bf110 exchange ratio (2 Viewers)

davebender said:

How many Me-110s were employed in the daylight fighter role after 1940? I'd hazard a guess not many. From mid 1940 onward most Me-110 units were converted to night fighters, photo recon and light attack. It's not surprising that Me-110s in such units fared poorly when jumped by day fighters. A-20s and Beaufighters in light attack units didn't fare too well in air to air combat either.

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I dont know, but judging by their losses over france, quite a few were shot down by the RAF. They were at least airborne in the dayligt actions at that time

davebender said:

How many Me-110s were employed in the daylight fighter role after 1940? I'd hazard a guess not many. r.

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Exactly the cases I referred to . Bf110's met Hurricanes by themselves in early Western Desert and Malta (both cases no 109's around at all for awhile), and occasionally in later parts of North Africa/Med campaigns time to time; day fighter or fighter/bomber Bf110 units. They didn't do nearly as well as 109's did, in contrast to the 1940 campaigns where, contrary to conventional wisdom, they often did about as well.

Joe

parsifal,

Does your source list how many bf110 were lost on the channel front during 1941? A list of the claims for the Biggin Hill Wing for all of 1941 lists only 3 bf110, the last on April 6.

Hello Dave
Quote:" How many Me-110s were employed in the daylight fighter role after 1940?"

Let's see, at least Z Staffel in North, meaning Norway, from June 41 operated from Northern Norway and Northern Finland.
In East:
I and II/SKG 210, later I and II/ZG 1. As SKG 210 it was fighter-bomber unit but flew also fighter missions. In 42 as ZG unit it flew fighter, fighter-bomber and ground attack missions. When II/ZG 1 operated around Brest in Sept-Nov 43, it flew day fighter missions.
I and II/ZG 26, fighter and ground-attack missions.

In Med: III/ZG 26, fighter and ground-attack missions.

In 43 ZG 76 was reformed for Reich Defence and flew at least at the beginning was equipped with both 110s and 410 s.

At least those.

Juha

That's another way of saying "light attack". An Me-110 loaded with bombs and operating at low altitude is not a daylight fighter.

Don't get me wrong. I am no fan of the historical Me-110 design. The Fw-187 was superior as a long range daylight fighter. The Ju-88 was superior as a light bomber and night fighter. That leaves Germany with no good reason to produce the Me-110 except that Goering liked the aircraft. However comparing kill ratios of a light attack unit vs a daylight fighter unit does not provide an accurate picture of Me-110 capability when operating in the day fighter role.

Dave
who is comparing kill ratios of a light attack unit vs a daylight fighter unit. At least I or JoeB aren't.

Juha

I think it is fair to say that the -110 did well against Single engine, Fighter opposition as of 1940. From a statistical Point of view and much better than many books make us believe. I don't think it did any better than the -109 and this Point isn't touched by the sample. The higher survivability rate of the -110 over England is explainable by -109 Defekts (Range) and does not occur in other samples. The -110 was effective in the fighter Role when used to it's strengths. It wasn't easy cannon fodder or outclassed per se. Underestimating it is One Case but neglecting the Statistics another One.

Hello Delcyros
I agree that 110 was clearly better fighter in 1940 than its popular image is in English language literature and that it did very well during BoF. But how well it did during BoB is a little more difficult to gauge. It depends the statics one use.

I f we look Alcorn figures, FC lost 830 S.E. fighters in air, which IMHO probably means in air during oper sorties because RAF lost 1140 fighters Cat 3 between 1 Jul and 31 Oct 40 for all reasons, and shot down 504 Bf 109s and 208 Bf 110s, altogether 712. It is IMHO very probably that the bombers shot down at least around 100 British fighters, so fighter vs fighter combat (excluding Blenheim fighters) results were not far from even according to Alcorn's year 2000 revised figures. Now the problem is how to weed away the bomb-carrying 110 fighter-bombers and recon planes. But IMHO even with that reduction LW fighters didn't got overly positive exchange rate. The other problem is the Cat 2 planes, but that is a very complex question.

Juha

Hello again
did same calculations by using info from Wood's Target England (1980) and Wood's and Dempster's The Narrow Margin (1961). RAF lost 1092 fighters Cat 3 between 10 Jul and 31 Oct 40 and between 1 Aug and 30 Sept 40 RAF lost in combat 705 out of 802 Cat 3 S.E. fighters lost for all reason during that time frame. So 87,9% of fighters lost during that timeframe were lost in air combats. If we used that % to the 1092 we got 960. Now it is entire possible that in July and in Oct 40 % of losses due the accidents were clearly higher than during busier times of Aug and Sept and worse weather during Oct also increased the % of losses due accidents but the figure 130 (960-Alcorn's 830) is rather high. I don't have time to look that more carefully just now.

Juha

I think losses caused by accidents go up during intense combat operations. Helmut Lent's accident at Paderborn on October 5, 1944 shows all the problems that combat can cause.

Pilot fatigue.
Helmut Lent was a busy man during 1944 and not just from flying operational missions. As commander of NJG3 he had to attend meetings and process a mound of paperwork in addition to finding the time for shooting down 110 enemy aircraft.

Bomb damage to airfield.
Lent had to divert to an emergency runway due to the primary runway being bombed just prior to his arrival.

War emergency measures leading to safety shortcuts.
The emergency runway at Paderborn would probably not be considered acceptable under normal conditions as an electric cable stretched across the approach lane.

Equipment / maintenance personnel fatigue.
As if he didn't have enough problems already, the port motor of Lent's Ju-88G quit when he was on final approach.

RAF and Luftwaffe pilots participating in the Battle of Britain would have to deal with problems of this type.

I think the context of the 110 performance is being lost somewhat in this narrow statistical interpretation, at least as far as the BoB is concerned. The point made by most BoB authors was not that the Bf-110 was a "bad plane" but that it failed to live up to the high expectations as a fully fleshed out Long Range fighter. Georing is quoted for example as saying that the Zerstoerers were the "tip of the spear" in regards to his Jagdwaffe and would essentially pave the way for victory against Fighter Command. This proved to be a false assumption. It was also noted that early Bf-110 "successes" over Poland and France were due in part to the less intense nature of those theaters giving a false sense of confidence (in some...others in the Luftwaffe remained skeptical).....a fact which would seem to be born out by subsequent performances post BoB. (again....not uniformly "bad", but ultimately disapointing in the context from which the 110 design was envisioned)

In the BoB....the 110's failed to be able to fully protect the bomber streams and according to multiple authors, had to often "circle the wagons" themselves in order to defend themselves against marauding 1E British fighter swarms. No doubt these Luftberry circles could and were quite dangerous to attempt to penetrate and probably accounted for more than a few UK pilots. It's also been written that 110 formations often needed 109 escort themselves. All this would impact the statistics being bandied about. What's getting lost in translation is that while the 110's were busy defending themselves, successfully or not, the Bombers were getting hit by other bombers and leaving the bulk of escort defense to the overworked and short legged 109's.

Who can fully protect the bomber streams? How many bf-110 Gruppen were active over England and how many bombers had they to protect? I don´t think that many authors are correct in their assesment of the bf-110´s ability to provide cover when judging on these samples in a negative way. It never was in the realm of the -110c´s Gruppen possibilities.
Goring is quoted for saying many idiotic things, about basically every single sidearm of the Luftwaffe: the bombers (Dunkirk will be destroyed by our bombers alone), fighters (defense of the Reich) and transport forces (air bridge over Stalingrad is easily possible). But it´s always the -110c which catches the attention.
I have also read that -110c pilots used the lufberry circle but if You dig deeper into it it appears that the tactic was not that a bad choice for a plane with a rear gunner covering the plane behind and a very hevay frontal armement covering the plane in front of You. Particularely if forced to slow close escort. Only once at BoB did a Bf-110c Gruppe required escort by Bf-109 Gruppen and that was when in late august they were forced to close escort orders. Here it suffered a negative exchange ratio (~0.6 : 1 if I remember correctly) but when allowed to Freie Jagd it could and did effectively deal with Spitfire Hurricane in hostile airspaces with exchange ratio´s sometimes (not regularely) reaching 3:1.
I am not going to say that the Bf-110C was the better plane but it was a significantly more capable if flown to it´s tactical performance envelope than BoB does imply.
Limiting dive speed on the 110C was 750 Km/h vs. 700 Km/h for the Bf-109E and ca. 650 Km/h for the Hurricane. The 110C has a significant cruise speed advantage over the Hurricane and while the climb rate is in within the same range, the Hurricane achieves it´s best climb at a much lower speed and steeper climb angle and thus may be outzoomed by a 110C driver in a climb duel who uses the superior excess speed at equal climb rates. In close escort situation, the Bf-110c couldn´t benefit from any of it´s advantages (zoomclimb, cruise speed, dive top speed) but heavily exposed all it´s weaknesses, most notably the low acceleration, low maneuverability (initially when rolling, otherwise it´s a very credible turner) and large target size. In the High Escort or Fighter Sweep role, the Bf-110c was a deadly platform.

delcyros said:

Who can fully protect the bomber streams? How many bf-110 Gruppen were active over England and how many bombers had they to protect? I don´t think that many authors are correct in their assesment of the bf-110´s ability to provide cover when judging on these samples in a negative way. It never was in the realm of the -110c´s Gruppen possibilities.

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I find this to be a bit evasive to be honest. Of course no escort fighter scheme can fully protect a bomber stream. It is also equally apparant that some fighter types are better at this critical mission than others. The "many authors" include Peter Townsend who fought in the Battle. I think his comments regarding the Zerstorer preformance have merit.

Goring is quoted for saying many idiotic things, about basically every single sidearm of the Luftwaffe: the bombers (Dunkirk will be destroyed by our bombers alone), fighters (defense of the Reich) and transport forces (air bridge over Stalingrad is easily possible)

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Implying that Goering was simply an idiot does not alter the fact that great expectations were made of the 110 in it's upcoming role in the BoB. Fact remained that the Luftwaffe had to fall back on the 109's to attempt to properly protect the bombers.

I have also read that -110c pilots used the lufberry circle but if You dig deeper into it it appears that the tactic was not that a bad choice for a plane with a rear gunner covering the plane behind and a very hevay frontal armement covering the plane in front of You.

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You missed the point i was making. It doesn't matter how effective the circle is in regards to preventing 110 losses or upping the score against UK pilots who chose to attack it. The point is that a 110 Gruppe or Staffel can't protect it's charges while its busy protecting itself. Given that FC prioritized the German bombers, such a tactic not only left the prinicple target undefended or underdefended but surrendered the initiative to the RAF. The vectored interceptors could choose whether or not to attack the luftberry circles. More often than not they went after the bombers.

In the High Escort or Fighter Sweep role, the Bf-110c was a deadly platform.

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Under the right conditions, which apparantly did not include Luftflotte 5's siutation as it pertained to the BoB. However in subsequent operations and Theaters the 110 shone in other roles such as night fighter and ground attack. In fighter vs fighter roles it's successes were more limited and often incurred a negative overall ratio of exchange with the partial exception of Russia during the early stages of the fighting. Even there however it was in ground support that the 110's proved most valuable.

I find that difficult to believe for the simple reason that so few Me-110 day fighters participated in the BoB. Let's look at September 15, 1940 since that OOB is readily available on the web.

Document-49: Fighter Command Order of Battle Sept 15th 1940
It appears to me that 90 Me-110 day fighters were available on this date. How do you achieve a decisive result with 90 long range escort fighters when the RAF defenders have several times that many Spitfires and Hurricanes plus the advantage of ground control radar?

In July near the start of the Battle 160 110's were listed available with LuftFlt 2 and 3 alongside 650 109's. After the August battles, 110 involvement was reduced (like the Stuka) as shown by the Sep 15 link you posted

The primary role envisioned for the 110 as a long range fighter was to clear the way for the mass bomber streams for the upcoming battle. In this role it was expected (by some, such as Goering) to be able to perform as good as a 1E bomber as early results seem to indicate it could. In reality the 110's had to as described, circle the wagons and protect each other's tail vs those said 1E fighters when they appeared en mass to challenge the Luftwaffe strikes leaving the bomber streams to fend for themselves or call in the 109's. In Luftflotte 5's case the only escort available was the Zerstorer, and the Air Fleet's debut against Northern England was a disaster.

Nikademus said:

The primary role envisioned for the 110 as a long range fighter was to clear the way for the mass bomber streams for the upcoming battle. In this role it was expected (by some, such as Goering) to be able to perform as good as a 1E bomber as early results seem to indicate it could. In reality the 110's had to as described, circle the wagons and protect each other's tail vs those said 1E fighters when they appeared en mass to challenge the Luftwaffe strikes leaving the bomber streams to fend for themselves or call in the 109's. In Luftflotte 5's case the only escort available was the Zerstorer, and the Air Fleet's debut against Northern England was a disaster.

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Much is made at times of the inexperience of RAF pilots, but what experience had Bf110 or any LW pilot of attacking targets protected by radar controlled modern single engined fighters. I suspect they had as much to learn in different ways as the RAF in the early days of the BoB.

Hello Dave
In peace time 100% of losses are non-combat type, also in areas where there is no combats during wartime, simple as that. So when we talk about how big part of losses were combat related, IMHO very probably during intensive fighting their proportion was bigger than during quieter periods.

And on 13 Aug 40 LW had 315 110s of which 242 were serviceable in units ready participating attacks on GB.

Juha

tail end charlie said:

Much is made at times of the inexperience of RAF pilots, but what experience had Bf110 or any LW pilot of attacking targets protected by radar controlled modern single engined fighters. I suspect they had as much to learn in different ways as the RAF in the early days of the BoB.

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The mechanics of fighter vs fighter are the same whether there is radar or no radar. What was different in the BoB was that radar, along with other tools allowed the RAF to position more fighters where they needed to be thus ensuring that the incoming strikes would require a more determined defense by the escort fighters. As such under these conditions, the 110's weaknesses were exposed to a greater degree within a short space of time same as the weaknesses of the Ju-87 were exposed.

Hello Delcyros
if your exchange rates are from Christer's book, I'd treat them with some caution. because at least in net discussions he had a habit to be selective with his "facts" .

For ex
in a tread in The Forum of the 1.Jagdmoroner Abteilung
http://www.1jma.dk/topic.asp?TOPIC_ID=3371
Actual losses in the Battle of Britain

which no seems to went to cyber cemetery but on which on this board there was a thread on Christer's "original" interpretation on RAF's Cat 2 damage classification.

On 04 July 2004 : 22:00:20 message

Christer had opinion when trying to proof accuracy of 109 pilots claim during the BoB,

Quote: "The twin-engine Me 110 crews with their rear gunners were just as notorious for huge overclaims as any bomber crews of any air force."

On the other hand when he tried to proof the effectiveness of Bf 110s he tended to forget Bf 109s,

see: Skalman.nu Forum • Visa tråd - Bf 110 - ett misslyckande?
Forumindex » Militär teknikhistoria » Bf 110 - ett misslyckande?

Christer Bergström Från: Sverige 11 Feb 2007 19:52

…John Foreman skriver i sin bok "Fighter Command War Diaries", vol. 2, sid 44, om det uppdrag som ZG 26 flög den 28 september 1940: "Det sista anfallet genomfördes mot 10 Groups område när en stor formation närmade sig Southampton. Denna visade sig bestå av Bf 110r och de invecklades i strid med tre Hurricane-Squadrons utanför Selsey Bill. Hurricaneplanen fick stora problem med dessa tvåmotoriga jaktplan. Trots brittiska anspråk på tre förstörda och en skadad, gick inte en enda Messerschmitt förlorad. De tyska flygarna lyckades skjuta ned inte mindre än sex Hurricanes, där fem av piloterna också gick förlorade."…


The problem is that The BoB Then and Now Mk V allocated only one Hurricane plus one badly damaged, which force-landed back at base, a/c repairable, to Bf 110s and 5 to Bf 109s and one damaged because it run out of fuel.

So I have my doubts on Christer's rates and after a short extra study on BoB losses I now tentatively think that FC S.E. fighters vs 109s and 110s during the BoB ended something like 750 vs 712 lost, so when bomb carrying fighter-bombers and recon planes were deducted, something like 745 vs 680, ie 1,1:1. I still think that 109E was more effective than 110, so maybe 1:1 for 110 but that is only an opinion.

Juha

Nikademus said:

The mechanics of fighter vs fighter are the same whether there is radar or no radar. What was different in the BoB was that radar, along with other tools allowed the RAF to position more fighters where they needed to be thus ensuring that the incoming strikes would require a more determined defense by the escort fighters. As such under these conditions, the 110's weaknesses were exposed to a greater degree within a short space of time same as the weaknesses of the Ju-87 were exposed.

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Nikademus


what I meant was prior to the BoB fighters patrolled or escorted. During the BoB the Luftwaffe were met by interceptors who knew how high they were and approximately where they were going before they took off, that must be a huge advantage. As you said the LW had to learn new tactics for new conditions (difficult when the head honcho is a buffoon) that isnt the fault of the plane or the pilots.