BoB Mathematical Modeling of Alternative Outcomes

[Admiral Beez]

T
I the end, to say the Germans were ill prepared to conquer the UK is an understatement.

The Germans ignorance or neglect of geography was their undoing. The English Channel and Russian Winter, these are known geographic challenges that have defeated previous invasion attempts, challenges that need to be planned for in advance.

 

[fastmongrel]

The weather late September early October 1940 was surprisingly good with a lot of sunshine and not a lot of rain. Fog was a major problem though a warm day and a cool night bring lots of fog and there were days when Fog banks lasted until well into the afternoon. On the days when the Fog is not a problem there were fresh south westerly breezes of up to force 5. Sea States of 4.Sea winds and waves

There's a tide table somewhere on the internet that shows tides for the period but I can't find it.

 

[pbehn]

The barges were hardly seaworthy and had to be towed. .

I am not a barge expert, but I don't think a barge can ever be sea worthy, you have to choose sea conditions that the barge can cope with, something hardly understood by those who thought the channel is just a wide river.

 

[pbehn]

There's a tide table somewhere on the internet that shows tides for the period but I can't find it.

I just found this in wiki, "One complication was the tidal flow in the English Channel, where high water moves from west to east, with high water at Lyme Regis occurring around six hours before it reaches Dover. If all the landings were to be made at high water across a broad front, they would have to be made at different times along different parts of the coast, with the landings in Dover being made six hours after any landings in Dorset and thus losing the element of surprise. If the landings were to be made at the same time, methods would have to be devised to disembark men, vehicles and supplies at all states of the tide. That was another reason to favour landing craft."

 

[nuuumannn]

Opperation SeaLion required Air Dominance, the term used in German documents. If they had of achieved that, which I contend they could have with Drop tanks on all Me 109/Me 110 and 50% of the Me 110 repplaced by equal numbers of Fw 187 they could have. All these fighters would need to be fitted with the approprate REVI and altimeter alarms to allow slide bombing. That would substantially increase the Lufwaffe's anti shipping capability.

Your example above of the Luftwaffe suffering losses trying to sink a convoy shows them being thwarted by RAF land based fighters. It doesn't really count in the even of Luftwaffe total air superiority.

Luftwaffe total air superiority??? Not even a thing. Never was. Never could have been, even with Bf 109s with drop tanks - hindsight is wonderful and in this case erroneously misplaced. The reasons why are obvious and pointed out before in this thread. The Germans never knew how well or badly they were doing against the RAF. On 30 August, General Stapf reported to Gen Fritz Halder that the British had lost 800 fighters since 8 August out of a frontline strength of 915. At the time, Oberst Beppo Schmid had estimated production capacity to be around 2 to 300 fighters, so the assumption was that the RAF had around 3 - 400 fighters left and it was predicted that by the end of the first week of September, the RAF must have been down to their last 2 - 300 machines. The facts were quite different and illustrate the errors in German analysis - they believed their own hubristic claims, as you seem to be doing, Koopernic, on the evening of 6 September, Fighter Command had over 750 serviceable fighters and 1,381 pilots available, of around 950 flew Spits and Hurris.

'Onkel Theo' Osterkamp pointed out right at the start that in order to subdue the RAF (specifically Fighter Command, presumably) the Luftwaffe Jagdgruppen needed a very high kill ratio (Osterkamp and Kesselring were by far the best of the German strategists and both were realistic about their chances, as opposed to the likes of Fink and Goring himself), but the figures speak for themselves. Although the Bf 109 pilots achieved favourable kill ratios, it wasn't enough and in terms of actual losses Fighter Command wasn't suffering nearly as much as the Germans were claiming or had estimated they would in pre-planning (there's that hubris again).

Between mid July and the end of September the Luftwaffe only achieved a favourable kill to loss ratio on 5 days fighting, the highest being 4:1 on 28 September, with 16 RAF losses against 4 Luftwaffe ones, and of those five days, the average being a 1.3 to 1 ratio. Otherwise, every other day within that time period Fighter Command had a greater kill to loss ratio, which means that overall, throughout the majority of the Battle of Britain period, bar those five days, the British shot down more German aeroplanes than the Germans shot down British ones.

Stephen Bungay, whose numbers I'm quoting here - they come from among other things monthly Luftwaffe personnel records for fighter units, so German ones, not just British, has this to say in his analysis; (P.370) "The Luftwaffe was soundly beaten in the air-fighting. The defences never weakened in their ability to meet any raid in whatever strength was necessary, whilst the German fighter arm was wearing itself out."

As for the example of the Germans failing to stop the convoy, the point still stands, it wasn't as easy as anyone thought at the time. The Luftwaffe came out well below expectations, with greater losses than its commanders predicted and the convoy went unscathed. That is far more telling than any presumption on your part.

 

[nuuumannn]

The one question I have, Koopernic, with all your optimism and belief in the superiority of the German machine over the British, tell me, why didn't the Germans win?

If Sealion was going to be successful, why were its most senior commanders, Raeder and his sub commanders - it wasn't a sense of humour, mate, don't kid yourself; you misunderstand that very German characteristic of being blunt and obtuse in the face of authority, when the authority is wrong about something - all claiming it would have been a disaster? It always makes me cringe when I read that back in 1940 even those planning it could see that it was a disaster waiting to happen, yet Nazi fanboys round the world today in front of their computers insist it would have worked!

 

[pbehn]

The one question I have, Koopernic, with all your optimism and belief in the superiority of the German machine over the British, tell me, why didn't the Germans win?

If Sealion was going to be successful, why were its most senior commanders, Raeder and his sub commanders - it wasn't a sense of humour, mate, don't kid yourself; you misunderstand that very German characteristic of being blunt and obtuse in the face of authority, when the authority is wrong about something - all claiming it would have been a disaster? It always makes me cringe when I read that back in 1940 even those planning it could see that it was a disaster waiting to happen, yet Nazi fanboys round the world today in front of their computers insist it would have worked!

Once you impose a requirement of achieving air superiority then your other plans can be as fanciful as you like. The RAF were never going to hand a victory on a plate and if they had an attempt would be made to bomb London into a political settlement. Supplies landed to support the allies in Normandy averaged at 1 ton per month for each soldier. I cant see that Sealion could have worked even if the UK had no air force or navy. Once the initial landings have taken place how do you land the ammunition fuel and everything else needed from barges, how do you get the injured back? Once you involve the UK navy it has no chance. If you involve the RAF it has no chance, the front line strength of monoplane fighters was one thing, the number of planes and pilots military and civilian who were capable of taking off and strafing a beach is another.

 

[nuuumannn]

Once you impose a requirement of achieving air superiority then your other plans can be as fanciful as you like.

Yup, I know this, so do you. It appears that so many do not despite the fact that even the German commanders involved thought it ridiculous.

 

[special ed]

I normally don't participate in these discussions, so I only want to throw in the experiences of the Japanese trying to reinforce Guadalcanal with barges. The Cactus air force slaughtered the troops even to the point of one pilot throwing hand grenades into the barges. The Japanese navy and Air Force were still a viable adversary.

 

[pbehn]

Yup, I know this, so do you. It appears that so many do not despite the fact that even the German commanders involved thought it ridiculous.

If someone like Adolf or uncle Joe tell you to come up with a plan, you come up with a plan, it may change your life chances if you don't. So they came up with a plan that put everything on Herman's ability to do what he boasted he would and could do. It is as much politics as it is military planning, what would have happened if the RAF made a tactical retreat, as William did at Hastings, the carnage could have put paid to Barbarossa because Hitler would have to choose which branch of the military he would sacrifice to save other branches, as he did at Stalingrad later but pretty much lost the lot. The problem is that now we have maps and plans produced and hard copy makes things seem real. Some of the plans with arrows and lines even naming armies divisions and commanders overlook the nonsense of using tugs and barges some of them towed on journeys in open sea of 100 miles or a 200 mile round trip with hours taken to embark and disembark.

 

[Koopernic]

The Germans ignorance or neglect of geography was their undoing. The English Channel and Russian Winter, these are known geographic challenges that have defeated previous invasion attempts, challenges that need to be planned for in advance.

The Germans were very aware of both. Fully aware at all levels.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The Germans were very aware of both. Fully aware at all levels.

Aware? Perhaps. But they made no plans for either. Sealion's success assumed the Channel and the RN waiting therein would let the barges pass. Barbarossa's success assumed the Russians would roll over before the rasputitsa and winter. But the Germans made no plans to bring these assumptions, as flawed as they were to reality.

 

[Shortround6]

There is no reason that the original German plans could not have been changed. Size and number of landing sites for example. Greater use of German warships instead of the big diversion.
However there were certainly limits to the changes that could have been made in forces available.

Germans had about 3 months after the fall of France to get their act together in regards to the ships/boats available.
The 9 divisions (or more or less) alloted to the invasion need some time to rebuild, re-equip and resupply depending on losses in French campaign. Yes they can do some preliminary training during this time. Germans did one daylight landing exercise and it was a fiasco.

Most of the Luftwaffe is trying to defeat the RAF during this time period, not trying to turn into an anti-shipping force although they did get some practice in the Kanalkampf .
And again, the Luftwaffe can only do so much.

There is a lot of talk about mining the Channel, a lot less talk about how mines would be needed, how long and what was going to lay them, assuming of course that the thousands of mines (or tens of thousands) are actually available.

Much has been argued about German shore batteries. While the channel is 21 miles wide at it's narrowest it gets bigger quicker.
to the North of Dover it is 36.4 miles from Ramsgate (14.4 miles from Dover) to Grand-Fort-Philippe (11 miles east of Calais)
From the easternmost point above Ramsgate it is 64.4 miles to Ostend.
going the other way it is 67 miles from Eastbourne to Dieppe
it is 79 miles from Brighton to Etretat (14 miles north of Le Havre.

German shore batteries would have influence on a very small part of the Channel and only a small number of rare guns are able to shoot across the even the Dover Straight.
BTW trying to shoot moving ships with rail road guns requires a lot of luck or divine intervention. Most railroad guns have such limited traverse on carriage that only a few shells could be fired at a ship without the railroad gun having to be shifted along a curved track with either a locomotive or winches.

 

[PAT303]

The only thing the Germans would have achieved if they went ahead with operation Sealion is cause the war to end in 1941 instead of 1945.

 

[Snautzer01]

The only thing the Germans would have achieved if they went ahead with operation Sealion is cause the war to end in 1941 instead of 1945.

Certainly not. Germany suffered distruction of complete army groups, was pushed out of Africa etc and kept fighting. So a lost big battle so early will not make the reich fall apart. Nor will England be capable to do much at this time. Dieppe was not a glorious victory now was it. And that was 1942.

 

[fastmongrel]

The only thing the Germans would have achieved if they went ahead with operation Sealion is cause the war to end in 1941 instead of 1945.

It would be a defeat for Germany but they are only going to lose say 150,000 men plus equipment. Compared to the Russian campaign that's barely a statistic worth writing down.

What I can see it butterflying away is any German troops in Africa.

 

[Koopernic]

Aware? Perhaps. But they made no plans for either. Sealion's success assumed the Channel and the RN waiting therein would let the barges pass. Barbarossa's success assumed the Russians would roll over before the rasputitsa and winter. But the Germans made no plans to bring these assumptions, as flawed as they were to reality.

That's right. They made no plans for invading Britain because they had no intention to do so, that is why they had no long range aircraft or amphibious assault landing craft at all. Likewise they made no serious plans to invade the Soviet Union because they also had no intention to. No, they weren't dumb or unaware. Every German Officer studied Napoleons very similar defeat. Prussian Officers such as the von Clausewitz himself worked with the Tsars Armies in defeating Napoleon. The weather, raspadura and logistical difficulties were understood. Before Barbarossa it was understood that German Forces and Germany had the resources to get no further than about 1/4 of the way into the USSR before running into manpower resource and logistical impossibilities. Halder was hoping for a political collapse by capturing Moscow, Hitler was focused on Grozny/Crimea to get the oil and resources needed to sustain a war, even that oil wouldn't have produced a victory.

Conflict with the Soviet Union and Bolshevism was a legitimate fear, not an intention. I realise I'm beyond the pale here has far as the narrative of p the haughty establishment historians but as Henry Ford noted History is Bunk. By which he meant its as much manipulated for the common masses as the current media narrative.

 

[Koopernic]

The barges were hardly seaworthy and had to be towed. I read somewhere that it would take the barges 1.5 days at least to cross the Channel. The Royal Navy only had to send a couple of destroyers to sail through the formation at full speed in order to sink a substantial amount of German barges.
I the end, to say the Germans were ill prepared to conquer the UK is an understatement. The BoB while impressive in it's own right was a mere sideshow and a nice propaganda victory for the the British. It was t device for the invasion whatsoever as the Germans had defeated themselves in this regard so to speak, long before they reached Dunkirk.

A Rhine River Ship can have a displacement of as much as 1100 tons. These ships sometimes entered the Baltic or travelled even further, A Rhine Barge could carry several tanks and might be 150 tons. Medieveal Cogs of 180-250 tons travelled up the Rhine 300km to Cologne. I have the impression that people think its like the impressive system of British canals such as the one carrying barges across the Pontcysyllte Aqueduct . These were much bigger vessels with much more freeboard and several types likely built for the sea.
s.

 

[pbehn]

A Rhine River Ship can have a displacement of as much as 1100 tons. These ships sometimes entered the Baltic or travelled even further, A Rhine Barge could carry several tanks and might be 150 tons. Medieveal Cogs of 180-250 tons travelled up the Rhine 300km to Cologne. I have the impression that people think its like the impressive system of British canals such as the one carrying barges across the Pontcysyllte Aqueduct . These were much bigger vessels with much more freeboard and several types likely built for the sea.
s.View attachment 606872

Whatever your impression is people are individuals. I have worked all over Europe especially northern Europe. I used to cross the Elbe Seiten canal and witnessed loading of cargo in Wittingen which went straight to Wick in North Scotland but on a sea going vessel not a barge, when shipping in winter the cargo went either by road and ferry or to Hamburg. The picture you show is a narrow boat, my brother has one, you can actually cross the channel in one and people have. You can swim across the channel or paddle in a canoe, you can also die if you get the sea state wrong. When I think of barges at the time I think of the pictures already posted here or of Thames sailing barges and Dutch coasters as used in the evacuation of Dunkirk.

 

[JDCAVE]

I'll weigh in on this one. I am now retired from a career in quantitative Biology. I used Bayesian methods to estimate abundance of salmon and also build quantitative models of fisheries on migrating salmon. At one point I build a Monte Carlo based simulation model exploring variation in reproductive and exploitation rate parameters as well as run timing on possible outcomes.

First, as near as I have been, this model is not published, nor is it peer review. Furthermore, the authors do not describe the model, how it is parameterized, but in particular, HOW THE UNDERLYING UNCERTAINTY is parameterized. That's pretty critical. Without that information, I am left with a lot of questions.

But all the math, not withstanding RCAFson nailed the major issue: "I don't think it means much because it makes assumptions without regard to potential RAF countermeasures." For every action the German Command might take, there would be a reaction on the part of the RAF and other commands.

The Luftwaffe, had just finished a campaign to support the invasion of France, Holland and Belgium. They did so with aircraft best suited for the support of a land campaign. They immediately turned towards an air campaign over Britain. They were ill-prepared, the campaign was largely unplanned, and they lacked a capable "strategic bomber" fleet or a long-range fighter. Although the RAF had a greater task of conducting a strategic bombing campaign over Germany, it wasn't really until 1943 that they were able to achieve significant success and not until the fall of 1944 that they had the upper hand. And of course there were many failures along the way.

If the Luftwaffe continued attacks on airfield in the south of England they would have continued to suffer great attrition. Airfields are very small targets difficult to find at night and even harder to hit.

What about my "Monte Carlo based simulation model exploring variation in reproductive and exploitation rate parameters as well as run timing on possible outcomes?" It suffered from the same flaw that RCAFson described: it suffered from lack of reactions of fisheries managers to variation any particular parameter. Therein was its Achilles heel.

Jim