bf110 exchange ratio

[Nikademus]

Nikademus


what I meant was prior to the BoB fighters patrolled or escorted. During the BoB the Luftwaffe were met by interceptors who knew how high they were and approximately where they were going before they took off, that must be a huge advantage. As you said the LW had to learn new tactics for new conditions (difficult when the head honcho is a buffoon) that isnt the fault of the plane or the pilots.

True, but remember that Dowding's objective were the bombers, so even in cases where the defenders knew the approx altitudes of the defending fighters, this did not automatically mean that the escorts would defend or attack at a disadvantage or be the target. It also does not automatically mean the scrambled fighters will gain altitude advantage in time in all cases.

Detection and vectoring of defending interceptors itself does not automatically present the escort fighters with a radically different situation vs. an escort formation facing an enemy bereft of radar direction. What it ensures is that the bomber streams and the escorts wil bel opposed and/or opposed strongly more often than not and reduces the need for constant patroling or CAP'ing. Once the two enemies spot each other however, the mechanics remain the same at which point it does come down to pilots, planes and tactics.

 

[tail end charlie]

True, but remember that Dowding's objective were the bombers, so even in cases where the defenders knew the approx altitudes of the defending fighters, this did not automatically mean that the escorts would defend or attack at a disadvantage or be the target. It also does not automatically mean the scrambled fighters will gain altitude advantage in time in all cases.

Detection and vectoring of defending interceptors itself does not automatically present the escort fighters with a radically different situation vs. an escort formation facing an enemy bereft of radar direction. What it ensures is that the bomber streams and the escorts will opposed and/or opposed strongly more often than not and reduces the need for constant patroling or CAP'ing. Once the two enemies spot each other however, the mechanics remain the same at which point it does come down to pilots, planes and tactics.

I agree compeletely however the vectoring when it worked correctly would also give the interceptors a hight advantage. I remember reading that Bader disobeyed orders so that he would meet the bomber stream coming out of the sun (obviously the sun is in a different position in the afternoon).

IMHO it is difficult to seperate the effect of the environment the LW were fighting in vis a vis changing orders, objectives methods of escorting, types of raids etc etc from the actual hard statistics of machines available, used and lost.

Just reading the day by day history posted here I was staggered to read that the LW never discovered radar wasnt effective over 20,000 ft.
In other books I have read that they knocked out several radar stations and for a while "blinded" the chain home systems in places. However they didnt perform any systematic probing or really determined attacks to knock out 3 adjacent transmitters to create a "hole".

As with many parts of the conflict I think we were lucky that people who knew what they were doing were over ruled by people who didnt.

 

[davebender]

In July near the start of the Battle 160 110's were listed available

That still isn't very many. The U.S. 8th Air Force employed over 800 long range escort fighters during the February 1944 "Big Week". If the Luftwaffe had 800 Me-110s available for the BoB I think RAF Fighter Command would be in for a rough time.

 

[tail end charlie]

That still isn't very many. The U.S. 8th Air Force employed over 800 long range escort fighters during the February 1944 "Big Week". If the Luftwaffe had 800 Me-110s available for the BoB I think RAF Fighter Command would be in for a rough time.

If anyone had 800 of any fighter in the BoB it would have been important. The war showed that both performance and numbers were important. If the Big week was met with groups of 800 LW fighters it might have been big monday.

 

[Milosh]

That still isn't very many. The U.S. 8th Air Force employed over 800 long range escort fighters during the February 1944 "Big Week". If the Luftwaffe had 800 Me-110s available for the BoB I think RAF Fighter Command would be in for a rough time.

Feb 20 1944 - first Big Week mission

94 P-38s
73 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s
668 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s

These 167 long range escort fighter are split among:

- 417 B-17s are dispatched to Leipzig/Mockau Airfield, and aviation industry targets at Heiterblick and Abnaundorf
- 314 B-17s are dispatched to the Tutow Airfield
- 272 B-24s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Brunswick, Wilhelmtor and Neupetritor

Feb 25 1944 - last Big Week mission

73 P-38s
139 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-51s
687 Eighth and Ninth Air Force P-47s

These 212 long range escort fighters are split among:

- 268 B-17s are dispatched to aviation industry targets at Augsburg and the industrial area at Stuttgart
- 267 B-17s hit aviation industry targets at Regensburg and targets of opportunity
- 172 B-24s hit aviation industry targets at Furth and targets of opportunity

The P-47s are short/medium range fighters barely able to cross the border into German air space.

For other Big Week missions see, USAAF Chronology:

 

[davebender]

That only holds true for early model P-47s. The P-47D-15 carried 375 gallons of fuel internally plus a 150 gallon belly tank. By March 1944 P-47s were flying all the way to Berlin.

 

[Milosh]

That only holds true for early model P-47s. The P-47D-15 carried 375 gallons of fuel internally plus a 150 gallon belly tank. By March 1944 P-47s were flying all the way to Berlin.

How many P-47D-15s were there? The combat radius of the P-47 with 2x75 gal drop tanks (150gal) was about 375mi, still a few miles short of Berlin.

 

[parsifal]

According to Deighton there were 280 Me 110s on strength in LFs 2, 3 and 5 as off 20 July. Not sure how many were allocated to LFs 1 4.

On the 1st July 11 Group only possessed a little over 300 Hurricanes and Spits. Given the claims being made here about the superiority of the Me 110 over the Spit and the Hurricane, the question begs why could it not defeat them even with Me109s to support them, let alone doing the job on their own. And why had so many been lost in less than two months.

And this claim that the LW was outnumbered in any category of aircraft is yet another post war myth being put out by the post war german apologists in their attempts to distort the facts and hide the truth that they lost the battle. Facts are that over the operational area the Germans always outnumbered the British by large margin overall , and in the case of the Me 110 came close to parity. Despite this, the germans still couldnt win.

I'll answer my own question.....because as a long range escort fighter the 110 was outclassed by the Spits and Hurricanes operating as interceptors, and because they consequently suffered loss rates far in excesws of their replacement rates.

 

[Juha]

Hello Parsifal
first of all at the beginning of BoB, the 110s of Lfl 5 (a Stab plus a Gruppe) weren't to operate against 11 Group but against 12 and 13 Group. Secondly, the fight was very bloody, in fact the only participant which lost over 100% of its first-line strength on 10 July 1940 was FC but all suffered very heavy losses. I don't have monthly production figures on Bf 110 for the time of the BoB but IIRC the production of 110 in 1940 was appr. 1200, so appr. 100 per month, so it covered at least the total losses. The number of zerstörer diminished not only because of the losses but also because of a number of ZGrn were converted to NJGrn

Juha

 

[davebender]

That statistic is meaningless. We need to know how many Me-110s were assigned to day fighter units. Me-110 night fighters, recon aircraft and attack aircraft like those assigned to Erprobungsgruppe 210 are not day fighters.

 

[Milosh]

That statistic is meaningless. We need to know how many Me-110s were assigned to day fighter units. Me-110 night fighters, recon aircraft and attack aircraft like those assigned to Erprobungsgruppe 210 are not day fighters.

I'll let you crunch the numbers.
Luftwaffe Campaign Orders of Battle

 

[Juha]

Dave
my numbers in my message #37 happened to be the numbers in Zerstörer units. You probably can figure out what that means by yourself. Try to do some serious study on the subject. So it is easier to understand what others write and you don't need to write those ignorant meaningless comments.

Juha

 

[Kurfürst]

And this claim that the LW was outnumbered in any category of aircraft is yet another post war myth being put out by the post war german apologists in their attempts to distort the facts and hide the truth that they lost the battle.

Its a simple fact that Fighter Command had more aircraft, more aircrew and flew far more fighter sorties than the Germans during the Battle, apart from other inherent advantages of the defender.

Nobody can help you if you can't get over the simple facts and create a childish distortion of reality for yourself...

Facts are that over the operational area the Germans always outnumbered the British by large margin overall , and in the case of the Me 110 came close to parity. Despite this, the germans still couldnt win.

These are simply not facts but wishful fantasies of a partisan... if what you would be saying would be true, it describes the British commanders as absolute and utter fools, having the aircraft for the job but not using them, and when using them (see relative fighter sortie numbers - the Brits flew about twice as many) they didn't use these assets where they were needed (i.e. near German formations).

Of course thats assuming that the childishness about the RAF FC being outnumbered would be true. Of course it weren't. The historical reality was that the British for once in the war acted properly, they geared up fighter production to sufficient levels to absorb the punisment the Luftwaffe had for them in store for the summer. They had the assets and used those assets properly to prevent the Luftwaffe from gaining total and undisputed air supremacy; although the other part of the truth is that it came at very serious loss in pilots and material, and at no point theyl couldn't effectively stop German air operations.

 

[tail end charlie]

Its a simple fact that Fighter Command had more aircraft, more aircrew and flew far more fighter sorties than the Germans during the Battle, apart from other inherent advantages of the defender.

Nobody can help you if you can't get over the simple facts and create a childish distortion of reality for yourself...



These are simply not facts but wishful fantasies of a partisan... if what you would be saying would be true, it describes the British commanders as absolute and utter fools, having the aircraft for the job but not using them, and when using them (see relative fighter sortie numbers - the Brits flew about twice as many) they didn't use these assets where they were needed (i.e. near German formations).

Of course thats assuming that the childishness about the RAF FC being outnumbered would be true. Of course it weren't. The historical reality was that the British for once in the war acted properly, they geared up fighter production to sufficient levels to absorb the punisment the Luftwaffe had for them in store for the summer. They had the assets and used those assets properly to prevent the Luftwaffe from gaining total and undisputed air supremacy; although the other part of the truth is that it came at very serious loss in pilots and material, and at no point theyl couldn't effectively stop German air operations.

The luftwaffe choose the point of attack and so have a local superiority the RAF had to defennd the whole of the UK. If the RAF engaged the figters one for one who would be shooting down the bombers.

All RAF accounts I have read said they were outnumbered while the Luftwaffe pilots remarked that the RAF were always there not in high numbers but always there. it was a feature of the high commands that they didnt know the numbers of the opposition the British overestimated German numbers and production while the Germans did the opposite.

 

[Milosh]

Tell me Kurfurst how many fighters from 10, 12 and 13 Group could participate in the air battles over south east England?

What are the sortie numbers for the 4 Groups in FC?

Read some combat reports and there was always more German a/c than RAF fighters participating in the air battles.

 

[tail end charlie]

Tell me Kurfurst how many fighters from 10, 12 and 13 Group could participate in the air battles over south east England?

What are the sortie numbers for the 4 Groups in FC?

Read some combat reports and there was always more German a/c than RAF fighters participating in the air battles.

Since the Bf110 had two engines and two crew wouldnt it have to be substantially superior to a single engined fighter to justify deployment except where a single engined plane couldnt do the job like over the N Sea

 

[Kurfürst]

The luftwaffe choose the point of attack and so have a local superiority the RAF had to defennd the whole of the UK.

That assumes it was always the *whole* Luftwaffe concentrating on a single point - it simply wasn't so. They had a lot of diversionary raids in the first place, and the typical employment during most of the summer were consisting of a groups of of bombers, typically a Wing or two, escorted by a number fighters, all groups attacking their seperate targets at the same time or in intervals, while the RAF engaged those raids seperately with a number of squadrons intercepting each.

Even at maximum effort, seventy years ago, when the LW started Verdun-like operations by attacking targets in London, there were about 300 bombers escorted by 600 German fighters. And that was when the Germans threw everything they had at London. The big picture was, and this is beyond dispute, that the RAF FC flew a lot more fighter sorties during any period then German fighters, and about as many as German bombers and fighter sorties combined. How on Earth they were outnumbered then when they had just as many planes in the air as the Germans is a mystery..

IF, and that's a big if which I personnally doubt very much they were regularly outnumbered, then simply the British Air staff did a very poor job a C&C.

All RAF accounts I have read said they were outnumbered while the Luftwaffe pilots remarked that the RAF were always there not in high numbers but always there.

That's pretty typical of any combat account by pilots. Pilots overestimated the number of enemies by a factor of two to three, and claimed equally more enemies shot down. Their subjective perception in the heat and stress of combat, and the objective reality of how many were there and how many actually went down were two rather different things.

 

[Kurfürst]

Tell me Kurfurst how many fighters from 10, 12 and 13 Group could participate in the air battles over south east England?

Well how many enemy aircraft did they claim again..? Absolutely NONE, riiiiiight...

 

[tail end charlie]

Even at maximum effort, seventy years ago, when the LW started Verdun-like operations by attacking targets in London, there were about 300 bombers escorted by 600 German fighters. And that was when the Germans threw everything they had at London. The big picture was, and this is beyond dispute, that the RAF FC flew a lot more fighter sorties during any period then German fighters, and about as many as German bombers and fighter sorties combined. How on Earth they were outnumbered then when they had just as many planes in the air as the Germans is a mystery..

.

This is bizzarre, when those operations were mounted the RAF were pairing spifies and hurricanes for the spitfires to attack the fighters and the hurricanes the bombers 900 in total by your figures. I repeat if it was only fighter against fighter then no one was stopping the bombers which was the whole point of intercepting. 600 fighters was close to the front line strength of the RAF which had to defend the whole of the UK not just london. During attacks radar didnt work in land so many sorties were flown which met nothing and many were flown to protect the airfields of squadrons scrambled to intercept.

Radar didnt have the resolution to give exact numbers so Park would always err on the side of caution, if ever he over committed he could be open to a massacre on the ground.

 

[delcyros]

exaggeration in numbers to be read in combat records is a normal occurance and doesn´t tell us anything. You have to compare the sortie number of BOTH SIDES instead of concentrating on the british side with sorties combat records. The latter only tell us subjective in comparison to objective points.
I don´t trust assesments of pilots who participated in the BoB either. They are subjective and tell us informations from their rather limited perspective but don´t return the whole picture, which lies way beyond their scope. They can´t do that for a number of reasons. Wh have to widen the scope of interest from the local level to the level beyond local events but still in a very shorttermed timeframe (what happened else on that day?) before jumping to general conclusions.
Even assuming an even exchange ratio between -110 and Spit / Hurricane in hostile (for the -110) airpsace - And I believe that Bergström is correct and the exchange ratio was positive instead- that wouldn´t even come close to support the idea that the Bf-110c over England was outclassed by Hurricane and Spitfire. An even exchange ratio would imply a competetive environment. The term "outclassed" does not apply here and is used by many authors in a wrong context. Even an exchange ratio of 0.5 to 1 is still not "outclassed", compare the actions with Spitfire Zero over Darwin.