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The Dec. numbers shows the Lw fighters decreasing in number from the pre-BoB numbers with a -278 On hand and -270 Serv.
Definitely shows that production, and repair, couldn't keep up with the losses as the pre-BoB numbers could not be attained.
On the subject of RAF serviceability, one must remember that at that time a RAF squadron had an establishment strength of ~20 a/c. Of these 20 a/c, the combat flying component was 12 a/c. Even at a 65% serviceable rate this still left 13 a/c for the combat flying component.
In other words, the RAF could still put a full squadron in the air while the Germans could only put between 73.1% and 50.4% of their establishment strength in the air.
Some clue as to what was happeing to the Me 110 as a Day Fighter can be seen by the numbers of Me 110s available for barbarossa. By that stage there were less than 100 available for operations in the East
Again, you keep posting Single events without paying any attention
To the whole scope of interest. As Long as the BoB is a rather 4 Week Long Episode to your mind -concentrating on the for the FC Best missions and selling them as examples for the Bf-110's true capabilities they are worthless. Selective perception in my Limited View.
Parsifals Assessment is a very good one, mind to ASK Why?
The comparison is rather meaningless; Squadrons were a tactical unit and the benefit of a full 12 aircraft flight were tactical. The RAF's organisation revolved around a small tactical unit, the Squadron, an independent tactical and operational unit which didn't have organic parent units to draw replacement aircraft from. And in practice RAF FC Squadrons actively engaged in Battle were in pretty rough shape by September, often being wiped out completely in a matter of days and had to be rotated for fresh Squadrons/pilots.
In contrast the German organisation preferred the larger Wing, or Gruppe, consisted of Staffeln, which were merely tactical in their nature but operationally relied on the Gruppe's infrastructure and reserves. In other words, German Staffeln simply drew aircraft from other Staffeln in the Gruppe when neccessary.
Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.
Zestörer losses to enemy action (destroyed), July-October, as per Wood and Dempste via the LW Quartermaster reports:
July: 34 destroyed, 6 damaged
August: 114 destroyed, 32 damaged
September: 81 destroyed, 17 damaged
October: 10 destroyed, 1 damaged
Total: 239 destroyed, 56 damaged to enemy action. (for all four months)
In addition 11 were destroyed on operation due to non-enemy causes, and further 17 outside operations. 3 damaged in accidents on operations, four outside operations.
Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.
The BoB period was only a few months. That's not long enough for aircraft to wear out and/or become technically obsolete.
Not quite. For example in the RAF we had the Mk 1 Spitfires being replaced with Mk II, in the Luftwaffe 109 E1's were being replaced with 109 E3's with cannon instead of MG's. Some were rearmed but most were replaced.
As for the wearing out that did happen, aircraft have a finite life and the pressure of combat adds significantly to the wear and tear. Some planes would have accumulated damage over the weeks to make them not fit for combat, some will have been overstressed in the heat of battle or suffered structural damage in heavy landings. Also it should be remembered that most of the Me109 aircraft had been fighting for months in the battle for France without any let up in the field. Whereas the vast majority of the RAF aircraft had only started combat from around Dunkirk and were mainly operating from home bases with all the infrastructure support that helps servicability.
There was also the pressure of pilots. It is clear from the link that Kurfurst gave us that the fall in the servicable Me109's was significant and serious, but that the fall in pilots ready for combat was even worse. In September if you only have 676 pilots ready for action, it doesn't matter if you have 717, 850, 950 or 2000 servicable aircraft, you only have 676 pilots to fly them.
Yup. Several units become Night Fighter in the meantime, hence they don't show up in Day Fighter counts.
Amusing that the greatest decline in strenght only occurs in December, when fighting and fighter losses went down to just about nil isn't it. Yet there are no such drastic decrease in fighting strenght, whereas in the peak of fighting activity, there's no such trend.QUOTE]
There is another possibility not being considered here....that the losses and damaged units suffered in the previous months were not showing up in the daily returns as quickly as they should have. Aircraft with less than 60% damage might be listed as available in October, and then quietly re-assesed as not repairable and written off in December. Hitler usually flew into a rage whenever he was told about low serviceability rates, and the Luftwaffe, like most German service arms , became very adept at hiding unpalatable truths from their fuhrer, and not written off until the end of the quarter after the fighting was no longer relevant, and therefore of no interst to the little corporal.
A classic example of this creative accounting occurred at the beginning of the campaign. Luftwaffe returns show that at the beginning of July, LFs 2 3 had 1300 bombers available in Northern France. But the truth is they had less than half that number. S ome units were still undergoing repairs after the BoF, some units were in transit and moving their SGSUs into position.....there was an acute shortage of suitable airfields in the right positions, which needed a coupe of weeks to rectify. None of this comes up in the official records that I am aware of, and that makes sense, given that Hitler either was about to, or already had, issued his directive for the invasion of Engtland. Der Fuhrer would have been less than impressed to learn most of his bomber units were still holidaying i the south of France somewhere......
Surviving Me 109Es were hardly ever retired outright. Many were redeployed to the Southern and eastern fronts in the following year. Emils were still arriving in the MTO as late as February 1942, and continued to be the principal type throughout most of 1941. Me109fs did not begin to arrive on the southern front until August 1941.