Great post, as far as the bold part, German high command did try almost everything, re running the battle with differing tactics is almost always the same tactics but with experience learned from post war records. Attacking airfields is obvious but that is what the hardest day was about, both sides suffered their highest losses but the LW suffered most. Attacking radar is also obvious now, it wasn't at the time because you need to knock at least three probably 5 adjacent stations, they are difficult to actually knock out and you can invite the RAF to a Stuka party in the process. It is fair comment to suggest what the LW could have done better, it is not fair comment to assume Dowding and Park would be overcome with terminal stupidity and start doing things they never had done in the past. In any case in a "what if" , all the RAF had to do historically was to remove Leigh Mallory and forget talk of big wings under Bader.I'll weigh in on this one. I am now retired from a career in quantitative Biology. I used Bayesian methods to estimate abundance of salmon and also build quantitative models of fisheries on migrating salmon. At one point I build a Monte Carlo based simulation model exploring variation in reproductive and exploitation rate parameters as well as run timing on possible outcomes.
First, as near as I have been, this model is not published, nor is it peer review. Furthermore, the authors do not describe the model, how it is parameterized, but in particular, HOW THE UNDERLYING UNCERTAINTY is parameterized. That's pretty critical. Without that information, I am left with a lot of questions.
But all the math, not withstanding RCAFson nailed the major issue: "I don't think it means much because it makes assumptions without regard to potential RAF countermeasures." For every action the German Command might take, there would be a reaction on the part of the RAF and other commands.
The Luftwaffe, had just finished a campaign to support the invasion of France, Holland and Belgium. They did so with aircraft best suited for the support of a land campaign. They immediately turned towards an air campaign over Britain. They were ill-prepared, the campaign was largely unplanned, and they lacked a capable "strategic bomber" fleet or a long-range fighter. Although the RAF had a greater task of conducting a strategic bombing campaign over Germany, it wasn't really until 1943 that they were able to achieve significant success and not until the fall of 1944 that they had the upper hand. And of course there were many failures along the way.
If the Luftwaffe continued attacks on airfield in the south of England they would have continued to suffer great attrition. Airfields are very small targets difficult to find at night and even harder to hit.
What about my "Monte Carlo based simulation model exploring variation in reproductive and exploitation rate parameters as well as run timing on possible outcomes?" It suffered from the same flaw that RCAFson described: it suffered from lack of reactions of fisheries managers to variation any particular parameter. Therein was its Achilles heel.
Jim