Brewster Buffalo - what is the verdict? (1 Viewer)

[EwenS]

Any chance you could upload that, either here or through DMs?

The WW2 USN Aircraft Location reports are available on line here.

Location of U.S. Naval Aircraft, World War II

Click on the day, month and year (e.g., 2 Feb 1942) to view the Location of U.S. Naval Aircraft report for that particular timeframe. NOTE: All of these records are unclassified or have been declassified. Due to the age of the records, type of typewriter font, and capability of current OCR...

www.history.navy.mil

The early 1942 reports do contain inaccuracies however.

I've asked this before but since the variants came up, I've seen mention of an "F2A-2A" in a Curtiss-Wright engine type per aircraft type list. Any idea what that might be? Just the first batch of F2A-2s? Perhaps minor improvements were made to later F2A-2s, leading to different sub-designations by some?

Can't help with that one I'm afraid.

 

[MIflyer]

If the commander of the RN force that included the Repulse and the Prince of Wales had thought to call up the RAF and let them know where he was and where he was going then they could easily have covered those ships. Buffalos were on the ground, well within range, and could have scrambled on short notice. Since an IJN sub had reported the RN ships had no carrier with them, they sent the Nells and Bettys that sank the ships without fighter escort. The Buffalos would have had a field day with those Japanese bombers found at low altitude. And today we would be saying, "The Buffalo was the USN's first modern monoplane fighter, a contemporary of the Douglas TBD, and a nice airplane to fly, but a POS in combat against the Japanese. They did save the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, though."

 

[SaparotRob]

Agreed.

 

[Marcel]

If the commander of the RN force that included the Repulse and the Prince of Wales had thought to call up the RAF and let them know where he was and where he was going then they could easily have covered those ships. Buffalos were on the ground, well within range, and could have scrambled on short notice. Since an IJN sub had reported the RN ships had no carrier with them, they sent the Nells and Bettys that sank the ships without fighter escort. The Buffalos would have had a field day with those Japanese bombers found at low altitude. And today we would be saying, "The Buffalo was the USN's first modern monoplane fighter, a contemporary of the Douglas TBD, and a nice airplane to fly, but a POS in combat against the Japanese. They did save the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, though."

View attachment 845836

Still like the looks of the flying beer barrel, though. Would love to see one flying.

 

[SaparotRob]

Were any flown on and off USS Sable or USS Wolverine? I'm hoping there's a couple of them down there worth salvaging.

 

[EwenS]

If the commander of the RN force that included the Repulse and the Prince of Wales had thought to call up the RAF and let them know where he was and where he was going then they could easily have covered those ships. Buffalos were on the ground, well within range, and could have scrambled on short notice. Since an IJN sub had reported the RN ships had no carrier with them, they sent the Nells and Bettys that sank the ships without fighter escort. The Buffalos would have had a field day with those Japanese bombers found at low altitude. And today we would be saying, "The Buffalo was the USN's first modern monoplane fighter, a contemporary of the Douglas TBD, and a nice airplane to fly, but a POS in combat against the Japanese. They did save the Repulse and the Prince of Wales, though."

View attachment 845836

The sub threat had nothing to do with there being no carrier with Force Z. None was available. And the Admiralty weren't planning to send one East of Suez until about April 1942.

Nearest was Hermes (air group 12 Swordfish) in refit at Durban South Africa Nov 1941 to Feb 1942.
Furious in refit Philadelphia Nov 1941 to April 1942
Eagle in refit at Liverpool Nov 1941 to Jan 1942
Illustrious in Caribbean working up after repairs at Norfolk
Formidable completing repairs at Norfolk.

In early Dec the last two sailed for Britain to collect their air groups. Collided en route. Formidable wasn't able to sail East until mid-Feb 1942. After repairs to her bow, Ilustrious followed at the end of March.

Victorious with the Home Fleet.

Indomitable working up in the Caribbean following completion in Oct and delays from a grounding. This work up was accelerated after repairs and she arrived at Cape Town just before New Year 1942. Contrary to many sources it was NEVER intended that she should join Force Z. Until war broke out with Japan, it was intended that she should go to Gibraltar by the end of the year, probably as the replacement for Ark Royal which, had she not been sunk in Nov 1941, was overdue for refit.

 

[MIflyer]

I think the F2A went straight to the USMC. A really old USMC pilot said that he was on the West Coast before WW2 and they got news that the East Coast Marines had got the hot new F2A and thus were mightily P.O.ed and envious.

After Midway the F2A's went to Miami and Pensacola and were used for training.

I don't suppose any were used on RN carriers?

 

[MIflyer]

The sub threat had nothing to do with there being no carrier with Force Z.

I did not say there was sub threat. I said a IJN sub had spotted the ships and reported there was no carrier with them. The RN did not take the carrier with them because it was too slow and ineffective.

 

[Greg Boeser]

I think the F2A went straight to the USMC. A really old USMC pilot said that he was on the West Coast before WW2 and they got news that the East Coast Marines had got the hot new F2A and thus were mightily P.O.ed and envious.

After Midway the F2A's went to Miami and Pensacola and were used for training.

I don't suppose any were used on RN carriers?

View attachment 845842View attachment 845843

F2A-3s were aboard USS Lexington (CV-2) at the outbreak of the Pacific War. Transferred to USMC end of December 1941. The only combat action they saw in USN service was strafing a Japanese submarine.

 

[EwenS]

I think the F2A went straight to the USMC. A really old USMC pilot said that he was on the West Coast before WW2 and they got news that the East Coast Marines had got the hot new F2A and thus were mightily P.O.ed and envious.

After Midway the F2A's went to Miami and Pensacola and were used for training.

I don't suppose any were used on RN carriers?

View attachment 845842View attachment 845843

10 of the first 11 F2A-1 produced for the USN were delivered to VF-3 on Saratoga in Dec 1939. They traded them for F2A-2 in 1940 and in 1941 VF-2 on Lexington and VS-201 on Long Island received them in 1941. These were in turn traded for F2A-3 models later in 1941 by these USN units. At that point the earlier F2A-2 models were passed to USMC squadrons and later augmented by more F2A-3.

VF-2 was still operating the Buffalo into early 1942.

805 squadron FAA flew some Buffalos while in Egypt in 1941. These came from the Belgian order, 33 of which were diverted to Britain arriving from July 1940. These lacked arrester gear. One or maybe two, were however deck landed on Eagle in early 1941.

 

[GregP]

A few corrections if a I may?

3 - F4F-4 (early) = 7,426 lb
Checked my copy of AHT, this weight appears to be be one of those "trick" weights the Navy was so fond of. Only 4 guns and only 200rpg of ammo. Also only 110 gals of fuel.

4 - F4F-4 (late) = 7,973 lb
5 - FM-1 = 8,050 lb

The FM-1 took out two guns and went back to the 430 rpg ammo capacity. The extra ammo weighed more than extra guns did.

3 - Me-109T2 = 6,786 lb
one of my books says that is the maximum overload weight. The T-2s were given the same sort of under wing/fuselage rack as the Jabo 109Es had and would hold the 66imp gallon drop tank, four 50kg bombs or one 250kg bomb.


I Appreciate your work, I have no idea how to make a graph

The FM-1 took out two guns and went back to the 430 rpg ammo capacity. The extra ammo weighed more than extra guns did.

Yes, but the remaining guns DID shoot longer, which is always a good thing.

 

[cammerjeff]

Were any flown on and off USS Sable or USS Wolverine? I'm hoping there's a couple of them down there worth salvaging.

Not that I know of Rob, they were still flying off of the Lexington until Feb of 1942, then just operational on the USS Ranger in the Atlantic for a few more months. Then the USMC unti shortly after Midway. Then off to the training squadrons. The books I have on the 2 Lake Michigan Training Ships do not list them operating from either carrier, sorry

 

[GregP]

This thread has uncovered some interesting things about the Buffalo.

Nevertheless, it seemingly easily produced the worst combat / service record of any Naval or land-based fighter of its time in contemporary US Navy active service. That would easily seem to grant it the distinction as having the worst record from the point of view of the US Navy. That doesn't mean it had the worst record in ALL of it's service use, just from the US Navy's point of view.

One person's junk can be another person's treasue, and the Finns seemed to get quite good use from theirs.

The Finns operated 44 Buffalos.

The US Navy operated 163.

The US Navy should have given the Finns ALL of their Buffalos. The war might have been shorter and the Finns would have had a lot more spare parts. They might have developed a Jet Buffalo and might still be flying it.

 

[cammerjeff]

You have to consider that the Fin's did not do arrested carrier landings with them, they were notorious for breaking the lower MLG leg when landing on carriers.
Also the Fin's versions were much lighter than the versions flown my the USN & USMC. From what I understand the Buffalo was a good flying aircraft, as long as you did not have to climb rapidly to intercept incoming A/C with short notice.
Also Pilot training and Quality account for alot, the inexperienced USMC Aviators did not stand much of a chance vs the best of the Japanese Naval Aviators in the best Carrier Fighter of the era.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Not that I know of Rob, they were still flying off of the Lexington until Feb of 1942, then just operational on the USS Ranger in the Atlantic for a few more months. Then the USMC unti shortly after Midway. Then off to the training squadrons. The books I have on the 2 Lake Michigan Training Ships do not list them operating from either carrier, sorry.

VF-2 went ashore at Pearl Harbor on 26 January to exchange their F2A-3 with F4F-3A. The Brewsters would go to the Marines.
VF-3 went aboard Lexington with F4F-3 on 31 January.

[The First Team - Lundstrom]

 

[Greg Boeser]

You have to consider that the Fin's did not do arrested carrier landings with them, they were notorious for breaking the lower MLG leg when landing on carriers.
Also the Fin's versions were much lighter than the versions flown my the USN & USMC. From what I understand the Buffalo was a good flying aircraft, as long as you did not have to climb rapidly to intercept incoming A/C with short notice.
Also Pilot training and Quality account for alot, the inexperienced USMC Aviators did not stand much of a chance vs the best of the Japanese Naval Aviators in the best Carrier Fighter of the era.

The Finns assigned their Brewsters to their most seasoned fighter wing. It was considered the best of the hodge-podge of fighter aircraft Finland had purchased either directly from the manufacturers or from war booty stocks from Germany.

 

[EwenS]

Not that I know of Rob, they were still flying off of the Lexington until Feb of 1942, then just operational on the USS Ranger in the Atlantic for a few more months. Then the USMC unti shortly after Midway. Then off to the training squadrons. The books I have on the 2 Lake Michigan Training Ships do not list them operating from either carrier, sorry

The fighter squadron on Ranger was VF-4.

The first USN squadron to receive the F4F-3 Wildcat was VF-4 (renumbered VF-41 in March 1941) on Ranger in Dec 1940 followed by VF-72 on Wasp in Jan 1941. In both cases these replaced F2F & F3F biplane fighters.

I don't believe either of these squadrons ever operated the Buffalo.

 

[Elvis]

The US Navy should have given the Finns ALL of their Buffalos. The war might have been shorter and the Finns would have had a lot more spare parts. They might have developed a Jet Buffalo and might still be flying it.

You have to remember, the Finns were never in the war, per se. They had a disagreement with the Russians over some land. That was the whole skirmish in a nutshell. Once the skirmish had concluded, Finland went back to being a neutral country.
The Brewsters were used to great effectiveness, but once they were TBO'd beyond repair, they just borrowed some 109's from the Germans and continued fighting, until (again) the land dispute had been resolved.
There was a one-off wood framed version of the Buff that the Finns tried to develop, but it all came for naught, because there were other issues with this equation, besides just supplying an air frame.

 

[EwenS]

There are two reasons why more Buffalos were not supplied to Finland. Politics and Production.

The initial production run for the USN ordered in 1938 was for 54 F2A-1. Finland approached the US to purchase new aircraft in Sept 1939. When the USSR invaded Finland in Nov 1939 the US agreed that 43 of these (+ another aircraft for a total of 44) would be released to the Finns leaving just 11 with the USN as noted previously, to equip VF-3 on Saratoga.

The aircraft sent to Finland were denavalised so lighter. They were shipped to Sweden where they were assembled by Norwegian Air Force mechanics before being flown to Finland by US and Finnish pilots. BUT only 6 had arrived by the time the "Winter War" ended on 13 March 1940. AFAICT none of these saw combat in the "Winter War".

An uneasy peace ensued, with Finland turning to Britain & Sweden for help. Britain had already supplied Gladiators &, Blenheims during the "Winter War" and Hurricanes immediately afterwards. After April / May 1940 that couldn't continue and the Finns turned to Germany building an increasingly close relationship until they joined Germany in attacking the USSR in June 1941. They actually allowed German troops onto Finnish soil ahead of Barbarossa.

The next Buffalos to be built, further delaying USN deliveries, were the 40 B339B for Belgium (33 of which ended up in Britain in 1940/41. Then came delivery of 43 F2A-2 to the USN between Sept & Dec 1940 followed by 108 F2A-3 from Jan 1941.

So all the Finnish success with the Buffalo was when Finland was fighting alongside Germany and against the USSR which then became a US ally.

So in 1939 / 40 the USN lost out on Buffalos as deliveries to Finland and Belgium were prioritised. Then in 1940 it lost out again when production of the F4F saw a French order prioritised (diverted to Britain as Martlet I). Meanwhile USN fighter squadrons continued to fly obsolete F2F and F3F biplane fighters. So by the beginning of 1941 the USN needed every modern fighter it could get, leaving none of its own Buffalos available for export.

And by early 1941 Brewster was also busy filling orders for Britain and the Netherlands East Indies.

So all in all there really wasn't another opportunity to supply more Buffalos to Finland after the initial batch.

 

[FulmenTheFinn]

You have to consider that the Fin's did not do arrested carrier landings with them, they were notorious for breaking the lower MLG leg when landing on carriers.

The Finnish Buffaloes suffered from the same weak undercarriages that those in Allied use did. The difference is the Finns made structural reinforcements, along with a number of other changes, to their Buffaloes during the Interim Peace of 1940-41 between the Winter War (1939-40) and the Continuation War (1941-44), a period of reprieve that proved to be a blessing for the Finnish Buffalo as well. Had the aircraft gone into action in Finland right away with all its numerous teething issues: weak undercarriages, engine overheating*, exhaust fumes in the cockpit, etc. etc., it would not have gained the kind of reputation in Finland that it did.

*Engine overheating and the resulting malfunctions were especially problematic still at the beginning of the CW in the summer of 1941, mainly resulting from a disregard for power setting guidelines and the dustiness of Finnish airfields, virtually all of which were unpaved.

Also the Fin's versions were much lighter than the versions flown my the USN & USMC. From what I understand the Buffalo was a good flying aircraft, as long as you did not have to climb rapidly to intercept incoming A/C with short notice.

This "Finnish Buffaloes were significantly lighter" is a myth that refuses to die, and one that comes up every time the aircraft in Finnish use is mentioned. It's just one of those things that have entered into the popular discourse as a "fact". It however isn't one. When the Americans sold the Finns the 44 Brewster Model 239s they stripped the aircraft of what they deemed US Navy property, much to the Finns' surprise who thought they were getting fully kitted-out aircraft for the quite hefty price they paid for them, which meant the Finns had to buy new instrumentation etc. for them. In addition to these changes the Finns got rid of the tailhook and replaced the tailwheel with a larger Nokia tailwheel, installed armour to the pilot's seat on the back and the bottom of the seat, replaced the .30 cal in the fuselage with a fourth .50 cal, though this change would be made to the Finnish Buffalo fleet over the course of several years, usually I think when the aircraft came in for repairs/maintenance overhauls, and finally they gave the aircraft a camouflage paintjob. All this increased weight by about 85-100 kg (190-220 lb), give or take. I'm still trying to figure out how much a fully loaded "model 1941" Finnish Buffalo weighed, but by my calculations it's at least around 2,700 kg (5,950 lb). This would put a fully loaded Brewster Model 239 by the "1941 standard" of modifications with a 1,000 hp R-1820-G5 Cyclone 9 engine in the same power-to-weight ratio range as a fully loaded F2A-3 in a fighter configuration with a 1,200 hp R-1820-40 Cyclone 9 engine, and a loaded weight of around 3,190 kg (7,030 lb). Trapped fluids in the sumps and coolers would've increased the weight further for both models from the aforementioned by some dozens of kilos. In America's Hundred-Thousand there's a mention on p. 442 that one measurement of the F2A-3's empty weight yielded 4,732 lb, but on F2A-3 No. 01516 it was 4,879 lb with oil contained in the sumps and coolers, so 147 lb more. Speaking of the AHT book, excellent as it is otherwise, it makes no mention of Finnish weight-increasing modifications to their Buffaloes. Instead the book cites weight figures for the Model 239s that are not accurate to the configurations the Finns flew them into combat with. A typical sortie take-off weight for a Finnish Buffalo was probably around 2,500-2,600 kg (5,510-5,730 lb).

Here's an example of the kind of incorrect weight figures for the 239 in the book. The figures are based on the aircraft's manual the Americans delivered the Finns with the aircraft, not on what the aircraft were actually equipped with when they flew into combat with the Finns.

The Finns assigned their Brewsters to their most seasoned fighter wing. It was considered the best of the hodge-podge of fighter aircraft Finland had purchased either directly from the manufacturers or from war booty stocks from Germany.

Here's something I translated a couple of months ago somewhere else. It's from Jukka Raunio's 2018 Brewster: taivaan helmi vai maailman huonoin? [Brewster: A Pearl of the Sky or the Worst in the World?]. The text in square brackets is my own.

The Brewster Buffalo's [henceforth "Brewster" or "BW"] poor reputation abroad was because of difficult military defeats whose core reasons were largely elsewhere than in the aircraft. It was further exacerbated by Brewster Aeronautical Corporation's problems and misdemeanours. The written word, such as James Gilbert's book [The World's Worst Aircraft] was taken at face value, with no means or will to investigate the matter more deeply. As mentioned before, the Zero was a dangerous opponent to all US aircraft in service in 1941.

The Buffalo was lifted to new heights above all by Jorma "Joppe" Karhunen with his many books, and others who have spoken about flying the aircraft (Ilmari Juutilainen, Eino Luukkanen, Heimo Lampi) haven't dimmed its reputation. And there is no need to dim it. After the Winter War's Fokkers and even lesser aircraft types the Brewster represented unforeseen performance in Finland. The reliability, armament and speed were better than for example in the FIAT G.50s and Moranes received by the Finns around the same time.

The early success of summer 1941 was psychologically important. If for one reason or another the Finnish Air Force would have experienced something similar to what the US Marine Corps experienced at Midway, or the Brits experienced around Singapore, the pilots' trust into the aircraft and into themselves would have suffered. The Finnish pilots' abilities and war experience from the Winter War were certainly in a key position when the reputation of the Brewster was being forged. Another factor in the key position was the enemy, who had to give a long break to learn new things.

The transfer of experience to new pilots was still something not fully developed, and relied mostly on the voluntariness of Winter War veterans. The orchestra called Squadron 24 wasn't entirely at its best in the summer of 1941. Things could well have ended up badly if the opponent had been the equivalent of e.g. Japan or Germany.

Success always requires several factors. One of them was that the materiel pool, which was small to begin with, remained numerically and operationally significant all the way until the final stages of the long war. That required things which Commander of the Air Force Major Arne Somersalo described in the 1920s with the word "belated delivery". The first advantage vis-à-vis the Allies fighting in the Far East were the roads and railways, with which deliveries could be made. Another advantage were the locations and resources where one should deliver to.

The technical personnel of the squadron worked long hours and performed small miracles compared to the amount of resources at their disposal. The resources at the remote forest airfields were after all very small. E.g. there weren't enough tools, nor workers, to perform sheet metal work, nevermind people to assess the strength of repairs. Original spare parts and replacement tools became ever more rare as the war went on.

The effort of domestic industrial and repair centres, suffering from all sorts of shortages, such as Valtion Lentokonetehdas [State Aircraft Factory], Veljekset Karhumäki Oy [Brothers Karhumäki Ltd.], Tampella and Aero Oy's [Aero Ltd.'s] engine repairshop, was indispensible. Supporting these main functionaries were many other companies and state-owned institutions. Without the factory repairs and domestic spare parts the BW fleet would have sunk to insignificance already at the beginning of the Continuation War. It would not have had time to develop the reputation it did.

Wars, especially long ones, are fought with material potential. Individual heroics don't decide them. During the entire Continuation War Finland received material support from Germany and Sweden. Especially from Germany it had to be asked for all the time using every possible channel and reasoning. Germany sent significant numbers of aircraft only in the summer of 1944.

German and Swedish raw materials and intermediary products, and war booty sold by Germany, such as engines, were indispensible in maintaining the Brewster. Making use of them relied solely on Finnish ingenuity. It was unique; options were created in a situation where original spare parts had ran out and obtaining new aircraft was more than difficult.

The Finnish Air Force Headquarters' less-glorified War Materiel Division was thinly manned, but in modern terms it had processes with which to get things done: a system with which to inform about changes, established connections to factories making repairs and to foreign suppliers of equipment (mainly in Germany and in Sweden), aviation attachés, the Air Depot, field air repair centres, etc.

Mistakes and other obstacles came and went, but the system was never paralysed. Fuel, special liquids and cartridges were in supply until the end. Finland's fighter pool was small in the Continuation War as well, but still in June 1944 stronger than that of Sweden, who was rich, had tried everything in acquiring more aircraft and enjoyed peacetime.

But to return to the topic at hand: was the Brewster a pearl of the sky or the worst in the world? Neither. The Brewster was a first-generation all-metal fighter plane equipped with a retractable landing gear and standard revolution propeller. It lacked serious design flaws found in other fighters, such as difficult take-off or landing attributes, instability when firing, tendency for an "insane", i.e. sudden flipover in a turn, poor visibility, weak structural integrity or stiff handling.

The Brewster didn't have an absolute in any performance category, instead it was a "jack of all trades", with which e.g. Toyotas have won tests in the world of automobile magazines. The basic construction however lacked growth potential, unlike e.g. the Bf 109, whose K model differed massively from the 1930s versions of the aircraft, and which was, thanks to increased power, still usable in 1945.

Thus it can be said that the Brewster's reputation in Finland comes down to four principles:

1. The commander, flight, swarm and patrol leaders of Squadron 24 had experience from the Winter War, which could be transferred to new pilots in relatively advantegous circumstances. The pilots of the battles over Midway and Singapore were on average less experienced and probably less motivated, as they weren't fighting over their own country.,
   
   
2. At the beginning of the Continuation War the Soviet Air Forces were under the German steamroller and suffered from Stalin's purges, along with suffering from a lack of materiel and logistics. Japan with her Zeroes and tougher pilots was a significantly more difficult opponent.,
   
   
3. The Brewster Model 239 was superior compared to the main aircraft of the USSR and adequate until 1943. The F2A-3 and 339E versions were heavier. The hot air and humidity exacerbated their problems.,
   
   
4. Finland had the time and ability to fix the Brewster's teething issues and supplement its equipment before combat operations. The industrial resources and ingenuinity for maintaining the aircraft was there. For the Allies operating far from home there were no possibilities for factory or central repair centre-level maintenance. Indeed it wasn't even worth it for the great powers to pour resources into improving the aircraft, as they received new types as replacements faster.

The above text didn't go quite as much into what I was looking for, but from what I've learned the Buffalo's failure in Malaya and the Dutch East Indies can be summarised into a few things:

-A lack of time to iron out the teething issues and to get familiar with the aircraft
-Distance from factories capable of providing repairs and improvements to the aircraft
-Not enough pilot experience
-Obsolete air combat doctrine
-An underestimation of Japanese capabilities

The hot climate also probably played at least some role. Whether pilot error was a significant contributing factor as with Finnish experiences of Cyclone 9 overheating in the summer of 1941, I do not know. This is likely another one of those things that requires further investigation.

Some of these were probably factors in the aircraft's performance in the Pacific as well.

I've also read the claim that Richard Dunn has shown in his South Pacific Air War series that aerial combat between Japan and the US was far more evenly matched than how American historiography has traditionally portrayed it as. Whether this includes fights involving the Buffalo, I do not know. I've not read Dunn's series but I hear it is excellent.