bf110 exchange ratio

[Juha]

Hello Kurfürst
now because none of the 18 Sept raids were massive, usually only small number of Ju 88s with massive escort attacking targets SE of London. Only substantial bomber attack was that of III/KG 77, so one Gruppe, which lost 9 of its planes.
27 Sept, morning attack was made by 15 Ju88s of I./KG 77 with heavy escort, 4 Ju 88s were shot down and the others never reached London, hardly a massive attack or successful. If we call 80 bomber attack massive, afternoon attack counts, II. and III./KG 77 lost 8 Ju 88s. LW would have been very happy in 43-44 if it had succeeded deflect 75% of 8th AF bomber formation from its target. IMHO that only shows that FC could effectively hinder LW operations.
28 Sept, 120-150 a/c, a Gruppe of Ju 88s at most with very heavy fighter escort, main purpose was to ambush fighters which worked very well, 16 to 4 to Germans, but a massive bomber attack on London?

So in 2 weeks one attack, if we can called a attack of appr 80 bombers, of which only 25% got over their targets, massive. Hardly "just about every day" but lets others decide which of us "prefer to present again ones usual partisan reaction of stubbornly hanging onto your previously stated fantasy".

Juha

 

[Juha]

Hello Nikademus
I also have a soft spot for 110, IMHO it was a better plane than its popular image in English speaking nations implies. And cool looking plane. With or without shark mouth it looks a bit like hunting shark. It had looks of a killing machine, just like its little brother.

And thanks again for your victory/loss info!

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Then do so. Until then, my comments stand.

I can and will do that, but your comments arent very informative at this point. I would have thought you would jump at the opportunity to clarify what it is you believe are the correct answers to the questions I have posed to you?


Because you brought it up, the burden of proof is upon you, and finally because I am not playing your games which only aim to sidetrack the question at hand.

This is not a court of law....ther is no "burden of proof". Its a discussion board, wher people make plain their views on subjects. I made a statement, you made another statement, neither of which are conclusive or helpful. I would have thought you would want to clear up your actual beliefs on these questions. That way, whatever you said, or did not say, in the past is largely superceded, (or confirmed) by a more recent statment that you can make

I am not trying to sidetrack the issue at all or play games with you . And neither am I trying to use flaming tactics to derail the discussion. I am trying to give you the opprtunity to clearly state what it is you believe, within the direct context of this thread. You have the invitation to state your case I dont understand why you find that so offensive. I cannot be fairer than that. I would therefore ask you to provide your views on the four simple questions that I have asked of you. There can be be no fairer or more direct method of determining what it is you believe than to ask you.

I can't change a position I haven't made. When you run out of arguments and facts, you went back to the same old routine, ad hominem discrediting by stating a nonsense and then crediting it to me and using fancy words like 'propaganda'
As usual you are trying to drag down other to the mud, but unfortunately for you, I do not play this game. If you dug a hole for yourself, get out there by yourself.

I havent dug any holes. You said what you said. But that is the past. Now you are saying you didnt say it. Why not clear the whole thing up by making plain to the rest of us what it is you really believe are the correct answers to the questions I have posed to you? I am offering you the oportunity here and now to put your opinions on the table in whatever form you want, and clear this up. you are refusing. Which is odd to me, to put it mildly.

 

[Milosh]

2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939.

Flak 18 production started in 1928. Major production started during the Spanish Civil War.

In 1939 only 138 Flak 18/36 were produced, however the Germans already had 2,459 Flak 18/36 in the inventory when the war started on 1 Sept. 1939.

'Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden:' translates as '1 September 1939 were present:' or 'onhand', so I don't know where you got the idea that I was saying there was 2459 Flak 18/36s produced in 1939.

 

[RCAFson]

The Bf110 must have cost at least twice as much as a SE fighter and, in 1940, represented the pinnacle of German aircraft technology yet it was soundly defeated by the Hurricane, an aircraft which was a decidedly low tech, low cost, approach to building a monoplane fighter.

 

[Glider]

Actual Luftwaffe SEF strenght and servicibilty on the 28 September:

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

1132 Bf 109s on establishment, 920 on strenght, 712 servicable (77,4%. Fighter command's servicibilty rates were around 65% at the same period).

So either Ellis and Deighton made a typo, or they were on some kind of mushroom when they wrote it.
But I suppose Ellis made a typo, and Deighton, who used only secondary sources, copied his mistake.

Thanks for the information Kurfurst. I notice from the evidence that you put forward that the establishment of fighters and fighter pilots was 1,132 machines and pilots. You correctly state that there were 712 servicable me 109's that is unquestionable but I also notice that the Luftwaffe only had 676 pilots, around 60% of their establishment.

I also notice that when you compare the Luftwaffe figures with the pre BOB figures as at 26th June you see a marked reduction in the strength of the Me 109 fighter fleet.

Establishment
June 1171 fighters and pilots
September 1132 fighters and pilots a drop of 39 aircarft/pilots

On Strength
June 1107 aircraft
September 920 aircraft a drop of 187 aircraft

Aircraft Servicable
June 856 aircraft
September 712 aircraft a drop of 144 aircraft

Pilots Present
June 1126 pilots
September 917 pilots a drop of 209 pilots

Pilots Ready
June 906 pilots
September 676 pilots a drop of 230 pilots. Of all the criteria this is probably the most important and the %age fall is really scary, being close to a quarter.

So clearly there was a massive drop in strength of both the pilots and aircraft of Me109 between June and September resulting in a number of units being at around 2/3rds of their original strength.
However, there is one interesting feature and that is there are more servicable aircraft than pilots. On the front line RAF squadrons there were more pilots than aircraft even at the height of the battle in the darkest days.
So what is the explanation for the difference in the Luftwaffe, if it isn't that the above figures include the reserves?

I don't know the reason, do you have any information

 

[steve51]

Thank you Nikademus for those loss rates in several theaters. Along with those, we know from JoeB that the bf110 downed 78 British fighters during the Battle of France while losing 43. During this discussion only Delcyros mentioned bf 110 exchange ratios in the BoB of 340 victories for 196 loses, per Bergstrom. I take it that some are skeptical of these numbers. Are there generally accepted figures for bf110 exchange ratios during the BoB?

Also, occasional unpleasantness notwithstanding, this has been a very informative thread. Thank you all.

 

[fastmongrel]

I also like the look of the Bf110 but even after reading this thread and some books and the internet I am still a little confused as to what the exact mission the Luftwaffe planned for the 110. I know what it ended up doing but what exactly was its original mission or werent things thought through so much in the days before accountants got there sticky fingers on the world.

 

[Kurfürst]

I also like the look of the Bf110 but even after reading this thread and some books and the internet I am still a little confused as to what the exact mission the Luftwaffe planned for the 110. I know what it ended up doing but what exactly was its original mission or werent things thought through so much in the days before accountants got there sticky fingers on the world.

Frankly I don't think they ever figured it out.. the book by Mankau and Petrick is very interesting, as it details the pre-war thinking about how to employ this kind of fighter - and interestingly enough, even in the mid-1930s, they already considered the "battering ram" and long range escort fighter mission essentially a suicide mission.

So no, they don't seem to have been very keen about the idea from the start, and no, there weren't any high hopes placed for it acting as an escort; it was hardly a nasty surprise, as common Anglo-Saxon authors suggest, that the aircraft would work in that role.

It seems to me that the doctrine for the plane a sort of jack of all trades, like the destroyers of the navy. Let us not forget, that when the 110 (and P-38!) was designed, the engines available were weak, and you couldn't put much on a fighter.. with two engines, the 110 could carry a lot more fuel, ammo, and guns and a rear gunner to boot, following that in World War I these kind of two seat fighters were, AFAIK, considered rather successfull.

As Messerschmitt already choose to develop the 110 into the explicitely multirole 210/410 before the war, I guess the multirole aircraft idea triumphed. In essence that what the 110s did early in the war, when roles were much more rigid: acting as a fighter, a bomber, close support and as a recce aircraft.

 

[RCAFson]

Thank you Nikademus for those loss rates in several theaters. Along with those, we know from JoeB that the bf110 downed 78 British fighters during the Battle of France while losing 43. During this discussion only Delcyros mentioned bf 110 exchange ratios in the BoB of 340 victories for 196 loses, per Bergstrom. I take it that some are skeptical of these numbers. Are there generally accepted figures for bf110 exchange ratios during the BoB?

Also, occasional unpleasantness notwithstanding, this has been a very informative thread. Thank you all.

The Hardest Day, by Price has a nice breakdown of losses for one day, 18 Aug 1940. On that day the Luftwaffe lost 17 Bf110 aircraft to fighters, although GF may have shared in two kills, while only 3 Hurricanes and no other types were lost to bf110s. Two Hurricanes were lost to bomber defensive fire and several RAF fighters were lost to fighters of unknown types.

 

[parsifal]

Thank you Nikademus for those loss rates in several theaters. Along with those, we know from JoeB that the bf110 downed 78 British fighters during the Battle of France while losing 43. During this discussion only Delcyros mentioned bf 110 exchange ratios in the BoB of 340 victories for 196 loses, per Bergstrom. I take it that some are skeptical of these numbers. Are there generally accepted figures for bf110 exchange ratios during the BoB?

Also, occasional unpleasantness notwithstanding, this has been a very informative thread. Thank you all.

I think Bf 110 loss rates were higher than that, per my post quoting Ellis and Deighton. I think Me 110 losses were in the ordrer of 260 to 300, for the three months July to October. I do not think the claims for losses on FC aircraft can be so neatly split away from losses to other sources. Firstly, overclaiming by both sides was so bad that the claimed enemy losses need to be basically ignored. That forces one back to the recorded losses by each side, and so often aircraft were shot down by an unseen enemy, or due to an unklnown cause that its really meaningless and impossible to try and say this many aircraft were shot down by this particular weapon system. All we do know is that FC losses compared to JG and ZG losses were about 1.83 to 1, however into that equation must also be considered that FC aircraft were being ordered to concentrate on attacking the bombers.

I think grossly skews the statisitical sample. Britain was fighting for its life, and Dowding knew he had to hurt the bombers first, and try and deal with the Fighters as best he could. Complicating the British problem was that the British could not afford to get into a stand up fight with the Luftwaffe. This meant they had to attack with limited numbers, to reduce the risk of heavy losses to themselves

This means the battlefield in 1940 was anything but a level playing field on which to judge the relative merits of the aircraft. There were strategic imperatives that skewed the British effort, and made their task much more difficult.

The Germans began the task correctly, by allowing their fighters to operate in a free ranging capacity. Whilst this was happening, the Me 110s could play to their strengths, using speed, diving and heavy firepower to good advantage, whilst the british fighters were busy concentrating on the bombers. Similar tactics could be used by the the 109 crews.

The problem with this approach was that it left the German bombers dangerously exposed. They lacked the performance , protection and defensive armament to be so left unguarded. What the germans needed was more fighters....some to range freely and some to protect their own. There simply were too few to do both jobs. As bomber losses mounted, and servicability rates fell (which is something being hotly contested at this moment), the germans had to try and protect their bombers more directly. For the me 110 this played against its strengths, and forced it to fight more in areas where it was relatively weak....turning fights, with lots of climbs....yielding the initiative to fighters more manouverable than it.

In my opinion better ideas on the capability of the Me110 as a fighter can be found in the following year, wherer the British again met it in their sweeps of Northern Europe. Though the British still had to yield numbers (otherwise the germans would refuse to come and fight....the fighter sweeps of Northern France had to be structured so that the Germans would take the bait and rise to fight) ther were several occasions where numbers of Me 110s became involved in Day fighting. In these situations, the British fighters primary mission was to enagage the Luftwaffes fighters, with only a few fighters generally assigned to protect the bombers. The results were at least a little more on equal terms. Though usually outnumbered in the inidividual combats, at least the British fighters were now able to engage directly the German fighters as fighters themselves and not bomber destroyers. They suffered two main disadvantages. they were usually outnumbered, and their aircraft were just as range limited as the 109s were in the previous year. And crucially, in my opinion, the German pilots retained a significant experience advantage over the british.

I previously posted the exchange rates in another thread, from memeory, the exchange rates against German fighters was still not good, though it appears (but cannot be certain, given the inherent gaps that occur when attributing losses to type) the 109s were very succesful, the 110s less so, much less than during the BoB. For the record, the exchange rates against German Fighters in April were 1.68:1 whilst in June they were down to 1.44:1. Some clue as to what was happeing to the Me 110 as a Day Fighter can be seen by the numbers of Me 110s available for barbarossa. By that stage there were less than 100 available for operations in the East

 

[fastmongrel]

Interesting Kurfurst I wonder if it was a case of Messerschmitt saying I can build an aircraft with these performance figures the Luftwaffe liking it and then trying to work out what they could do with such an aircraft. It wouldnt be the first time the military made up a role for something simply because the weapon looked and performed so good.

Your analogy of a Destroyer as the jack of all trades is a bit off though. Destroyers of the time had 2 missions, protect the heavy fleet units against other destroyers and submarines, attack the enemy fleet. Later on in the war defence against aircraft was added to the role of the larger destroyers. Destroyers didnt have the range, armour or armament to do anything else particulary well. A cruiser I think would be the better analogy, almost as fast as a destroyer with better guns and range . Faster than a battleship and with the ability to work independently. A modern destroyer has grown to take the place of the cruiser.

 

[Hop]

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

1132 Bf 109s on establishment, 920 on strenght, 712 servicable

I don't think anyone disputes that the Luftwaffe began to recover once they scaled back their attack on Britain.

13 August - JG strength 976 on hand, 853 serviceable

12 August - 8 September the Luftwaffe flew 3,650 fighter sorties a week, and lost 111 fighters a week (figures include BF 110s)

7 September JG strength 831 on hand, 658 serviceable

9 September - 29 September the Luftwaffe flew 1,500 fighter sorties a week, and lost 50 a week. (again includes 110s)

28 September JG strength 920 on hand, 712 serviceable

It's clear that the effort of August and early September was unsustainable for the Luftwaffe. Their lower level of attacks after that was sustainable.

 

[Hop]

Serviceability rates from Logistics and the Battle of Britain by Air Commodore Peter Dye, RAF:

 

[Juha]

Hello Steve
a partial answer because it doesn't incl BC and CC losses and I think incl ErproGr 210 and possibly recon losses (recon 110 losses were few but especially late in BoB those of Erpro 210 were heavy. Other problem with Erpro is that it also made claims, its most successful pilot, Tratt had 12 kills at the ends of the BoB, later he became the most successful ZG of them all) but gives a clear picture of situation at the eve of the Adlertag.
FC lost 10 Jul – 11 Aug 40 115 a/c destr. (Cat 3) in combat, of which 87 were lost to 109s, 6 to 110s, 13 to bombers, 4 in collisions, 1 to Flak, 1 to friendly fire and 3 to unknown causes. And 47 in accidents. Total 162

LW had lost in combat 72 bombers, 22 Stukas, 61 109s, 27 110s, 18 recon and 16 seaplanes, so total combat losses 216. Plus 85 in accident. So total 301.

So 6 FC fighters were lost to 110s but LW had lost 27 110s in combat. Exchange rate is worse than I expected, BC and CC losses will add some victories to 110s but I doubt that they could give to 110 a positive exchange rate for that period. When I'll have time, I'll go through 110 losses during the BoB and calculate the pure ZG losses, Erpro losses and recon 110 losses. Then I'll have clearer picture on 110.

Source: Bungay's The Most Dangerous Enemy pp195 and 199. His figures are based on Peter Cornwell's amended figures

Juha

 

[delcyros]

The Hardest Day, by Price has a nice breakdown of losses for one day, 18 Aug 1940. On that day the Luftwaffe lost 17 Bf110 aircraft to fighters, although GF may have shared in two kills, while only 3 Hurricanes and no other types were lost to bf110s. Two Hurricanes were lost to bomber defensive fire and several RAF fighters were lost to fighters of unknown types.

Again, you keep posting Single events without paying any attention
To the whole scope of interest. As Long as the BoB is a rather 4 Week Long Episode to your mind -concentrating on the for the FC Best missions and selling them as examples for the Bf-110's true capabilities they are worthless. Selective perception in my Limited View.
Parsifals Assessment is a very good one, mind to ASK Why?

 

[Kurfürst]

I think Bf 110 loss rates were higher than that, per my post quoting Ellis and Deighton. I think Me 110 losses were in the ordrer of 260 to 300, for the three months July to October.

Zestörer losses to enemy action (destroyed), July-October, as per Wood and Dempste via the LW Quartermaster reports:

July: 34 destroyed, 6 damaged
August: 114 destroyed, 32 damaged
September: 81 destroyed, 17 damaged
October: 10 destroyed, 1 damaged

Total: 239 destroyed, 56 damaged to enemy action. (for all four months)

In addition 11 were destroyed on operation due to non-enemy causes, and further 17 outside operations. 3 damaged in accidents on operations, four outside operations.

 

[Maximowitz]

Again, you keep posting Single events without paying any attention
To the whole scope of interest. As Long as the BoB is a rather 4 Week Long Episode to your mind -concentrating on the for the FC Best missions and selling them as examples for the Bf-110's true capabilities they are worthless. Selective perception in my Limited View.
Parsifals Assessment is a very good one, mind to ASK Why?

+1

Single events are meaningless.

 

[Gixxerman]

Put me down as another who has always thought the Bf 110 looked very mean.
The F variant looks interesting, but I suppose the run-down anticipating the Me 210 kept their numbers small, the pinnacle of the jack of all trades fighter-bomber this type reached (save perhaps for a G without all the NF kit)?

I wonder just how many of these they had at any given time?
I recall being pretty shocked to read that they never had more than 500 Ju 87's operating in all theatres at any one time through out the entire war.
If that sort of 'thin' coverage was normal with most types (the hugely produced Me 109 Fw 190 excepted?) it's no wonder they were so hard pressed in the air in the later stages of the war.

 

[Milosh]

Actual Luftwaffe SEF strenght and servicibilty on the 28 September:

Single engine fighters - 28.09.40

1132 Bf 109s on establishment, 920 on strenght, 712 servicable (77,4%. Fighter command's servicibilty rates were around 65% at the same period).

Lets look at the Luftwaffe SEF strength and serviceability for June 29 1940 to get a better overall picture of the state of the LW fighters.
Single engine fighters - 29.06.40

Estab. - 1171, Onhand - 1107, Serv. - 856

% of Estab.: Onhand - 94.5, Serv. - 73.1

and compare to the Luftwaffe SEF strength and serviceability for Sept 28 1940

Estab. - 1132, Onhand - 920, Serv. - 712

% of Estab.: Onhand - 81.3, Serv. - 62.9

That is a decrease of 187 onhand and 144 serviceable.

Luftwaffe SEF strength and serviceability for Dec 28 1940

Single engine fighters - 28.12.40
Estab. - 1162, Onhand - 829, Serv. - 586

% of Estab.: Onhand - 71.3, Serv. - 50.4

The Dec. numbers shows the Lw fighters decreasing in number from the pre-BoB numbers with a -278 On hand and -270 Serv.

Definitely shows that production, and repair, couldn't keep up with the losses as the pre-BoB numbers could not be attained.

Only in March 1941 did the Onhand (1104) and Serviceable (804) numbers approach the pre-BoB numbers, though the Establishment number had risen to 1324.
Single engine fighters - 29.03.41

% of Estab.: Onhand - 83.4, Serv. - 60.7


On the subject of RAF serviceability, one must remember that at that time a RAF squadron had an establishment strength of ~20 a/c. Of these 20 a/c, the combat flying component was 12 a/c. Even at a 65% serviceable rate this still left 13 a/c for the combat flying component.

In other words, the RAF could still put a full squadron in the air while the Germans could only put between 73.1% and 50.4% of their establishment strength in the air.