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As the AGNA suckered Germany into building a small balanced treaty-style fleet, anything substantially different, such as this what-if scenario, would require the AGNA to be different than it was historically. Or just non-existent, as Germany repudiated the land and air restrictions in the Versailles treaty, they could have repudiated the naval parts as well without any replacement treaty.Grossly exceeding that 47,250 ton limit destroys AGNA 1935. It is one thing to build ships a few thousand tons over agreed limits, another to build multiple ships of 20,000 tons or more. For raiding in the Atlantic and IO something bigger than a WW2 escort carrier would be required. Hitler was keen to keep Britain onside for as long as possible.
Ceteris paribus, I agree. But it never is, is it? With no German heavy surface units to worry about, UK could churn out more ASW escorts, escort carriers etc, and transfer the home fleet capital ships to the Med and the far east.Swarms of subs with properly tested torpedoes would have been way more useful than big naval ships in the early war years. So build way more Type VII and IX instead of Bismarck/Tirpitz and the carrier(s).
The AGNA didn't sucker Germany into anything.As the AGNA suckered Germany into building a small balanced treaty-style fleet, anything substantially different, such as this what-if scenario, would require the AGNA to be different than it was historically. Or just non-existent, as Germany repudiated the land and air restrictions in the Versailles treaty, they could have repudiated the naval parts as well without any replacement treaty.
The UK had more shipbuilding capacity than the Germans, but it wasn't infinite either. What are they going to give up to respond to German light CV's?
Those flattops must come past the UK. You needn't sacrifice anything, just keep RAF on the ball.
If so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?
Though broadly I agree. As the war progresses and the Allies improve the aerial patrols, getting past the GIUK gap undetected is becoming increasingly untenable for any KM surface ship.
It was there?If so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?
Not if the light cruiser keeps it's distance. What caused HMAS Sydney's demise was the captain's decision to close to within 3k yds. The effective range of a director controlled 6in battery is about 15-18k yds vs 8 to 10k yds for a 10.5cm battery. Yes both gun calibres can shoot farther but the hit rate is abysmally poor beyond the effective ranges.The lighter DP secondaries would likely be unable to penetrate the citadels of light cruisers. However the Leanders had only 25mm turret armor, so even 10.5cm secondaries should be able to wreck them. So a hail of 10.5 cm shells would quickly mission kill it. Then again, a light cruiser would also be capable of mission killing a PBB as long as the PBB main guns are occupied elsewhere, and the UK would happily trade a mutual mission kill in the south Atlantic.
A fast "PBB2" would have the option to keep out of light battery range and rely on the main guns. However dispatching 3 cruisers at long range would run down the main battery magazines, so.. No magic solutions however you turn it.
Bomber command would have gone after Bismarck if she had lingered in a Norwegian fjord for any length of time.If so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?
Though broadly I agree. As the war progresses and the Allies improve the aerial patrols, getting past the GIUK gap undetected is becoming increasingly untenable for any KM surface ship.
It was there just randomly? Or was it placed in the area explicitly to guard against a escape into the Atlantic by German heavy surface units? And why was the Hood placed there instead of, say, a RAF squadron? Perhaps because, at the time, they didn't believe the RAF would be up to such a task?It was there?
I'm sure you're correct about the effective ranges.Not if the light cruiser keeps it's distance. What caused HMAS Sydney's demise was the captain's decision to close to within 3k yds. The effective range of a director controlled 6in battery is about 15-18k yds vs 8 to 10k yds for a 10.5cm battery. Yes both gun calibres can shoot farther but the hit rate is abysmally poor beyond the effective ranges.
Bomber Command went after Tirpitz while she was in and around Trondhiem between Jan & April 1942. 4 raids did exactly no damage for the loss of 13 heavy bombers.Bomber command would have gone after Bismarck if she had lingered in a Norwegian fjord for any length of time.
Given the situation caused by Sydney's captain, a 10.5cm battery would have actually been more effective because it would have had a higher rate of fire and, IIRC, Kormoran's 5.9in guns didn't have any AP ammo and couldn't penetrate Sydney's armour belt. Sydney was able to reply and sink Kormoran and sank from the combined effects of dozens of hits that caused fires and from a torpedo hit forward. Sydney was so close that Kormoran's 37mm guns were able to cause havoc on Sydney.I'm sure you're correct about the effective ranges.
But to nitpick about the demise of the Sydney, the Kormoran was also equipped with 6" guns. Though I'm sure the Sydney had better directors, so for a longer range engagement the Sydney should definitely have the advantage.
I suspect that the KM was better prepared by then but I also know that the RAF opposed the use of divebombers and didn't act quickly enough to place tactical strike aircraft in Iceland and also demilitarized many aircraft that could have been used for glide and divebombing KM ships, such as the Hawker Henley and Fairey Battle. OTOH RAF torpedo bombers turned out to be quite useful.Bomber Command went after Tirpitz while she was in and around Trondheim between Jan & April 1942. 4 raids did exactly no damage for the loss of 13 heavy bombers.
All of the German WW II raiders used pre WW I 15cm guns from Pre-dreadnoughts and/or Dreadnoughts/battle cruisers.But to nitpick about the demise of the Sydney, the Kormoran was also equipped with 6" guns. Though I'm sure the Sydney had better directors, so for a longer range engagement the Sydney should definitely have the advantage.
The could not build the 38cm guns in time to complete the ships. The S+G were scary enough to British and French. They were faster than any of the old BBs and Repulse and Renown were questionable. Renown started refit in Sept 1936, Repulse never got the new/better refit. ONLY the Hood was fast enough and 'dangerous' enough to really fight the twins as they stood. Fitting the 3 twin 38cm turrets would have prompted the British to make a few drastic changes of her own. Like speed up a Lion? kind of depends on when.hey still have S+G and the heavy cruisers and could at least try to get 38cm guns on S+G to make them (look) more dangerous
so, why did they sacrifice the Hood instead of just sending in the RAF to sink the Bismarck?
It was there just randomly? Or was it placed in the area explicitly to guard against a escape into the Atlantic by German heavy surface units? And why was the Hood placed there instead of, say, a RAF squadron? Perhaps because, at the time, they didn't believe the RAF would be up to such a task?
It was there just randomly? Or was it placed in the area explicitly to guard against a escape into the Atlantic by German heavy surface units? And why was the Hood placed there instead of, say, a RAF squadron? Perhaps because, at the time, they didn't believe the RAF would be up to such a task?