Best World war two warships?

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Steeldust, The Scheers were a kind of hybrid with BC or BB guns and CA armor probably best classed as large cruisers. An example of a BC in WW2 was the Alaska class although the US liked to call them large cruisers. The Scharnhorst was actually a slightly undergunned BB, not an armored cruiser. The Atlanta, although classed as a CL was actually more properly called an antiaircraft cruiser. In a fight with a true CL, she would have not stood much of a chance. Parsifal, you are saying that the IJN and US did not operate carriers in really bad weather. That seems bit of a stretch to me as the North Pacific weather could get really nasty. But to say that the Germans who never operated carriers at all would be better in bad weather than the US seems like a real stretch.
 

The answer should be obvious...what you are saying is what if the germans had four fully operational carriers....well, they would have had four carriers. Incidentally, leaving the beginning of the development work to 1933 is delaying the carrier development program, not bringing it forward. The Germans began looking into Carriers in the Weimar years.

But I get the drift....you are saying what if the Germans had somehow overcame all the problems they faced....Well firstly, that IS the issue, overcoming the problems is just not something that the Germans were going to do in the time frame all that easily.

The nearest equivalent you are going to find isnt the big three, but the French, and they had difficulties with their sole carrier, the Bearn.

The other thing you are not considering is the quid pro quo that is likley to develop as a result of this intense activity into carrier aviation. . The Brits are not going to just sit back and let the germans develop an advantage. They are going to maintain their advantage, by building more carriers, introducing more capable types etc etc. One of the great lies about the so-called "Z" plan was that the british would simply sit back and let such a construction program pass unchallenged. If the germans stated building carriers, or battleships, or landingcraft, there is going to be a reaction from the allies

So while the Germans would derive some benefits from a better use of carrier aviation, it is hardly going to go unchallenged, and therefore it is difficult to say that it would be a "war winning" strategy.
 
Shades of Tony Williams' "The Foresight War!" I act, he reacts...

Yes, that could well have happened, Parsifal. (OT - I spent last night reading up on your bio, and you get a four star salute from me! )

However, my thinking (admittedly biased) was that the simultaneous building of BOTH the carriers and the two German Battleships would spur the hand of the battleship admirals in the Bwiddish Navy (just a little joke there, All brits here keep your famous sense of humour, please!) to keep their King George V class and smile and say complacently that the illustrious class was quite enough to handle these four small buggers.
 
Actually, I think the scenario that you would need to adopt in order for this to occur is a deferral in hostilities until 1943 or so.

I am at work (in my break) , and dont have the building schedule for the Z plan at hand. However, as a guess only, I would say that by 1943, the Germans might have had 2 carriers, and 4 or 5 BBs (including the bismarcks) , plus the BCs (possibly two others with 15' guns as well as the Scharnhorst class) and the Pocket battleships. In reply to that the Brits would have had the four Illustrious plus the two Indefatigibles, the Unicorn, and probably two or three other Light carriers of the Colossus vintage (in lieu of the escort carriers, which were forced on the british as a wartime expedient).

The British would have completed the KGVs plus they probably would have built two or three Lion Class BBs. In cruisers the brits probably would have built repeats of their Town Class and Colony classes, and more AA cruisers.

With only 68 DDs projected in the Z Plan, the germans would have been completely outclassed in Light Forces. By that stage the british had built over 200 DDs with many smaller ships of ocean going capability to support them. As the germans had only projected an expansion of the U-Boat fleet to about 100 boats, the pressure to erxpand the ASW forces would have been less than historical, and so more resources would go into the Blue Water fleet.

In aircraft the germans would probably be equipped with Me 109fs and Ju87D carrier based equivalents. Ranged against this the Brits would be equipped with Fireflies, Seafires and Sea Hurricanes. I dont think the US types would have been as well represented, but if they were, the brits would have some Corsairs, Hellcats, Avengers as well. in that scenario the Germans would have been completely outclassed, outnumbered, and outranged.

The only hope for the Germans would be a Guerre De Course campaign centred around individual carriers, and battle squadrons of two or three Heavy Ships. Individually these TGs would still be vulnerable to being hunted down by the british, but it would be the best outcome that could be hoped for. if the Germans could break out, and operate at range, they would get an advantage, since British refuelling at sea capabilities were virtually nn-existent until 1945.
 

Outclassed ? Hardly seeing that the 109F4 outperformed all the mentioned a/c in 43.
 
The moment those KM carriers and their escorts left their sanctuaries, they would be the most hunted ships in the world. They would face an huge allied armada with lots of aircraft doing one thing .... find them and sink them.

You are forgetting the huge numbers of B17's and B24's that could be deployed against them had they existed. The allied bombing campaign would have taken a hiatus and the bomber assett's used for maritime patrol and attack.

The IJN and USN experience in the Pacific showed just how much fleet defense was needed to protect the carriers. And the KM just didnt have it.

Read Leonard's article again about how small the defending air wing was and how vulnerable the GZ was just from normal attrition.

Their fate would be the same as what befell the Bismark. A single sortie to sea, accomplishing nothing in the way of commerce raiding, and then an inglorious ride to Davey Jones locker.
 
I was not referring to the actual combat performance as such when i made the comment about the me109f. Although I would like to know the outcomes of any air battles that may have occurred between corsairs and me 109s (gs???) i think) over norway in 1944.

What I was referring to mostly were the range differences, followed by the aircraft handling capabilities of the ships themselves, followed by the tactical concept s the Germans would be likley to possess.

Do you agree that ther was a signifcant range difference between the Corsair and Hellcat (on the one hand) and the me 109 on the other. But if the Allies can outrange the germans in strike distances, all the performance advantages (if any) by the german fighter is going to count for nothing, because the Allies will sink the carrier, for the loss of say 5 or 6 aircraft , and then after the german carrier has been dealt with move in to sink the rest of the TG.

The aircraft handling capabilities of the ships themselves have been criticized in the past. assuming that the germans have manged to get to sea in their carriers, their AC capabilities are going to be terrible compared to the british carriers. GZ launching, and deck areas and catapults were broadly based on the Furious, which had a launch rate (called a spot rate) that was a fraction of a later Brit Carrier. If the Germans were keeping their fighters fuelled, but on the deck, until radar detection was achieved, they might have the ability to get 10 fighters launched in a hurry. It then depends on the lead time, that is the time it takes for the strike to reach the target, as to whether, and how many, of the intercepting fighters can make it to combat altitudes. If you have ever been in a carrier Ops room, as I have, then you will know that getting the birds off the deck in good time is a major headache, and if the deck crews are struggling with a slow catapult, and/or a cluttered deck space, then sometimes that lead time is very short indeed. this is particualrly true if the weather is at all bad, and the birds are a bit finicky in handling on the deck.

It may admittedly be possible for the germans to maintain a constant air patrol, but this would increase the at sea attrition rate, increse the wear and tear on the birds themselves (and a downgrading of the performance asa result) and would prevent a massed emergency CAP effort. Say the Germans had a total deckload of 20 Me 109s, but were mounting constant air patrols, that would mean in clear weather they might be able to put 7 or 8 birds into the fight. If they kept the birds on the deck, readied with the pilots strapped in and engines running, they might get 10 of the 20 airborne, but an indeterminate number to combat altitude.

The tactical concept that the germans might possess for their carrier fighters would probably follow that of their land based air forces, which may or may not suit the at sea conditions Its difficult to be specific in this area, but most of the pundits here are saying that the german concepts are mre than likley going to be more backward than those of their opponents.

Of course there is one other possibility we have not even canvassed as yet. Alone amongst all the navies, the british possessed the ability to deliver massed strikes at night, using ASV radar, flares, and a defgree of night flying training that they had been working on for more than 10 years. If the british delivered their bismarck style strikes at night, the germans are going to be completely flummoxed, since they could not have developed the same skills in the short time of development available to them
 
Corsairs never had any ACM in the ETO. They escorted some strikes against the Tirpitz but no LW fighters were encountered. There were a few encounters by Hellcats and from memory they did well.
 
Syscom 3's post is accurate - except for one thing. Time.

I believe, Syscom, that we are talking at cross-purposes.

In my posts I have based my premise on the possibility of the KM having four carriers having two years of Atlantic Weather Experience and ready to fight in 1939.

In 1939. Way, wayyy before the USA got into the war. Way before even the illustrious class was ready. Way before even the sea hurricane was ready. Way before the British had absorbed the lesson of carriers combined with other ships used efficiently - lessons that would be driven home only after many ships, including the Ark Royal, had been sunk through a shocking misunderstanding of how best to use and protect carriers... the list goes on and on...

I think Parsifal, too, has made this misconception. Parsifal, I believe you are still thinking that I am only tinkering with the Z plan (I'm aware of it). No. What I am positing is a radical redrawing of the Z plan, using even less resources than it called for (the plan was an economic impossibility, as I'm sure you know very well!) but redistributing those resources radically.
 
Put the economic issue to one side just for a minute, although I concede it is a big issue. What you are proposing is essentially, what would happen if the germans had the biggest and most effective carrier force in the world in 1939?

well, in short they would win....

Why would I say that your hypothesis involves the Germans having the biggerst carrier fleet in the world? Well, because in order to get where you would want to go, the germans would have to make some fundamental changes to their designs. The GZ was an innefficient design, although I baulk at saying she was an abject failure, because her deck area was too small, her lifts innefficient, her machinery spaces too large and overpowered, and the amount of weight devoted to armament far too great. At 20000 tons, she was the equivalent in tonnage to a yorktown, yet only was designed with an airgroup of 40. If you are going to factor into the equation a complete re-think of the theory, then at some point the germans are going to realize that they can cram 100 planes onto the same displacement as they currently have 40. So, the fleet you are proposing has a capacity of 400 or 500 planes. Nobody else, not the Japs, not the Americans, not the british had a carrier capacity of that size in 1939. moreover, nobody had fully developed their respective carrier tactics to anything like what you are nudging at here. So the answer is very simple....if the germans are given the wonder weapon that nobody else possesses in 1939 then of course they are going to clobber everyone..

But the whole hypothesis is just a bit ridiculous to me. No mention or thought on how they might get there, no mention or thought of the allied reaction to such a program...it assumes, in the worst possible way, that the allies are just going to sit there like a bunch of dumars*s and let the germans build their uber fleet and do nothing about it. Its really is a silly concept in my opinion, because it is just a bit too fanciful for my liking.
 
Just a bit of trivia ....

The efficiency of the carrier ops can be related directly to the numbers and placement of the aircraft elevators and just how fast the elevators operate.

Think that is important? You bet it is!!!! Slow elevator cycle times dicatate how fast aircraft can be spotted on the deck and how soon aircraft can be brought to the hanger. When the elevator is in operation, a good chunk of the flight deck is not available for flight ops. And that also goes for the placement of the elevators. Poorly chosen locations can create congestion on the flight deck and hanger.

Mr. Parsalls in his excellent book about the Battle of Midway looked at such mundane things such as this and realized that the tempo of ops and how the battles were fought were directly related to these little nuances.

Now has anyne have figures for the elevator cycling times on the GZ?
 

I think that this is one of the most unlikely scenario's ever. The British, Americans and Japanese had been learning their art from the end of WW1, adapting their designs in stages.
For a good example look at the changes made to the Furious, Glorious and Courageous from when they were first built compared to when WW2 started. The lessons were incorporated in the Ark Royal.
Similar examples exist in the USN and IJN. You don't just build a ship or four, practice for a few years and hey presto can take on the best in the world.

Even today, look at the problems Russia has had in developing an aircraft carrier, with all the benefit of history and no doubt the assistance of people with some experience who have been hired as 'consultants'.

The aircraft have been mentioned. No one would doubt that the 109F was a first class fighter in its time, but on a carrier? If the Spitfire had all those problems with a weak undercarridge, what on earth makes anyone believe that the 109 would do any better? That is no slight on its designers it simply wasn't designed for the job. The additional weight alone to allow for the stresses and strains would have had a measurable impact on its performance.
Its hard to think of many land based aircraft that have been a success on a carrier. Take away the Harrier which is a special case and your probably left with the Sea Hurricane which at least had a solid set of wheels and that was only good against weaker opposition.

Then there is the small point that has been mentioned ie, do you think that the other nations would have sat back and done nothing?

What are you going to arm it with.
The German 4.1in AA gun was very good but without a proximity Fuze it (and all other heavy AA) was of little use in a situation where you have to stop the enemy and no second chances.
The pre war 37mm was a very poor weapon being semi automatic with a very slow rate of fire.
The 20mm was very good but you are not going to stop a bomber or dive bomber attack with a 20mm. You may get them when the load has been dropped, but not before unless you are really lucky.

Sorry but this is a non starter.
 
When I step in again on this issue, let me first assure You that I don´t have any doubt that carrier operations on a large scale are somehow ridicolous to think about from the german perspective. They lacked many key abilities to do so in the proposed time frame.

In defense of the historic carrier and it´s airwing I might add these points to consider:

(A) insufficiant flight deck area:
The flight deck area of Graf Zeppelin (795ft. x 120 ft.) might appear to be small in comparison with that of SHINANO but once You looked into the details, it is not small in comparison to other carriers. As a matter of fact, the flight deck area is larger than that of the largest british aircraft carriers HMS ARK ROYAL (720 x 95 ft.) and HMS IMPLACABLE (760 ft. x 95 ft.) and only second to the largest US and japanese fleet carriers.

(B) insufficiant avgas storage:
GRAF ZEPPELIN carried 65.000 US gal. for 40 A/C. it might have been small in comparison with an ESSEX-class or another PTO CVL but I am convinced that it compares with the european carriers: 100.000 gal AVGAS storage are recorded for the 60 A/C of HMS ARK ROYAL. The late war HMS IMPLACABLE-class of CVL carried a legend 60 A/C airwing (to be increased to 81) and had a petrol storage of 94.540 gal. I would also like to stress that a number of carriers had less AVGAS: 20.800 gal AVGAS carried by HMS FURIOUS for it´s airwing of 36 A/C is a good example. 34.000 gal AVGAS of HMS COURAGIOUS for it´s 48 A/C or a look into the ILLUSTRIOUS-class gives an AVGAS storage of 50.540 gal, which was considered to be enough for 50 A/C. Even the INDOMITABLE-class had a fuel storage of 75.110 gal, which allowed her to operate 56 A/C.
Therefore the AVGAS storage of GZ doesn´t appear to be to small, rather contrary, it appears to be on the large end of the european carrier capacities with reflection of the numbers of A/C carried by the ship.

(C) Elevator capacity was to small
GZ had three main elevators from hangar deck to flight deck. I don´t know about the cycle times for them but the whoole flightgroup (design) launchtime was in within a margin of a 10(20) minutes.

(D) Some notes on the carrier ability of the Bf-109T:
Compared to other european carrier fighters (Sea-Gladiator, Fulmar, Sea Hurricane, Firefly, Sea-Spitfire), the Bf-109 appears to be better prepared for carrier operations. The Sea-Spitfire, it´s closest performance match, for example had it´s fixed wing unchanged until the appearence of the (l)Mk III in 1944. It also failed to counter the weight increase with larger wing area (one distinctive new figure on the -109T, which helped to reduce take off approach operating speed and thus contributed to an increased level of safety) and thus experienced weight growths, which increased the landing speed. The -109T also had air brakes to give improved approach angle controll over other fighters of that period. The weak undercarriege should be noted but this problem was shared by Seafire, Fulmar Firefly, too. From a purely technical perspective, the Bf-109T was certainly fitter for carrier operations than was the Seafire.
With regards to performance, the -109T in it´s 1941 state with D-601N is a credible A/C. It features two LMG + two 20mm guns, has unsurpassed climb performance, goos maneuverability and in top of all, it appears to be quite fast for a carrier fighter: 575 Km/h.

F4F-3 Wildcat 1941 (unlike -109T no pilot windscreen armour, no reflector type gunsights and no self sealing fuel tanks):
530 Km/h
F4F-3A/4 Wildcat 1942 (like F4F-3 but with a full outfit):
510 Km/h
FM-2 Wildcat 1944:
535 Km/h
F6F-3 Hellcat 1943:
597 Km/h
F6F-5 Hellcat 1944:
611 Km/h
Sea Gladiator 1940:
430 km/h
Fairey Fulmar MK II 1941:
445 Km/h
Sea Hurricane MK II 1942:
530 Km/h
Firefly MK I 1943:
510 km/h
Seafire (L)MK III 1944:
560 Km/h
A6M2 1941:
561 Km/h
A6M5a: 1943
576 Km/h

You could expect to see the DB-601N beeing replaced by DB-601E in 1942 with clearance to full 1.42 ata in mid 1942, giving a top speed in excess of 610 km/h (no weight increase). I don´t think that the Bf-109 T could easily accept the heavy and more powerful D-605 without a significant weight increase but from late 1943 an MW-50 injection could be included, which could boost performance further. It would not have been on par with land based fighters in mid war but compared with carrier fighters, the Bf-109T would remain competetive until the appearence of the F4U-1. Until that time the allies would certainly have been successful to trap the carrier somewhere on it´s raids, hands down.

GRAF ZEPPELIN was an isolated tactical element and for this very reason abandoned in construction. Had it been put in service by late 1941 it would have been a nasty fast atlantic raider but as the war progresses, the little GZ would find the operational environment more and more hostile for an isolated carrier without TF. That certainly would seal her fate this way or another...
 
Also, the scenario being posted is for the germans to have four to five carriers with a modern deck park, and a lot of experience under their belts by 1939...

With regard to the suitability of the air wing, Polmar et al had this to say " As part of the pilot training for Gruppen 186 (the carrier air wing) the Luftwaffe operated a small airfield on a Baltic island which resembled the carrier in size particularly runway legth. There were so many accidents because of the short runway, particularly amongst the Me109T formations, that these training operations were abandoned "pending the installation of better catapults".

Thes improved catapults incidentally, as far as I know, were never installed, suggesting they were never designed or built. This further suggests that had the GZ gone to sea she may well have gone to sea with sub-standard catapults. But we will never actually know. Just as an aside Japanese carriers as I understand it never needed catapults on their carriers because of the light weight of the planes they embarked. One reason, perhaps, why the German mission to Japan prewar was so fruitless. Many sources I have read talk about the German difficulties with designing an adequate catapult


Quite apart from the obvious conclusion that the catapults that had been installed were inadequate (and I am presuming the arrester gear as well) was the noted high attrition of the 109. It seems to me that like the Seafire, the narrow tracks of the undercarriage is the common thread here. hohun proved to me that in land based ops the narrow track was no big danger, but I wonder if it was not a problem on shipboard operations. It would certainly make deck handling a problem.

Lastly were the German air groups practising night operations to any degree. If not, how would they defend against the standard British method of attack in the pre-1943 environment, namely a strike at night
 
First of all thanks to Delc, the 109T was more specialised than I thought. I have been digging around as it caught my attention and found a couple of things that might be of interest.
A 109T was the plane that shot down the first B17 destroyed by the Germans in WW2. It was an RAF aircraft from 90 squadron and I know from other books that I have, that the RAF were surprised that a 109 was able to intercept the B17 so quickly. At the time, the B17 was being used as a very high altitude bomber the idea being that it would fly above any interception.
You have to wonder if the additional wingspan helped.

Re other interesting item relates to the 'spot' time. The wings did fold but the flaps had to be detatched first which wouldn't have helped ground handling.

Addition
I don't know about the catapults being fitted to the GZ but I did find a photo of a 109B being used as a trials aircraft for catapults.
 
I found the CinCs report to the Fuhrer dated April 12 1942, on the problems associated with the then still incomplete carrier. In part it says:

"About two years are required to develop, construct, and test the catapults.....If it is possible to convert the existing catapults the time limit would be reduced by six months. New winches for the arresting gear are needed. The company developing these winches has not yet announced when they can be delivered, or even when development will be completed"



This suggests that catapults had been developed prewar, but for some reason they were deemed inadequate. The lack of arresting gear suggests even more key problems.

The development of carrier based airpower for the German Navy appears to have been riddled with difficulties. I thin the lack of experience, or even interest in the pre-war period made it anextremely hard nut for them to crack. I still think that given the right priorities, and entusiasm, the Germans could have built carrier(s). They may have been ready by 1941-3 if they were extremely lucky. But these ships would have had a hard time being as efficient as the contemporary allied carriers, who by then had a wealth of experience behind them.

The report I mentioned above also advised that the fuel capacity reduced the endurance of the ship to unnacceptable proportions, and that modifications were needed to lift the fuel stowage by at least 25%. Air capacity for the 1943-4 configuration was expected to reduce to 32 aircraft, at maximum, partly because of the limited supply of converted aircraft, and partly, it seems beccause the air force was reluctant to spend more effort providing wing folding to the a/c.

This is a scenario that does not look good
 
From what I have seen, the original catapults installed into GRAF ZEPPELIN were operated by compressed air. There were compressed air depots which - when depleted- required half an hour to replenish. This can be described as a design mistake and was to be changed to steam operated catapults in 1942 and that coincides perfectly with Your source, Parsifal.
Another aspect in that timeframe is the increased fuel oil capacity of GZ to refuel it´s own TD´s while enroute. By this time, they tried to adopt true task force setups to their lone carrier. Realistically spoken, such an attempt would have encountered many more serious problems not yet discussed.
The only useful scenario for the carrier in my opinion is in late 1941, when it could have been fitted out and -with all shortcomings- had at least a realistic chance to be on operational status.

I am certain that no night flight ops were carried out by any dayfighters. Strike fighters had night ops experience but in the context of a german carrier, I think we may conclude that night ops wouldn´t happen soon.

best regards have some nice holidays,
 
Delcyros!

I found a post by "Delcyros" on the Naval Weaps.Com board in the thread "Designing a better Graf Zeppelin" in which you posted your (assuming that it's you!) thoughts on a 'cheap raider variant' which the Germans could have built on a light cruiser hull.

Great work, Delcyros! You posted it on Dec 26. Two questions.

(1) Why didn't you post it here?
(2) Does this mean that you think my premise, that cheap diesel powered carriers for commerce raiding, is both possible and plausible?

Here, for the benefit of all forumers, is "Delcyros" of the Naval Weaps.com board's post...

Based on a 8.250 t. light cruiser hull, I managed to install a sizable flight component composed of 24 Ar-195 naval strike fighters into a cruiser hull.
He-118 with folding wings are possible, too.
It retains two 15cm triple turrets on the stern for self defense and to finish off lone freighters. All Diesel propulsion for increased range.

Ingenohl, german CVL laid down 1934

Displacement:
7.924 t light; 8.202 t standard; 9.406 t normal; 10.369 t full load

Dimensions: Length (overall / waterline) x beam x draught (normal/deep)
(656,33 ft / 628,94 ft) x 60,20 ft x (17,39 / 18,69 ft)
(200,05 m / 191,70 m) x 18,35 m x (5,30 / 5,70 m)

Armament:
6 - 5,91" / 150 mm 60,0 cal guns - 110,23lbs / 50,00kg shells, 150 per gun
Quick firing guns in turret on barbette mounts, 1934 Model
2 x Triple mounts on centreline, aft deck aft
1 raised mount aft - superfiring
10 - 3,46" / 88,0 mm 76,0 cal guns - 23,56lbs / 10,69kg shells, 250 per gun
Anti-air guns in deck mounts, 1934 Model
4 x Twin mounts on sides, aft evenly spread
2 raised mounts
1 x Twin mount on sides, aft deck centre
1 double raised mount
16 - 0,79" / 20,0 mm 115,0 cal guns - 0,29lbs / 0,13kg shells, 500 per gun
Breech loading guns in deck mounts, 1934 Model
4 x Quad mounts on sides, evenly spread
4 raised mounts
Weight of broadside 902 lbs / 409 kg

Armour:
- Belts: Width (max) Length (avg) Height (avg)
Main: 1,97" / 50 mm 341,21 ft / 104,00 m 13,12 ft / 4,00 m
Ends: Unarmoured
Main Belt covers 83% of normal length

- Gun armour: Face (max) Other gunhouse (avg) Barbette/hoist (max)
Main: 2,36" / 60 mm 1,57" / 40 mm 1,57" / 40 mm
2nd: 0,79" / 20 mm 0,39" / 10 mm -

- Box over machinery magazines:
1,18" / 30 mm
Forecastle: 0,00" / 0 mm Quarter deck: 1,18" / 30 mm

- Conning towers: Forward 3,15" / 80 mm, Aft 3,15" / 80 mm

Machinery:
Diesel Internal combustion motors,
Geared drive, 2 shafts, 64.000 shp / 47.744 Kw = 30,86 kts
Range 8.450nm at 16,00 kts
Bunker at max displacement = 2.167 tons

Complement:
476 - 620

Cost:
£3,149 million / $12,597 million

Distribution of weights at normal displacement:
Armament: 271 tons, 2,9%
- Guns: 271 tons, 2,9%
Armour: 1.016 tons, 10,8%
- Belts: 371 tons, 3,9%
- Armament: 77 tons, 0,8%
- Armour Deck: 508 tons, 5,4%
- Conning Towers: 60 tons, 0,6%
Machinery: 1.841 tons, 19,6%
Hull, fittings equipment: 3.895 tons, 41,4%
Fuel, ammunition stores: 1.481 tons, 15,7%
Miscellaneous weights: 900 tons, 9,6%
- Hull below water: 100 tons
- Hull above water: 200 tons
- On freeboard deck: 500 tons
- Above deck: 100 tons

Overall survivability and seakeeping ability:
Survivability (Non-critical penetrating hits needed to sink ship):
18.069 lbs / 8.196 Kg = 175,5 x 5,9 " / 150 mm shells or 2,2 torpedoes
Stability (Unstable if below 1.00): 1,13
Metacentric height 3,0 ft / 0,9 m
Roll period: 14,7 seconds
Steadiness - As gun platform (Average = 50 %): 71 %
- Recoil effect (Restricted arc if above 1.00): 0,34
Seaboat quality (Average = 1.00): 1,60

Hull form characteristics:
Hull has low forecastle, rise forward of midbreak,
a normal bow and small transom stern
Block coefficient (normal/deep): 0,500 / 0,513
Length to Beam Ratio: 10,45 : 1
'Natural speed' for length: 26,86 kts
Power going to wave formation at top speed: 51 %
Trim (Max stability = 0, Max steadiness = 100): 44
Bow angle (Positive = bow angles forward): 15,00 degrees
Stern overhang: 19,69 ft / 6,00 m
Freeboard (% = length of deck as a percentage of waterline length):
Fore end, Aft end
- Forecastle: 10,00%, 28,77 ft / 8,77 m, 24,61 ft / 7,50 m
- Forward deck: 35,00%, 35,04 ft / 10,68 m, 35,04 ft / 10,68 m
- Aft deck: 40,00%, 13,12 ft / 4,00 m, 13,12 ft / 4,00 m
- Quarter deck: 15,00%, 13,12 ft / 4,00 m, 14,44 ft / 4,40 m
- Average freeboard: 22,21 ft / 6,77 m

Ship space, strength and comments:
Space - Hull below water (magazines/engines, low = better): 78,2%
- Above water (accommodation/working, high = better): 241,4%
Waterplane Area: 25.832 Square feet or 2.400 Square metres
Displacement factor (Displacement / loading): 142%
Structure weight / hull surface area: 96 lbs/sq ft or 469 Kg/sq metre
Hull strength (Relative):
- Cross-sectional: 0,95
- Longitudinal: 1,58
- Overall: 1,00
Excellent machinery, storage, compartmentation space
Excellent accommodation and workspace room
Ship has slow, easy roll, a good, steady gun platform
Excellent seaboat, comfortable, can fire her guns in the heaviest weather
 

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