bf110 exchange ratio

[davebender]

What's wrong with that? Mass production of a few effective yet inexpensive weapon types allows you to get the most bang for the buck. Just like the USA did with the Sherman tank and the Heer did with the MG34 and MG42 machineguns.

 

[Kurfürst]

The Dec. numbers shows the Lw fighters decreasing in number from the pre-BoB numbers with a -278 On hand and -270 Serv.

Amusing that the greatest decline in strenght only occurs in December, when fighting and fighter losses went down to just about nil isn't it. Yet there are no such drastic decrease in fighting strenght, whereas in the peak of fighting activity, there's no such trend.

There are two (or more) possible answers.

Yours is that German production, repair centre output and reserves were insufficent to replace the rather miniscule, on daily one or two 109s that were lost on avarage during October, November and December.

The other is that something else was going on - the likely answer is the reorganisation of fighter units, and the preparation to withdraw old types (109E) and replace it with the new type (109F) during a relatively calm period when combat flying was marginal, and many pilots were on Christmas leave.

Definitely shows that production, and repair, couldn't keep up with the losses as the pre-BoB numbers could not be attained.

Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.

On the subject of RAF serviceability, one must remember that at that time a RAF squadron had an establishment strength of ~20 a/c. Of these 20 a/c, the combat flying component was 12 a/c. Even at a 65% serviceable rate this still left 13 a/c for the combat flying component.

In other words, the RAF could still put a full squadron in the air while the Germans could only put between 73.1% and 50.4% of their establishment strength in the air.

The comparison is rather meaningless; Squadrons were a tactical unit and the benefit of a full 12 aircraft flight were tactical. The RAF's organisation revolved around a small tactical unit, the Squadron, an independent tactical and operational unit which didn't have organic parent units to draw replacement aircraft from. And in practice RAF FC Squadrons actively engaged in Battle were in pretty rough shape by September, often being wiped out completely in a matter of days and had to be rotated for fresh Squadrons/pilots.

In contrast the German organisation preferred the larger Wing, or Gruppe, consisted of Staffeln, which were merely tactical in their nature but operationally relied on the Gruppe's infrastructure and reserves. In other words, German Staffeln simply drew aircraft from other Staffeln in the Gruppe when neccessary.

 

[Kurfürst]

Some clue as to what was happeing to the Me 110 as a Day Fighter can be seen by the numbers of Me 110s available for barbarossa. By that stage there were less than 100 available for operations in the East

Yup. Several units become Night Fighter in the meantime, hence they don't show up in Day Fighter counts.

 

[RCAFson]

Again, you keep posting Single events without paying any attention
To the whole scope of interest. As Long as the BoB is a rather 4 Week Long Episode to your mind -concentrating on the for the FC Best missions and selling them as examples for the Bf-110's true capabilities they are worthless. Selective perception in my Limited View.
Parsifals Assessment is a very good one, mind to ASK Why?

I happen to own The Hardest Day and it gives a detailed breakdown for that day. Juhu provided the exchange rate for 10 july - 11 Aug:
So 6 FC fighters were lost to 110s but LW had lost 27 110s in combat.

On Aug 15 and 18, 24-25 Bf110s were lost and they downed 3 Hurricanes, for certain, but if we credit them with a couple of kills where the Luftwaffe fighter was not identified and give full, instead of partial, credit to GF, then we might get 22 Bf110 losses against 5 kills, for Aug 15 and 18. So the exchange rate for these dates runs from a probable 52 bf110s to 9 FC fighters, to a low of 49 bf110s to 11 FC fighters.

I'm sorry if it is not very flattering to the Bf110.

 

[Milosh]

The comparison is rather meaningless; Squadrons were a tactical unit and the benefit of a full 12 aircraft flight were tactical. The RAF's organisation revolved around a small tactical unit, the Squadron, an independent tactical and operational unit which didn't have organic parent units to draw replacement aircraft from. And in practice RAF FC Squadrons actively engaged in Battle were in pretty rough shape by September, often being wiped out completely in a matter of days and had to be rotated for fresh Squadrons/pilots.

In contrast the German organisation preferred the larger Wing, or Gruppe, consisted of Staffeln, which were merely tactical in their nature but operationally relied on the Gruppe's infrastructure and reserves. In other words, German Staffeln simply drew aircraft from other Staffeln in the Gruppe when neccessary.

Drawing a/c from other staffels to complete another staffel's establishment compliment does not change the overall numbers. That is robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The RAF squadron didn't need organic parent units as there was a reserve of a/c in the squadron to draw from. They had the a/c right there unlike the German unit which had to fly in replacement a/c from wherever.

Examples of RAF FC squadrons being wiped out completely please.

 

[Juha]

Hello Nikademus
take a brief look on your 110 kill/lost list. Interesting to note that before the Battle of France 110 did badly against Hurricanes, during the BoF very well (as the figures JoeB gave, based on Cornwell's BoF Then and Now), then during the BoB, again based on Cornwall's figures in BoB Then and Now it did again poorly, Greek/Yug again better etc. Now only during BoF and BoB figures are substantial. IMHO they clearly shows that combat environment had very important effect on combat results.

Mid-1941-42 seemed to have been bad period to 110s but over Tunisia it again did reasonable well. Maybe the F and G subtypes, at least the late-comer II./ZG 1 had the latter, which restored the powerloading of ever more heavier 110s, helped to restore at least partially 110's air-to-air capacity. Over Tunisia it wasn't a first class fighter but was still a reasonable dangerous opponent.

Thanks again for your interesting info.

Juha

 

[Glider]

Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.

Yes lets look at the production figures.

Total: new production 718

From RLM Delivery reports.

Total destroyed in the same period:

To enemy action: 502
Accidents in operations: 98
Accidents outside the scope of operations: 63

Total: 663

A net gain of 55 These figures exclude aircraft returned from repair but they also exclude:-
a) those that were sent away for repair
b) It also excludes those that were used to replace older aircraft with newer versions

I don't know how many were sent for repair but a rule of thumb was that for every two lost one was badly damaged. Frankly it doesn't matter how accurate that rule of thumb is, I am as sure as possible that more than 55 aircraft were sent for repair the probably figure is nearer the 200 mark.
Also you have ignored new production to replace older versions or tired aircraft.

These aspects go a long way to explaining why German Me109 strength fell between June and Septrember.

 

[davebender]

The BoB period was only a few months. That's not long enough for aircraft to wear out and/or become technically obsolete.

 

[parsifal]

Zestörer losses to enemy action (destroyed), July-October, as per Wood and Dempste via the LW Quartermaster reports:

July: 34 destroyed, 6 damaged
August: 114 destroyed, 32 damaged
September: 81 destroyed, 17 damaged
October: 10 destroyed, 1 damaged

Total: 239 destroyed, 56 damaged to enemy action. (for all four months)

In addition 11 were destroyed on operation due to non-enemy causes, and further 17 outside operations. 3 damaged in accidents on operations, four outside operations.

which confirms that total losses were 267 written off and a further unkown percentage of the 56 damaged. Luftwaffe policy was anything more than 60% damaged was a write off, from memory, but often anything with more than 30-35% damaged spent the rest of its career parked on the side of the tarmac, acting as a target....luftwaffe games with operational rates to keep Hitler happy mostly

 

[Milosh]

Well keep repeating that if you wish, production and loss numbers have been shown, and the above notion was utterly disproven already. No need to discuss it again. Production alone was sufficient to replace losses, even without the output of repair centres or drawing from the reserves.

You keep repeating that the German were producing enough Bf109s, yet the fact is clearly seen that they could not meet the Establishment number. One would think that one week into a major campaign, Babarossa, the German have enough Bf109s in reserve to meet establishment numbers or at least keep the 'onhand' number lost to attrition > Estab.- 1401, Onhand - 1213, Serv. - 858 and this includes Erg. numbers. In fact, the percentage of serviceable Bf109. 61.2%, was slightly less than at the end of Sept. '40 (62.9%). One would think in a relatively calm period (Jan '41 to June '41) that the serviceability percentage number would increase.

Single engine fighters - 28.06.41
1401 1213 858

Single engine fighters - 27.09.41
1420 1137 738

The Germans Bf109 production certainly could not keep up with attrition until the lull for the winter.

Single engine fighters - 27.12.41
1420 1233 654

Single engine fighters - 28.03.42
1456 1257 752

Producing an extra 44 Bf109s in 9 months over attrition? That is barely keeping ones head above water and still the Establishment number could not be attained.

 

[Glider]

The BoB period was only a few months. That's not long enough for aircraft to wear out and/or become technically obsolete.

Not quite. For example in the RAF we had the Mk 1 Spitfires being replaced with Mk II, in the Luftwaffe 109 E1's were being replaced with 109 E3's with cannon instead of MG's. Some were rearmed but most were replaced.

As for the wearing out that did happen, aircraft have a finite life and the pressure of combat adds significantly to the wear and tear. Some planes would have accumulated damage over the weeks to make them not fit for combat, some will have been overstressed in the heat of battle or suffered structural damage in heavy landings. Also it should be remembered that most of the Me109 aircraft had been fighting for months in the battle for France without any let up in the field. Whereas the vast majority of the RAF aircraft had only started combat from around Dunkirk and were mainly operating from home bases with all the infrastructure support that helps servicability.

There was also the pressure of pilots. It is clear from the link that Kurfurst gave us that the fall in the servicable Me109's was significant and serious, but that the fall in pilots ready for combat was even worse. In September if you only have 676 pilots ready for action, it doesn't matter if you have 717, 850, 950 or 2000 servicable aircraft, you only have 676 pilots to fly them.

 

[parsifal]

Not quite. For example in the RAF we had the Mk 1 Spitfires being replaced with Mk II, in the Luftwaffe 109 E1's were being replaced with 109 E3's with cannon instead of MG's. Some were rearmed but most were replaced.

As for the wearing out that did happen, aircraft have a finite life and the pressure of combat adds significantly to the wear and tear. Some planes would have accumulated damage over the weeks to make them not fit for combat, some will have been overstressed in the heat of battle or suffered structural damage in heavy landings. Also it should be remembered that most of the Me109 aircraft had been fighting for months in the battle for France without any let up in the field. Whereas the vast majority of the RAF aircraft had only started combat from around Dunkirk and were mainly operating from home bases with all the infrastructure support that helps servicability.

There was also the pressure of pilots. It is clear from the link that Kurfurst gave us that the fall in the servicable Me109's was significant and serious, but that the fall in pilots ready for combat was even worse. In September if you only have 676 pilots ready for action, it doesn't matter if you have 717, 850, 950 or 2000 servicable aircraft, you only have 676 pilots to fly them.

and that does not mean that even theoretically they could put even close to 676 in the air at the same time. There is always a only a fraction of these available....some are recovering from illness or injury, some are on leave, some are simply too tired to be reasonably expected to get airborne, some are too green to be considered combat ready, as an earlier post alluded to.

As a rule of thumb, generally you can get about half your pilots airborne at any given time in an extended attritional battle like the BoB. That operational number of 278 is looking better and more realistic all the time......

 

[Juha]

Hello Glider
in fact E-3s were converted to E-4 standard, that was easily done, the main differences being that E-4s had more powerful MG FF M instead of MG FF as a wing cannon and better armour protection. On the other hand IIRC the weapon bay in E-1 wing, in addition of being different, was also in slightly different place than in the later, cannon armament Es. In spite of that there were conversations from E-1 to E-4 and E-7 standards but there were numerous E-1 losses even in late Oct 40. In fact E-1 losses were only second to E-4 losses and much more numerous than E-3 losses. So E-1s were not replaced but used throughout BoB but some were probably converted to E-4 standard during the BoB and many more later.

Juha

 

[Glider]

Hi Juha
Thanks for the additional information. I knew that some were converted which is why I made the caviet, but am certain that some were replaced.
I was going from a memoir that I read about a luftwaffe pilot who had his mg armed 109 replaced by a cannon armed version during the BOB. He was in many ways upset at losing 'his' mount as pilots do get attached to aircraft and he had set it up just how he liked it. It didn't say (or I cannot remember) what sub type the aircraft was. However the point is that some at least were replaced.

 

[Juha]

Hello Delcyros
you have not answer to my question on your source of your message #95. I guess that it is the Christer's book. Because the 1050 litre aux tank wasn't improvised but designed for 110D and because all the lost and damaged 110s of I./ZG 76 on that day had 2 man crews, IMHO not the most reliable source. And of course the bombing of Driffield was done by Ju 88s of KG 30 not by He 111s of KG 26.

Why I ask your source again is because even the only written off Hurricane according to BoB Then and Now Mk V, F/O Passy's P3827, was according to Bowyer's A/c for the Few declared as FBO2 meaning A/c suffering battle dam and requiring contractor's attention and not as written off. The info on other dam FC planes of that combat is identical in both books. I'd like to know if P3827 was first declared Cat 3 and then revalued as repairable or was it other way around. So I'll ask from RAF specialists which explanation is correct for P3827. If your source gives the construction numbers of those extra losses it claimed to have happened, I'd ask on those at the same time.

Juha

 

[Juha]

Hello Glider
according to BoB T and N Mk V for ex. on 22 Oct 40 of the 109s lost in combat on that day 2 were E-4s and 1 E-1.

Juha

 

[parsifal]

Yup. Several units become Night Fighter in the meantime, hence they don't show up in Day Fighter counts.

Only partially true. There were some Staffeln that had converted toi the Nightfighter role, but at this stage (1940-41) the workhorse of the Night Fighter forces was the Ju-88C. Prior to that there had been a few Bf 109Ds. There were also a smattering of D-17s converted to the role

Me 110s were sometimes used in the night Intruder role, mostly during the early part of the blitz.

Part of the reason for the low turnout of Me 110s on the Eastern Front was its employment on other fronts. By June 1941, it was being used principally in the anitshipping and convoy escort role. Its principal areas for deployment were the Med, where about 40 were depployed from January1941, and Norway, with an unkown number deployed (but about 40, as per the Med).


I can look up the actual numbers, but this means that if 80 were deployed to the East, 40 to the med and 40 to Norway, and around 30 to the night defences, you have roughly 190 on strength, give or take. I could do this properly, but could care less to be honest

 

[parsifal]

Amusing that the greatest decline in strenght only occurs in December, when fighting and fighter losses went down to just about nil isn't it. Yet there are no such drastic decrease in fighting strenght, whereas in the peak of fighting activity, there's no such trend.QUOTE]

There is another possibility not being considered here....that the losses and damaged units suffered in the previous months were not showing up in the daily returns as quickly as they should have. Aircraft with less than 60% damage might be listed as available in October, and then quietly re-assesed as not repairable and written off in December. Hitler usually flew into a rage whenever he was told about low serviceability rates, and the Luftwaffe, like most German service arms , became very adept at hiding unpalatable truths from their fuhrer, and not written off until the end of the quarter after the fighting was no longer relevant, and therefore of no interst to the little corporal.

A classic example of this creative accounting occurred at the beginning of the campaign. Luftwaffe returns show that at the beginning of July, LFs 2 3 had 1300 bombers available in Northern France. But the truth is they had less than half that number. S ome units were still undergoing repairs after the BoF, some units were in transit and moving their SGSUs into position.....there was an acute shortage of suitable airfields in the right positions, which needed a coupe of weeks to rectify. None of this comes up in the official records that I am aware of, and that makes sense, given that Hitler either was about to, or already had, issued his directive for the invasion of Engtland. Der Fuhrer would have been less than impressed to learn most of his bomber units were still holidaying i the south of France somewhere......

Surviving Me 109Es were hardly ever retired outright. Many were redeployed to the Southern and eastern fronts in the following year. Emils were still arriving in the MTO as late as February 1942, and continued to be the principal type throughout most of 1941. Me109fs did not begin to arrive on the southern front until August 1941.

 

[Kryten]

It's not that well documented (if at all) that when a new model of a plane became operational how long it took to filter down to all the front line units, consider the logistical requirements of training airframe fitters and mechanics, organising spares parts and repair facilities and actually delivering the planes from a factory that may well be bombed over night!

and thats before you even get round to converting pilots over to the new type!

It must have a been a nightmare in reality and is testament to all the "pen pushers" without who the front line pilots would have been grounded!

 

[Juha]

Hello
to give a clearer picture on the how common various 109E subtypes were latein 1940.
Based on the losses reported, any damage, between 16 Sept and 31 Dec 40
E, meaning no info on subtype 27
E-1 156
E-2___3
E-3___0
E-4 251
E-7__41

Juha