BoB Mathematical Modeling of Alternative Outcomes

Koopernic said:

The Luftwaffe had drop tanks during the battle of Britain. Me 109E4/B and Me 109E7N/B came into service towards the end of the battle of Britain.

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The key words being towards the end of the BOB

The structural work had already been done on the Me 109E1/B but it had been for a bomb. It apparently could carry a fuel tank but it couldn't be jettisoned.

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I think we can agree that this would have been a really bad idea

I've already dealt with the other issues such as why a 15" gun might hit a Battleship or cruiser 25-30km away but not a coaster that is 5% the size and 35km-50km away and below the horizon. The channel seems to be 35km at its narrowest.

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Actually you haven't. There were a number of opportunities during the war for the 15 in (or any other gun) to open fire on naval targets but failed to hit anything. Dieppe was one chance, during the BOB itself RN forces ranging from MTB up to R class battleships sailed up and down the North Sea without being hit.

Koopernic said:

That would require the Luftwaffe to get everything right all of the time

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That's right, but it still wouldn't have guaranteed them victory.

Koopernic said:

If the narrative is that "the few" narrowly saved Britain by winning the "Battle of Britain" then it is legitimate to argue that minor changes in German strategy might have tipped the balance. I can't see that it was a problem in strategy since it was a problem of equipment rather than strategy.

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Nope, not at all, their entire strategy was at fault simply because even by 1 August none of the commanders nor Goering could agree on exactly what was the best way to go about destroying the RAF, and they had completely underestimated how many RAF fighters the British had. Regarding the German plans, they couldn't agree on what specific targets should be attacked or what approach they should take. This is evident in all the records surviving of German meetings held between commanders and Goering.

Sperrle wanted to destroy the RAF in passing while ports and supply lines were under attack, but Goering had excluded Channel ports from the list of targets stipulated on his document of 21 July because they were required for the invasion, while Kesselring thought that attacking ports would result in too high attrition. Kesselring, in fact was sceptical about attacking the UK at all and argued for attacking Gibraltar first, then attacking London. London, of course was initially off the table because Hitler had forbidden attacks on the capital, but junior commanders still supported the ideas of terror attacks on the civilian population. Of course, Goering rejected Kesselring's views because (once again, as I've said before) he underestimated the number of fighters the RAF had up to that point (which, I've been saying was the biggest strategic blunder the Germans made) and based his plans on a three-phase assault for destroying those fighters across lines of battle approaching the capital.

Osterkamp, the only one with his finger on the pulse correctly assessed that the RAF had more fighters than Goering was predicting and that experience by the bomber crews was proving him correct. At that meeting, Goering angrily interrupted him and told him that was nonsense, claiming that the Luftwaffe's intel was accurate and that Osterkamp himself had once stated the RAF was too cowardly to come up and fight, which Osterkamp did not state, and he corrected Goering and stated that the Listening service had heard that the British tactic was to refuse to be baited into coming out in force against masses of fighters, which was used as a tactic to lure the RAF into combat to whittle their numbers down.

All this does is prove beyond doubt that the Germans couldn't agree on the banalities of the task ahead, which hindered their approach going forward, particularly since Goering based his entire strategy on faulty intelligence.

Koopernic said:

The claim that the Germans did not know of British radar is mythical.

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I don't think anyone here has claimed that the Germans didn't know about British radar and you've raised this point before and you've been told exactly the same thing before; the Germans did not understand the entire Dowding system and how it worked.

Koopernic said:

he reality is that they simply did not have the right equipment. That is all.

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Nope, as I've said before, as long as the Germans are insisting on basing their intel on combat reports alone, they were never going to be anything but behind the curve. The Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain as much as Dowding's and Park's tactics won it. Experts who have written books on the subject acknowledge this, even the German commanders themselves were advising it was the case - Goering refused to listen to Osterkamp, who had a better idea of British tactics as any one else, and he was right to think the British had more fighters than Goering thought. Goering's numbers were out by around two to three hundred fighters available to the RAF.

The meeting I refer to in which Goering held and Osterkamp, Sperrle and Kesselring attended took place on 1 August and it was intended that Goering lay his plans down for the coming Eagle attacks, but he wasn't counting on his top three generals railing against him, or at least providing him with their own assessment of the situation as it was up to that point. Osterkamp, as the leader of JG 51 was in a unique position as he had flown in combat against the RAF even went as far as praising the Spitfire in combat, but Goering rubbished him and claimed the Bf 109 was superior. He wrote about this meeting and it is clear that the strategy for destroying the RAF was far from complete or even practicable. Goering simply had no idea what he was up against and wouldn't listen to those who did.

nuuumannn said:

. Goering simply had no idea what he was up against and wouldn't listen to those who did.

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Does this remind anyone of someone else?

I love revisionist history.

Postponing things to 1941 wouldn't just have advantages to the LW. Without the pressure to produce planes and engines immediately, Rolls Royce and Supermarine could have a better Spitfire and maybe RR could have the Vulture in service by 1941. At the fall of France the RAF had 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes with pilots, given a year to recover and train that would be at least 1,000 with much more effective planes and pilots. Germany had stolen a march in armament production but was being out produced by mid 1940, the passage of time was not on their side.

pbehn said:

Without the pressure to produce planes and engines immediately, Rolls Royce and Supermarine could have a better Spitfire

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Without the pressure of production there is no need for the interim models, instead of MkV's and IX's the Luftwaffe would be facing MkIII's and MkVIII Spits, plane's that historically dominated the Me109 but 2 years earlier, there's even time to get the MkXII in large scale production, the FW190 wouldn't be the butcher bird, it'll be the one butchered.

nuuumannn said:

That's right, but it still wouldn't have guaranteed them victory.

Nope, not at all, their entire strategy was at fault simply because even by 1 August none of the commanders nor Goering could agree on exactly what was the best way to go about destroying the RAF, and they had completely underestimated how many RAF fighters the British had. Regarding the German plans, they couldn't agree on what specific targets should be attacked or what approach they should take. This is evident in all the records surviving of German meetings held between commanders and Goering.

Sperrle wanted to destroy the RAF in passing while ports and supply lines were under attack, but Goering had excluded Channel ports from the list of targets stipulated on his document of 21 July because they were required for the invasion, while Kesselring thought that attacking ports would result in too high attrition. Kesselring, in fact was sceptical about attacking the UK at all and argued for attacking Gibraltar first, then attacking London. London, of course was initially off the table because Hitler had forbidden attacks on the capital, but junior commanders still supported the ideas of terror attacks on the civilian population. Of course, Goering rejected Kesselring's views because (once again, as I've said before) he underestimated the number of fighters the RAF had up to that point (which, I've been saying was the biggest strategic blunder the Germans made) and based his plans on a three-phase assault for destroying those fighters across lines of battle approaching the capital.

Osterkamp, the only one with his finger on the pulse correctly assessed that the RAF had more fighters than Goering was predicting and that experience by the bomber crews was proving him correct. At that meeting, Goering angrily interrupted him and told him that was nonsense, claiming that the Luftwaffe's intel was accurate and that Osterkamp himself had once stated the RAF was too cowardly to come up and fight, which Osterkamp did not state, and he corrected Goering and stated that the Listening service had heard that the British tactic was to refuse to be baited into coming out in force against masses of fighters, which was used as a tactic to lure the RAF into combat to whittle their numbers down.

All this does is prove beyond doubt that the Germans couldn't agree on the banalities of the task ahead, which hindered their approach going forward, particularly since Goering based his entire strategy on faulty intelligence.



I don't think anyone here has claimed that the Germans didn't know about British radar and you've raised this point before and you've been told exactly the same thing before; the Germans did not understand the entire Dowding system and how it worked.



Nope, as I've said before, as long as the Germans are insisting on basing their intel on combat reports alone, they were never going to be anything but behind the curve. The Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain as much as Dowding's and Park's tactics won it. Experts who have written books on the subject acknowledge this, even the German commanders themselves were advising it was the case - Goering refused to listen to Osterkamp, who had a better idea of British tactics as any one else, and he was right to think the British had more fighters than Goering thought. Goering's numbers were out by around two to three hundred fighters available to the RAF.

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nuuumannn said:

The meeting I refer to in which Goering held and Osterkamp, Sperrle and Kesselring attended took place on 1 August and it was intended that Goering lay his plans down for the coming Eagle attacks, but he wasn't counting on his top three generals railing against him, or at least providing him with their own assessment of the situation as it was up to that point. Osterkamp, as the leader of JG 51 was in a unique position as he had flown in combat against the RAF even went as far as praising the Spitfire in combat, but Goering rubbished him and claimed the Bf 109 was superior. He wrote about this meeting and it is clear that the strategy for destroying the RAF was far from complete or even practicable. Goering simply had no idea what he was up against and wouldn't listen to those who did.

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"Nope, not at all, their entire strategy was at fault"

This is a rehash of the same old claim that 'strategy' could have made the difference rather than equipment. It's also a rehash of the double standard where every piece of information the Germans are missing in the first 3 weeks of the Battle on British aircraft production and loses or the centralised Chain Home Radar system is proof of Germans are bumbling rather than just proof of British secrecy. Secrecy is what one tends to practice during a war.

In reality the 'faulty intelligence' Goering supposedly based his campaign on can be traced to inappropriate equipment: the lack of a high speed reconnaissance aircraft.

Thanks for using at least 1 date, the 1st of August 1940 when the meeting with Goering took place.

Let me get some dates down. Wikipedia states the Battle of Britain (really a campaign) started on 10th July 1940 (20 days before the meeting you base your argument on)

The events prior to that are this:

May 30 1940 the Germans are still trying to make peace with Britain. Things start to change by mid June 1940.

The various Fuherer directives to destroy the RAF were issued by June 14th and came not as part of the plan for a possible operation SeaLion but to stop the RAF's further bombing of the Ruhr Basin.

Hitler wants to get on with preparing for Operation Barbarossa. Doenitz's analysis of SeaLion highlights the extreme difficulties. SeaLion 1940 is seen as a last resort.

When the 1 August 1940 meeting takes place the Luftwaffe had been flying against the RAF over Britain for only 20 days.

Now Goering comes across as a c*nt and his accusatory talking out of his ass style doesn't help analyse information as it comes in but the other commanders are clearly competent. They are not "bungling" for not understanding the extent or effectiveness of the RAF centralised control via CH radar. They are bringing up various strategies that might be employed and even Goering is thinking ahead that with SeaLion a possibility that docks might need to be preserved. These are the men that just successfully invaded Poland, France, Holland, Denmark, Belgium and Norway fighting of British forces in 2 of them.

Remember the priority Fuhrer Directive is to destroy the RAF to protect the Ruhr from the RAF.

So the Germans didn't understand the capabilities of the Chain Home system. Why should they? No one else had such a system. German radar developed out of German Navy attempts for using radar for fire control going back to 1932. Despite impressive radar sets and trials from 1934-1936 onwards (including lobe switching and blind fire) Deployment of series produced Seetakt and Freya didn't begin till 1938 in part because Freya radars had operate over ground clutter. not the north sea, thereby compelling a more difficult high frequency technology to be developed. I counted 12 Freyas in service protecting German borders during the Battle of France, it could by 9 it could be 22. They were developed out of tactical needs and integrated within the existing air reporting service hence the Luftwaffe hadn't organically progressed to evolving them into a more integrated system yet.

Nevertheless German Signals Intelligence worked out what was happening regarding centralised control of British fighters even if a bad report that assumed that RAF fighters were locally controlled undermined them for a while.

The British were keeping their production of Fighters secret, their deployment secret, their damage aircraft list secret. It's not like Goering can get a curtesy copy at on the end of week RAF fighter command report listing all fighter assets and dispositions of damaged aircraft, production rates, pilots on call.

Setting up a espionage network is nigh impossible in Britain since the only people likely to be slightly sympathetic to the Germans (only in the sense of avoiding a war), British Fascists, are also exceedingly loyal to Britain. That's the nature of nationalism.

This leaves the Germans with nothing but aerial intelligence, signal intelligence, interrogations of prisoners.

Here we can see again the lacking in the required equipment and procurement of the Luftwaffe. German aerial intelligence was based around excellent cameras mounted on bombers (maybe a Me 110) and in the face of radar and fighters like the Spitfire they were often shot down.

There had been warnings from within the Luftwaffe and German Army ( I forget the name of the commander) that whomever had the best reconnaissance would win any war.

When the Me 109 was adapted as a recon the pilot had to use a hand held camera. Basically too crude.

Then we have the issue of RAF losses. The serious problem of over claiming by aircraft and pilots (deliberate or more likely through confused observation) was an equal problem in all air forces. RAF, GAF, USAAF. All of them. The solution was tighter procedures, gun cameras and a factor to compensate. Not well understood at the time I think.

Destroying the RAF would need to be a battle of attrition. German forces are extremely poorly set up for this since a war of attrition always leads to the Germans loosing since they can be easily blockaded and starved of resources. The German armed forces are set up to win a two front war (Poland, France etc)

If destroying the RAF is the directive then bombing docks is a strategy to induce the RAF to defend them but it runs the risk of the RAF being wise to the ruse and harbouring their fighters (which the French and Polish Air forces did) and relying on docks out of reach (eg Liverpool) to take in shipping. If the British don't come up and fight then the Luftwaffe has to attack the RAF directly.

Again this is not 'bungling' since how are they too know how the RAF will react? The Germans tried both.

Unfortunately Goering's personality stands out here. He's highly intelligent, extremely sarcastic and this aspect means his own biases dominate decision making and analysis and biases his decisions for politics.

Still the problem is not German strategy. It is 1/ Lack of long range fighters, 2 lack of high speed photo reconnaissance and 3/ The preference for putting resources into Operation Barbarossa 1941 rather than SeaLion 40 or 41. Destroying the RAF would be a war of attrition that the Luftwaffe would need to be prepared to loose 2:1 since shot down Luftwaffe aircraft would crash in Britain and their pilots captured. This is why when unarmed Heinkel He 115 float planes with a red cross came to rescue down German pilots the British, under orders of Churchill, had them attacked.

If the Luftwaffe wanted to destroy the RAF it would need 1 different equipment and 2 the willingness to commit resources towards a war of attrition that would be initially expensive as it favoured the British.

pbehn said:

Postponing things to 1941 wouldn't just have advantages to the LW. Without the pressure to produce planes and engines immediately, Rolls Royce and Supermarine could have a better Spitfire and maybe RR could have the Vulture in service by 1941. At the fall of France the RAF had 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes with pilots, given a year to recover and train that would be at least 1,000 with much more effective planes and pilots. Germany had stolen a march in armament production but was being out produced by mid 1940, the passage of time was not on their side.

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You'll need to explain this logic to me? You are saying that had the Luftwaffe continued its campaign to destroy the RAF beyond September 1940 Instead of preparing for Barbarossa) there would be less pressure and The RAF would better engines and aircraft. I think it would be worse if anything.

The Spitfire broadly was produced in two airframe versions. The Basic unit produced in massive number at Castle Bromwich consisting of the Mk 1/II/III/V/IX and the advanced units consisting of the Mk VII(2 stage merlin),VIII(2 stage merlin), XII(single stage griffon), XIV(2 stage griffon) and the aborted Spitfire IV (single stage griffon, basically a Spitfire XII)

Here is the thing: the 'advanced' airframe was produced in small number throughout the war.

PAT303 said:

Without the pressure of production there is no need for the interim models, instead of MkV's and IX's the Luftwaffe would be facing MkIII's and MkVIII Spits, plane's that historically dominated the Me109 but 2 years earlier, there's even time to get the MkXII in large scale production, the FW190 wouldn't be the butcher bird, it'll be the one butchered.

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Again, see above. If the RAF enters into a war of attrition over the British Isles it will be compelled to produce more basic spitfires.

Koopernic said:

"
You'll need to explain this logic to me? You are saying that had the Luftwaffe continued its campaign to destroy the RAF beyond September 1940 Instead of preparing for Barbarossa) there would be less pressure and The RAF would better engines and aircraft. I think it would be worse if anything.

The Spitfire broadly was produced in two airframe versions. The Basic unit produced in massive number at Castle Bromwich consisting of the Mk 1/II/III/V/IX and the advanced units consisting of the Mk VII(2 stage merlin),VIII(2 stage merlin), XII(single stage griffon), XIV(2 stage griffon) and the aborted Spitfire IV (single stage griffon, basically a Spitfire XII)

Here is the thing: the 'advanced' airframe was produced in small number throughout the war.
.

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You will need to explain your "what if". Are you saying things would remain the same as they were historically up to September 1940 and then the LW starts again in the spring to have another go at Sealion in 1941? The LW couldn't continue its campaign after Sept 1940, it was running out of bombers to do it. The Mk III was not the same as others from Supermarine Spitfire Mk III
The Mk III was the first major redesign of the Spitfire. The new aircraft was based around the Merlin XX engine, a 1240 hp engine with a two-speed supercharger, which would have given much better high altitude performance. Other changes included a shorter clipped wing, which reduced the wing span to 32'7", increasing the rate of roll. The bullet proof glass on the canopy was moved inside the cockpit, reducing drag. The tailwheel was made retractable. The universal "c" wing was used, which could take four 20mm cannon, eight .303in machine guns, or two cannon and four machine guns. Maximum speed increased to 385 mph.


However, although an order was placed for mass production of the Mk III, it was soon cancelled. The Merlin XX was in short supply, and was needed more urgently in the Hurricane II. Meanwhile, Rolls-Royce had developed the Merlin 45, a similar engine that could be used in a Mk I or Mk II fuselage. The Mk III was abandoned in favour of the Mk V, although many of the improvements first seen in the Mk III were used in later versions of the aircraft. The Mk III airframe was later used to test the Merlin 61 engine, becoming the ancestor of the Mk VII, VIII and IX Spitfires.

Koopernic said:

Again, see above. If the RAF enters into a war of attrition over the British Isles it will be compelled to produce more basic spitfires.

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If Sealion was postponed 12 months to allow the Kriegsmarine to build invasion ships and the Luftwaffe to develope long range fighters the British will use the same time to build better Spitfires, instead of the interim models they would have the time to build the best models, you can't have your cake and eat it too.

pbehn said:

becoming the ancestor of the Mk VII, VIII and IX Spitfires.

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And MkXIV and even later the Spiteful.

pbehn said:

You will need to explain your "what if". Are you saying things would remain the same as they were historically up to September 1940 and then the LW starts again in the spring to have another go at Sealion in 1941? The LW couldn't continue its campaign after Sept 1940, it was running out of bombers to do it. The Mk III was not the same as others from Supermarine Spitfire Mk III
The Mk III was the first major redesign of the Spitfire. The new aircraft was based around the Merlin XX engine, a 1240 hp engine with a two-speed supercharger, which would have given much better high altitude performance. Other changes included a shorter clipped wing, which reduced the wing span to 32'7", increasing the rate of roll. The bullet proof glass on the canopy was moved inside the cockpit, reducing drag. The tailwheel was made retractable. The universal "c" wing was used, which could take four 20mm cannon, eight .303in machine guns, or two cannon and four machine guns. Maximum speed increased to 385 mph.


However, although an order was placed for mass production of the Mk III, it was soon cancelled. The Merlin XX was in short supply, and was needed more urgently in the Hurricane II. Meanwhile, Rolls-Royce had developed the Merlin 45, a similar engine that could be used in a Mk I or Mk II fuselage. The Mk III was abandoned in favour of the Mk V, although many of the improvements first seen in the Mk III were used in later versions of the aircraft. The Mk III airframe was later used to test the Merlin 61 engine, becoming the ancestor of the Mk VII, VIII and IX Spitfires.

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Thanks for that information. I enjoyed your explanation. Merlin XX engines used for a hypothetical Spitfire III would presumably be taken from Wellingtons, Lancaster's, Hurricanes, Whitby' etc effecting bomber production (what the Germans want). The Spitfire III seems to belong to the same series as the Spitfire IV, VII, VIII, XII, XIV, XVIII i.e. enlarged fuselage tank and leading edge wing tanks, retractable tail wheel. It certainly seems to be a powerful aircraft but belonged to an airframe series that was only produced in modest numbers.

The Me 109F1 with the DBB601N2 engine using C3 fuel entered service in August 1940 at the close of the BoB. The Me 109F3 and Me 109F4 with the DB601E using B4 fuel a short time latter. By Feb 1942 both engines had been released to a 1350hp rating allowing a speed of 391 mph. There were intermediate increments as well. In essence in August at the close of the Battle of Britain not only were drop tank capable Me 109E4/B and Me 109E7N/B entering service so was the Me 109F1. The Me 109F1 had significantly enhanced range due to its better aerodynamics.

The more likely scenario I think is that the Merlin XX gets dropped straight into the Mk II or Mk V airframe and few Mk III actually get the engine.

I'm not sure what the Luftwaffe's response to the Spitfire Mk III would be. There were proposed Me 109F series beyond the F4 and plans for a more capable higher power levels for the Me 109E (heavier DB601 based engine) though the Me 109G1 with DB605A started entering service in Feb 1942.

Had the Luftwaffe persisted beyond the traditional end of the battle of Britain with the new longer range Me 109 there might be a significant capability to attrite the RAF if they confine daylight raids to only those in which the bombers can be fully escorted all the way to target by drop tank capable Me 109 (with those not fitted out yet protecting those that had drop tanks from early jettison). This can be combined with the night raids to strike industrial targets associated with aviation that actually did happen. My gut opinion is that this strategy would probably not attrite the RAF sufficient because I believe a long range escort fighter bomber such as the Fw 187 would still be needed.

Koopernic said:

Thanks for that information. I enjoyed your explanation. Merlin XX engines used for a hypothetical Spitfire III would presumably be taken from Wellingtons, Lancaster's, Hurricanes, Whitby' etc effecting bomber production (what the Germans want). The Spitfire III seems to belong to the same series as the Spitfire IV, VII, VIII, XII, XIV, XVIII i.e. enlarged fuselage tank and leading edge wing tanks, retractable tail wheel. It certainly seems to be a powerful aircraft.

The Me 109F1 with the DBB601N2 engine using C3 fuel entered service in August 1940 at the close of the BoB. The Me 109F3 and Me 109F4 with the DB601E using B4 fuel a short time latter. By Feb 1942 both engines had been released to a 1350hp rating allowing a speed of 391 mph. There were intermediate increments as well. In essence in August at the close of the Battle of Britain not only were drop tank capable Me 109E4/B and Me 109E7N/B entering service so was the Me 109F1. The Me 109F1 had significantly enhanced range due to its better aerodynamics.

The more likely scenario I think is that the Merlin XX gets dropped straight into the Mk II or Mk V airframe and few Mk III actually get the engine.

I'm not sure what the Luftwaffe's response to the Spitfire Mk III would be. There were proposed Me 109F series beyond the F4 and plans for a more capable higher power levels for the Me 109E (heavier engine) though the Me 109G1 started entering service in Feb 1942.

Had the Luftwaffe persisted beyond the traditional end of the battle of Britain with the new longer range Me 109 there might be a significant capability to attrite the RAF if they confine daylight raids to only those in which the bombers can be fully escorted all the way to target by drop tank capable Me 109 (with those not fitted out yet protecting those that had drop tanks from early jettison). This can be combined with the night raids to strike industrial targets associated with aviation that actually did happen. My gut opinion is that this strategy would probably not attrite the RAF sufficient because I believe a long range escort fighter bomber such as the Fw 187 would still be needed.

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You havnt explained your what if? If the RAF suffers the same losses and difficulties in 1940 as they historically did then the LW must do also, your scenario has the RAF weakened in 1940 but the LW bright eyed, bushy tailed and stronger than ever. The following types were introduced in 1940 too late to be involved in the battle but there, Short Stirling, HP Halifax, Avro Manchester, Bristol Beaufighter, Westland Whirlwind. The war in 1941 was going to be different to 1940 and there is no possibility of fighting any war of attrition in winter, many missions were postponed or called off in September/October, meanwhile pilots from the Arnold Scheme and pilot training were arriving from USA Canada and those with only a few hours on type quickly increased them. As previously stated, at the fall of France the RAF had 500 front line fighters in service, this was the best chance for Germany to win, from then throughout the battle the number of front line fighters increased even if pilot quality dropped. The LWs war of attrition saw the RAF increase in numbers, things were not going to improve in 1941 when it would start with 1000 better planes with better pilots and lots more better bombers and mine layers.

P.S. it wasnt my explanation, it is from the link I posted, other links are available saying the same thing.

Koopernic said:

"
The various Fuherer directives to destroy the RAF were issued by June 14th and came not as part of the plan for a possible operation SeaLion but to stop the RAF's further bombing of the Ruhr Basin.

Hitler wants to get on with preparing for Operation Barbarossa. Doenitz's analysis of SeaLion highlights the extreme difficulties. SeaLion 1940 is seen as a last resort.

When the 1 August 1940 meeting takes place the Luftwaffe had been flying against the RAF over Britain for only 20 days.

Now Goering comes across as a c*nt and his accusatory talking out of his ass style doesn't help analyse information as it comes in but the other commanders are clearly competent. They are not "bungling" for not understanding the extent or effectiveness of the RAF centralised control via CH radar. They are bringing up various strategies that might be employed and even Goering is thinking ahead that with SeaLion a possibility that docks might need to be preserved. These are the men that just successfully invaded Poland, France, Holland, Denmark, Belgium and Norway fighting of British forces in 2 of them.
.

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This is revisionist apologist invention. Hitler didn't want bombing of the Ruhr or anywhere in Germany at any time because he was the head of the German political system and it meant the war he started coming home to roost. If he wanted to stop bombing of the Ruhr he should withdraw from Poland Netherlands Belgium Norway and France, that is what the war was all about. Goering wasn't just a bit of a c*nt, he was a killer, cold blooded murderer, and ruthless political operator. He was also a complete buffoon, a vain incompetent drug addict art collector and model for various uniforms, batons and pink boots. There was a meeting you should note on July 19 1940 where Mayer was presented with his second baton for his new position of Reichsmarschall and Hitlers second in command. On that day Hitler made a kind offering to halt hostilities with the UK which he claimed had already lost 150 aircraft and would be unable to withstand further attacks by German bombers. It was at the meeting on 1 August 1940 that Goering was advised what the ACTUAL strength of the LW was, approximately half what he thought it was, because he took little notice of losses throughout the campaigns in Poland Norway Netherlands , Belgium and France. This meeting of 1 Aug. was to plan and construct a strategy 3 weeks after the battle had actually started. The increasingly clueless duo were starting to enter their own fantasy world that would end in a bunker after magnificent victories in North Africa and Stalingrad.

How dare those effete, drunken Englishers get in the way of the glorious Charlie Chaplin impersonators campaign to rule de welt

fastmongrel said:

How dare those effete, drunken Englishers get in the way of the glorious Charlie Chaplin impersonators campaign to rule de welt

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At times Goering both in his style of dress and verbal outbursts could fit straight into a "Blackadder" sketch with no changes at all. Accusing front line airmen of cowardice while his boss was in a bunker and his mates were looking for routes to South America is black comedy Baldrick would admire.

Koopernic said:

This is a rehash of the same old claim that 'strategy' could have made the difference rather than equipment. It's also a rehash of the double standard where every piece of information the Germans are missing in the first 3 weeks of the Battle on British aircraft production and loses or the centralised Chain Home Radar system is proof of Germans are bumbling rather than just proof of British secrecy. Secrecy is what one tends to practice during a war.

In reality the 'faulty intelligence' Goering supposedly based his campaign on can be traced to inappropriate equipment: the lack of a high speed reconnaissance aircraft.

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No, not correct. Again, you are just not facing the facts, Koopernic. It has been stated to you on many occasions that the Germans underestimated their opponent's number. It's plainly stated in the meeting on 1 August, in Osterkamp's assessment of it and in other documentation and accounts of the battle that the Germans did this. This is the blunder and they will not win regardless of what equipment they have.

Koopernic said:

Now Goering comes across as a c*nt and his accusatory talking out of his ass style doesn't help analyse information as it comes in but the other commanders are clearly competent. They are not "bungling" for not understanding the extent or effectiveness of the RAF centralised control via CH radar. They are bringing up various strategies that might be employed and even Goering is thinking ahead that with SeaLion a possibility that docks might need to be preserved. These are the men that just successfully invaded Poland, France, Holland, Denmark, Belgium and Norway fighting of British forces in 2 of them.

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You're putting your own words on what is being posted here as I never said anything like what you are presuming I have done so. I never said Goering was a c*nt (is it really necessary to use that language?) and no one, other than you has stated that the Germans were 'bungling'; I certainly haven't.

Koopernic said:

So the Germans didn't understand the capabilities of the Chain Home system. Why should they?

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My constant pointing this out is because of your constant repetition, despite the fact no one is saying it, that the Germans didn't know about British radar. In two slightly related threads you have made the same claim, yet no one has actually said it!

Koopernic said:

Again this is not 'bungling' since how are they too know how the RAF will react? The Germans tried both.

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Again, who has said the Germans are bungling, apart from you? The simple fact is, that the way the battle actually played out, the Germans made serious errors of judgement and their lack of organisation and lack of clarity of purpose - you can put whatever spin you like on it, the commanders certainly were not on the same page and did not have an overall strategy that they were in agreement with; all the surviving evidence contradicts what you are claiming in regard to this - contributed highly toward their downfall. As I have pointed out to you repeatedly, the Luftwaffe lost the Battle of Britain, campaign or not, it's a semantic point barely relevant of clarification, because of its incompetent leadership, as much as the British won it. NOT because of the lack of range of the Bf 109.

Koopernic said:

The Me 109F1 with the DBB601N2 engine using C3 fuel entered service in August 1940 at the close of the BoB.

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The new version first saw action in Oct 1940 with Stab/JG51. The first know loss, WNr 5635, was Nov. 11 1940, Oblt. Georg Claus. of 1./JG51.

The BoB ended in August?

Milosh said:

The new version first saw action in Oct 1940 with Stab/JG51. The first know loss, WNr 5635, was Nov. 11 1940, Oblt. Georg Claus. of 1./JG51.

The BoB ended in August?

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Officially ended on 31 October, "Battle of Britain day" commemorates the 15 September when the massed raids on London were met, a few days later Hitler postponed Sealion, after that the attacks switched to the night time Blitz and sporadic day time activity with high altitude Me109s a fore runner to the Tip and Run raids.

pbehn said:

This is revisionist apologist invention. .

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This is where you start the ad hominem.

Let the dates and facts speak for themselves.

Fuhrer Directive 13, (still during the battle of France) so most of this is concerned with operations in France.

___________________________________________________-

The Leader And Supreme Commander Of The Armed Forces.
Headquarters. 24th May, 1940. 7 copies
der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/wardirectives/13.html (der-fuehrer.org)

"3. Tasks Of The Air Force.

(a) Apart from operations in France, the Air Force is authorised to attack the English homeland in the fullest manner, as soon as sufficient forces are available. This attack will be opened by an annihilating reprisal for English attacks on the Ruhr Basin.

Commander In Chief Air Force will designate targets in accordance with the principles laid down in Directive No. 9 and further orders to be issued by the High Command Of The Armed Forces. The time and plan for this attack are to be reported to me."

Goering's orders to implement these attacks, with Reference to protecting the Ruhr, only occurred on June 30th and they did not take place immediately.

In "Directive No. 16 – On preparations for a landing operation against England" on 16 July 1940 Hitler required readiness by mid-August for the possibility of an invasion he called Operation Sea Lion, unless the British agreed to negotiations.

As you can see the directives are initiated as reprisals and neutralising objectives (annihilating)

From Wikipedia.
"By the end of June 1940, Germany had defeated Britain's allies on the continent, and on 30 June the OKW Chief of Staff Alfred Jodl issued his review of options to increase pressure on Britain to agree to a negotiated peace. The first priority was to eliminate the RAF and gain air supremacy. Intensified air attacks against shipping and the economy could affect food supplies and civilian morale in the long term. Reprisal attacks of terror bombing had the potential to cause quicker capitulation, but the effect on morale was uncertain. Once the Luftwaffe had control of the air, and the UK economy had been weakened, an invasion would be a last resort or a final strike ("Todesstoss") after Britain had already been conquered, but could have a quick result. On the same day (30 June), the Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief Hermann Göring issued his operational directive; to destroy the RAF, thus protecting German industry, and also to block overseas supplies to Britain.[54][55] The German Supreme Command argued over the practicality of these options. "
_____________________________________________________________________________-



Directive No. 17 -- For The Conduct Of Air And Sea Warfare Against England
der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/wardirectives/17.html (der-fuehrer.org)
The Leader And Supreme Commander Of The Armed Forces.
The Leader's Headquarters. 1st August, 1940. 10 copies

"In order to establish the necessary conditions for the final conquest of England I intend to intensify air and sea warfare against the English homeland. I therefore order as follows:

1. The German Airforce is to overpower the English Airforce with all the forces at its command, in the shortest possible time. The attacks are to be directed primarily against flying units, their ground installations, and their supply organisations, but also against the aircraft industry, including that manufacturing antiaircraft equipment.

2. After achieving temporary or local air superiority the air war is to be continued against ports, in particular against stores of food, and also against stores of provisions in the interior of the country.

Attacks on south coast ports will be made on the smallest possible scale, in view of our own forthcoming operations.

3. On the other hand, air attacks on enemy warships and merchant ships may be reduced except where some particularly favourable target happens to present itself, where such attacks would lend additional effectiveness to those mentioned in paragraph 2, or where such attacks are necessary for the training of aircrews for further operations.

4. The intensified air warfare will be carried out in such a way that the Airforce can at any time be called upon to give adequate support to naval operations against suitable targets. It must also be ready to take part in full force in Undertaking Sea Lion.

5. I reserve to myself the right to decide on terror attacks as measures of reprisal.

6. The intensification of the air war may begin on or after 5th August. The exact time is to be decided by the Airforce after the completion of preparations and in the light of the weather.


The Navy is authorised to begin the proposed intensified naval war at the same time.

______________________________

der-fuehrer.org/reden/english/wardirectives/16.html (der-fuehrer.org)
The Leader And Supreme Commander Of The Armed Forces.

The Leader's Headquarters. 16th July, 1940. 7 copies"


Directive No. 16 -- On Preparations For A Landing Operation Against England
Since England, in spite of her hopeless military situation, shows no signs of being ready to come to an understanding, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and, if necessary, to carry it out.

The aim of this operation will be to eliminate the English homeland as a base for the prosecution of the war against Germany and, if necessary, to occupy it completely.

I therefore order as follows:

1. The landing will be in the form of a surprise crossing on a wide front from about Ramsgate to the area west of the Isle Of Wight. Units of the Airforce will act as artillery, and units of the Navy as engineers.

The possible advantages of limited operations before the general crossing (for example, the occupation of the Isle Of Wight or of the county of Cornwall) are to be considered from the point of view of each branch of the Armed Forces and the results reported to me. I reserve the decision to myself.

Preparations for the entire operation must be completed by the middle of August.

2. These preparations must also create such conditions as will make a landing in England possible, namely:

(a) The English Airforce must be so reduced morally and physically that it is unable to deliver any significant attack against the German crossing.

(b) Mine free channels must be cleared.

(c) The Straits Of Dover must be closely sealed off with minefields on both flanks; also the western entrance to the Channel approximately on the line Alderney-Portland.

(d) Strong forces of coastal artillery must command and protect the forward coastal area.

(e) It is desirable that the English Navy be tied down shortly before the crossing, both in the North Sea and in the Mediterranean (by the Italians). For this purpose we must attempt even now to damage English homebased naval forces by air and torpedo attack as far as possible.

3. Command Organisation And Preparations.

Under my overriding command and according to my general instructions, the Commanders In Chief will command the branches of the Armed Forces for which they are responsible.

From 1st August the Operations Staffs of Commander In Chief Army, Commander In Chief Navy, and Commander In Chief Airforce are to be located at a distance of not more than 50 kilometres from my Headquarters (Ziegenberg).

It seems to me useful that the inner Operations Staffs of Commander In Chief Army and Commander In Chief Navy should be placed together at Giessen.

Commander In Chief Army will detail one Army Group to carry out the invasion.

The invasion will bear the covername Seelöwe -- Sea Lion.

In the preparation and execution of this operation the following tasks are allotted to each Service:

(a) Army:

The Army will draw up the operational and crossing plans for all formations of the first wave of the invasion. The antiaircraft artillery which is to cross with the first wave will remain subordinate to the Army (to individual crossing units) until it is possible to allocate its responsibilities between the support and protection of troops on the ground, the protection of disembarkation points, and the protection of the airfields which are to be occupied.

The Army will, moreover, lay down the methods by which the invasion is to be carried out and the individual forces to be employed, and will determine points of embarkation and disembarkation in conjunction with the Navy.

(b) Navy:

The Navy will procure the means for invasion and will take them, in accordance with the wishes of the Army, but with due regard to navigational considerations, to the various embarkation points. Use will be made, as far as possible, of the shipping of defeated enemy countries.

The Navy will furnish each embarkation point with the staff necessary to give nautical advice, with escort vessels, and with guards. In conjunction with air forces assigned for protection, it will defend the crossing of the Channel on both flanks. Further Orders will lay down the chain of command during the crossing. It is also the task of the Navy to coordinate the setting up of coastal artillery -- that is, all artillery, both naval and military, intended to engage targets at sea -- and generally to direct its fire. The largest possible number of extra heavy guns will be brought into position as soon as possible in order to cover the crossing and to shield the flanks against enemy action at sea. For this purpose railway guns will also be used (reinforced by all available captured weapons) and will be sited on railway turntables. Those batteries intended only to deal with targets on the English mainland (K5 and K12) will not be included. Apart from this the existing extra heavy platform gun batteries are to be enclosed in concrete opposite the Straits Of Dover in such a manner that they can withstand the heaviest air attacks and will permanently, in all conditions, command the Straits Of Dover within the limits of their range. The technical work will be the responsibility of the Organisation Todt.

(c) The Task Of The Airforce Will Be:

To prevent interference by the enemy Airforce.

To destroy coastal fortresses which might operate against our disembarkation points, to break the first resistance of enemy land forces, and to disperse reserves on their way to the front. In carrying out this task the closest liaison is necessary between individual Airforce units and the Army invasion forces.

Also, to destroy important transport highways by which enemy reserves might be brought up, and to attack approaching enemy naval forces as far as possible from our disembarkation points. I request that suggestions be made to me regarding the employment of parachute and airborne troops. In this connection it should be considered, in conjunction with the Army, whether it would be useful at the beginning to hold parachute and airborne troops in readiness as a reserve, to be thrown in quickly in case of need.

4. Preparations to ensure the necessary communications between France and the English mainland will be handled by the Chief, Armed Forces Signals.

The use of the remaining eighty kilometres of the East Prussia cable is to be examined in cooperation with the Navy.

5. I request Commanders In Chief to submit to me as soon as possible:

(a) The plans of the Navy and Airforce to establish the necessary conditions for crossing the Channel (see paragraph 2).

(b) Details off the building of coastal batteries (Navy).

(c) A general survey of the shipping required and the methods by which it is proposed to prepare and procure it. Should civil authorities be involved? (Navy).

(d) The organisation of Air Defence in the assembly areas for invasion troops and ships (Airforce).

(e) The crossing and operation plan of the Army, the composition and equipment of the first wave of invasion.

(f) The organisation and plans of the Navy and Airforce for the execution of the actual crossing, for its protection, and for the support of the landing.

(g) Proposals for the use of parachute and airborne troops and also for the organisation and command of antiaircraft artillery as soon as sufficient English territory has been captured.

(h) Proposals for the location of Naval and Air Headquarters.

(i) Views of the Navy and Airforce whether limited operations are regarded as useful before a general landing, and, if so, of what kind.

(k) Proposal from Army and Navy regarding command during the crossing.