When Second Tactical Air Force was formed in 1943 it acquired operational research staff from Fighter and Army Cooperation Commands. Fighter Command had a good deal of experience with OR work and had amassed considerable information about attacks on ground targets. For example, in early 1943 a full scale model of a German artillery division with 48 mock guns and 558 dummy soldiers was created. "Every effort was made to aid the fighters and fighter bombers in their attack task, but neither Mustangs strafing, nor Typhoons firing their new rockets with 60 lb. warheads were able to inflict more than negligible damage on the position.""" A second experiment with a mock up troop of medium artillery produced equally dismal results.
A carefully controlled study of the ability of pilots to find specific positions on the ground produced even more startling information. Tactical Memorandum No.30, dated March 1943, reported that:
fighters, given a six figure map reference were unable to spot well camouflaged guns even when the guns were actually firing ... attacks on gun positions give negligible results for a high wastage and should only be ordered in an emergency. 102
After 2 TAF was established, OR studies continued to show that there were very real problems in attacking the kind of targets which were of interest to the army. Operations against a variety of targets were carefully examined in the pre D Day period. Typhoon rockets were found to hit a viaduct 500 yards long and 8 yards wide, one in 15 times. Bombs dropped from fighter bombers scored hits one in 82 times. Rocket Projectile (RP) attacks on gun positions produced results varying from 110 rockets fired at a casement in Courseulles sur Mer with zero hits to two hits out of 127 at Fontenay. Second TA F found all this disappointing, particularly since none of the targets had been "well defended."103
The Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) established a school for training fighter pilots in close support during 1944. Results were not encouraging, for while strafing was "outstandingly successful" for damaging or destroying soft skin vehicles, bombs and rockets could not be delivered accurately by average pilots. Near misses, it was found, did little damage. Even worse, accurate target location and identification of friendly troops proved to be an art which was readily mastered by very few pilotS.104
The AEAF operational research section concluded that the probability of pilot error in identifying friendly troops and the inaccuracy of rocket and bombing attacks meant that close support of army operations should be ordered only in an ernergenCy.105 This information confirmed 2 TAF's preference for missions involving armed reconnaissance, deep interdiction and the search for targets of opportunity well beyond the battle lines. Nothing in the first two months of the campaign had altered this view, but if the Typhoons had really stopped the German armour at Mortain the whole question of close support might need to be re examined and 2 TAF ordered its OR section to the scene of the battle.
The two rival OR groups began work at Mortain as soon as the German retreat cleared the area. For eight days, August 12th to August 20th, a not entirely friendly competition to locate and examine German tanks, self propelled guns and other vehicles was underway along the roads and lanes of the hilly countryside. Descriptive accounts of the battle, as well as air force claims, had prepared the investigators for scenes of devastation. A Panzer division, it was said, had been caught in a traffic jam caused by the crash of an Allied aircraft onto the lead tank in the column. Scores of panzers had been destroyed near St. Barth61emy, and this was just one among many stories that everyone had heard.
What the researchers saw was very different. Despite the most systematic search, very few wrecked tanks could be located. The army team borrowed an Auster aircraft to conduct a survey, but not a single additional vehicle was seen. In the end only 33 Panthers, 10 Mark IVs and 3 self propelled guns were uncovered. If armoured troop carriers, armoured cars and tank recovery vehicles were added, the total for all armour left behind in the area was 78. Nor was it possible to find many of the motor vehicles which the air force had claimed to have destroyed. Only 30 German trucks were available to investigate. While this discrepancy was difficult enough to account for, the results of the individual examination of vehicles was even more problematic. Nineteen of the 43 tanks had definitely been destroyed by US Army units. Only seven tanks showed signs of being struck by rocket projectiles. Two had been disabled by US Army Air Force bombing, seven had been abandoned without a mark on them, and four had been destroyed by their crews. The fate of just three tanks was judged to be from unknown causes .106
The Army OR group was quite prepared to accept the argument that air power might be credited for some of the abandoned and crew destroyed tanks. Their report, however, noted that these tanks could not be taken into consideration when comparing pilots' claims of having destroyed or damaged vehicles. Major Pike's dispassionate analysis of the evidence angered the RAF and provoked outrage at 2 TAF headquarters. An official air force review of the events was quickly developed. It is worth quoting at length:
Ground Investigation:
An attempt was made to examine the area on the ground within five days of the air attacks. However, at that time, fighting was still in progress and it was not until 20th August 1944 that the examination was completed. Nevertheless 39 tanks and 58 other vehicles, or the remains thereof, were examined. An analysis of the extent to which these were damaged is given below:
Destroyed . Damaged . Abandoned, Slightly damaged or untouched
Tanks . . . .24 . . 10 . . 5
Other Veh. . . 32 . . 23 . . 3
The German recovery service is remarkably efficient, and on this occasion there was very definite evidence that it had been as efficient as usual. Eye witnesses confirmed this fact. It can therefore be safely assumed that the vehicles found were only a small proportion of those actually destroyed and damaged, and probably an even smaller proportion of those which, although only slightly damaged, had been abandoned by their crews. To attribute destruction or damage to a particular arm or weapon is particularly difficult; however, taking into account the number of vehicles found, surrounded by rocket craters, and others with almost certain rocket or 20min strikes, it appears that the claims were reasonable. It is inevitable that when a large number of aircraft are operating in a comparatively small area, that certain claims will be duplicated. There is no reason to believe, however, that on this occasion the duplication resulted in anything but a small over statement of the damage inflicted.
Officers and other ranks who witnessed the attacks were effusive in their praise of their effectiveness. They freely admitted that had the counter attack continued with the same determination as before the Typhoons had appeared, they would have been unable to repel it."107
This was a serious distortion of the evidence which the Army OR group could not let pass unchallenged. Major Pike, in his report, directly contradicted the RAF view:
The efficiency of the German recovery system has been put forward as an explanation of the large discrepancy between the number of vehicles claimed to be destroyed and the actual number found. Tanks and lorries that are destroyed as a result of air attack are almost always burnt out and would not be worth salvaging unless time and labour were both very plentiful. Many prisoners have been questioned on the subject of the recovery of tanks and it has been established that burnt out tanks are never salvaged. In addition it has been ascertained that, contrary to certain statements made about the Mortain battle, very little recovery was done in this part of Normandy at the time; in fact the repair and recovery teams were already pulling out of Normandy when the battle of Mortain was at its height."108
The Army OR group agreed that the Allied Air Forces had a "considerable effect" on the German attack at Mortain. But nothing remotely resembling the air force claims could be justified. 1ndeed, in many areas of the battlefield, no signs of the characteristic rocket crater could be found. The RAF ought to have accepted this view, for it knew from its own recent research that there were serious aiming problems with rocket (and bomb equipped) Typhoons.
The most recent RAF study on the "accuracy of attacks" had been completed in June 1944. It showed that under the most favourable conditions average pilots were lucky to concentrate their rockets in a circle 150 yards in diameter. The report stated:
In order to hit a small target with R.P. the pilot must be at the right height and dive angle, have the correct speed, have his sight on the target and the right angular depression on his sight, make the correct wind allowances and be free from skid or 'g' ...
All of these factors are important but it is very difficult for a pilot to have them all right at the same time."109
The report raised the question of what really happened in combat when the pilot was also being harassed by anti aircraft fire. It concluded that previous views of the accuracy of RP attacks and of divebombing (which was even more subject to aiming error) were wrong. Such ideas must have been based on "the performance of a few very keen and experienced pilots who can hit small objects, such as tanks, with R.P.'s." Such men might be grouped into a "corps d'elite" capable of attacking special targets but only continual training and practice could improve the accuracy of most of the TAF pilots.""
The rival OR teams next raced north to examine the battlefield around Falaise and the roads leading to the Seine crossings. Here there were thousands of wrecked vehicles to investigate and a new round of argument over the role of air power to be waged. The army investigators would once again report that their three week investigation established beyond dispute that the devastation of the German forces in the area known as the "Shambles" was not due to direct air attack. Only 11 of 171 armoured fighting vehicles examined had been hit by bombs or rockets. No doubt the air force had assisted in destroying German morale strafing had accounted for a third of all soft skinned vehicle losses but, in the words of the OR report, the destruction of the German army had been achieved by 1and action.""'
The investigation of the Mortain battle continued to produce sparks. After one particularly nasty exchange, Brigadier Schonland suggested that "unless there were fairies in Normandy who could remove a large formation of tanks from the Mortain area," 112 it was time to accept the evidence and act on the basis of fact, not fiction. But in the summer of 1944, 2 TAF was in no mood to discuss the issues raised by Army OR. In an official "Addenda" to the Army's Report the Air Force insisted that:
It would be wrong to regard the data provided in this report as yielding information on which to make recommendations for changes in weapons, tactics or operational doctrine, although the factual side of the report can itself be accepted. 113
If it was not permissible to use accepted data as the basis for recommendations about "changes in weapons, tactics or operational doctrine" then there was little point to further investigation of tactical air power. However, 21 Army Group was not about to give up its attempts to influence tactical air doctrine. A formal agreement was negotiated between Schonland and 2 TAF which provided for joint investigations of air operations against ground targets.
Air Force and Army OR researchers prepared four Joint Reports in the fall and winter of 1944-1945. 114 Again there was no disagreement about the evidence. For example, in Joint Report No.3 titled "Rocket Firing Typhoons in Close Support of Military Operations," it was found that 350 rockets, involving 44 sorties, would have to be fired at a small gun position to obtain a fifty percent chance of a hit.115 Typhoons were clearly weapons which were best used to reduce enemy morale and raise the morale of Allied infantry. Both doctrine and the manner of planning operations needed to be revised to take account of this new information as had been done in the US Ninth Air Force.116 The RAF, however, would not budge. The German offensive in the Ardennes provided the section with another opportunity to study the hard evidence on the role of tactical air power and once again their findings challenged the accepted interpretation. Almost the entire section was involved in the ground search while D.N. Royce worked his way down the line of communications interviewing prisoners of war. 117