Better German naval strategy 1930-1945?

Thumpalumpacus said:

I think the near-impossibility of invading the UK was amply demonstrated in 1940.

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and then they had to wait until June 1944

Zmauky said:

and then they had to wait until June 1944

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Sure, and with massive American help. But by then I think the Germans would've been so wrapped up around the Eastern Front that they'd have been happy to say, "Hey, look, guys, sorry we gave you early trouble, what do you want to go back to norms?" In which case I think the Brits even without American help would likely have said, "No thanks, we'll keep up the blockade and let you Continental opponents bleed themselves dry," as they'd done for a couple of hundred years already, and continued huffing American support.

Especially once America included the USSR in L-L. No way the Germans can interdict the North Pacific route.

Yes, British policy was clear for a couple of centuries ago, what changed (between the Franco-Prussian and WW1 wars) were the political and military blocs - the rapprochement of Prussia/Germany and Austria-Hungary created an overwhelming force, so the UK decided to help France (and Russia indirectly as a French ally). It is interesting that almost all of Germany's allies in WW2 (Japan, Italy, Romania) were their opponents 25 years earlier. Which actually explains the lack of cooperation and coordination. (And Italian policy towards Germany until '38).


And the alternative scenarios ... that Germany cannot stop the Pacific route for the American LL is correct, but Japan can, it is impossible to imagine that in the case of, for example, the balkanization of the CCCP, Japan would not react, and the ships did not sail with the American flag.
Or what would be the reaction of the UK if they lost Alessandria / Suez?
Or let's say what about Turkish move (not to mention the Iraqi revolution or the Shah of Iran or India) ?

And as it was said, butterflies multiply with each step and it may not be the most accurate to take things that happened as written in stone for any possible situation.

And don't get me wrong, I'm not advocating a different course of history, I'm just open to different possibilities. Anyway, my opinion is that we rolling in our way through time without any vision and general plan and only sometimes we see (and correct) mistakes here and there. Somehow, that would be an explanation of the situation in which the world finds itself today.

Thumpalumpacus said:

I'm simply pointing out that the UK wasn't in nearly such dire straits as was painted.

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Depends on who you listened to.
And about what, and when.

The Army needed more tanks, guns, troops, cement and.....................to repel an invasion.
The RAF needed more bombers to bomb the German factories supplying German "invasion stuff", the army could just deal with whatever the Germans showed up with.
The Navy could barely keep from falling out their chairs laughing at the idea of a successful German invasion but what did they know

Now about the U-boat threat you were going to get different answers.
Navy wants more ships and men.
RAF wants more bombers so they can blow up the U-boat factories/ship yards and the Navy can deal with the ones already built. No swaning about all over the ocean on the chance to spot a U-boat for them.
Army wants as much "stuff" as can be spared incase the Germans come back after knocking out Russia.

Just the very threat of a German invasion tied up precious resources that Britain could have used elsewhere.

This also had a psychological effect on the public just like the threat of a Japanese invasion on the west coast of North America did, both in terms of military focus as well as with the public.

Shortround6 said:

Depends on who you listened to.

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Yeah, that's rather my point.

GrauGeist said:

Just the very threat of a German invasion tied up precious resources that Britain could have used elsewhere.

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Even before Barbarossa, the OKW had decided that Seeloew wasn't doable. The Brits didn't know of that decision, to be sure, but they knew that the Heer lacked the barges for troop transport, the Kriegsmarine lacked the ships for escort, and the Luftwaffe couldn't seize control of the air. They judged right.

The Brits actually did send troops from the UK to North Africa in 1941, both around the Cape route and iirc a convoy of tanks through the Med when the situation was still in doubt. What was it, Operation Tiger? The UK was sending troops, arms, and materiel to the Med almost as soon as Italy jumped in.

So while they kept forces on Britain and trained up, and gathered in American troops later for the European invasion, they still sent out large units even before Barbarossa kicked off, which kinda tells you what they really thought.

Thumpalumpacus said:

Yeah, that's rather my point.



Even before Barbarossa, the OKW had decided that Seeloew wasn't doable. The Brits didn't know of that decision, to be sure, but they knew that the Heer lacked the barges for troop transport, the Kriegsmarine lacked the ships for escort, and the Luftwaffe couldn't seize control of the air. They judged right.

The Brits actually did send troops from the UK to North Africa in 1941, both around the Cape route and iirc a convoy of tanks through the Med when the situation was still in doubt. What was it, Operation Tiger? The UK was sending troops, arms, and materiel to the Med almost as soon as Italy jumped in.

So while they kept forces on Britain and trained up, and gathered in American troops later for the European invasion, they still sent out large units even before Barbarossa kicked off, which kinda tells you what they really thought.

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This is a wiki page, and I apologize, however, it does give a fairly straight foreward over view of the effort and resources dedicated to the potential of a German invasion:


(solid references provided, btw)

And to further the invasion overview, this is the invasion overview (again, wiki), but with reputable numbers.

GrauGeist said:

This is a wiki page, and I apologize, however, it does give a fairly straight foreward over view of the effort and resources dedicated to the potential of a German invasion:

British anti-invasion preparations of the Second World War - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

(solid references provided, btw)

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No slag, brotha, I linked to a wiki as well. But while I know the Brits took preps against invasion, I know as well that even before Germany invaded USSR the UK was sending resources to North Africa taken directly from the home islands. That says a lot about their assessment of the situation. If in May 1941 they'd rush tanks -- through the Med, not around the Cape -- from UK to Egypt, don't you think that gives us insight on where they thought the real threat was?

Well, Britain was Cat juggling.

Meaning they had to scramble to put out spot fires as fast as possible all across the board.

They had to deal with Africa - not just north, but the Palestine and middle east, the potential German invasion, the situation in the Southwest Pacific and India.

To back off for a moment, buying Hudsons and to an extent Harvards created a number of problems for the British.
Political, the quite real backlash for buying foreign
Financial, US types cost more for a start while building local enables the government to recover some of the costs via taxation of the companies and workers and then more taxation downstream as the people involved spent their wages and profits.
Maintenance, US types used different specifications starting with fundamental things like alloys, rivets and screws
Military, the US had the neutrality act, there was a real chance spare parts supply would be cut off in war.

The British/RAF judged the need for an improved maritime reconnaissance type important enough to run those risks, similar for the need for more trained airmen.

Pre war everyone agreed air power had become much more powerful compared with WWI, to the point where some ideas resemble modern nuclear war. The campaigns in Poland and France certainly showed air power was very devastating, everyone agrees the Luftwaffe was a major reason for the successes. So if air power was really that good then it should be possible to devastate the RAF airfields, forcing the RAF away from the invasion area while doing the same to the ports the RN was using. Assume something like the Luftwaffe air to air kill claims had been accurate and that says the RAF will lose many more aircraft in the fighting than the Luftwaffe will. The port attacks should also inflict losses on the RN.

The RAF and RN forced away from the invasion front, both heavily hurt by the fighting, and then the Luftwaffe can then go and add convoy and battlefield protection as well as front line support and interdiction and it will all work. After all it was only a few days before the Luftwaffe had air superiority in France for example. This resulted in the Luftwaffe initially writing off British targets it attacked, moving onto the next, until it was understood few targets were being destroyed.

One of the hidden factors to the Luftwaffe's success in France was the Army's success, and vice versa in a virtuous circle. None of the allied air formations had very much mobility, moving airfields was disruptive. So the Luftwaffe hit the allied air force, which enabled the army to advance which in turn made the Luftwaffe's job easier. As far as I can tell at the end of June 1940 the Luftwaffe high command was largely awarding itself most of the credit, ignoring the effects of the army advance.

All the above says as of June 1940 the German ability to invade Britain looked very good or better, any defenders would be short of heavy weapons which reduced the need for the attackers to have them, reducing specialist sea transport requirements, the Luftwaffe would be available to act as artillery like at the crossing of the Meuse.

While the vulnerability of ships to air attack was lower than the air forces thought pre war it was higher than the navies thought. April to August 1940 the RN lost 22 modern and 6 older destroyers to all causes. Any major fight over invasion convoys was going to cost both sides a lot. It cost the British a lot anyway as ships retained in Britain could not escort convoys.

With the over estimation of air power continuing into 1941 (Butt report necessity anyone?) the threat of Battle of Britain second round remained real.

Hurricane exports April to December 1940, 6, 0, 9, 24, 45, 15, 12, 58, 76. In November 73 squadron was sent to the Middle East.

Britain exported 1,727 aircraft April to October 1940, mostly trainers, the Mediterranean (mostly Malta) was sent 46 (15 Hurricanes, 8 Wellington), the Middle East 314 (80 Blenheim, 66 Hurricane, 42 Lysander, 20 Wellington), also 24 Hurricanes to Kenya and South Africa, used in East Africa.

After the BEF returned there were a nominal 28 British divisions in Britain, half had been in France, some as a labour force, 2 were disbanded in July 1940, while 6th Armoured was formed in September. A convoy of Anzac troops was diverted to England in mid 1940 thanks to both the need in England and the problems of Italian bases on the Red Sea. Enough troops to form a nominal, but weak, Anzac division in theory. One Brigade of New Zealanders, 1 of Australians, plus various other units, then the Australian 25th and New Zealand 7th Infantry Brigades were formed in England, the majority of these troops left for the Middle East November 1940 to January 1941. 1st Canadian Division made it to France in 1940, 2nd Division arrived in Britain August to December 1940, 3rd and 5th Divisions in 1941. The US 34th Division was sent in January 1942.

The 2nd Armoured division was sent to the Middle East in October 1940, 1st Armoured was sent in December. Next to leave Britain was 50th infantry in April 1941, then 18th Infantry in October, the manpower situation was such that November 1941 to January 1942 six divisions in Britain were downgraded to Lower Establishment, meaning 7 out of the nominal 29 present were LE.

Tank production (all types) was 392 in Q3/40, 449 Q4/40, 653 Q1/41, 943 Q2/41, as a result Britain formed the 8th, 9th and 11th Armoured Divisions November 1940 to March 1941, while the 1st Cavalry Division in the Middle East was redesignated 10th Armoured in July 1941.

If the Kreigsmarine were to attempt an operation in the Caribbean, then they'd have to deal with the USN, USCG and USAAF - who covered the Carribean extensively.
In just 1942 alone, the Germans lost six U-boats in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.

Zmauky said:

The dates clearly show that the marine mammal operation is seasonal - any armored formations are not needed in the winter and can go where the situation is problematic.
And let's get back to the topic - I think that for KM it is less important how many and what kind of ships it has and that the real omission is how they used them.
KM could not oppose RN directly, but they failed to create direct pressure. Namely, as the Fleet in Being, they have already blocked considerable resources of the RN (and the RAF), let's imagine what would have happened if Bismarck, instead of (repeated) trip to the Atlantic, for example, made a night bombardment of some coastal target in Scotland, repeated by schnellboot raids, then a provocative commando attack on, say, Cyprus, then a concentrated pre-Drumbeet u-boot to Jamaica or Cape of Good Hope .... The mosquito sting tactic would have blocked and stretched significantly more UK power. And with that, KM would contribute more.

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Shore bombardment
What target of any significance? Based on where? Wilhelmshaven to Hull is 345 miles. The Home Fleet was based at Scapa Flow in the Orkneys and would have sortied in an attempt to intercept. It has to avoid RAF aerial recce. Pass through the east coast mine barrier. Taking minesweepers with them would have slowed the whole operation.


Cyprus
Paphos in western Cyprus to Rhodes, the nearest occupied Axis territory is about 260 miles. Britain maintained ground and air forces on Cyprus against just such an event through most of the war. By mid-1941 there was an entire division on the island.

The RAF maintained an aerial recce over the whole of the eastern Med. Highly likely that had a surface force been detected the RN Med Fleet at Alexandria would have sortied to intercept. Even after the battleships QE & Valiant were damaged in Dec 1941 there was still a cruiser squadron with destroyer support to contend with.

Cape of Good Hope
When Donitz sent the Gruppe Eisbar south to the Cape, he made the decision in July 1942 but it wan't until mid-Aug that the U-boats could be dispatched. Just 4 of the Type IXC (of which there weren't that many). And they were supported by U-459 the first Type XIV Milch Cow that had only completed in Nov 1941. It was March 1942 before it undertook its first war patrol with the first two patrols being to support operations in the western Atlantic. It was its third war patrol between 18 Aug 1942 & 4 Nov 1942 to support operations off the Cape. Its success between Oct & Dec 1942 was also partly due to the Allies not being able to read Ultra intercepts at that time, so forces couldn't be redeployed ahead of time to tackle them. One result was that the Eastern Fleet was virtually grounded as its few destroyers were redeployed to convoy escort.

Without the Milch Cow, in 1941 the KM would have had to depend on deploying a tanker to the South Atlantic. In the aftermath of the Bismarck outing in May 1941 the RN swept up most of the German supply ships deployed in support. Cruisers were deployed in the Central & South Atlantic throughout that period on just such interception duties.

So I'm not sure just how much further your proposals would in fact have stretched Britain in that 1941/42 period beyond what it already was.

GrauGeist said:

If the Kreigsmarine were to attempt an operation in the Caribbean, then they'd have to deal with the USN, USCG and USAAF - who covered the Carribean extensively.
In just 1942 alone, the Germans lost six U-boats in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico.

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Operations in those areas would have been in the declared Neutrality Zone in 1941. Inevitably it would have brought the KM into conflict with the USN just as happened when the USN, later in 1941, began escorting convoys to the Mid Ocean Meeting Point south of Iceland. It undoubtedly would have brought forward US entry into WW2, which was something Hitler tried to avoid until Dec 1941.




The initial ships of the Neutrality Patrol were reinforced from April / May 1941 by the arrival of the carrier Yorktown & the 3 New Mexico class battleships from the Pacific.

Zmauky said:

The dates clearly show that the marine mammal operation is seasonal - any armored formations are not needed in the winter and can go where the situation is problematic.

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Can they, realistically? I'm not an expert on WWII military logistics, but is it really worth the effort, and is there time, to ship an armored division to Egypt in the autumn, integrate them into whatever forces are there, do something useful, then ship them back to the UK, refit, and be prepared to repel an invasion come spring?

And let's get back to the topic - I think that for KM it is less important how many and what kind of ships it has and that the real omission is how they used them.

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These issues go hand in hand, I think. First, you need to think of what the mission the navy is supposed to fulfill, then you build the navy that suits those requirements. Of course, given the volatile political situation in interwar Europe, you cannot be sure how the world is going to look in a decade or so, so you should design a navy that has some kind of flexibility to perform different kinds of missions rather than being hyper-optimized for any one particular mission (that might no longer exist by the time war breaks out).

But what you shouldn't do is build a navy with big guns BOOM BOOM just to satisfy the chest-thumping ego of the great leader.

KM could not oppose RN directly, but they failed to create direct pressure. Namely, as the Fleet in Being, they have already blocked considerable resources of the RN (and the RAF), let's imagine what would have happened if Bismarck, instead of (repeated) trip to the Atlantic, for example, made a night bombardment of some coastal target in Scotland, repeated by schnellboot raids, then a provocative commando attack on, say, Cyprus, then a concentrated pre-Drumbeet u-boot to Jamaica or Cape of Good Hope .... The mosquito sting tactic would have blocked and stretched significantly more UK power. And with that, KM would contribute more.

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I don't know. To some extent the fleet in being strategy did work; the Brits spent a lot of resources bombing, or otherwise trying to destroy, German capital ships sitting in ports in France or Germany, or fjords in Norway.

Similarly for Bismarck's lone mission; was it reckless? Yes, maybe (but the Germans probably didn't know how bad the odds were). But without a credible threat to sortie out into the Atlantic they can't force the Allies to have their heavy capital ships at sea in the North Atlantic, sucking up fuel, and, well, not being somewhere else doing something useful.

z42 said:

Can they, realistically? I'm not an expert on WWII military logistics, but is it really worth the effort, and is there time, to ship an armored division to Egypt in the autumn, integrate them into whatever forces are there, do something useful, then ship them back to the UK, refit, and be prepared to repel an invasion come spring?

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Quite agree. It could take 2 months or more just to load up the ships, get them around Africa and unload them. Then 2 months or more to load ships, get them back and unload them.

z42 said:

These issues go hand in hand, I think. First, you need to think of what the mission the navy is supposed to fulfill, then you build the navy that suits those requirements. Of course, given the volatile political situation in interwar Europe, you cannot be sure how the world is going to look in a decade or so, so you should design a navy that has some kind of flexibility to perform different kinds of missions rather than being hyper-optimized for any one particular mission (that might no longer exist by the time war breaks out).

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Agree again. For instance they laid down the Hipper on 6 July 1935 and that is after drawing up the plans, issuing the contracts and collected the first few hundred tons (or thousand) of materials next to the slipway. They commissioned the ship 29 April 1939 but it took a number of months to complete trials/training. Other large German (and just about everybody else's) ships had somewhat similar build times. Without very good spies many times navies were responding to published accounts as to guns/armor/speed etc. which were often incorrect.
And countries hoped their new ships would be viable (useful) for many years after completion.
The Germans had been allowed to keep a number of ships after WW I but only rather old ships like 15-20 years old. What they were not supposed to keep was the number of men to actually man all the ships at the same time.
Germans got a bit of break what with Russia descending into chaos for a number of years and the French needing to rebuild all kinds of things and the French having completed very few ships (or at least large ones) during WW I everything they had was obsolete and/or worn out.

z42 said:

But what you shouldn't do is build a navy with big guns BOOM BOOM just to satisfy the chest-thumping ego of the great leader.

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This actually worked out rather well for the Germans in the short term. They managed to convince a lot of people that their Army, Air Force and Navy were more powerful/capable than they really were, which stopped the other countries from spanking Hitler during the mid 30s.
Most of the flaws of the German ships were either not revealed until well into WW II or post war with examination of captured ships and records. German ships were a lot more impressive on paper than they proved to be in action.

I would note that many of the famous "treaty" cruisers of the 1920s and early 30s were rather flawed ships of greater or lesser extent.
Germans could either try to over awe their opponents with German technology/engineering or sit in the corner and play quietly because they could not out build/out number their opponents. Germans built 22 destroyers 1935 and end of 1938 (launched) while the British built (launched) 52 (?) and while the British had to worry about the Italians and Japanese the Germans had to worry about the French (until 1940) and the Soviet Union which had stopped fighting themselves in 1923 (?) were were starting to rebuild their navy in the 1930s.

Well, I didn't say anywhere that I would recall the British armored divisions back, but I guess there's enough time from September to April - May to train people and produce new vehicles - after all, I only emphasized what happened in RT. And.. ok, I forgot about the Neutrality zone, but didn't the UK have a couple of isles in the Atlantic that are interesting to visit and shoot a couple of shells - from merchant/u-boot/panzershife ? And yes - we are talking about the period from 1939 to the winter of 1942. For example, as successful as the Merchant raiders were, they came too late and were too few when the time was right (as well as the Fw 200 Condor). And as an example of unpreparedness - KM practically exhausted its stock of magnetic mines by 1940, and the number of torpedoes fell to a dangerous low level (not to mention that the UK might have been without a Churchill if they were checking to see if they were working when fired from submarines).
The fleet in being strategy did work, I just wanted to say that it would have been even more successful if they had prepared purposeful plans for poking at various places. And admittedly, I was more expecting neat ideas on how to do something like that ?
For example, is it possible to transfer the Staffel of Condors to Corsica and visit Gibraltar in 1940. Because one squadron of NF Blenheims / Beaufighters in Gibraltar is one less in the UK?

Zmauky said:

Well, I didn't say anywhere that I would recall the British armored divisions back, but I guess there's enough time from September to April - May to train people and produce new vehicles - after all, I only emphasized what happened in RT. And.. ok, I forgot about the Neutrality zone, but didn't the UK have a couple of isles in the Atlantic that are interesting to visit and shoot a couple of shells - from merchant/u-boot/panzershife ? And yes - we are talking about the period from 1939 to the winter of 1942. For example, as successful as the Merchant raiders were, they came too late and were too few when the time was right (as well as the Fw 200 Condor). And as an example of unpreparedness - KM practically exhausted its stock of magnetic mines by 1940, and the number of torpedoes fell to a dangerous low level (not to mention that the UK might have been without a Churchill if they were checking to see if they were working when fired from submarines).
The fleet in being strategy did work, I just wanted to say that it would have been even more successful if they had prepared purposeful plans for poking at various places. And admittedly, I was more expecting neat ideas on how to do something like that ?
For example, is it possible to transfer the Staffel of Condors to Corsica and visit Gibraltar in 1940. Because one squadron of NF Blenheims / Beaufighters in Gibraltar is one less in the UK?

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Corsica was under Vichy French control from June 1940 until Nov 1942. Then it was occupied by the Italians until Sept 1943. Then the Germans arrived for a short period before being withdrawn in Oct 1943.

But the Luftwaffe, which only turned up in the Med at the beginning of 1941, used bases in southern Sardinia for their anti-shipping units from time to time alongside the RA. The latter used their 4 engined P.108 bombers to bomb Gibraltar on several occasions in 1942, to no real effect.

Contrary to the popular view, there were never very many Fw200 Condors available in the 1940-42 period you are looking at. They were too valuable in their role supporting KM U-boat and surface ship operations in the Atlantic to waste attacking Gibraltar, which was well defended against air attack.

As for Gibraltar itself, the airfield began as an emergency landing ground on the racecourse in 1936. By 1939 It had a single runway that was considered too short for safe operation of Wellingtons & Hudsons. It was Dec 1941 before work began to extend it out into the sea using rock removed in tunnelling operations. By mid-Jan 1942 it was still only 985 yards long, reaching 1,150 yards by April and an eventual 1,550 yards in time for Operation Torch in Nov 1942. It was increased to 1,800 yards and widened by July 1943.

Beaufighters were in very short supply in 1941. It was May 1941 before any of the coastal day fighters could be spared for the Middle East and Nov 1941 before any of the night fighter version could be spared. Blenheim fighters were also needed at home both as night fighters, until more suitable aircraft became available, or in Coastal Command providing fighter cover for convoys in home waters.

As for the KM merchant raiders, I don't follow why you say they came too late. The first, Atlantis, completed her conversion in Dec 1939 and sailed, after being delayed by ice in the Baltic, at the end of March 1940. She was followed by Orion in April & Widder in May. So I don't really see how their operations could have begun much earlier, unless conversions had been undertaken pre-war. Numbers were limited by lack of suitable shipping, both for conversions, and for the supply ships needed to support them.

Edit:- the Fw Condor entered Luftwaffe service in a maritime patrol role in April 1940 with the first armed version being just 6 Fw200C-0 aircraft.

On 6 Jan 1941 Hitler issued a directive ordering I./KG 40 (the sole maritime recce Fw200 unit) to be assigned to the KM to operate directly under the control of Donitz and U-boat HQ. Goring was ordered to bring the unit to a strength of 12 Condors maintaining that number "if necessary by assigned additional aeroplanes of type He 111". In theory I./KG 40 should have been able to field 36 Fw200 had it been at full strength.

That indicates the importance of the Fw200 to successful U-boat operations as well as just how few of the type were available for such work.

However by March I./KG 40 we once again under Luftwaffe control, highlighting the constant battle between the KM and the Luftwaffe over naval aviation assets in the German military that had been going on since 1934/35.

At the end of March 1941 only 3./KG 40 had Fw200. The rest if I./KG 40 was flying Ju88 or He 111 or Do 217. By May 1942 2./ KG 40 had 6 Fw200 (3 operational) while III./KG 40 had 19 (8 operational) at Bordeaux-Merignac, in France and maybe a few more in Norway.

There were never large numbers of Fw200 in service at any one time to spare aircraft for odd special missions like raiding Gib.

Zmauky said:

Namely, as the Fleet in Being, they have already blocked considerable resources of the RN (and the RAF), let's imagine what would have happened if Bismarck, instead of (repeated) trip to the Atlantic, for example, made a night bombardment of some coastal target in Scotland, repeated by schnellboot raids, then a provocative commando attack on, say, Cyprus, then a concentrated pre-Drumbeet u-boot to Jamaica or Cape of Good Hope

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Zmauky said:

The fleet in being strategy did work, I just wanted to say that it would have been even more successful if they had prepared purposeful plans for poking at various places. And admittedly, I was more expecting neat ideas on how to do something like that ?

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A lot of these ideas are rather fanciful. It is almost 4000 miles one way from 1/2 between Iceland and Scotland the gap between Cuba and Haiti before you get to Jamaica, or about 800 miles further than Cape Hatteras, one way.

I would like to thank EwenS for the maps in his posts, which show the problems with raiding the Scottish/north England coast. The High Seas fleet tried this several times in WW I, including the Battle of Dogger Bank (Jan 1915) with rather limited success. The gains were not worth the potential losses and both sides, British and Germans were franticly mining each coast and loosing small ships doing it. Risking a major fleet unit in mine fields for a propaganda raid was not worth it. Arial reconnaissance, poor as it was in 1939/40 was way ahead of what it was in 1914-1916.
Schnell boat raids depend on taking the Dutch and Belgian coasts. It is about 300 NM from Newcastle upon Tyne and Frisian Islands off the EMS. That is too long even in winter to stay in the cover of darkness even at 30kts.

A major problem for the Germans was simply that technology had overtaken some of the old historic ways of using sea power. Things like Hudsons and Catalinias (Much like Fw 200s) could pinpoint raiders faster and/or search much wider areas of the sea than surface ships even if they could not safely attack raiders. The aircraft were advancing much faster than the ships. The 3-4 years it took to build a large surface ship in the mid 30s saw large increases in the capabilities of maritime recon aircraft.

I would note that the RN had spent decades (centuries?) figuring out how to "poke" at the enemies of Britain and had a pretty good idea of what to took to do it and how to defend against it. They had also participated in some classic failures (Dardanelles) to also show how things could go wrong for the attackers and what was needed by defenders to help screw things up. Politicians trying to play Admirals and Generals was a classic red flag