Great post, as far as the bold part, German high command did try almost everything, re running the battle with differing tactics is almost always the same tactics but with experience learned from post war records. Attacking airfields is obvious but that is what the hardest day was about, both sides suffered their highest losses but the LW suffered most. Attacking radar is also obvious now, it wasn't at the time because you need to knock at least three probably 5 adjacent stations, they are difficult to actually knock out and you can invite the RAF to a Stuka party in the process. It is fair comment to suggest what the LW could have done better, it is not fair comment to assume Dowding and Park would be overcome with terminal stupidity and start doing things they never had done in the past. In any case in a "what if" , all the RAF had to do historically was to remove Leigh Mallory and forget talk of big wings under Bader.
BoB Mathematical Modeling of Alternative Outcomes
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fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
If Germany wants to invade Britain successfully it needs to start preparing in 1935. They also need British intelligence to get a fatal attack of stupidity so as not to notice all the prototype landing craft being built and tested.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
What landing craft??
In 1935 Germany starts digging a tunnel in the basement of a Belgian Nazi's house near the French border.
By 1940 the Germans just march through the tunnel and pop up in Margate, no fuss, no muss.
As construction advanced air tubes for ventilation were disguised as recue buoys.
In 1935 Germany starts digging a tunnel in the basement of a Belgian Nazi's house near the French border.
By 1940 the Germans just march through the tunnel and pop up in Margate, no fuss, no muss.
As construction advanced air tubes for ventilation were disguised as recue buoys.
A defeat that would totally change the outcome of the war, the world was scared of Germany in 1940 as they crushed every country in front of them, having there advance stopped and their army at the bottom of the channel would put them on the defensive, the Luftwaffe would take a beating, they were weaker after the BoB as the RAF became stronger and they would have to fight over British territory day after day because the RAF would be strafing the beach head day after day, the Luftwaffe would be ground into a pulp, the Kriegsmarine would be totally and completely destroyed, again they would have to fight and having destroyers and a couple of cruisers facing off against a battle line of 15'' and 16'' battleships means every German ship sunk, the RN would not let them get away once engaged, they would chase them all the way back to their home bases and destroy them. It's not a matter of loosing an Army, the Germans would be forced to commit their entire depleted Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine forces to protect the convoys and beach head, which means their complete and total destruction.
Happy new year everybody,
I'm not attached to the idea that the Luftwaffe could have won "the Battle of Britain". Nor do I think it plausible that by continuing to attack RAF bases they could have attired the RAF to the point of a spiralling collapse due to pilot and aircraft losses because the bulk of Britain was out of reach of the Luftwaffe fighters which would always allow the RAF a space for training, harbouring resources, developing, testing and manufacturing aircraft. That would require the Luftwaffe to get everything right all of the time and the RAF to get most decisions wrong most of the time.
I also think that SeaLion was an logistical impossibility in 1940 given the Germans had only 3 months to prepare for it before extremely difficult winter weather set in and were starting with essentially zero amphibious landing craft. They did remarkably even respectably well improvising a plausible plan based on using large river barges and ships. In Spring 1941 they could have been ready with hundreds of specialised amphibious landing craft, Ju 52 and Me 321/322/323 Gliders but that was not possible since resources were now dedicated to operation Barbarossa. I can see that 200 Ju 52/3m could for instance transport about 20,000 men or 2000 tons of supplies per day, maybe 50% more.
If the narrative is that "the few" narrowly saved Britain by winning the "Battle of Britain" then it is legitimate to argue that minor changes in German strategy might have tipped the balance. I can't see that it was a problem in strategy since it was a problem of equipment rather than strategy.
The Germans used drop tank equipped He 51 during the Spanish civil war. The He 112 had this capability and the concept had been first implemented in Germany in WW1 with the Siemens-Schuckert D.VI. The first series production Emils the Me 109E1 had a variant known as the Me 109E1B which had a bomb rack and Me 109 could be fitted with non jetisonable external tanks.
With the flick of a bureaucratic pen it could have been decreed that all Me 109E2 or at least E3/E4 would be equipped with drop tank capability and it would not have cost the Germans any delays or resources of consequence. Indeed it would have immensely helped their campaigns in Poland, Norway and France as well.
So the question is where does this narrative or narrow defeat come from. Is it credible? Was it a politicking or posturing from Park or Dowding?
Increasing the fuel capacity of the Me 109 from 400L to 700L by 75% increases range about 60%. The time spent over the UK goes up much more, about 100% and the area over the US the Me 109 could operate goes up by 2-3. Twice as many Me 109 over the UK for their 2-3 times as long. That swings things quite a lot.
As far as the Fw 187 goes it could have been built in numbers as great as the Me 110 so long as the DB601 engines were allocated. The Fw 187 was much lighter than the Me 110 and would have been faster than the Me 109 or Spitfire and thus a competitive dog fighter.
There were significant impediments in getting ready for SeaLion.
It could only occur in 1941.
Coastal Artillery had to be set up, mine fields, air superiority maintained, the German Navy built up with suitable escort vessels.
The 15 inch guns of Bismarck as (as coastal artillery firing a reduced projectile )45,932 yards (42,000 m) so one could assume that this type of gun could protect out to 30,000 yards given the infinitely better sighting, optics, range finding triangulation possible.
This protects the German Invasion force only 1/2 to 1/4 of the way across the channel.
By 1941 the German navy would be rebuilt. It only has to keep at bay Royal Navy Motor Torpedo Boats and destroyers while the Luftwaffe deals with the Cruisers and Battle ships.
I'm not attached to the idea that the Luftwaffe could have won "the Battle of Britain". Nor do I think it plausible that by continuing to attack RAF bases they could have attired the RAF to the point of a spiralling collapse due to pilot and aircraft losses because the bulk of Britain was out of reach of the Luftwaffe fighters which would always allow the RAF a space for training, harbouring resources, developing, testing and manufacturing aircraft. That would require the Luftwaffe to get everything right all of the time and the RAF to get most decisions wrong most of the time.
I also think that SeaLion was an logistical impossibility in 1940 given the Germans had only 3 months to prepare for it before extremely difficult winter weather set in and were starting with essentially zero amphibious landing craft. They did remarkably even respectably well improvising a plausible plan based on using large river barges and ships. In Spring 1941 they could have been ready with hundreds of specialised amphibious landing craft, Ju 52 and Me 321/322/323 Gliders but that was not possible since resources were now dedicated to operation Barbarossa. I can see that 200 Ju 52/3m could for instance transport about 20,000 men or 2000 tons of supplies per day, maybe 50% more.
If the narrative is that "the few" narrowly saved Britain by winning the "Battle of Britain" then it is legitimate to argue that minor changes in German strategy might have tipped the balance. I can't see that it was a problem in strategy since it was a problem of equipment rather than strategy.
The Germans used drop tank equipped He 51 during the Spanish civil war. The He 112 had this capability and the concept had been first implemented in Germany in WW1 with the Siemens-Schuckert D.VI. The first series production Emils the Me 109E1 had a variant known as the Me 109E1B which had a bomb rack and Me 109 could be fitted with non jetisonable external tanks.
With the flick of a bureaucratic pen it could have been decreed that all Me 109E2 or at least E3/E4 would be equipped with drop tank capability and it would not have cost the Germans any delays or resources of consequence. Indeed it would have immensely helped their campaigns in Poland, Norway and France as well.
So the question is where does this narrative or narrow defeat come from. Is it credible? Was it a politicking or posturing from Park or Dowding?
Increasing the fuel capacity of the Me 109 from 400L to 700L by 75% increases range about 60%. The time spent over the UK goes up much more, about 100% and the area over the US the Me 109 could operate goes up by 2-3. Twice as many Me 109 over the UK for their 2-3 times as long. That swings things quite a lot.
As far as the Fw 187 goes it could have been built in numbers as great as the Me 110 so long as the DB601 engines were allocated. The Fw 187 was much lighter than the Me 110 and would have been faster than the Me 109 or Spitfire and thus a competitive dog fighter.
There were significant impediments in getting ready for SeaLion.
It could only occur in 1941.
Coastal Artillery had to be set up, mine fields, air superiority maintained, the German Navy built up with suitable escort vessels.
- Scharnhorst was 28,600 yds. distant at 1632 when she opened fire on the aircraft carrier Glorious
- Her third salvo hit Glorious at 1638.
- Scharnhorst was 26,465 yds. distant or slightly less from the Glorious between 1636 and 1638.
The 15 inch guns of Bismarck as (as coastal artillery firing a reduced projectile )45,932 yards (42,000 m) so one could assume that this type of gun could protect out to 30,000 yards given the infinitely better sighting, optics, range finding triangulation possible.
This protects the German Invasion force only 1/2 to 1/4 of the way across the channel.
By 1941 the German navy would be rebuilt. It only has to keep at bay Royal Navy Motor Torpedo Boats and destroyers while the Luftwaffe deals with the Cruisers and Battle ships.
Your comparing an poorly handled aircraft carrier armed with AAA guns with a battleship armed with nine 11'' guns.
German navy rebuilt to a stage that it could match the RN in 12-18 months?, the Luftwaffe will deal with cruisers and battleships both day and night with over 700 Spitfires and Hurricanes on front line squadrons?.
All that sighting equipment will achieve is to miss more accurately, the British will have PR Spit's over those positions within 24hrs and bombers not long after.
The 2.5 meter Chain Home Low system was already operating at likely to plug many of those gaps as well. Some had quite small towers hard to spot.
There were temporary and portable systems plus the system could be repaired fairly quickly, it was low tech deliberately so that it used many readily available parts. This was a new part of warfare, things like RADAR and oil production had to be continually attacked because the people operating them immediately started repairing the damage.
Germany was careful to not alarm Britain in any way.
1 The German Navy was thinking in terms of 12 inch or 13 inch guns for Scharnhorst. Hitler advised the German Navy to use 11 inches as it would not alarm the British and he wanted to get the Anglo-German Naval Treaty through. 11,12 and 15 are the traditional German naval calibres. The 12" was in fact developed but eventually only developed for coastal artillery.
2 Hitler explicitly forbade the German armed forces from making plans for an invasion of Britain as he said it would be an insult to his diplomatic skills. This may have had quite an effect if one thinks about it.
3 Prior to the war the e USA were claiming that the Luftwaffe could bomb the USA. American journalists in fact directly pressed Goering on the matter and he made mocked the idea as ridiculous pointing to the massive resources that would be required, that little result would be achieved for the expenditure and that US defences would not be expensive. I He was 100% sincere about this at the time. An interest in a bomber to reach the US only developed in 1940 after defacto US entry into the war. Nevertheless it suited some interests in the USA. The arrival of a Fw 200S (actually the modified Fw 200 V1) in a direct flight from Berlin to New York against prevailing winds was used by Happ Arnold to lobby for more funding for the USAAF saying it was only a matter of time (before bombers could reach the USA).
German fears of provoking the UK or USA clearly had a significant effect in focusing German military preparations away from long range aviation and naval warfare.
They also made sense. France was a powerful adversary and the Battle of France a close run thing. Even Italy was an adversary over the Tyrol issue and Poland had huge potential as an adversary. Russia had attempted to invade in 1919 under Trotsky.
Any focus on preparing for warfare with the UK (amphibious assault capability, Ju 89's) detract from Germany's ability to defend itself from France (which had marched into the Rhineland) previously.
I though the premises is that the Luftwaffe has air superiority? That makes the RN task much more difficult.
Note also that the Germany Army or rather Luftwaffe FLAK that accompanied it in the early phases was well known to have been very well prepared with FLAK to protect its troops. The 2.0cm C30 canon was practical, quite accurate because of good ballistics, a stable solid had cranked base operated by men who had developed the art of cranking these weapons in elevation and train. FLAK was a significant factor in the defeat of the French Airforce and made life hard for the RAF in France. There were also 3.7cm guns 3.7cm FLAK 36 and the versatile 8.8 cm FLAK 37 but the 2,0cm guns would take a toll in any RAF attempts to straff. The Problem of FLAK is having enough guns to defend everything that might be attacked by roaming aircraft but if its a beach head the FLAK can be concentrated there.
Note also that the Luftwaffe had a demountable form of Freya that would be set up on the Invasion beaches within a day or two. They had used Frey LZ in the Norweighen campaign.
There would be no 'surprise' attacks.
I'm not fighting the British on the side of the Germans. I was merely establishing that German Navy Coastal Batteries could be established that were capable of dealing with British Battleships and Cruisers out to 30,000 yards (27km). Again coastal guns are extremely difficult targets and premise is that the RAF has lost air superiority.
Whether or not about enough 15 inch and 11 inch guns could be put into service (I estimate 40-80 needed) is another matter. If they can the Coastal Batteries can keep RN Cruisers and Battleships 25km-30km from the French coast.
Within the minded of zone the German Navy and Airforce would need to protect the invasion fleet. Radar equipped German Navy Cruisers Destroyers would need to be there at night to detect and control interception of RN small craft. U-boats outside the mine fields perimeter would be a hazard to any major units of the Royal Navy. U-boats could be safe in the event of Luftwaffe air superiority.
The premise is that the RAF has lost air superiority but lets consider your postulate. Hitting a gun emplacement within bomb proof concrete is likely to be unsscessufull or very costly. The multipurpose FLAK would also make it costly to the RAF and help the Luftwaffe attrite the RAF. Yes destruction could be achieved but at what cost?
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The Germans captured a number of portable British radars in the Battle of France. This is how they knew of British radar.
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How could the Luftwaffe get air superiority?, even with planes they never made and drop tanks for the ones they did the RAF could stay out of reach and attack on it's terms.
Extremely difficult compared to what, a maneuvering battleship 30,000 yards away?.
The Germans flew up the UK coast in a Zeppelin with sensing equipment plotting Chain Home before the war started, any German visitor to England could see the towers, it was not secret at all.
i believe that Chain Home was switched of for maintenance that day but the German Navy had already gathered significant data. The claim that the Germans did not know of British radar is mythical. They may have under-appreciated its impact, which is fair enough. They did perhaps have initial problems determining its frequency Since their own sets operated at 50, 70 and 2.4m. I think the sets captured in France operated at half chain homes frequency.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
In Theory, yes. in practice???
Much like the Americans found out in 1943, you need a bunch of fighters operating in relays. It isn't going to take the defence (British here) very long to realise that if they engage the drop tank equipped escorts early in the flight they have to drop the tanks with useable fuel in them and thus shorten their range and endurance. Drop tanks will help the 109s considerably ( they can at least arrive over the coast with near full internal fuel ( warm and take off is always done on internal fuel) which will help quite a bit. If the British wait to engage then the operational radius does get better. But planning on being able to carry the drop tanks to near exhaustion is bad planning.
Coastal artillery not only needs to be set up, it needs to be built (or dug out of storage).
It took a number of weeks just to set the available German railroad guns. The Germans did have a number of battleship guns from WW I that were used for coastal defence.
Construction of batterie Todt was begun in July of 1940, it was not completed until Jan of 1942. It may have been capable of firing at some point in 1941.
The mine fields are a subject of debate and speculation. Both sides used mine fields in the channel for much of the war to either hinder the enemy shipping or protect their own. However local mine fields of a few kilometers or few dozen are not the same as a mine field intended to block the entire width of the channel at points removed from Dover. Coastal batteries can protect local (your side of the channel) mine fields from being swept (or raise the cost substantially). They can do very little for minefields laid near the enemy coast or in the "open" channel. The British have a huge advantage in numbers of available ships (fishing boats) available for mine sweeping.
Escort vessels covers a huge range. Many of the British trawlers were considered escort vessels, One gun capable of dueling with a submarine deck gun, a few machine guns for AA defence (rather laughable but one or more 20mms were fitted later) a depth charge rack and perhaps sonar (primitive?) and you have an anti-sub escort, rather useless if the primary threat is aircraft. British have huge advantage in numbers of destroyers so any escort vessel intended to fight them needs a much better surface armament than a trawler or minesweeper conversion. two 105cm guns vs four 4.7in isn't going to cut it. How much AA is needed depends on how well the the luftwaffe can maintain air supremacy (not air superiority)
British also have some semi-expendable C and D class cruisers.
!940 S-boats are not as well armed as the later boats. 1941 armament? The early boats had one 20mm, the pre war boats had two 20mm and many of the early war boats (or rearmed
ones had the German naval 37mm gun which was crap for this type of fighting. The Germans did have the 37mm Flak 36/37 but that required a different mount/deck space. It was done. The German 20mm guns weren't that great either for Naval AA or small craft night fighting.
Building hulls from new is going to take time and compete with the landing craft program.
and the British are doing what over the winter of 1940/41 in regards to beach defences, equipping the land army and figuring out what they need for a bitter channel fight?
Please note that the British added about 20 Hunt class escort destroyers to the fleet in 1940/early 1941, a few Black Swan type sloops and most of the N class destroyers and a few of the larger L and Ms. Four Dido class cruisers were completed in 1940 and a few more in the Spring of 1941.
While the Germans might be a lot stronger in the spring/summer of 1941 (forgoing the Russian adventure) the British would also be much stronger.
Land based guns can shoot accurately much further than ship mounted guns. They are not rolling, pitching and yawing and they are NOT moving hundreds of yards between shots.
however this assumes a stable land mounting, which railroad guns were sometimes not.
https://imgur.com/gallery/j7oQtkL
Really?
Even in 1941 the German Luftwaffe does NOT have the capability of sinking Cruisers, Battleships and Destroyers at night. Even at 20 kts the British can start and end a mission 100NM from the target area at night and have 1-2 hours of engagement time. faster speeds increase either the distance to/from bases or increase time in target zone.
While the Luftwaffe may very well dominate the air space over the invasion sites and approaches the idea they can dominate the air space over a 250-300 NM area to extent that British ships cannon be at sea in dawn or dusk conditions at the limits seems rather incredible.
The rebuilt German navy would consist of what?
Strength of the German Navy fluctuates rather widely depending on what historical missions were done or not done.
pinehilljoe
Staff Sergeant
In "With wings like Eagles" Michael Korda wrote that Milch had proposed the day after Dunkerque fell with the British Army in disarray, to immediately use every Ju-52 to fly as many troops over as possible nightly, secure an airfield and a port and follow up with more sea borne troops. Germany may not have been able to conquer Britain, but peace negotiations may have gone differently with several thousand German troops in Kent.
Shortround6
Lieutenant General
Or even differently with several thousand German prisoners of war in Kent.
Unless they seize an airfield first, landing troops by Ju 52, STOL as it may have been was going to lead to a very high attrition rate of the JU 52s, trying to land and take off in Kent farm fields.
The entire British army was NOT in France in May/June of 1940, although many of the units in England may have been under strength and not well trained.
Seizing a Port for a few hours or a few days sounds a lot easier than it would have been. although the seizing would have been the easy part. Getting a decent number of German troops onto ships/large boats and getting them to the port that was seized without getting shot up by what was left of the Royal Navy after Dunkerque would be the hard part.
Unless they seize an airfield first, landing troops by Ju 52, STOL as it may have been was going to lead to a very high attrition rate of the JU 52s, trying to land and take off in Kent farm fields.
The entire British army was NOT in France in May/June of 1940, although many of the units in England may have been under strength and not well trained.
Seizing a Port for a few hours or a few days sounds a lot easier than it would have been. although the seizing would have been the easy part. Getting a decent number of German troops onto ships/large boats and getting them to the port that was seized without getting shot up by what was left of the Royal Navy after Dunkerque would be the hard part.
Admiral Beez
Major
It will be the end for Hitler. To sail 150,000 men into the Channel where they are, almost to a man killed by the Royal Navy will be a massive blow to Hitler's standing with the General Staff, especially after hundreds of aircraft and pilots have been wasted in the BoB. And then there's a massive propaganda boost for the British, the huzzahs of the returning RN warships will be heard in Calais, and you can imagine Churchill's radio broadcast announcing the national greatest naval victory since the Spanish Armada (or Trafalgar). German dead will be washing up upon on the shores of the UK and of occupied France for weeks.
Hitler will look ridiculous to the German people, and weak to other leaders, especially Stalin, but also to FDR, Mussolini, plus Hitler's intended allies the Finns, Romanians, Croats, etc. and to Japan. My guess, is Hitler is assassinated by the OKH (or a purged OKW) and most of the Nazi leadership (Himmler, Goering, Goebbels, Hess, Bormann, etc.) are arrested, tried and quickly shot by the General Staff. Barbarossa likely never occurs. Those 150,000 Germans drowned in the English Channel in 1940 might have saved millions from 1941-45.
