bf110 exchange ratio

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Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden:

* 6.072 Stück 2-cm-Flak 30 und 38
* 1.030 Stück 3,7-cm-Flak 18 und 36
* 2.459 Stück 8,8-cm-Flak 18 und 36
* 64 Stück 10,5-cm-Flak 38

Lexikon der Wehrmacht - Fugabwehrwaffen (Flak)
 

The production figures I saw were for 1940 Bf109 = 1868 and for 1941 = 2628 That is 5.1 and 7.2 per day.

Answers by others give the actual fall in front line strength
 

Hi,

The point however, made by the authors (and all the others who's work i've studied thus far on the Battle) is that the signifigance of Sept 15 (such that it's called Battle of Britian day) is that it represented the Luftwaffe's last major effort to establish full dominance over FC. As the author's of the OOB figures i previously posted pointed out, that FC only shot down 1/3 of the numbers they thought they did at the end of the day didn't matter. What mattered was that they'd survived again, and bloodied the Luftwaffe in the process (and by bloodied, that includes damage, harassement and wounding of crews).

The signifigance of the "Last 50 Spitfires" cannot be overstated in regards to failing Luftwaffe morale. These men had been giving their all at a grueling pace for weeks and on the eve of each major thrust, they were being continually told that with just one more major effort, final success would be there's and all the effort and sacrifice of past days would be justified....the enemy was on the ropes....their last reserves of aircraft thinning out etc etc. Yet here again on Sept 15 the bomber streams and their escorts were facing masses of interceptors (aka The "last 50" spitfires) who's fighting spirit and determination were still in place. Too often people focus on statistical information and discount the human factor in warfare. In the end airforces, like armies are made up of people. People arn't robots and their mental conditions, if not quantifiable are still critical elements of an effective fighting force.

After Sept 15 (according to some authors), Luftwaffe morale cracked. The bomber crews had lost faith in the escorts being able to protect them and the fighter crews were demoralized in the face of an enemy that refused to be humbled or beaten and was clearly not on it's Last 50 Spitfires as they were continually being told. (and despite all their efforts and successes would get berated after the battles) The fighting would continue after Sept15 and more lives on both sides would be spent....but Sept15 for many marked the day that the Battle as a whole was won. Hitler's cancellation of Sealion is seen as further proof of this.
 
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Hello Dave
if you have had studied many statistics on production for LW, you might have noticed that fairly often the 1939 production figures in fact means production between 1 Sept-31 Dec 39.

Juha
 
tail end charlie said:
The production figures I saw were for 1940 Bf109 = 1868 and for 1941 = 2628 That is 5.1 and 7.2 per day.
Click to expand...

Newly accepted (ie. new production w/o repair centres) Bf 109s between 29 June 1940 and 31 October 1940:

E-1: 45
E-1/B: 110
E-3a: 75
E-4: 47
E-4/N: 20
E-4/B: 211
E-4/BN: 15
E-7: 186
F-1: 9
Total: 718

From RLM Delivery reports.

Total destroyed in the same period:

To enemy action: 502
Accidents in operations: 98
Accidents outside the scope of operations: 63

Total: 663

Via Wood and Dempster, drawing from LW Quartermaster reports.

Add to that that there were substantial reserves of 109 from existing production before the Battle - just take a look at lossse. Whatever the reason was for the Germans not to deploy their fighter reserves to frontline, it certainly not production - that was more than sufficient. Perhaps they considered that it was enough to maintain the numbers of those units that actually fought. Another thing to consider is the "statistical losses" - ie. these strenght figures relate to role, ie. day fighters and so on. But during the Battle some Gruppen were re-designated as Night Fighters and were withdrawn to Germany. Naturally these no longer show up in the Day Fighter statistics.

tail end charlie said:
Answers by others give the actual fall in front line strength
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The problem is that it comes from a poster who has been banned from here three times already and has zero credibilty. I suspect the figures are for the aircraft deployed against Britain - but for example see Murray for the actual frontline strenght of bombers, they certainly did not fall but remained constant through the battle, even slightly increasing to 1423 by the end of October, starting from something like 1393 in the end of June. These figures of Murray are of course for the entire LW. It has to be noted that not all strenght was deployed against Britain.

Fact of the matter is, the Luftwaffe started its air attacks on Britain at around July 1940 and did not stopped them until May 1941, when they re-deployed their forces against the USSR, regardless if some people want to believe they all the sudden were "forced" to stop it in September, or in October, they simply didn't, and came back the next day and the day following, as weather permitted, naiively ignorant of that the Battle has supposedly "ended".
 
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2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939.

Flak 18 production started in 1928. Major production started during the Spanish Civil War.

In 1939 only 138 Flak 18/36 were produced, however the Germans already had 2,459 Flak 18/36 in the inventory when the war started on 1 Sept. 1939.
 
Thought this analysis might be of interst:

For the overall strengths of the whole air force, including those elements not actively engaged in the battle, Ellis gives the following Monthly subtotals.

Explanation: XX/YY = RAF/LW

August 1940: 2913/3015
December1940: 2916/2805
June 1941: 3106/3451

Ellis gives the following information with regards to serviceable strengths for both the RAF and the LFs 2 3 of the Lufwaffe at selected dates

July 6 1940
SE Fighters: 644 /760*
TE Fighters: (?)/220*
Ground Attack: (?)/280*
Level Bombers: (?)/1200*
*: At this date serviceability was only about 50% of the figures given, due to the state of the airfields in Northern France.

July 20 1940:
SE Fighters: 658 /656
TE Fighters: (?)/168
Ground Attack: (?)/261
Level Bombers: (?)/998

August 10 1940:
SE Fighters: 749 /805
TE Fighters: (?)/224
Ground Attack: (?)/261
Level Bombers: (?)/998

September 07 1940:
SE Fighters: 746 /623
TE Fighters: (?)/129
Ground Attack: (?)/180
Level Bombers: (?)/772

September 28 1940:
SE Fighters: 732 /275
TE Fighters: (?)/230
Ground Attack: (?)/276
Level Bombers: (?)/750

Deighton confirms the catastrophic loss in serviceability for Me109s. He lists the serviceability of the JGs as 238 as of early October.

Ellis provides further figures on the whole of the Luftwaffe at selected dates. These numbers are totals, but don't include reserves (if there were any):

June 1940: 1107 (SE) F, 357 (TE)F, 453 Ground Attack, 1380 Bombers, 357 Trans
September 1940: 932 (SE) F, 181 (TE)F, 483 Ground Attack, 1420 Bombers, 365 Trans
December 1940: 832 (SE) F, 241 (TE)F, 482 Ground Attack, 1330 Bombers, 415 Trans

With regards to numbers of sorties flown and bomb tonnages dropped, the Luftwaffe showed a dramatic loss of efficiency:
Sorties/tons dropped
Sept: 7260/7044, Oct: 9911/9113, Nov (c) 6000/6510, Dec 3844/4323

With regard to outright losses, Ellis provides the following statistics. Numbers in brackets show non combat losses (accidents mostly) where available, and included in the totals:
RAF: Fighter/Other, Luftwaffe SE fighter/TE Fighter/Ju87/Bomber/Other
10-30 July RAF: 75(27)/8(1), LW: 40(2)/9(3)/8(2)/108(29)/6(1)
31 July to 27 August: RAF: 284(30)/30(7), LW: 160(29)/108(6)/58(2)/248(51)/21(9)
28 August to 01 October: RAF: 471(32)/12(5), LW: 300(35)/100(6)/10(10)/335(68)/28(18)
02 October to 31 October:RAF: 174(57)/11(7), LW: 136(24)/26(12)/4(4)/190(64)/19(9)

In that period, the following se fighters were delivered to the RAF/LW
June: 446/164, July 496/220, Aug 476/173, Sept 467/218, Oct 469/144

Just comparing losses to additions, I calculate the Luftwaffe to have undergone the following changes to its SE Fighter OB in that July/October period

July: +180, August: +13, Sep -82, Oct +8

Overall, its true that more aircraft joined the LW than were lost, however this does not translate to a corresponding increase in frontline/operational strengths for the Fighter arm And we have not looked at what happened to the other types in Luftwaffe service. Compared to the net increases occurring in the RAF including reserves, Luftwaffe gains in numbers were trifling, and when serviceability rates were considered, losses were catastrophic.
 
Juha said:
Hello Kurfürst
Quote:" In which fantasy land did they stop bombing London after the 15 September..?"

Now we all know how difficult it is to you accept that British did something right.
Click to expand...

Spare me of your verbal diarrhea and concentrate on the facts please.


Juha said:
Now what your think the word DAYTIME means? Because the meaning of the word is well known I only comment the relevant dates on your list.
Click to expand...

Let's concentrate on the facts again. You lost connection so much with reality that you started to spout absolute nonsense, which was firmly shown to be of that nature.

Just to brush your memory a bit, you have stated:

"LW stopped the massive daytime air raids against London after 15 Sept"

I've shown that just about every day after your silly claim, they kept coming, as the detoriating weather permitted, or went after other targets just the same, regardless of the resistance FC could, of course, still show.

So if you prefer to present again your usual partisan reaction of stubbornly hanging onto your previously stated fantasy, pretending that what was made very clear in my previous post did not happen, its your problem then.

So IMHO FC contained pretty well those few big daytime attacks LW tried to make against London after 15 Sept 40.
Click to expand...

Ok, so that's your opinion. At least we can agree that your earlier comment about the LW suddenly disappearing from over London after the 15 was absolute rubbish.
 

Actual Luftwaffe SEF strenght and servicibilty on the 28 September:

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

1132 Bf 109s on establishment, 920 on strenght, 712 servicable (77,4%. Fighter command's servicibilty rates were around 65% at the same period).

So either Ellis and Deighton made a typo, or they were on some kind of mushroom when they wrote it.
But I suppose Ellis made a typo, and Deighton, who used only secondary sources, copied his mistake.
 
we have this discussion before, perhaps you recall, and when questioned as to why they (the germans) would find it necessary to switch from daylight attacks to night bombing attacks, if those serviceability rate were correct, and abandon their original directive of destroying the RAF as a viable force in SE England, your reply was less than convincing to me. As I recall, your reply was along the lines "oh, they achieved all that they set out to do, and simply moved on to different targets". Effectively, you were claiming the battle as a german victory.

I beg to differ.

Moreover, I think you know the quirks in the official LW records concerning serviceability rates, but arent fessing up as to the impact those quirks have on discussions like this.

So I would prefer Ellis and Deightons research over your propaganda anytime i am afraid, particularly in the light of your belief, previously stated that the germans won their battle and achieved all that they set out to do
 
And unless you manage to quote me, I will assume you are, becoming desparate again, resorting to your favourite tactic of lies and strawman arguements

re: "quirks in the official LW records" - what "quirks"?

This frankly reads to me: I've made it all up from my fantasies, now they bang my head with the actual reports, so it must be some kind of weird conspiracy, people 70 years ago falsifying their report to their superiors, risking court martial just to prove ME wrong in internet discussion of great global importance...
 
I can find your previous posts with a little searching, no problem, but to save time, why not aswer the following question now

Who won the battle
Did the germans achieve the aims of their battle plan
why did the Germans switch from daylight attacks to night raids
did the germans cease daylight attacks on RAF installations and if so, why

That way, if you have a changed position we dont have to go through this endless process of recrimination and name calling
 
DerAdlerIstGelandet said:
Alright guys I can see where this is going!

Keep it civil or else...
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Gentlemen

Much of this part of the discussion was started by my statement as follows.

At the time in 1940 the LW daytime losses in aircraft were exceeding their production. Daylight raids needed ever more protection within the limited radius of Bf109s which were down to about 400 servicable planes by the end of daylight raids. the night bombing of UK was stopped eventually by the invasion of Russia

"At the time" was the period around the 15th of September which was the point of discussion. From the figures in the day by day history by Najco are the totals damaged and destroyed

Date.......RAF........Luftwaffe
Sept

11.......... 29...........25
12............2...........13
13........... 3...........10
14 ..........14 ..........14
15...........36...........99
16.............5..........18
17.............8........... 8

Of course the figures are open to dispute and argument about what is damaged and what is destroyed but so far I havnt seen anyone disputing that history. The losses on the 15th were completely unsustainable at 99 per day which is why Germany had to change tactic. The tactic behind the raids was a final blow to finish the RAF off with a final mass battle but the 15th September showed that the Luftwaffe was in the greater danger. They were unsustainable for the RAF too but it wasnt their choice.

Many of the figures quoted are for months or more which averages out days of high loss with days where flying was impossible. My point was that as a strategy it had to be abandoned the LW could not sustain losses of planes (and also pilots/crew) of 99 per day nor anything like it. You could average the losses suffered by the USAAF at schwinefurt to make them reasonable in a two month period.

As there are personal issues of which I have no knowledge I will duck out of this discussion, I feel my point was valid and has been sidetracked into minutae. However I think the answer to this is that Sealion was cancelled officially on the 17th September 2 days after the disasterous raid of the 15th raids after the 17th were for a different objective.
 
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parsifal said:
I can find your previous posts with a little searching...
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Then do so. Until then, my comments stand.

parsifal said:
Until then, why not aswer the following question now..
Click to expand...

Because you brought it up, the burden of proof is upon you, and finally because I am not playing your games which only aim to sidetrack the question at hand.

That way, if you have a changed position..
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I can't change a position I haven't made. When you run out of arguments and facts, you went back to the same old routine, ad hominem discrediting by stating a nonsense and then crediting it to me and using fancy words like 'propaganda'
As usual you are trying to drag down other to the mud, but unfortunately for you, I do not play this game. If you dug a hole for yourself, get out there by yourself..
 
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well on a lighter note......I actually have a soft spot for the Bf-110. It's a cool looking plane....especially with the shark mouth art....and I just love saying the word "Zerstorer"
 
Some exchange estimates (fighter vs Fighter only) for my cool Zerstorer

France/Ger 1939 -40 eve of Blitzkrieg

110 kills:

2 x H-75A
1 x MS-406

110 losses:

5 to Hurricane
2 to H-75A
1 to MS-406

Greece and Yugoslavia 1941

110 kills:

7 x Hurricane
1 x Blenheim IF
1 x Y-Fury
1 x Y-Hurricane

110 losses

4 to Hurricane
3 to Y-109
2 to Y-Fury


Malta 1941-42

110 kills:

2 x Beaufighter
1 x Sea Hurricane

110 losses:

10 to Hurricane
1 to Sea Hurricane
1 to Beaufighter
1 to Fulmar

Iran 1941

110 losses:

2 to Gladiator

North Africa 1940-42

110 kills:

18 x Hurricane
8 x Tomahawk
1 x Beaufighter

110 losses

32 to Hurricane
15 to Tomahawk
7 to Kittyhawk
3 to Beaufighter
1 to Blenheim IVF

Tunisia campaign 1943

110 kills:

7 x P-38
1 x P-40
3 x Spitfire
1 x Beaufighter

110 losses:

5 to Spitfire
1 to Beaufighter
11 to P-38
1 to Kittyhawk
1 to Mosquito

sources: Christopher Shores and friends.
 
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