bf110 exchange ratio

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

'Am 1. September 1939 waren vorhanden:' translates as '1 September 1939 were present:' or 'onhand', so I don't know where you got the idea that I was saying there was 2459 Flak 18/36s produced in 1939.

Where did I say you said that? I was only putting the two statistics together based off what you posted and based off of what davebender posted. Note how I posted both davebender's and your posts together?

Don't get your panties in a wad, no one was trying to insult you and put words in your mouth. Don't always think you are being attacked. This is a discussion board...

 

[Glider]

Hello
to give a clearer picture on the how common various 109E subtypes were latein 1940.
Based on the losses reported, any damage, between 16 Sept and 31 Dec 40
E, meaning no info on subtype 27
E-1 156
E-2___3
E-3___0
E-4 251
E-7__41

Juha

Thanks again. I had no idea so many of the early Me109's were still in service so late on.

 

[Maximowitz]

Me 110s were sometimes used in the night Intruder role, mostly during the early part of the blitz.

The only unit flying intruder missions over Britain in 1940/41 was I./NJG 2, using Junkers 88C's and a few Do 17Z-10's.

No Me 110's were used as night intruders.

 

[Milosh]

Where did I say you said that? I was only putting the two statistics together based off what you posted and based off of what davebender posted. Note how I posted both davebender's and your posts together?

Pardon me. My panties aren't in wad. I'm cool. All I was asking for was an explanation.

Where did you say that? Here:

2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939.

I hope you can understand my confusion when my post said 'on hand' and you said the above.

Don't get your panties in a wad, no one was trying to insult you and put words in your mouth. Don't always think you are being attacked. This is a discussion board...

Yes, that is very good advice.

 

[Glider]

Hello
to give a clearer picture on the how common various 109E subtypes were latein 1940.
Based on the losses reported, any damage, between 16 Sept and 31 Dec 40
E, meaning no info on subtype 27
E-1 156
E-2___3
E-3___0
E-4 251
E-7__41

Juha

Thanks again. I had no idea so many of the early Me109's were still in service so late on and people complain that the 8 x LMG was below par as a weapon load.

 

[Juha]

Hello Glider
yes, E-1s were used in combat ops right to end of 40. My numbers overstate its importance a bit, because they incl those damaged or lost during training of the new pilots/recently to JGn arrived pilots.

To the defence of 109E-1, it carried 3000 rounds vs 2400rds in British 8mgs fighters. So it had longer firing time, appr 25 sec to 4mgs and after the wing mgs ran out of ammo, it still had appr. 30sec worth of ammo to its 2 cowling mgs. Now 2 7,92mm mgs was really a light armament against late BoB FC fighters (with armour and self-sealing fuel tanks) for a average shooter but still better than nothing.

Juha

 

[fastmongrel]

To the defence of 109E-1, it carried 3000 rounds vs 2400rds in British 8mgs fighters. So it had longer firing time, appr 25 sec to 4mgs and after the wing mgs ran out of ammo, it still had appr. 30sec worth of ammo to its 2 cowling mgs. Now 2 7,92mm mgs was really a light armament against late BoB FC fighters (with armour and self-sealing fuel tanks) for a average shooter but still better than nothing.

Juha

Surely 30 secs of ammunition is too much. From reading and watching first hand accounts it was rare to fire for more than 4 secs at a time and even the RAF fighters with 14 secs of ammunition dont seem to have been suffering from running out of ammo. For an interceptor you dont want to be bringing too much ammunition back because that would mean you have been trying to climb to the battle with excess unneccesasary weight.

 

[Juha]

Hello Fastmongrel
the ammo for the cowling mgs was 1000rpg, so worth of appr 55sec (25+30) firing time, rof of cowling mgs were slightly lower than that of wing mgs because of syncronosation. Maybe some pilots missed their E-1s just because its wing weapons had that 25sec firing time vs only 6½ sec of the 20mm MG FF/MG FF M. On FC pilots, they ran out of ammo at least sometimes.

Juha

 

[The Basket]

You can never have too many rounds.

It is surprising how badly armed the E-1 was.

Seems like an error....I remember one person saying that 8 .303s was obsolete by 1940...not as obsolete as 4 7.92mm guns.

 

[davebender]

2,459 8.8 cm Flak 18/36 were not produced in 1939. They were on hand in 1939.

How did Germany manage to get 2,459 modern 8.8cm flak weapons into service before the weapon entered mass production?

 

[davebender]

Actually I think it's a matter of weapons availability. Germany did not yet have a modern and reliable 20mm aircraft cannon in mass production so they had to make do with machineguns.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Pardon me. My panties aren't in wad. I'm cool. All I was asking for was an explanation.

Where did you say that? Here:


I hope you can understand my confusion when my post said 'on hand' and you said the above.



Yes, that is very good advice.

 

[Nikademus]

I also like the look of the Bf110 but even after reading this thread and some books and the internet I am still a little confused as to what the exact mission the Luftwaffe planned for the 110. I know what it ended up doing but what exactly was its original mission or werent things thought through so much in the days before accountants got there sticky fingers on the world.

The Bf-110 project came from a 1934 general request by the Luftwaffe for the development of a "destroyer aircraft" or a multi-purpose fighter bomber that would have long range, heavy armaments, fast speed, and all-weather capability. This program received high priority for funding and development [Corum: The Luftwaffe: Creating the Operational Air War 1918 - 1940 ]

To elaborate from Corum's study;

The creation of the Messerschmitt Bf-110 Heavy Fighter illustrates the interesting and innovative approach to operational doctrine shown by the Technical Office. In 1934, the Technical Office called for the development of a twin engine fighter that would be fast, heavily armed, and possess great range. It was to be a multi-purpose aircraft, capable of serving as a reconnaisance plane, a fighter-bomber, and most important, as a long range escort to bombers. Due to the lack of engines, the development of the Bf-110 was somewhat slower, but by 1936 there were prototypes ready for testing. The early models of the Bf-110 had impressive characteristics: long range, a maximum speed of 283mph, and heavy armament of two 20mm cannons and five machine guns. In the words of aircraft expert Eric Brown, the Bf-110 was a well designed aircraft "that placed Germany out in front in strategic fighter development.

Later, Kesselring, who strongly supported a program to produce a long range heavy bomber, pushed through a major change in Luftwaffe doctrine to greater emphasis fighter development and production. This was a process that consisted of two parts; the light fighter plane, single engined with high speed and night instrument flying capability, a one to one and a half hour endurance and moderate armament (The Bf-109 met these requirements)

The 2nd part was the "heavy fighter" which became the Bf-110 which was to have long range (3 hours endurance), instrumentation for night flying, very heavily armed to fullfill the primary roles of interceptor, long range bomber escort and long range recon. It's secondary mission was to serve as a light bomber capable of low level attack. (hence the fitting of bomb racks and a bombsight)
[source Corum]

It appears to me, that the Luftwaffe had a very definate idea of what roles the Zerstorer was to fill within the operational and tactical doctrine of the developing German airforce, same as they did for other types in development at the time. To suggest that the brains behind the Luftwaffe had no idea what to do with the plane or that one of it's principle roles was *not* long range escort are without merit. A driving factor in 2E fighter development in general was to attempt to solve the quandry of 1st generation 1E designs which as a group tended to be short legged prior to development of drop tanks or innovative designs that combined weight saving 'and' drop tanks such as the A6M. The secondary nature of missions that would fall under the "fighter bomber" mission are supported in other works on the BoB such as Collier's that document the debut of "Test Group 210" which pioneered the "Jabo" (fighter bomber) concept for the Luftwaffe in 1940. Apparantly there were some within the Luftwaffe (interestingly he mentions Kesselring as one of them) which doubted or even scoffed at the notion of 109's and 110's with bombs slung under their fusilages. Its easy to forget that the "Fighter Bomber" concept only reached maturity during the war.

So what went wrong then with the 110? While looking good on paper and while possessing definate strengths, ultimately the technology of the current period was not up to producing a truely or FULLY competetive 2E fighter...one that could meet a modern 1E equivilent plane on equal terms in most if not all situations. Specifically, the 110, while posessing great speed as has been repeatedly mentioned, was also saddled with poor maneuverability and poor acceleration in comparison to it's first real challenges (the Hurricane and Spitfire). As such it was most dangerous in situations where it had a speed and height advantage allowing bounce situations....but if it bled off energy and/or altitude, it was at a distinct disadvantage vs. these 1E's.

As one can asertain from Corum and other author's, this hindsight situation was not readily apparant prior to the war nor during the initial onset of hostilities. The BoB represented the first real test of the Zerstorer and it came up wanting as a result of the previous attributes mentioned. This was not a suprise to some in the Luftwaffe who had serious doubts regarding the heavy Zerstorer's chances against a lighter more nimble 1E opponent. The Wikipedia article (pause for laughter yes.....) mentions an interesting mock-combat between a 109 and a 110 which the 109 won hands down leading to the 109 pilot warning the Zerstorer pilots that they could expect a similar challenge from the 1E defenses of the English. If true, it was a prophetic statement. The 110 would find a 2nd life in less intensive theaters (kind of similar in retrospect to the situation of FAA fighter designs such as the Fulmar) and in alternative roles in which the 110's strengths could be best utilized (mainly night fighter and ground attack support). The plane's fast speed did give it a 2nd lease on life as a pure fighter on the Ost Front though according to Bergstrom, it's greatest contribution remained in the ground support role.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

How did Germany manage to get 2,459 modern 8.8cm flak weapons into service before the weapon entered mass production?

They were being produced from 1928 onwards. Go back and look at the links that Milosh provided.

 

[tail end charlie]

I found this on the net which makes some interesting points .......note I didnt write it.

Events were now leading to a confrontation between the Luftwaffe and the RAF, in which the Bf 110 would suffer heavily. Consequently, sharp criticism of the aircraft, and by extension the entire class of twin-engined fighters followed, well beyond what is justified by the actual events.

It is as well to start by looking at the performance parameters. The Bf 110C-4, a common model at the time, was powered by two 1,100 hp Daimler-Benz DB 601A engines, and had a normal loaded weight of 6,940 kg; so its power loading was 3.15 kg/hp. The Hurricane Mk.I weighed 2,924 kg loaded and was powered by a 1,030 hp Merlin Mk.III engine, giving a better power loading, of 2.84 kg/hp. The Spitfire Mk.I, powered by the same engine, was lighter because of its more advanced structure, and the normal loaded weight of 2,812 kg resulted in a power loading of only 2.73 kg/hp.

The Bf 110C-4 was claimed to be capable of a maximum level speed of 562 km/h at 7,000 m altitude, and 473 km/h at sea level. British test pilots, flying a captured C-5 reconnaissance version at lower weights, measured only 547 km/h at 6,700 m, so perhaps the German figures were too optimistic, but such variations between individual aircraft were common and the test aircraft had been assembled from two wrecks. This was still considerably faster than the 508 km/h at 5,400 m and 409 km/h at sea level of the Hurricane Mk.I, and competitive with the 557 km/h at 4,570 m of the Spitfire Mk.IA. The German fighter also performed reasonably well in the climb, with an initial rate of climb of 670 m/min, somewhat inferior to the 770 and 740 m/min attributed to the Hurricane and Spitfire. Nevertheless it could climb to 5,500 m in 7 minutes, while the Spitfire Mk.IA needed 6.85 minutes to 4,570 m (and the Hurricane 6.3 minutes).

During the battle of Britain, 100-octane fuel was used by RAF fighters. By allowing the Merlin to run at higher pressures and generate 1,200 hp, this considerably improved their performance, especially in climb. That came as an unpleasant surprise for the Luftwaffe. Nevertheless, in terms of performance the Bf 110 appeared competitive enough. Its weakness in combat against the RAF fighters was its manoeuverability, which was good for an aircraft of its size, but no match for the opposition it faced. The wing loading of the C-4 model, 181 kg/m2, was considerably higher than the 123 kg/m2 of the Hurricane and the 125 kg/m2 of the Spitfire, and this resulted in a larger turning circle. The handling of the Bf 110 was quite good at normal speeds, with effective controls and generally pleasant flying characteristics. However, the controls heavied up considerably at higher speeds, and the ailerons were almost immovable in fast dives. But this, it must be said, was a weakness of all fighters at the time, German and British alike.

Overall, the characteristics of the Bf 110 implied that the Zerstörer were at a serious disadvantage whenever they were forced into a defensive position. Their speed and firepower served them well when they made hit-and-run attacks, exploiting their good climb and dive characteristics, while declining to engage in turning combat. Most fighter-versus-fighter combat during battle was of short duration anyway, typically less than half a minute; long dogfights were very rare because they left those who engaged in them in a very vulnerable position, low and slow, and too preoccupied with their target to watch their rear.

When flying Freie Jagd fighter sweeps at high altitude (above 6,700 m) over Southern England, the Zerstörer units demonstrated that the Bf 110 was indeed a dangerous opponent, and could be more than a match for the Hurricane. Unfortunately for the Germans, this was not the pattern of the battle to come. Fighter Command soon decided to avoid contact with the fighter sweeps, and concentrate its attacks on the bomber formations. Then, flying at low and medium altitude, and robbed of the advantage of surprise by radar and the advanced command-and-control system of Fighter Command, the German crews often found themselves at a serious tactical disadvantage. This, of course, also handicapped the Bf 109, but the nimbler single-engined fighter could extract itself from an unfavourable situation with much more ease. The normal reaction of Bf 110 crews was to seek safety in a Lufbery circle, a defensive formation in which fighters fly a ring pattern, each covering the rear of the one next ahead in the formation. While an effective tactic, this could only be maintained for as long as the fuel reserve allowed, and the RAF fighters waited above for an opportunity to strike.

Indicative of how just badly things could go wrong was an attack on Croydon on 15 August 1940. This attack was executed by bomb-carrying Bf 110s and Bf 109s of Erprobungsgruppe 210. Serious damage was done to airfield, but while still in its attack run at low level the Germans were bounced by a superior number of Hurricanes. They found temporary protection in a defensive circle, but finally had to make a break for home; the RAF fighters immediately fell onto their targets, shooting down seven out of the twenty-two strong enemy force.

The Bf 110 also had to take on the role of escort fighter for the bombers, because the fuel capacity of the Bf 109 allowed it only a short stay over England. But the German escort tactics were flawed. (Arguably, they were not much more flawed than some other attempts to provide bomber escort, such as the early efforts of the USAAF.) Too many fighters were ordered to fly close escort, in formation with the bombers; in that position they could do little to defend the bombers and became vulnerable targets themselves. The error was made worse in early September: Against the strong opinion of the fighter leaders, they were ordered to stay closer to the bombers, and even to break off combat with enemy fighters if the bombers were threatened. The Bf 110 turned out to be unsuitable for close escort missions, and losses were heavy.

That said, the often-repeated story that the Bf 110s themselves had to be escorted by Bf 109s is a myth. Tactically, this would have made no sense. The only Bf 110s that were really escorted by single-engined fighters were the fighter-bombers of Erprobungsgruppe 210, which were otherwise too vulnerable with their combat loads, or when making their attacks at low level. Perhaps this, or maybe the complex organisation of the escort fighters around a bomber formation (including formation flying distant cover, close cover, and top cover) gave raise to the story.

Anyway, the failure of the Bf 110 as an escort fighter was just one more nail in the coffin of a doomed operation, but as they had been a much-propagandized part of the German air force, it became symbolic. Its importance should not be exaggerated, for at the height of the battle, Bf 110s were less than 12% of the Luftwaffe's available force, and only just over a quarter of the fighter force. There were many more important factors that doomed the German attempt to subdue Britain to failure: It had seriously underestimated RAF strength, and ignored the importance of the radar and command-and-control network. The available bomber strength was insufficient, and in turn the fighter strength fell short of the requirement to provide escorts in a 2:1 ratio. Aircraft production and crew training lagged behind the RAF. Intelligence and target identification were very poor, so that many bombs were wasted on targets of little importance, and enemy losses strongly overestimated. The range of the Bf 109E was too short, the use of drop tanks was neglected, and the available bombers had small bomb loads and weak defensive armament. Last but not least, the operation itself was handicapped by two conflicting goals, preparing for an invasion by destroying the RAF and forcing Britain to come to a negotiated peace by bombing, and neither was a realistic war plan.

The catalogue of failure should not obscure that the Bf 110 had also found a role in which it was very effective, that of a fighter-bomber. This was especially so in the hands of Erprobungsgruppe 210, a unit that specialized in precision attacks on targets such as airfields, radar stations, and shipping. At the beginning of the battle it operated a number of Bf 110C-6 with a powerful MK 101 30-mm cannon in a fairing under the fuselage, but operational and technical problems lead to the removal of this weapon. The occasional heavy losses demonstrated the need for air superiority on such operations, but a series of successful attacks also confirmed the effectiveness of the aircraft in this role. The large Messerschmitt fighter still had a long and generally successful career ahead of it.

 

[Nikademus]

Hello Nikademus
take a brief look on your 110 kill/lost list. Interesting to note that before the Battle of France 110 did badly against Hurricanes, during the BoF very well (as the figures JoeB gave, based on Cornwell's BoF Then and Now), then during the BoB, again based on Cornwall's figures in BoB Then and Now it did again poorly, Greek/Yug again better etc. Now only during BoF and BoB figures are substantial. IMHO they clearly shows that combat environment had very important effect on combat results.

Mid-1941-42 seemed to have been bad period to 110s but over Tunisia it again did reasonable well. Maybe the F and G subtypes, at least the late-comer II./ZG 1 had the latter, which restored the powerloading of ever more heavier 110s, helped to restore at least partially 110's air-to-air capacity. Over Tunisia it wasn't a first class fighter but was still a reasonable dangerous opponent.

Thanks again for your interesting info.

Juha

Yes, combat environment is critically important and is part of the reason why static kill ratios never tell the whole story. The Hurricane has probably the most variable kill ratio of any modern plane. It was one of the key players in the BoB.....won the vaunted ratio in Greece against the same plane type that later handed it it's worst kill ratio exchange in it's history (and possibly all of WWII....a five month 34:0 exchange rate). In the Fledgling Eagles summary, a major factor was that only at the tail end of this period did the RAF have any signifigant clashes with the Luftwaffe....leading to an early 110 defeat, and vice versa, a Hurricane defeat by 109's that got a couple good bounces on them prior to Blitzkreig.

As Shores mentions in his books covering the Mediterranian, the 110 found new life as a fighter in less intensive theaters. Given the less intensive day to day fighter vs fighter clashes, it had more opportunities to score a small positive ratio but in general....if it met large scale determined 1E fighter opposition, it faired more poorly as indicated in the North Africa figures. It's speed edge and good pilots gave it an edge on the Ost front during the first year as long as it kept it's speed up. It was of course, against bombers that it was most dangerous. Here's the full picture estimate for the plane in the Theaters i listed previously;

France/Ger 1939 - 1940 (eve of Blitzkreig)

110 kills

4 x Blenheim
11 x Wellington
1 x Anson
2 x H-75A
1 x MS-406

110 losses

5 to Hurricane
2 to H-75A
1 to MS-406
1 to Anson
3 Operational

I hope to start Battle of France: then and now this month so i can compare and expand.

North Africa 1940-42

110 Kills

18 x Hurricanes
1 x Beaufighter
8 x Tomahawk
2 x Blenheim
5 x Maryland
1 x Beafort
1 x Sunderland
1 x Hurricane PR
1 x Boston
4 x Liberator
2 x B-24
1 x Hudson
1 x Bisley

110 losses

1 x Ground
16 to AA
15 Operational
32 to Hurricane
15 to Tomahawk
7 to Kittyhawk
3 to Beaufighter
1 to Blenheim IVF
1 to B-24
2 to Liberator
1 to Murauder


Tunisia 1943]/b]

110 Kills

7 x P-38
1 x P-40
4 x B-17
1 x F-4
3 x Spitfire
1 x Beaufighter
1 x Beaufort


110 losses

1 on Ground
2 Operational
5 to Spitfire
1 to Beaufighter
11 to P-38
1 to Kittyhawk
1 to Mosquito


Yugoslavia/Greece 1941

110 kills

1 x Yugo Fury
1 x Yugo Do-17
1 x Yugo Hurricane
1 x Ju-88 (friendly fire)
7 x Hurricane
1 x Blenheim
1 x Blenheim IF


110 losses

3 to Yugo Bf-109
2 to Yugo Fury
21 to AA
9 Operational
4 on Ground
4 to Hurricane
1 to Gladiator
1 to Maryland

Malta 1941-42

110 Kills

1 x Sunderland
1 x Blenheim IVF
1 x Z-506B (Friendly fire)
2 x Beaufighter
1 x Beafort
2 x Blenheim
2 x Wellington
2 x Maryland
1 x Sea Hurricane

110 losses

2 to AA
3 Operational
10 to Hurricane
1 to Sea Hurricane
1 to Fulmar
1 to Beaufighter
1 to Liberator
1 to Blenheim


Iran 1941

110 Kills

No verified kills recorded

110 losses

12 Operational
2 to Gladiator

 

[Glider]

You can never have too many rounds.

It is surprising how badly armed the E-1 was.

Seems like an error....I remember one person saying that 8 .303s was obsolete by 1940...not as obsolete as 4 7.92mm guns.

I think that was me, never mind. I will now retreat and hang my head in shame.

 

[tail end charlie]

I think that was me, never mind. I will now retreat and hang my head in shame.

Ha Ha Ha Glider I always believed that the 109 had a cannon firing through the propellor based on no better evidence than the "commando picture library" cartoon books which always showed it firing after all what else would that hole be there for?

 

[RCAFson]

The Hurricane has probably the most variable kill ratio of any modern plane. It was one of the key players in the BoB.....won the vaunted ratio in Greece against the same plane type that later handed it it's worst kill ratio exchange in it's history (and possibly all of WWII....a five month 34:0 exchange rate).

Of course during the time that the Me109 was scoring those 34 kills, the Hurricane continued in its primary mission of destroying incoming bombers, and still, IIRC, eaked out an overall positive kill ratio.

 

[The Basket]

I too like the Bf 110.

It was much better than the Bf 210.

I remember reading somewhere that production was stopped so the 210 can be made...

Then restarting again when the 210 was a dog.

Those crazy guys.