Hey Macandy,
1. The A-10 was not "pulled out of point ops in GW1". They ran out of targets.
2. In operations during GW1, there were 22x USAF 'fast movers' (not counting the OV-10 or AC-130H) shot down by AAA and/or SAMs. These included:
1x F-4G 'Wild Wiesel' by AAA
1x F-14A shot down by a SA-2E heavy SAM
2x A-6E shot down, with 1x AAA, 1x unknown heavy SAM
2x F-15E shot down, with 1x AAA, 1x SA-2E heavy SAM
3x F-16C shot down, with 1x SA-16 (Igla-1) MANPAD, 1x SA-3 and 1x SA-6 heavy SAMs
5x AV-8B shot down, with 1x probably AAA, 3x unknown MANPADS, and 1x unknown heavy SAM
6x A-10A shot down, with 1x AAA, 1x SA-16 (Igla-1) MANPAD, 1x SA-9 (Strela-1) MANPAD, 2x SA-13 (basically a mobile SA-9 Strela launcher),
___and 2x unknown SAM (one is thought to have been a SA-13) so
possibly 5x A-10A shootdowns by MANPAD type SAMs
The total USAF 'fast mover' sorties was just over 43,000 in GW1, of which:
8,100 by A-10s
13,400 by F-16Cs
3340 by AV-8Bs
3. Most of the A-10 mission sorties in GW1 (over 8100 as mentioned above by FLYBOY J) were close air support and ground attack, many of which required low altitude operations and hence exposure to Regimental level AAA and SAMs. Some were flown at higher altitudes, such as when the Maverick was the main weapon used - and also included at lest 40 that were flown as 'Wild Weasel' (ie their load included jamming pods and ARMs) during escort of other A-10s or helos, and ~20 that were in effect armed reconnaissance.
Note that the Marines used the AV-8B for close air support and ground attack missions in a similar manor to the USAF use of the A-10A, and hence suffered similar losses.
Incidentally, 7 squadrons of the A-10 have been funded to remain in service until at least 2045. Although the A-10 remaining in service is often attributed to stupid politics, this is not really the case. One of the deciding factors was a series of 3 independent studies, all of which showed the A-10A as superior in the CAS role, although it was only marginally superior in 2 of the 3 main areas. The A-10 was found to be satisfactory in both marginal areas, and was found to be the only type capable of satisfactorily performing the third area mission. The only valid argument is whether the USAF can/should spend the funds on the A-10x rather than other platforms (such as the F-35 for example). The final statement put forward during the hearings by one Army general was "When the Air Force is willing to come down and fight on the ground along side of us . . . they can decide what we need [for CAS]."
4. I am quite familiar with how attack helicopters operate. As to their survivability in different environments?
IF the US attack helicopters ever have to operate in the face of serious opposition, including contested air space (ie the where the US does not have air superiority and/or where the majority of the air and ground based anti-helicopter threat has not been neutralized by fixed wing aircraft), maybe we will find out just how survivable helicopters are. For now the RF attack helos operating in the Ukraine are the only real example we have for helicopters operating in a theater where MANPADS are ubiquitous. (And yes, I realize that neither the A-10x or the AH-64x have faced the high intensity conflict they were both designed for.)