Boulton Paul Defiant

[Glider]

Yep, you are absolutely right, they were right to doubt; the thing is, the Defiant was not designed for the purpose of attacking single seat fighters, but it was employed in that role. Hence my comment about misappropriation of resources in another thread. Yet, despite a couple of bad days (264 Sqn suffered six shot down on one day too, but no lesson was learned) the Defiant continued to be used in a role it was not designed for. Clearly as these documents show, there was doubt about its speed in the face of the enemy, yet apart from Sqn Ldr Hunter's efforts, nothing was done officially to change its tactical use in the battle. This is not the fault of the aircraft, as obvious as that statement is.

The problem we have is that the role of the Defiant was to fight fighters and bombers, in combat you cannot pick and choose as the bombers are escorted by fighters.

Bearing this in mind, the Defiant did not do anywhere near as badly as is always assumed. Your statement of "loss rates through the roof" is a bit of an exaggeration considering only 14 aircraft were lost in combat in those 174 sorties, regardless if they were all combat sorties or not. Read my earlier post; on papr it looks worse than actual numbers suggest, but 14 lost in a month is not comparitively high losses at that time. As a percentage of a single squadron, yep - looks real bad on paper.

I dont think my comment was an exageration. 14 losses in 174 sorties is an 8% loss ratio and that is very high. If as is likely some of those sorties didn't involve combat, then the loss rate would be through the roof.
Look at it another way Many RAF squadrons flew three missions a day. Assume 12 planes a mission you would lose the squadron in a week at an 8% loss rate.

Yes, I agree with you that the Defiant should not have been used in the roles it was, convoy escort, standing patrols

This is where we disagree, any fighter in the front line had to face anything that came its way. You cannot and should not pick and choose. In theory the Hurricane was targeted against the Bombers but they fought fighters as often as they fought bombers.

,My second point is that losses of Defiants were not as high numerically as assumed by comparison to other types and the type fared better than you give it credit for. Yes it was slower than single seat fighters, but no more vulnerable than any other fighter if the tactics 264 Sqn employed were used. Actual combat proves that.

Losses for Defiants were much higher than Hurricane or Spitfire squadrons in a percentage of losses vs sorties. Actual combat proved that.

Regarding Sqn Ldr Hunter's reluctance to follow the official line - why would he? the tactics Defiant crews were trained to use against bombers clearly wouldn't work against fighters! His actions saved the lives of his squadron mates! Almost all RAF pre-war tactics were found wanting once the shooting started - squadrons were left to their own devices to adopt tactics based on their experiences, this is why Sailor Malan put out his Ten Rules of Air Fighting; this wasn't an edict from up above, this was a commander concerned about the high losses his troops were suffering. Again, the reason why RAF units adopted the Finger Four formation was because combat experience that proved that the Vic formation was unwieldy. This is also why indidivual airmen synchronised their guns to meet at a much closer range than what was officially specified and fitted armour plating behind their seats. These didn't come from official sources.

Small point but the official tactic for the Defiant was to use them in groups of four. It was the Squadron Leader who insisted on flights of three.

Interesting documents though Glider, thanks for sharing. Since I am in New Zealand it's kind of hard for me to gain access to material about the Defiant from official sources. I am keen to get hold of documents that outline when and why (yes, I know why, but offically) the Daffy squadrons were withdrawn from day ops.

I attach the combat trials which I hope you find of interest, I also hope you can read then because they are dreadful copies.

 

[CobberKane]

Irrespective of whether the Defiant was misused or did not perform so badly as is commonly believed, I think the whole concept of the turret fighter was fatally limited. Initially it seems that the Defiant had some success against enemy fighters when they were mistaken for Hurricanes but once the LW figured out what was going on the only option for the turret fighter was to go onto the defensive. Obviously then the Defiant was useless against fighters in any offensive capacity.
Against unescorted bombers the Defiant had some success but it is worth noting that the bombers it shot down were slow and poorly armed – D0-17s and Ju87s for the most part. Against turret equipped bombers the Defiant's tactics would have amounted to a match-up of firepower and durability, like a couple of man'o'wars duking it out at Trafalgar. The bomber would generally have won.
About the best gloss that could be put on the Defiant is that it could be effective against slow, lightly armed and unescorted bombers and that with the right tactics it could defend itself against fighters, though it could not take the offensive against them. That's a pretty narrow job description, and one that could be filled at least as well by single seat fighters which were also more economical in terms of money and lives, able to intercept faster, better armed bombers and able take the offensive against enemy fighters as well.

 

[buffnut453]

I don't think anyone's arguing that the Defiant concept was a smart idea. Indeed, it was an entirely flawed product of interwar thinking and mis-application of lessons from WWI. One of the reasons it was developed was the belief that enemy fighters would not reach the British Isles, an assumption that was entirely valid...right up to the point where France fell, which brought the Luftwaffe's operating bases much closer to the UK. None of this should take away from the fact that the tactics developed by Hunter made the most of a bad situation, indeed he deserves much credit for his leadership and tactical acumen.

 

[nuuumannn]

Thank you Buffnut, very well put. 264 Sqn made the best of an awkward situation; yes, the turret fighter concept was flawed, but didn't they do well all things considered!

The Battle of Britain was about numbers; FC heads counted the German bombers and fighters and allocated their squadrons accordingly. The Defiant's strengths and weakenesses were well known, yet nothing was done to pull them out of harm's way. Documents provided by Glider prove that there were questions asked about whether it was able to cope, but nothing was done. 264 proved in combat that the type could and did do well against determined opposition. Getting rid of them before they had proven themselves in combat would have reduced the number of available units - this might also answer why the type was kept as a fighter until August 1940. That decision was a knee jerk reaction to circumstance - as I stated in another thread.

Here's a possible scenario. Take the bomber destroyer off fighter duties - standing patrols, convoy escort etc (it's not about picking and choosing - my point was that there was clearly weaknesses identified with the type yet the Daffy was STILL used in these roles) and away from single-seat fighter opposition and place it in the North of England and Scotland at places like Prestwick where 141 Sqn went to recouperate, or Drem and Turnhouse, near Edinburgh (where 264 was sent to recouperate) where it can effectively be used against bombers flying from Norway. By doing this squadrons of Spits and Hurris based at these airfields, 602 was based at Drem in late 39 early 40 but moved to Westhampnett (satellite to Tangmere) by August 1940, 603 at Turrrnhoose (now Edinburgh Airport) for example, can be moved to 11 Group airfields, thereby increasing the number of units operating types more suitable for the fighter role.

Initially it seems that the Defiant had some success against enemy fighters when they were mistaken for Hurricanes but once the LW figured out what was going on the only option for the turret fighter was to go onto the defensive.

Cobber, you've been misled - such a thing is popular myth. This is the work of the RAF's official scribe of the Battle of Britain and has been constantly repeated by authors since. The Defiants was not initially misidentified by the Germans (how could the British know this at that time?!), evidence proves this in that before 264 Sqn's Big Day (37 e/a claimed without loss), the day identified as when the Germans misidentifed the Daffys as Hurricanes, Defiants were attacked by Bf 109s in numbers over Holland where the Daffys suffered. They knew about the turret, no denying that. Also on that day, the Defiants attacked the Germans, not the other way round.

As for the claim that losses to Daffys were slower types, the first aircraft shot down by a Defiant was a Ju 88 on 12 May 1940! More was to follow. On the 24th August four Ju 88s were claimed and another damaged by 264 Sqn. Elsewhere I have given examples of He 111s being attacked without loss to the Defiants, and even on 29 May 264 Sqn claimed Bf 110s and a single Ju 88.

Later combats in August 1940 show that the Defiants were not solely on the deffensive as popular myth would have you believe - 24th August the day Sqn Ldr Hunter went missing, 264 was scrambled to intercept a formation of Ju 88s attacking Manston when they were attacked by the bomber's escorts.

In every combat 264 Sqn entered into in August 1940 they were scrambled to attack formations of bombers and escort fighters and in every one of those combats, the RAF fighters were attacked by largely superior numbers of enemy escort fighters; on the 26th for example the 12 Do 17s and 40 He 111s were escorted by no less than 80 Bf 109s and '110s.

the official tactic for the Defiant was to use them in groups of four.

Small point, this was to attack bombers, not fighters. A 'Flight' was three a/c based on the Vic formation, which fighter pilots were trained to fly.

Many RAF squadrons flew three missions a day. Assume 12 planes a mission you would lose the squadron in a week at an 8% loss rate.

Yep, but actual combat shows that the actual loss figures (NOT percentages - and at any rate, the same percentage of losses on one combat op would not necessarily be suffered on another - actual combat proves this) suffered by Defiants were not significant by comparison to other types. I can post figures of Spitfire and Hurricane combat losses in the month of August by Squadron to prove my point.

Thanks for the documents Glider, very interesting.

 

[nuuumannn]

Lots of words, Guys; my angle is that the turret fighter was flawed, we are all in agreement about that. I'm not defending the concept, I'm defending the aircraft built to fulfill that role. There are many myths published about the Defiant that actual experience proves are wrong. The vision of Defiants falling out of the sky in numbers every time they got airborne is a fallacy; actual combat and my figures prove that without a doubt. I believe it simply does not deserve the bad reputation it has.

In fact we are all in agreement about many aspects of the Defiant and its use as a day fighter, but the exercise from my point of view is to dispell the myths - sort out the fact from fantasy.

 

[CobberKane]

When I said the Defiant's had to go on the defensive when attacked by enemy fighters I was referring to the Luffberry circle that seemed to work well for them, but ceded all initiative to the enemy. I wouldn't call being intercepted by a bomber escort and example of the defiant being used offensively against fighters Likewise the example of the Defiant being flown against Spitfire – it demonstrated that it could defend against a single seat fighterwhen expertly flown but it didn't demonstrate it could attack one. If would be interesting to know how mant if any of the Defiant victories over fighters came about from circumstances other than the single seat fighter makiing the boo-boo of initiating and ttack from behind. But at the end of the day it sounds like we are all pretty much on the same page re the Defiant's place in history, anyway.
I'm a little reminded of the a recent thread where someone pointed out that the Bf110 had a better kill/loss ratio than any other BoB. On paper you might call it the most successful fighter of the battle, but in practice it succeeded by only attacking whenever the odds were heavily in its favour and otherwise avoiding combat – not an ideal way to win air superiority!

 

[Glider]

As for the claim that losses to Daffys were slower types, the first aircraft shot down by a Defiant was a Ju 88 on 12 May 1940! More was to follow. On the 24th August four Ju 88s were claimed and another damaged by 264 Sqn. Elsewhere I have given examples of He 111s being attacked without loss to the Defiants, and even on 29 May 264 Sqn claimed Bf 110s and a single Ju 88.

On the 24th August the Defiants claimed four but shot down one, whilst losing over three days twelve Defiants.

Yep, but actual combat shows that the actual loss figures (NOT percentages - and at any rate, the same percentage of losses on one combat op would not necessarily be suffered on another - actual combat proves this) suffered by Defiants were not significant by comparison to other types. I can post figures of Spitfire and Hurricane combat losses in the month of August by Squadron to prove my point.

Clearly we disagree over this and I would appreciate your figures over the August Losses plus the sortie rate. After all 14 fighters in a month is not excessive but if you stay on the ground most of the time, it is excessive. 174 sorties would equate to about 15 missions over the month.

 

[Juha]

IIRC Mason in his Battle over Britain notes that while Defiants claimed during Battle of France 65 enemy a/c they in fact shot down only 12 - 16. So their kill ratio was in reality appr. 1:1 (14 losses), not very good for a fighter whose victims were mostly bombers and dive-bombers, many of them unescorted.

And thanks to Nuuumannn and Glider for their very informative posts!

@Glider do you have NA signums for the docus you posted in style of AIR...

Juha

 

[Glider]

I am afraid not.

 

[nuuumannn]

Hello Glider, haven't forgotten about those figures, will post soon, just a bit held up with other things right now. They are taken from the book Battle of Britain Then and Now (a fairly accurate source) and cover losses in combat by squadron over the month of August but not sortie rates of those squadrons (sorry). I'm researching RAF losses in that period and thought people might be interested if I posted them.

As for the figures of Defiant kills over the posts, I've deliberately stuck to what 264 Sqn claimed rather than actual kills since at the time that's what was believed had been shot down. Obviously the number of aircraft shot down by the squadrons was going to be lower once post war research goes into action. My reason for this is that the men of 264 Sqn, despite what happened to 141 Sqn, did not believe they were at any disadvantage to any other unit and were dismayed by the decision to go onto night duties. This is despite the loss of Sqn Ldr Hunter four days after their last day combat.

Yes, Cobber, you are right; the Lufbery circle was a desperate measure, but it proved to work to the Defiant's advantage. Sqn Ldr Hunter was a smart man to employ it.

but in practice it succeeded by only attacking whenever the odds were heavily in its favour and otherwise avoiding combat – not an ideal way to win air superiority!

That's a pertinent point, but its pretty hard to expect to win air superiority with only 12 Defiants against 30 or more Bf 109s!

 

[Glider]

No urgency about the figures, take your time and thanks for the effort, its appreciated

 

[Juha]

Hello Nuuumannn
Have you seen John Alcorn's survey on the claims and real victories of the British fighter sqns during the BoB, I mean the 2nd and better one? It must be taken with a grain of salt because much of the results were based on Circumstancial, Statistical Credit, but still interesting. It was published in July 2000 Aeroplane.According to him 141 Sqn claimed 3, of which he credits one to the sqn and lost 6 a/c, 264 15.5 claims of which he credits 8 to the sqn and 10 losses.

Juha

 

[61fury]

If they were designed as bomber attackers were they ever escorted by "real" fighters to provide cover?

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Cover against what? The only expected threat, as well as bombers, came from the Me110, and the Spitfire and Hurricane were expected to deal with them, without trouble.
As always, in these discussions, 20:20 hindsight is allowed to colour the debate. There was never a thought that France would be defeated, and single-seat fighters would be within easy reach of these shores, so the Defiant was designed to meet a threat from massed bomber formations, possibly with twin-engined fighter escorts, and the drawn-up planned attacks (from alongside, in front, and underneath) reflected this thinking.
It's very easy, with the accumulated knowledge of 72 years, to mock 1930s planning, but, just occasionally, try putting yourselves into the 1930s, and anticipating the future; when Dowding demanded armour plate, for his pilots, Sholto-Douglas refused it for the Spitfire, because, as far as he was concerned, there was nothing faster than the Spitfire, and only an incompetent pilot would allow anyone to get behind him. Again, no expectation of combat with the Me109.
Once the invasion of France began, and the BEF needed fighter cover, the Defiant was thrown into a situation for which it was never designed, and many men died because of it.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... There was never a thought that France would be defeated ....".

Not like that hadn't happened - repeatedly - over the years, EB

MM

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Not like that hadn't happened - repeatedly - over the years, EB

Didn't happen in WWI, though, and, on paper, at least, their armed forces were no weaker in the 1930s.

 

[stona]

France was considered the pre-eminent military power on the European mainland in the 1930s. Her defeat would have seemed almost inconceivable to 1930s military planners.

There is a famous film of Hitler literally skipping for joy following the fall of France in 1940. He could scarcely have believed it himself.

Steve

 

[michaelmaltby]

".... France was considered the pre-eminent military power on the European mainland in the 1930s."

They obviously believed their own propaganda and defense spending stats --- I have no doubt that your statement is true Stona but - in reality - the Soviet forces were probably in better overall disposition -- before the Purge, of course. The Soviets had joint-trained with Weimar Germany in facilities funded in Russia by the Weimar Republic.

The 1930's was a very delusional period IMHO ...

"... Didn't happen in WWI, though,"

ONE swallow a summer does not make, EB.

MM

 

[Shortround6]

It was always iffy if Russia was considered part of the European mainland from a political or economic view point, no matter what the geography says. Is Turkey European or mid-eastern?

It may have been patronizing or false pride but France had been considered the premier Continental land power since Napoleon.

People tended to count bayonets, guns, and tanks without asking if the troops were trained, if there were spare parts or adequate stocks of ammo let alone if the weapon designs were actually any good.

 

[Edgar Brooks]

It does, here, when you see how much rain it has to dodge.