Bomb sights for light bombers.

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

The RN forces involved in the battle were disposed as follows. this information is based on the dispatches made by Cunningham and handed to the AQdmiralty 31 March 1941.

Convoy " Excess," consisting of ESSEX for Malta, and CLAN GUMMING, CLAN MACDONALD and EMPIRE SONG for Piraeus, having sailed the previous evening.

Force "A", consisting of WARSPITE, VALIANT, ILLUSTRIOUS, JERVIS, NUBIAN, MOHAWK, DAINTY, GREYHOUND, GALLANT and GRIFFIN, sailed at 0500.6th Jan

On 10th jan the fleet undertook the following movements and actions:

At 0430, when in position 35° 56' N., 13° 20' E., course was altered to 290° to rendezvous with Convoy " Excess " At 0741 a report was received "from BON A VENTURE,
who was in position 36° 29' N., 12° 10' E., that she had sighted two enemy destroyers
bearing 010°, 3 miles, and at 0756 the Rear-Admiral Commanding, 3rd Cruiser Squadron*
reported that SOUTHAMPTON, BONAVENTURE, JAGUAR and HEREWARD were engaging.

The gun flashes at the commencement of this action were seen from WARSPITE, and
Force A continued westward to close the scene of the action, passing close to the southward of Convoy " Excess " at 0800. By this time,. BONAVENTURE and HEREWARD were in sight against Pantellaria, still firing heavily at close range into the crippled and burning Italian. SOUTHAMPTON and JAGUAR were rejoining the convoy.

At 0810 one enemy destroyer blew up, having been torpedoed by HEREWARD, the second having escaped to the north-west at high speed. The destroyer sunk is believed to have
been the VEGA.

In the meantime a rendezvous had been, made with Convoy " Excess " in position 36°
28' N., 12° n' E. A fighter patrol of 6 and an air search in sector 280°-310° was flown
off at' 0815, and the mean line of advance altered to 140° at 0820 in the wake of the
convoy.

At 0834 when in position 36° 27' N. 12° n' E , GALLANT was torpedoed or mined, her bows being blown off. She was taken in tow by MOHAWK, and BONAVENTURE and GRIFFIN were detached to stand by her, HEREWARD and JAGUAR joining the fleet screen. GLOUCESTER and SOUTHAMPTON were also detached to stand by GALLANT at 1000, the fleet remaining close to the convoy for the remainder of the forenoon

One of the A/Sf patrol aircraft sighted a Spica class destroyer about 5 miles from Pantellaria and attacked with A/S bombs, reporting a near miss. Two enemy aircraft unsuccessfully attacked BONAVENTURE with torpedoes.

27. The movements of "Malta convoys were as follows: —
M.W.5 arrived Malta at 0800.
M.E.6 escorted by PEONY, SALVIA and,
HYACINTH, sailed at 0700.
M.E.sfc escorted by DIAMOND, sailed at 1130 to join Convoy " Excess ".
JANUS left Malta at 1200 and joined the fleet screen, and CALCUTTA joined M.E.6.

In the meantime the fleet had been located by enemy aircraft at 0930 and reported
at 1015, and at 1127 a shadower was shot down over Linosa Island by Fulmars. At 1223, two SM.79s dropped two torpedoes which missed astern of VALIANT. These aircraft were
engaged in good time by the close range weapons of the battlefleet, without effect.
29. At 1235 large formations of aircraft were sighted approaching from the north. These
•were identified as JU.Sy and 88 aircraft with German markings A very heavy, determined and skilful dve bombing attack developed on the fleet,
directed on ILLUSTRIOUS, and the Convoy .....

Anyone with any experience at sea will identify what was happening. All through the morning, the fleet was presented with multiple threats that had the effect of distracting and dispersing the Task Force. Most of the ships of the Task Force were completely out of position at the time of the attack. The two battleships had been tasked, as their primary mission, the defence of the convoy, but in any event came under attack themselves. They were not in a good position to provide defensive cover to the carrier. The carrier was well equipped with AA weaponary, but that weaponary has known deficiencies in its targetting and fire control mechanisms. one ships AA versus 45 aircraft is not a heavy AA defence. Maybe 50 ships could be so considered, but not one ship. The defensive CAP was completely out of position at the time of the attack, hence the low number of kills. as Cunningham notes elsewhere in his repoprt, the perfoiarmance of the AA was disappointing.

Despite what the Luftwaffe ra ra squad here would have you believe, this was not a case of the very best of the RN concentrating all its efforts to defeat a detrermined and formidable opponent. its a case of a force distracted from its main purpose by multiple threats and events, caught off guard, but somehow managing to survive. The carrier was not manouvering at speed, it was travelling at a leisuerly 17 knots and steaming straight to either launch or recover aircraft a big part of that recipe for survival was the relative innaccuracy of the bombers, despite their obvious skill. they just could not hit the carrier with enough force to kill her, not because she was hurting them, or causing them much grief by her return fire, but simply because they could not hit her. Some of this was because she was moving, some of this was because she was firing AA, but mostly its because the bombers were simply too innaccurate to hit her....and that tells volumes about comparing aircraft with a bombsight being any or significantly, more accurate than aircraft without a bombsight.

What these guys are trying to feed you is , to put it bluntly, a load of bull
 
In its first mode I guess BT-2 was a bit inferior to TSA-2D. If input of altitude data was for BT-2 manual for TSA-2D it was automatic from radioaltimeter FuG-101 as far as remember.

TSA-2D could use barometric altitude or optionally FuG 101a radar altimeter. When the pullup light flashed the barometric chamber was locked off (sealed) and the accelerometer took over tracking of altitude. Obviously if one was using barometric altititude one needed to enter an offset for topgraphical altitude of the target, however it could not be jamed or interfered with and was quite accurate anyway.

There was a less refined TSA-2A but the Luftwaffe wanted to go to the TSA-2D straight away.
 
So, if you think that computing bombsights would make a difference to bombing accuracy, why is it that this attack on the RN is considered the most accurate, and most efficient ever achieved by the LW on a moving seaborn target, except for PQ17???? Your failing to answer that


1 the most succesfull portion of the attack was the first attack when the bulk of the attacking bombers were Ju 87.

2 Ju 87 do not need computing bombsights as their vertical dive capabillity means little to no compution is required for accuracy.

3 Ju 88's would benefit from a computing bombsight due to their preference for a 45 degree dive (60 max). The Ju 88's were the bulk of the second and 3rd attacks. Ju 88's are very accurate at this angle nevetheless. However its clear that the German attackers were under heavy fire. They lost 10 aircraft; that's heavy fire assuming this is not allied over claiming and that it marries up with Luftwaffe losses. (claims are usually inflated 50% to 100% both sides.

So on the second attack when a higher proportion of the attackers were Ju 88s and the RN defences better organised one would expect poorer results. Something has to explain the decline in efficiency.

4 76 bombers can not all attack at once and saturate, they would collide.

5 The 40mm PomPom had less range than the 20mm FLAK vierling used on German ships, however there were two versions, one with higher velocity, that would have been on Ark Royal, still inferior to the 20mm but with a large and deadly round, big maganzines, long sustained fire and good director, it was effective to 1.5km.

4.5 inch guns are not the primary defence. Kamikazee were stopped 20% by 5 inch, 40% by 40mm boffors and 40% by 20mm Oerlikon.

Illustrious was also moving at 25 knots when Stukas achieved a 9% direct hit rate and then latter 17 knots and she was defended. I can't see that this can be compared to a bridge.

The reason she was not sunk is because 250kg bombs are inadaquet and 500kg also. One needs 1000kg bombs (which needs a Ju 88 or late model Ju 87) or one needs torpedoes.

Had she been attacked by FW 190F with 1000kg bombs and a TSA-2D the results for Illustrrious would have been worse: the fast moving fighter bombers hard to hit, their toss bombing sights providing some standoff capabillity and range.
 
Last edited:
Part I

the most succesfull portion of the attack was the first attack when the bulk of the attacking bombers were Ju 87.

I agree, and i also concede that Illustrious was attacked in the successive attacks by far less numberes in mass from 3pm, though overall the numbers appear greater. What complicates the issue greatly is that in the follow up strikes, the LW were not just going after the Illustrious, they were going after most of the ships in the convoy and the escort as well, which is why Southampton was lost. What is baffling about the first strike is that the majority of hits were obtained by Ju88s, 5 out of the 7 hits/near misses were 1000lb bombs, which could only come from the Ju88s

Ju 87 do not need computing bombsights as their vertical dive capabillity means little to no compution is required for accuracy.

I know, and thats one of the points being made. The steeper the angle, the more accurate the attack. However the flaw here is that in the first attack, undertaken by 25 Ju87s and 17 Ju88s, 5 of the 6 hits were made by the Ju88s, with 1000 pounders

3 Ju 88's would benefit from a computing bombsight due to their preference for a 45 degree dive (60 max)
.

And yet history shows us that, in the main despite the introduction of all these U-beaut gizmos, they never succeeded in achiving quite the accuracy level that they did on that day, when you say they were not fitted with advanced bomb sights. what they did have was a weak defence, exceptionally good weather, a very good attack plan, and air crews that were exceptional at their job. oh, and a lot of help from their allies.

There are a number of conclusions that may logically explain this. On the British side, they perhaps were never caught in such a complacent and disadavataged defensive position, For the germans, it might be that falling aircrew standards had something to do with it. There are other possibilities, but one thing we can say for sure is that the bombing aids you put so much faith in could not compensate for these other disadvantages. This has to mean that as an element of the battle they simply were not that great an advantage. the very thing you are attempting to "prove" is in fact disproven by events. The Germans, with one or two very lucky exceptions never got close to this level of efficiency ever again.



The Ju 88's were the bulk of the second and 3rd attacks. Ju 88's are very accurate at this angle nevetheless. However its clear that the German attackers were under heavy fire. They lost 10 aircraft; that's heavy fire assuming this is not allied over claiming and that it marries up with Luftwaffe losses. (claims are usually inflated 50% to 100% both sides.

Firstly, lets have a closer look at the second attack. I freely admit my recollections about numbers were completely off the mark, but this is about getting the facts right, rather than making up a convenient story or relying on dodgy source material

No Ju88s were not in the majority in the attacks after 3pm, they werent even present according to Cunningham. FKX at this time consisted of 50 He111s, 80 Ju87s, 70 Ju88s and 26 Me110s (remember your comment about "where were the me109s.....there werent any). The source for this is Polmar. In the subsequent attacks after 3pm, Cunningham again gives good details on the way the attacks and fleet movements developed. Relevantly he advises on the escort provided to the carrier....remember, even at this stage the carrier was NOT the focus of british concerns....getting the convoy to Malta was still the prime objective, and this was reflected in Cunnighams dispositions:

"ILLUSTRIOUS reported that she was " badly hit " and making for Malta; but it was not until 1530 that she was got under control and steering steadily for Malta at 17 knots. In the meantime she was turning circles while the battlefleet was manoeuvred to maintain supporting distance from her. HASTY and JAGUAR were detached to screen her".

If you read this carefully, this means the Carrier was provided with the two Battledhips and two destroyers as a screen. I can assure you that is not a heavy AA screen, as Cunningham advises in his report. I dont know where you get the notion that the second attack was met by "heavy AA" but according to contemporary British accounts this was not the case. Cunnighams report is backed up by Polmars account of the battle as well accounts

Cunninghams official report goes on to give further details of the 2nd attack on Illustrious:

"Between' 1600 and 1700, a second attack, developed on ILLUSTRIOUS and the battlefleet, by about 20 JU87 aircraft. ILLUSTRIOUS's Fulmars, who had been refuelled at Malta, were, able to intervene and shot down 6 or 7 JU.87S,damaging others. The attack on the battlefleet was mostly concentrated on VALIANT who had one killed and two wounded from splinters".

to be fair, I should say that some reports say this second attack saw another 1000 lb bomb hit the carrier. if so, the attackers were indeed Ju88s, but then thjis seems unlikely to me. The bomb penetrated the hanger deck and then exploded. One would have expected an AP fuse, in which case the bomb would have penetrated both levels of armour and sunk the ship. It didnt, which means either the bomb was SAP and/or it was lighter than 1000lbs

I could not find a reference as to how many a/c were shot down by AA fire in Cunninghams report, but according to Polmar a total of 6 Axis aircraft were lost to all causes (flak and fighters). I thnk Cunnigham made an eror here by attributing all the German losses to the fighters. I think his number is the total lost as well. If assume conservatively that the Fulmars shot down 3 a/c, that means the flak on this occasion shoy down 3. thats more effective than the midday effort (by one a/c) , but its still not a heavy loss rate on the LW. And still, claiming the
flak over Illustrious was "heavy" is not supported by any reputable facts. Its a fantasy.

Again, it would be wrong to assume all effort was devoted to defending the Illustrious. once again the Stukas split up and attacked all the heavy ships, suppressing all the defensive fire over the carrier, as stated in Cunninghams report, and backed up by both Polmar and Barnett.

Now, lets have a look at the third attack to see if your claims do any better there....

The next attack of any description by the LW did not occur until the 11th, and did not even target the Carrier. the target was Cruiser Squadron 3, which had left the damaged Gallant outside Malta, and was heading north to cover the Convoy. According to Cunningham: "At 1500, C.S 3,* who had left GALLANT off Malta reported that SOUTHAMPTON and GLOUCESTER had been attacked in position 34° 54' N., 18° 24' E. by 12 JU87 dive bombers who achieved a surprise attack down sun, and both ships had been hit SOUTHAMPTON was making good a course of 105° at 22 knots. At 1605, C.S.3 reported that SOUTHAMPTON was stopped in position 34° 54' N., 18° 24' E"

SOUTHAMPTON was eventually scuttled, no evidence of either heavy flak or any Ju88 presence there either.....

Cunninghams report for Sunday 12 January provides the folowing important entry

Sunday, I2th January, 1941. 44. The Commander-in-Chief's position at 0001 was 35° 05' N., 20° 40' ^E., and at
0800 all forces, including Force X, made a rendezvous in position 34° 40' N. 23° 10' E.

The Commander-in-Chief m WARSPITE, with VALIANT, GLOUCESTER, JERVIS, JANUS, GREYHOUND, DIAMOND
VOYAGER, HERO and DEFENDER, proceeded to Alexandria. Vice-Admiral, Light Forces, 7'th Cruiser Squadron, YORK, MOHAWK, GRIFFIN and Force X then all proceeded to Suda Bay to refuel. The entire fleet, less the Ilustrious cleared out before any 3rd attack on the carrier developed.......mmmm

At no stage in Illustrious's advance to malta can her flak protection be described as heavy
 
Last edited:
Part II If your third attack claim relates to things that happened whilst Illustrious was being repared in Malta, thats a different story, we would have to look at the amount of flak being provided around the harbour whilst the ship was being made ready for sea. Whilst the level of flak could be described as heavy here, the ship was stationary, here and protected by less than 10 fighters...against escorted raids with 70 bombers r more I did find these bits in Polmar.... "The bombers from Fligerkorps X were escorted by Messerschitt, Fiat Macchi fighters. The RAF managed to send up 4 Hurricanes, 3 Fulmars 2 Gladiators. These were instructed to stay out of the harbour area pick off stragglers. The attack comprised of 2 seperate attacks - the first by Ju 88's (shallow dive bombers) the second by Ju 87 (Stuka's). This force amounted to 70 bombers all concentrating on sinking Illustrious.
The harbour guns opened up to a deafening noise described as 'hell let loose'. The ships in harbour including Illustrious fired their guns also.

Despite the bravery of the German airmen only one bomb hit Illustrious this being on the quarterdeck caused little damage.

Despite the RAF pilots being told not to enter the harbour area a Fulmar chased a Stuka right through the barrage. After the bomber released his bombs he swept off down the harbour so low to the water he had to climb to get over the 15' breakwater. The Fulmar eventually shot it down. This returned to Hal Far where the pilot remarked - 'Don't think much of Malta's bloody barrage'. The plane however was so badly damaged it didn't fly again apparently.

During this attack the merchantman Essex which was lying at the other end of the creek was hit by a heavy bomb in the engine room with the loss of 38 men. Luckily the bulkheads contained the explosion. She was loaded with 4,000 tons of ammunition torpedoes.

On the 19th January came the last bombing raid which raised up clouds of dust to 1,000 feet. This probably screened the ship was accurate bombing.


For the moment i will leave off on that issue, but as far as any attacks "third" attacks on the Illustrious between 10 and 12 January, there were none".

If you wanted to include the raids within the harbour as well as those made at sea on the 10th and 11th, you get a total of 8 hits for 200 sorties, or a 4% success rate overall. Not bad, but again brings the p-47 incidents reported by Davebender sharply into perspective. Remember these were the best days for the Luftwaffe.

[
I]So on the second attack when a higher proportion of the attackers were Ju 88s and the RN defences better organised one would expect poorer results. Something has to explain the decline in efficiency.[/I]

As indicated above, it is unlikely ther were no Ju88s present in the second attack, or if there were, a maximum of 12. For the third attack (the ones in the harbour the numbers of Ju87s and Ju88s were about equal by the look of it, though if you have better source material, please do provide those sources. Flak for the two attacks against the Illustrious carried out at sea was always light. The engagement of 45 Ju87 sorties and 17 Ju88 sorties for the two strikes achieved a total of 5 bomb hits for the Ju88s and 2 bomb hits by Ju87s. Thats a hit to sortie rate of about 2% for the Ju87s and about 30% for the Ju88s. So much for the Ju88s being less accurate.....

There wasnt a decline in efficiency, there were far less numbers of aircraft involved in the second attacks. In the third attack on the cruisers, there was total surprise which tends to skew the statistics. In the attacks carried out in the harbour, there was a lot more flak, but the target was stationary, and still very large

76 bombers can not all attack at once and saturate, they would collide.

Huh???? whats this got to do with anything??? Oh, I get it, your claiming that the 70 bombers attacking the carrier in harbour could not attack all at once. no they couldnt, thats true, but the attacksd by 45 aircraft on the 10th was allover in 6 minutes. thats near enough to simulataneous in my book For the record more than 76 aircraft can attack a single target, but as this has absolutely nothing to do with what we are talking about,i'll let this one slide

The 40mm PomPom had less range than the 20mm FLAK vierling used on German ships, however there were two versions, one with higher velocity, that would have been on Ark Royal, still inferior to the 20mm but with a large and deadly round, big maganzines, long sustained fire and good director, it was effective to 1.5km.

According to Campbell, the Ark Royal was equipped with the 2pdrr QF Mark VIII. it had a max horizontal range of 6200m and a max vertical range of 3960m. the 20mm Flak vierling may be just about any gun of that calibre. I will stick with those guns used by the KM. There were two principal types used afloat by the germans, the 2cm Flak 38, and the older 2cm Flak 30. The flak 38 was the more common, and had a max horizontal range of 5250m and a max ceiling of 3900m. How is that superior to the pom pom???? However there is a big difference between max and effective ranges. Because the KM guns used open sights the effective range for most 20mm guns in the KM was about 1000m

The PomPom was similalry restrained, at least in 1941. its big drawbacks were the weight of the mountings and the relatively low MV of the gun, not so much the range. Typically its effective range was perhaps slightly more than the 20mm guns, but certainly no more than about 12-1500m


4.5 inch guns are not the primary defence. Kamikazee were stopped 20% by 5 inch, 40% by 40mm boffors and 40% by 20mm Oerlikon
.

Not really relevant to this discussion but would love to know the source for this. suffice it to say I dont agree with the proportions.

Illustrious was also moving at 25 knots when Stukas achieved a 9% direct hit rate and then latter 17 knots and she was defended. I can't see that this can be compared to a bridge.


She was recovering aircraft, which required her to steam at a set speed and course. Made her speed advantage far less important. Moreover, the illustrious was as big as a football field in terms of deck area, wheras a bridge might be one or two car lengths long, and one or two car lengths wide (a bigger bridge would have been hit by medium or heavy bombers). The target size more than compensates the fact that the carrier was moving (in a dead straight line). During the attack in harbour, which you insist on bringing into the discussion, the Carrier was far better protected by flak, rather less well protected by aircraft, and stationary. Being underway is an advantage, but apparently not as great an advantage as you are claiming, particulalry agsint divebombing


The reason she was not sunk is because 250kg bombs are inadaquet and 500kg also. One needs 1000kg bombs (which needs a Ju 88 or late model Ju 87) or one needs torpedoes
.

Err wrong again. According to Polmar, there were 6 hits and one near miss (which actually passed through the pom pom platform. Of the actual hits that were made, one was a 500lb bomb with a contact fuse, the rest were all 1000 lb bombs, which had to be carried by the Ju88s as you say.

I dont know where you get the notion that a 1000kg (ie 2200lb) bomb was needed to to sink the Illustrious. The ship was armoured to withstand 6" gunfire, and bombs of up to 500lbs weight. She could not withstand 1000lb (400kg or above bombs, and this is borne out by the damage she sustained.

The 500lber destroyed both forward pom pom crews (reducing AA defences incidentally. Of the 1000 lbers one hit and wrecked the after lift, and started a massive fire in the hangar). shrapnel from this bomb wrecked three of the 4.5 inch guns and temporarily knocked out the remainder for several hours.

Another 1000lber penetrated the upper armoured deck but because it had an SAP fuse then exploded in the hangar. it did not penetrate the lower armoured deck simply because of the fuse it was carrying. One bomb penetrated both armoured decks, and would have sunk her but failed to explode. Not sure about the damage caused by the other bombs, but i can assure you 1000lbers can easily sink the Illustrious.

[
I]Had she been attacked by FW 190F with 1000kg bombs and a TSA-2D the results for Illustrrious would have been worse: the fast moving fighter bombers hard to hit, their toss bombing sights providing some standoff capabillity and range[/I].

Funny thing about that, the illustrious class faced worse attacks by the kamikazes which failed to have any appreciable effect. We will never know if these wonder weapons you talk about would have made any difference. Personally i doubt it.
 
Perhaps its useful to compare the german effort against the illustrious to the RAF efforts at brest, from around about the same time. There were two raids in July 1941 that are perhaps comparable. On the night of 1/2 July 1941 52 Wellingtons attacked the Prinz Eugen whilst she lay moored in brest along with 5 Destroyers and the two battleships. Brest was at least as heavily defended by flak as Malta IMO. Two aircraft were lost to that flak, but scored a hit on the ship.

Within the month, the RAF was back, this time in daylight and using the new Halifax bombers. 93 aircraft participated in the attack. Again there were two losses to flak, but this time there were 5 hits on the Scharnhorst.

So wheras it took 200 German bomber misions to achieve 8 hits on the Illustrious, it took the RAF 140 missions to hit German warships 6 times. For the germans they achieved a hit to sorties rate of 0.25%, whilst the brits achieved a hit to mission ratio of just under 0.2. . The P-47 raids was somewhere between 0.1 and 0.2%, which is not that unfavourable compared to those achieved by the germans or the RAF true bombers...

i dont see anything wrong or outrageous with the performance of the P-47s to be honest. if I was to hazard a gues as to why they were a fraction less accurate, it might be because of weather, the difficulty of the target or even the speed of the aircraft. It might be the lack of bombsghts also for that matter, though the difference in accuracy arent enough to worry about.
 
Hajo Hermann ,in his book' EAGLE s WINGS' , describes some of these mediterennean naval attacks. He reports how british battleships held course even with Ju 88s in their dives and only sharply changing direction as bombs were released. And it was a succesful tactic.. Nomatter the reason , the failure to sink Illustius ,Formidable, and cripple ( very dificult to sink battleships just with bombs) the Battleships Valiant , Warspite and Queen Elizabeth was a MAJOR FAILURE of the luftwaffe with no excuses.. It was a tactical defeat with great effects in the entire campaign.
 
A moored ship isn't moving so it's comparable to attacking a large bridge.

Do we have historical accounts of Allied light bombers attacking moored ships? Attacks by RAF Bomber Command heavy bombers belong in a seperate discussion.
 
Perhaps its useful to compare the german effort against the illustrious to the RAF efforts at brest,

I can't see it as particularly usefull within the context as you are comparing medium altitude level bomber attacks using level bombing sights and large strings of bombs against dry docked ships with dive bomber attacks against ships at speed and out to sea fully defended and at the ready. Brest was in fact regarded as difficult to defend, it was too open to the sea and so gave limited opportunites to mount a defense and had limited FLAK which is one reason the Germans moved their ships from the area. It was a level bomber attack against a dry docked ships using armour piercing bombs dropped from sufficient height to penetrate rather than semi-armour piercing bombs dropped from low level against a manouvering ship. Halifaxes and Wellingtons would have been nearly relatively ineffective against manouvering ships. The height of these attacks also precludes use of smaller more effective light FLAK. HMS Illustrious's danger, given her proximity to port, was limited so long as she remained mobile; it takes torpedos to sink a ship of that size, 250kg SC250 can generally disable it unless they get hits on the waterline or underneath the ship (by delay fuse), which toss bombing sights would in fact do but dive bombers generally don't. Of course while Gneisau was hit by a string of bombs Scharnhorst escaped hits.

By attacking the side of the ship from a shallow, high speed, dive (eg as was done by against HMS Fiji) the bomb can either acheive a direct hit on the waterline, the superstructure or hit ahead of the waterline in which case a time dealy fuse (5 seconds is good) ensures the bomb sinks to about 10 meters under the ship and detonates, likely breaking a destroyer or merchanman in half or severely damaging a larger ship.

In fact a special series of highly connical bomb topedoes was developed to maximise the tunnelling effect: the so called BT series (BT 250, BT400, BT1000) which tunneled through the water and detonated by magnetic influence and or pressure.
 
Last edited:
Part I

......you are comparing medium altitude level bomber attacks using level bombing sights and large strings of bombs against dry docked ships with dive bomber attacks against ships at speed and out to sea fully defended and at the ready. Brest was in fact regarded as difficult to defend, it was too open to the sea and so gave limited opportunites to mount a defense and had limited FLAK which is one reason the Germans moved their ships from the area.

You forgot to mention that according to your estimations German flak was not as good as Allied flak and was manned by untrained personnel. These are all assertions I completely disagree with in the context of 1941, and am supported by Westermann to that extent. Also Scharnhorst and the 5 destroyers were not in drydock, they had just returned that very day from shakedown exercises just outside port. They were not ready for major operations, according to German standards, but they were operational. After major refits, the germans liked to work up their crews for about 3 months or so before committing them to operation. Of course this does not accord to your theories of German trainng levls I know.

However as level bombers, one part of which were operating at night, one would expect the British losses to be lower than the losses to divebombers. I see that you are still perservering with the notion that Illustrious was heavily defended at sea despite all the witness accounts and reports that I have presented to you that says completely the opposite for Illustrious whilst she was at sea. Some people never listen, and never learn do they. You also make the claim that the ships were in drydock, when most of them werent. Im not sure about Gneisenau, but she had not suffered any significant damage to that point, so there is no reason for her to be in drydock. Prinz Eugen had been placed in refit when she first arrived at Brest in early June, but as far as I know that did not require drydock. She had last been in drydock just before departing on the ill fated Rheinabung mission, less than a month before. She was a brand new ship, fully worked up and ready for action. As I understand it a full flak regiment was in attendance at the port, and my understanding is that about 30 fighters were available sas well (I am less sure about that, but neither is it significant).

In any event, Illustrious oin her arrival at malta WAS put into dry dock, but because she was in a combat zone, her AA guns remained manned and functional for the entire stay at malta. The Germans operated to the same procedures, so their shipboard and port defences can be expected to have been contributing to the defence during these raids.

If you were in any way correct in these asserions, one could reasonably expect the RAF bomber losses to be lower. These were level bombers, operating at about 14000 ft, some of them at night. The flak defences according to you were of lower quality more difficult to deploy and the ship borne defences unable to fire. If those assertions were correct it should be the case that British losses should be lower. they werent. In the raid on the night of 1/2 July those 52 Wellingtons lost 2 bombers to flak....a loss rate of 4%. In the raid by FKX against Illustrious at 1230 10 jan 41, the Germans lost 2 a/c to flak, a loss rate very nearly the same. In the raid between 1600 and 1700 on that same day, a force of 20 Ju87s suffered a loss to flak of 3 a/c, or about 15%. This was against two battleships, a damaged carrier and two destroyers. In the raid over Malta 12 Jan 41, the germans committed 70 bombers to the attack and lost 4-5 to flak....a loss rate of about 7.5%. The British raid on the scharnhorst at her La Pallice Berth was carried out by 93 Halifax bombers. 6 were shot down by flak. thats a loss rate of about 6.5%. Thats a rmarkably similar loss rate to that suffered by the germans in their lower level raids against the ilustrious.

I would suggest to you that your information about what happened at brest is wrong, as is your assumptions about what happened at Brest. Flak at Brest was always described by the RAF crews tasked to attack it as heavy.


It was a level bomber attack against a dry docked ships using armour piercing bombs dropped from sufficient height to penetrate rather than semi-armour piercing bombs dropped from low level against a manouvering ship. Halifaxes and Wellingtons would have been nearly relatively ineffective against manouvering ships
.

There is no argument that level bomber oprating against manouvering ships are less effective, however it is another one of those post war myths that they were totally inneffective. In March of 1941, for exaample, the British Coastal Command sank something like 50000 tons of Axis Shipping on the Atlantic Seaboard, out of Malta, Wellingtons were sinking large amount of shipping using conventional bombing techniques. Whilst these merchantmen and warships were moving more slowly than the illustrious, they were also more free to manouvre. This made the task of hitting almost as hard as hitting the carrier in my opinion. But they did it regulalry.

What was inneffective was high altitude level bombing aaginst a moving target, as Germany, Britain and Italy all found out at the beginning of the war. High level generally means dropping bombs from higher than 10000 ft. The stukas attacking dropped their bombs on Illustrious from about 5000 feet, if level bombers had operated at a similar height,, the bombs would have reached terminal velocity well before impact, and there would be a reasonable chance of hits from that altitude as well.

Despite this, the bomb hits achieved by Divebombers in Malta Harbour (1 hit in 70) against a stationary target does not compare well with the RAF effort against similar target, operating at a higher altitude using a known less accurate method of attack. Losses were similar, suggesting a similar amount of flak. So why were the British more accurate in their bombing??? The difference expressed as a percentage of the total bombs dropped is not that great, suggesting the statisitcal sample is not significant enough, but at this stage I cannot explain the anomaly
 
Part II

The height of these attacks also precludes use of smaller more effective light FLAK. HMS Illustrious's danger, given her proximity to port, was limited so long as she remained mobile; it takes torpedos to sink a ship of that size, 250kg SC250 can generally disable it unless they get hits on the waterline or underneath the ship (by delay fuse), which toss bombing sights would in fact do but dive bombers generally don't. Of course while Gneisau was hit by a string of bombs Scharnhorst escaped hits

Illustrious' armouring scheme was designed to withstand up to 500 lb hits, so in theory the best the Ju87s could hope for was to disable her. However, this was the argument that underpinned the Bismarcks deployment....she was immune to the 18in torpedoes carried by Swordfish, and could resist the 14in shells of the KGVs. This was because the armour protection scheme was designed to withstand that ordinance or below. Even the 16 in shells of the Nelson were very hard pressed to penetrate her. She still was forced to either sink, or scuttle. The 18 in tops could not penetrate her main belt, but still disabled her. The shellfire from the KGV, even the cruisers firing at her, disabled her main guns within 30 mins of the final enagements commencing. There is no such thing as an immune defensive system.

Moreover (but conversely), the majority of hits on the Illustrious were 1000 lbers. These should have sunk her, but by sheer good luck did not.

You can argue all you like about the advantage of toss bomb sites, but what we really need is hard evidence of that advantage. The facts are, there is none. Germans never achieved as good a result as they did on the 10 Jan 1941. It was the zenith of their bombing efficiency against a Brit carrier.


Arguing that Divebombers cannot sink ships by lobbing bombs on top of them is simply wrong. Suggest you have a look at the battles of Midway, Coral Sea amd Eastern Solomons to observe the effects of 500lb bombs on carriers. And arguing the Jap carriers were not as well protected is really a furphy too. Shokaku and the Akagi class were both as well or better protectefd in terms of armour protection as the illustrious. What was lacking was the intelligent design and the good damage control. Once through the japanese armoured deck, those ships were vulnerable, and because theu were not well managed in terms of damage control, they were even more vulnerable. illustrious's torpedo protection was never tested, but it was extensive. Because she was designed to a closed hanger, armoured box principal, I simly disagreee that she was vulnerable to the attack from the side, We wil never know, but there is no reason to suppose that her side protection would operate any worse.

I would point out that Ark Royal was sunk by a single torpedo, and very poor counterflooding. There was a design fault in the Ark Royal that contributed to her loss (can dig it out if you are interested, but this had been rectified in the illustrious class. I d not see a 250 kg bomb having any greater chance of sinking her than a horizontal attack. Just remember as well, the vertical protection was designed to withstand totpedoes up to 18in which from memory have an explosive warhead of about 550-600lbs. One should be careful to say "never " about this sort of thing, but then one should be equally careful to say "a sure kill". Too many variables


One minor point of correction. Gneisenau was not targetted or damaged in the attack late July. It was the Scharnhorst that was hit. She was hit by 5 1000lbers, in a near straight line, suggesting she was hit by a single stick of bombs dropped by one aircraft

By attacking the side of the ship from a shallow, high speed, dive (eg as was done by against HMS Fiji) the bomb can either acheive a direct hit on the waterline, the superstructure or hit ahead of the waterline in which case a time dealy fuse (5 seconds is good) ensures the bomb sinks to about 10 meters under the ship and detonates, likely breaking a destroyer or merchanman in half or severely damaging a larger ship.

The loss of fiji occurred at the same time as Gloucester, a near sister sunk by conventional attacks. Four months previously, another half sister, the HMS Southampton had also bee sonk by conventional "vertical" bombing. There is no evidence here that confirms a horizontal attack was any more deadly to this class of ships than conventional attack methods. Moreover, such attacks carried with them a real problem. In order to be carried out the aircraft had to get close, extremely close, and the pnly reason the 109 that attacked Fiji could do that was because Fiji at the time of her attack was extremely low in ammunition and did not think that a fighter was a particular threat. The RN after that certainly changed its attitude after that....So for this method to work, the attacks had to be delivered at ranges of about 500yds or less, compared to 2000 yards for a torpedo, or about the same for a divebomber. That means that most of the time these attacks are going to end in failure.


In fact a special series of highly connical bomb topedoes was developed to maximise the tunnelling effect: the so called BT series (BT 250, BT400, BT1000) which tunneled through the water and detonated by magnetic influence and or pressure
.

Genuinely very intersting, but not relevant, and no evidence of use i expect.
 
Part I

1 What is baffling about the first strike is that the majority of hits were obtained by Ju88s, 5 out of the 7 hits/near misses were 1000lb bombs, which could only come from the Ju88s

I know, and thats one of the points being made. The steeper the angle, the more accurate the attack. However the flaw here is that in the first attack, undertaken by 25 Ju87s and 17 Ju88s, 5 of the 6 hits were made by the Ju88s, with 1000 pounders

. SNIP

2 And yet history shows us that, in the main despite the introduction of all these U-beaut gizmos, they never succeeded in achiving quite the accuracy level that they did on that day, when you say they were not fitted with advanced bomb sights. what they did have was a weak defence, exceptionally good weather, a very good attack plan, and air crews that were exceptional at their job. oh, and a lot of help from their allies.

SNIP

3 There are a number of conclusions that may logically explain this. On the British side, they perhaps were never caught in such a complacent and disadavataged defensive position, For the germans, it might be that falling aircrew standards had something to do with it. SNIP

Firstly, lets have a closer look at the second attack. I freely admit my recollections about numbers were completely off the mark, but this is about getting the facts right, rather than making up a convenient story or relying on dodgy source material
SNIP

4 "ILLUSTRIOUS reported that she was " badly hit " and making for Malta; but it was not until 1530 that she was got under control and steering steadily for Malta at 17 knots. In the meantime she was turning circles while the battlefleet was manoeuvred to maintain supporting distance from her. HASTY and JAGUAR were detached to screen her".

If you read this carefully, this means the Carrier was provided with the two Battleships and two destroyers as a screen. I can assure you that is not a heavy AA screen, as Cunningham advises in his report. Cunninghams official report goes on to give further details of the 2nd attack on Illustrious:

"Between' 1600 and 1700, a second attack, developed on ILLUSTRIOUS and the battlefleet, by about 20 JU87 aircraft. ILLUSTRIOUS's Fulmars, who had been refuelled at Malta, were, able to intervene and shot down 6 or 7 JU.87S,damaging others. The attack on the battlefleet was mostly concentrated on VALIANT who had one killed and two wounded from splinters".
SNIP

to be fair, I should say that some reports say this second attack saw another 1000 lb bomb hit the carrier. if so, the attackers were indeed Ju88s, but then thjis seems unlikely to me. The bomb penetrated the hanger deck and then exploded. One would have expected an AP fuse, in which case the bomb would have penetrated both levels of armour and sunk the ship. It didnt, which means either the bomb was SAP and/or it was lighter than 1000lbs
SNIP
I could not find a reference as to how many a/c were shot down by AA fire in Cunninghams report, but according to Polmar a total of 6 Axis aircraft were lost to all causes (flak and fighters). I thnk Cunnigham made an eror here by attributing all the German losses to the fighters. I think his number is the total lost as well. If assume conservatively that the Fulmars shot down 3 a/c, that means the flak on this occasion shoy down 3. thats more effective than the midday effort (by one a/c) , but its still not a heavy loss rate on the LW. And still, claiming the flak over Illustrious was "heavy" is not supported by any reputable facts. Its a fantasy.
SNIP

Again, it would be wrong to assume all effort was devoted to defending the Illustrious. once again the Stukas split up and attacked all the heavy ships, suppressing all the defensive fire over the carrier, as stated in Cunninghams report, and backed up by both Polmar and Barnett.
SNIP

Now, lets have a look at the third attack to see if your claims do any better there....

At no stage in Illustrious's advance to malta can her flak protection be described as heavy
SNIP
According to Campbell, the Ark Royal was equipped with the 2pdrr QF Mark VIII. it had a max horizontal range of 6200m and a max vertical range of 3960m. the 20mm Flak vierling may be just about any gun of that calibre. I will stick with those guns used by the KM. There were two principal types used afloat by the germans, the 2cm Flak 38, and the older 2cm Flak 30. The flak 38 was the more common, and had a max horizontal range of 5250m and a max ceiling of 3900m. How is that superior to the pom pom???? However there is a big difference between max and effective ranges. Because the KM guns used open sights the effective range for most 20mm guns in the KM was about 1000m

1 It was possible for Ju 88's to carry 4 x SC500 bombs, I assume the Ju 88A5 that was likely used could do this as the Ju 88A4 was not yet available, this allows a slight spreading of the bombs to increase hit rate.

2/3 The very degradation in bombing accuracy you claim, which I would argue, was likely caused by the kind of gizmos you somewhat dismiss on the other side; improved fire control on ships emanating from better computers, more and better sensors such a radars, rate gyros, stablised plaforms etc. Aircraft too needed to use more advanced systems to improve their accuracy, especially at range. By the time the Luftwaffe had these the air-power situation had turned against the Luftwaffe.

1942 should have seen a large number of Me 210 or Me 410 aircraft taken into service. An aircraft capable of delivering a pair of 500kg Armour piercing bombs in a dive brake supported dive attack and with a level speed of 368 or 386 mph repectively: at low altitudes probably as fast or faster than a Mosquito, Spitfire V or even Spitfire IX.

The Me 210/410 was designed by Professor Woldamer Vogt but Willy Messerschmitt personally intervened in the design process to shorten the tail and remove the slats to hopefully improve the performance, the two features which lead to nearly a 1 year delay to the program and a massive disruption of German manufacturing.

Had it been available in quantity and on time the Me 210/410 could have made a substantial difference. As it was it was late and abreviated in production leaving the Luftwaffe with far more vulnerable types.

4 NAVWEAPS gives the following
for the C/38 guns:

Muzzle Velocity
HEI:* 2,740 fps (835 mps)
API:* 2,625 fps (800 mps)

Elevation
With 0.300 lbs. (0.134 kg) HE Shell
Range @ 45 degrees
5,360 yards (4,900 m)
AA Ceiling @ 85 degrees
12,140 feet (3,700 m)

Wiki give and effective range of 2200 meters.

For the 2 pounder using its High Velocity ammunition:


Muzzle Velocity
LV:* 1,920 fps (585 mps)*
HV:* 2,300 fps (701 mps)
Others - N/A

Shell Type and Weight
Range
With LV shells 2.0 lbs. (0.91 kg)
3,800 yards (3,475 m)
With HV shells 1.81 lbs. (0.82 kg)
5,000 yards (4,572 m)
AA Ceiling with HV shells
13,300 ft. (3,960 m)
Note:* The British considered the 2-pdr HV to have a maximum effective range of 1,700 yards (1,550 m).


As you can see the 20mm C38 exceeds the pom pom in range by 8% but has less AA ceiling by 7.5% .

The C38 mount did have reflector sights available (early in the war) and leading computing (latter) it was also available on gyro stabilized mounts.

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101II-MN-0945-08, Schulboot "Drache", Doppelflak.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


Accuracy of the TSA 2D in the very early evaluation test was about 84m in a 30 degree approach from a range of 3000m (3.5km slant). This is good as it requires little pilot judgment apart from entering in head and tail winds. Obviously the less the better. Latter accuracy seems to have grown to about 45m at that range. This is a substantial standoff outside of the range of much AAA.

TSA 2D accuracy evaluation.
Trefferbild Me 262.jpg
 
Last edited:
1 It was possible for Ju 88's to carry 4 x SC500 bombs, I assume the Ju 88A5 that was likely used could do this as the Ju 88A4 was not yet available, this allows a slight spreading of the bombs to increase hit rate.

Thats true, but the normal warload in these situations was a single 1100 lb (sc500) bomb. The the A-5 could carry up to 2 x SC500 internally and another 3-4000 lbs externally, however range and performance were very badly affected if they did that. The raid on the illustrious was unescorted so the germans would be looking to maximise performance of their strike aircraft to offset that disadvantage. The most likley offensive loadouts for the Ju88s attacking would have been a single sc500. Second most likley might have been either 2 x sc500, or 1 x sc500 and 4 x sc250.

Somewhere in the vault i have details on the attack from an FKX perspective. i will look a boiut and see what the offensive arrangements were....

2/3 The very degradation in bombing accuracy you claim, which I would argue, was likely caused by the kind of gizmos you somewhat dismiss on the other side; improved fire control on ships emanating from better computers, more and better sensors such a radars, rate gyros, stablised plaforms etc. Aircraft too needed to use more advanced systems to improve their accuracy, especially at range. By the time the Luftwaffe had these the air-power situation had turned against the Luftwaffe.

Of course, technology makes a difference, but it does not occupy the critical position for bombing accuracy you guys are tryiing to claim, at least in a WWII context. Crew training and the weapons platform were impp9ortant, there were massive improvements in blind bombing aids. for ground defences the advnaces in computing, stabilized gunb platforms, ammunition, radar etc all added up to a major improvement in efficiency. All true, I have no argument with that. However, that is not what was being arguyed here. what was argued was that VISUAL aids were improved AND this made a big difference to bombing accuracy. I can agree that there wwere big advances in visual aids technology, and that this made some difference on bombing accuracy. However where I draw the line is that visual aids made a big difference. there is no evidence to support that especially in the field of study that I do know a thing or two about.

What was THE critical factor in accuracy was the crew training....how well your people knew how to do their jobs. My opinion is that the method of delivery (Divebombing, level bombing, skip bombing, trpedo bombing, makes a bit of difference, but not much. The training of ther crews makes a huge difference, whilst the gizmos make only a small difference.

You are singing the praises of the "toss bombing sights" yet the allies, in both the ETO and the PTO by the end of '42 and early '43 were usiing similar methods with their skip bombing terchniques. At Bismarck sea, approximately 200 attack aircraftover a two day perios, flying around 400 sorties sunk 22 Japanese merchant ships and from memory about 6 destroyers. They didnt have the benefit of specialist bombsights, what they did have was six months of training behind them


1942 should have seen a large number of Me 210 or Me 410 aircraft taken into service. An aircraft capable of delivering a pair of 500kg Armour piercing bombs in a dive brake supported dive attack and with a level speed of 368 or 386 mph repectively: at low altitudes probably as fast or faster than a Mosquito, Spitfire V or even Spitfire IX.

The Me 210/410 was designed by Professor Woldamer Vogt but Willy Messerschmitt personally intervened in the design process to shorten the tail and remove the slats to hopefully improve the performance, the two features which lead to nearly a 1 year delay to the program and a massive disruption of German manufacturing.

Had it been available in quantity and on time the Me 210/410 could have made a substantial difference. As it was it was late and abreviated in production leaving the Luftwaffe with far more vulnerable types.

This is entering into the realm of luftwaffe ra ra land. Its a case of coulda, shoulda but didnt. WWII is a story of lost opportunities for both sides. It would not have been 1942, incidentally, it would have been 1943, before a decent force of these aircraft could have been put together and trained for the purpose. Time enough for the RN and the RAF to develop effective countermeasures. Moreover these aircraft would not have been able to deliver their ordinance at anywhere near those speeds. A mosquito BIV carrying a full 2000lb warload had a top speed of 340mph and a cruise speed just over 300mph. No reason to believe that the performance of an Me 410 would be any less degraded when carrying its bombload.

Moreover, level bombing at the deck level carries with it a massive risk. in order to do it, the aircradt has to get in close, which in 1943 was a deadly proposition for any LW aircraft getting close to a defended TF. Real;istically the LW might ghet 20-30 of these aircraft concentrated at any one tome. They would face swarms of SAefires or Hellcats by that stage, easily able to run them down, and backing them up a wall of AA fire, which instead of the two minutes enagegement time they had against conventional bombers (and then oply with their 40mm calibres) they would get about 3 mins with everthing down to the captains signal pistol firing at them. Deck level bombing is really only effective when the AA is light....better proposition is a Mosquito fitted with a Molins gun and/or rockets





4 NAVWEAPS gives the following
for the C/38 guns:

Muzzle Velocity
HEI:* 2,740 fps (835 mps)
API:* 2,625 fps (800 mps)

Elevation
With 0.300 lbs. (0.134 kg) HE Shell
Range @ 45 degrees
5,360 yards (4,900 m)
AA Ceiling @ 85 degrees
12,140 feet (3,700 m)

Wiki give and effective range of 2200 meters.

For the 2 pounder using its High Velocity ammunition:


Muzzle Velocity
LV:* 1,920 fps (585 mps)*
HV:* 2,300 fps (701 mps)
Others - N/A

Shell Type and Weight
Range
With LV shells 2.0 lbs. (0.91 kg)
3,800 yards (3,475 m)
With HV shells 1.81 lbs. (0.82 kg)
5,000 yards (4,572 m)
AA Ceiling with HV shells
13,300 ft. (3,960 m)
Note:* The British considered the 2-pdr HV to have a maximum effective range of 1,700 yards (1,550 m).


As you can see the 20mm C38 exceeds the pom pom in range by 8% but has less AA ceiling by 7.5% .

No, what I can see are difference between the ranges given by Campbell and Navweapons. Both are good sources, both give different ranges. The ranges I wuoted are the ranges for the Mk VIII fitted to Ark Royal and the figures for the 2cm Flak 38 are for the types used afloat. You may find the Pom Pom subtype is not correct, or you may find that the subtype for the flak38 given in the Navweapons are not for types taken to sea. The term Flakvierling can refer to basically any 20mm gun, and does not necessarily refer to types taken to sea.

As to effective ranges, I'd really like to see anybody hit anything over open sights at 2200 m, especially when the target is moving at 300 knots. Having fired 40mm Bofors at that range, I can assure you about all you are doing is trying to scare your target. Any gun fired over open sites, with no predictor assistance, is flat out hitting anything beyond around 1000m

The C38 mount did have reflector sights available (early in the war) and leading computing (latter) it was also available on gyro stabilized mounts.

File:Bundesarchiv Bild 101II-MN-0945-08, Schulboot "Drache", Doppelflak.jpg - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As did the 40mm 2pdr. Which ships did either of these weapons go to sea in???????


Accuracy of the TSA 2D in the very early evaluation test was about 84m in a 30 degree approach from a range of 3000m (3.5km slant). This is good as it requires little pilot judgment apart from entering in head and tail winds. Obviously the less the better. Latter accuracy seems to have grown to about 45m at that range. This is a substantial standoff outside of the range of much AAA.


Are you claiming the germans could lanch iron bombs at 3000 m (9000 ft) and hit a target with a +/- 45m error???. If so that is better than a modern day Bullpup missile. You will forgive me if I say, bar!!! humbug!!! to the claiml
 
The 2200m for 20mm AAA is not realistic; the ex-Yu guns of 20mm have had effective range of 1500m, and that's with analog computer (import from Italy, made by Officine Galileo).
I myself was on the 30mm (Praga V3S), and if we were to score a 'hit' on the drogue traveling at 150m/s, we were to receive rewards. The drogue was flying at 500m in the closes point.
 
Are you claiming the germans could lanch iron bombs at 3000 m (9000 ft) and hit a target with a +/- 45m error???. If so that is better than a modern day Bullpup missile. You will forgive me if I say, bar!!! humbug!!! to the claiml

Parsifal, surely the data should be exemine additionally but I suppose you forgot that bombing was done form piston-engined aircraft approacing a target with less speed than a jet aircraft.

Anyway we should tale into account that the primer task for designing such sophisticated for WWII equimpent was not the inceasing the accuracy in comparison with for instance Ju-87 in steep dive.
a well trained (for several year) pilot of the Stuka may bomb it with no less rate of accuracy than in shallow dive with more modern sights on more speedy aircrafts. He was well trained to calculate mentally all the corrections (including drift and taking into account moving target's maneuver to some degree) and could produce it with a great skill.
The primer tasks were to allow less trained staff to achive a comparible rate of accuracy and to hit a target in less risky way - to increase pilots chances to survive while have a considerable chance to hit a target.
 
the Ju-88 can't load SC 500 internally, and sure they don't fly with a 1 SC 500 externally but with 2 (1 left and 1 right wing)
 
Parsifal, surely the data should be exemine additionally but I suppose you forgot that bombing was done form piston-engined aircraft approacing a target with less speed than a jet aircraft.

Anyway we should tale into account that the primer task for designing such sophisticated for WWII equimpent was not the inceasing the accuracy in comparison with for instance Ju-87 in steep dive.
a well trained (for several year) pilot of the Stuka may bomb it with no less rate of accuracy than in shallow dive with more modern sights on more speedy aircrafts. He was well trained to calculate mentally all the corrections (including drift and taking into account moving target's maneuver to some degree) and could produce it with a great skill.
The primer tasks were to allow less trained staff to achive a comparible rate of accuracy and to hit a target in less risky way - to increase pilots chances to survive while have a considerable chance to hit a target.

My apologies but did not quite follow you here. I would say that visual and electronic aids in the longer term made a fundamental difference to bombing accuracy. today, using guided freefall bombs, if a strike does not achieve an 80% hit ratio they are having a very bad day. Thats why a squadron of todays aircraft can achieve what would have taken 4 or 500 aircraft in 1943. So, I am not arguing that in the longer view bombing aids dont make a difference. They do, and a big one. What is at issue here is whether visual aids make a difference in the context of wwII. More specifically, do those p-47s operating wothout sights with about 1-1.5% hit ratio fly with hopeless innaccuracy compared to other aircraft. I say no they dont. One of the most accurate strikes undertaken by the LW with bombers known for their accuracy ( the Ju88 and the Ju87) managed toi achieve accuracy rates of about 2, maybe 3%. Level bombers on the allied side achieved accuracy rates of around 2%. All this other stuff we have been discussing is whether the situations are comparable...... I think there is not that much difference in the situations that might affect accuracy, so here we are, with a range of accuracy varying from 1.5-3, maybe even 4% accuracy, and this was on one of the best days for the LW compared to what I bet is one of the worst for those p-47s. I am not singling the LW out for special treatment. What is the issue here is whether the gizmos made any significant difference. Perhaps, but I dont see any evidence to support that. Thats the very issue.
 
My apologies but did not quite follow you here. I would say that visual and electronic aids in the longer term made a fundamental difference to bombing accuracy. today, using guided freefall bombs, if a strike does not achieve an 80% hit ratio they are having a very bad day.
Maybe you will argue it but I suppose that it isn't worth mentioning modern smart weapon coupled with modern sensors taking into account any comparison with the era of piston - engined aircrafts of wwii.
It gives nothing to any useful conclusion. Just statistic without a way to turn it to anything useful.

So, I am not arguing that in the longer view bombing aids dont make a difference. They do, and a big one. What is at issue here is whether visual aids make a difference in the context of wwII. More specifically, do those p-47s operating wothout sights with about 1-1.5% hit ratio fly with hopeless innaccuracy compared to other aircraft. I say no they dont. One of the most accurate strikes undertaken by the LW with bombers known for their accuracy ( the Ju88 and the Ju87) managed toi achieve accuracy rates of about 2, maybe 3%. Level bombers on the allied side achieved accuracy rates of around 2%. All this other stuff we have been discussing is whether the situations are comparable......

you have considered that that the situations were comparable. I suppose that the situation of attack on a maneuring and moving target (its speed was about 45 km/h) differed to situation of an attack of a stationary target but as I see you prefer to treat them as same ones.
Second - you have taken into account the attack on Illustrioues, on the briges in Italy and Brest.
And have taken them as typical - and why? Why haven't you consider the attack japanese Val's on two british cruisers (Dorsetshire and Cornwall) as typical example of dive-bombers accuracy? According to your arguments all the rest of british ships from british task gave to Illustious no help so it is more than comparable example.


I think there is not that much difference in the situations that might affect accuracy, so here we are, with a range of accuracy varying from 1.5-3, maybe even 4% accuracy, and this was on one of the best days for the LW compared to what I bet is one of the worst for those p-47s. I am not singling the LW out for special treatment. What is the issue here is whether the gizmos made any significant difference. Perhaps, but I dont see any evidence to support that. Thats the very issue.

I suppose that Japanese dive-bombers crew and US Dauntless crew were the most trained crew in the world for attacking naval ships. Not German pilots. But I suppose we can find the examples of more accurate bombing of naval vessels by LW crew than the above mentioned.

I mean that you're making too profound conclusions if take into account how narrow is the base -just three isolated cases chosed arbitrary.
 
Last edited:
Speaking of which....

Russia employed A-20s as a torpedo bomber and also for attacking targets on land. What bombsight did they use for this Lend-Lease aircraft?
 
Toss bombing sights and computing slide bombing sights also allowed greater tactical freedom. They allowed use of aircraft such as fighters not usually capable of carrying as bomb sight which is important since specilised dive bombers were not survivable. The Luftwaffe was not only planning to aim bombs with the TSA-2D but 'rocket bombs' such as the BT 700 (Bord Torpedo weighing nominally 700kg but in reality 830kg). This large conical rocket propelled bomb gave a standoff range and also penetrated the water ahead of a ship and could tunnel several hundred meters before detonating via magnetic fuse beneath the ship. I believe backup fuses in the form of timed delay, hydrostatic and impact were also fitted. There were a range of BT "bord torpedos" the larger ones such as BT 1000 and BT 1400 may not have been propelled. Tested in lakes but didn't see service.

The Luftwaffe was also experimenting with rockets that discharged clusters of 15-30 SD 4 4kg shaped charge warheads. (some picks in Fleischers German air dropped Weapons) A bombsight could be given a supplimental cams to provide flight time data for the purpose of setting a time to blossom the cluster.

Some fast aircraft such as the Me 262 when flying at speed had the problem of the bombs slipstreaming and a pullup helped detach the bombs.
 
Last edited:

Users who are viewing this thread

Back