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i dont think you are going to get the us high brass to concede any tactic or strategy they have already made their minds up on. a stubborn lot if ever there was one. they didnt listen to mitchell, chennault, the raf, or the hosts of others who tried to tell them. it took heavy losses for them to decide self defending bombers are so self defending....
As hindsight is a wonderful thing. I agree with you.Objective - shorten the war by destroying German capacity to wage effective war. Their ability to sustain a high capability force depended on a.) raw materials, b.) industrial base, c.) technology/innovation, d.) a healthy population with will to continue to supply labor, troops and logistical support and e.) a power grid to adequately support their industrial base and food production. Secondary but essential - kill the luftwaffe for D-Day invasion
I. Strengths UK (ad Commonwealth) - RAF Heavy bomber force well trained and capable in 1943 to go anywhere in Germany and attack any target with large tonnage capability.
Weakness - vulnerable to night fighters
I would dispute this. By late 1943 bombing aids and pathfinding methods could give the RAF equivalent results to the 8th AF. Also the introduction of teh master bomber, who would control teh bombing, call for additional marking when required, and correct for bomb drift.less capable of 'precision bombing required to hit point targets of a city block size at night.
Strength - good bombsights and bombers equally capable of precision bombing in daylight as US counterparts.
Something they shared with the USAAF. The RAF didn't think they were possible, so didn't try to develop them, the USAAF didn't think they were necessary.Weakness - lack of daylight escort fighters to reduce losses to acceptable levels.
Strengths - highly capable RAF Fighter and Tactical Air Command with comparable or better aircraft with respect to local air superiority. Weakness - range.
That was always the big issue with the Mosquito - the production mix. Mosquito bombers could have provided a highly efficient daylight bombiing force, but where do you take them from? NFs, FBs, PRS?RAF Medium bombers largely same as US in type and mission. Weakness - defense when target objectives exceeded escort range. Strength - extremely capable long and short range special ops in form of Mosquito night fighters, daylight intruders. Weakness - maybe not enough quantity to standardize US and UK staffing, TOE and aircraft to unify the missions.
II. Strengths US - Large and growing force of Heavy, medium and attack bombers capable of precision bombing in daylight when crews trained and weather favorable.
Weakness - initially incapable of delivering multi range results on key targets without heavy losses.
Small and rapidly growing 8th and 9th AF Fighter Command chartered intially with supporting Heavy bombardment strategic objectives deep in germany as well as Medium bomber objectives in France, Holland, Belgium to destroy logistics infrastructure capability. Weakness - no long range escort in early to late 1943.
III. Combined strengths
RAF/US BC had ability to go anywhere from UK to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany and attack key industrial targets. RAF/US had ability to cover bomber to Bremen, Frankfurt by late 1943 before Mustangs arrived. Weakness - no cover beyond Dummer lake, Stuttgart until December 1943.
Conclusions - Independently both 8th AF and RAF Bomber Command were experiencing heavy losses versus German Day and Night fighters while attempting to a.) destroy German cities and b. German industrial capability while giving the GAF a maximum effective defense capabilty versus day and night ops.
Change the game. RAF and US go to 90% daylight bombing in late 1943 to spread the GAF day fighter defenses and neutralize the NJG effectiveness as a single force. Re-assign RAF to attack key targets such as Schweinfurt, Ruhr valley dams, Merseburg, Misburg, etc during day light.
Shift priorities of P-38 assignment from PTO/MTO and move all to ETO to support both the RAF and USAAF on deep penetrations. Expedite production of P-51s (A and B) to ETO. P51A to escort RAF and US Medium daylight attacks as far as Brunswick and Friedrichshafen. Re-deploy P-47s to MTO and PTO for medium range escort until P-47N and P-51B and P-38s are available tomove from ETO.
Key emphasis - destroy chemical, oil, power generation, rail, ball bearings and armaments centers - skip the population concentrations unless a major industrial capability is in the center.
A lot of the targets mentioned are "one hit wonders".
For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings
Another highly debateable statement. There is no evidence to support either of the two notions pedalled in this piece. Germany may not necessarily have responded adequately (she may well have not been able to) and there is not evidenece that actual German potential could have been recovered after the "bomb proffing of her oil industry (if that were in fact possible). In any event, spending money and manpower to do that work hands the allies a victory in itself. As it was, the establishement of the synthetic plants cost germany a bomb prewar, making them harder targets only adds to that cost, something that would have knowck on effects somewhere. Personally i doubt they had the resources or capability to achieve the outcomes you are suggesting.Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas.
I would say that had the plants been hardened with basic precautions such as semi submerging of key parts of the plant and armour concrete around key areas much of the oil bombing campaigne would have had limited effects.
Another highly debateable statement. There is no evidence to support either of the two notions pedalled in this piece. Germany may not necessarily have responded adequately (she may well have not been able to) and there is not evidenece that actual German potential could have been recovered after the "bomb proffing of her oil industry (if that were in fact possible). In any event, spending money and manpower to do that work hands the allies a victory in itself. As it was, the establishement of the synthetic plants cost germany a bomb prewar, making them harder targets only adds to that cost, something that would have knowck on effects somewhere. Personally i doubt they had the resources or capability to achieve the outcomes you are suggesting.
As above, making the germans expend resources to achieve that outcome hands a bloodless victory to the Allies in itself, moreover I dont think that given the resources available to the germans that such an outcome is at all relaistically achievable. If it was, I think they would have at least done it to some of their petrochemical industry. they didnt, and I think that was partly bewcause they couldnt
For instance attacks on the German oil industry were delayed untill a few months before D-day so that the effect would be concentrated around the landings. Had the bombing commenced earlier the Germans would have responded and eventually recovered much of their production capacity as they did in many other areas. The Edmund Geilenberg Plan consisted of dispersed mini plants plus a few deep underground plants as well as hardening of critical areas of the plants.
Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.For quite some time, the the bomb raids were the only instrument available for Allies to bring the war to Germany. However, those raids whole Combined bomber offensive is criticized sometimes. So how would you conduct it, both during day night, with equipment historically available?
Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.
Seriously consider deploying B-29's in Europe instead of India and China.
I suppose that fact had a big impact. That is to say, that had to be a hard habit to quit, once they got it underway. I'm just a novice on this, understand, but that'd be my observation.What would happen to the thousands of B-17s/B-24s already being turned out in mass production.
They would have to fit somewhere else within the Allied effort as their numbers are too great to become redundant.
Aircrews would have to be re-trained as well consuming a certain amount of time.
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/b-29s-over-germany-4013-17.html
From Wiki..
" Initial plans to use the B-32 to supplement the B-29 in re-equipping B-17 and B-24 groups before redeployment of the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces to the Pacific were stymied when only five production models had been delivered by the end of 1944, by which time full B-29 operations were underway in the Twentieth Air Force."
"The Army Air Forces wanted to begin replacing B-17s and B-24s with B-32s in the summer of 1944. The plan called for Mediterranean-based B-24 bomb groups to transition first, followed by other groups in the 15th Air Force and finally 8th Air Force groups. Because the B-32 test program was so far behind schedule, however, not a single B-32 was ever sent to the Mediterranean or European Theaters of Operation."
Factsheets : Consolidated B-32