Carrier air war "what if"....

[timshatz]

Yamamoto did say that he could only win for the first six months - an estimate that proved eerily accurate as events unfolded at Midway. The only prospect for Japanese victory was to smash the US fighting capability, grab all the bits of SE Asia they needed to acheive autarky, and then get to the table and agree favourable terms. IMHO, if the US hadn't been backing the Allied Nations and gunning for revenge, they might have got away with it. But Yamamoto was under no illusions about the need to win a quick victory. His main mistake seems to have been in misjudging just how far the US was willing to go to seetle the account...

EDIT: Diiddy, you read my mind mate

I think Yammamoto was more considering the US capabiity in the Pacific more than the potential. While he understood the US had what it took to fight a protracted war more than Japan did, IMHO, he was looking fore at the ability of the US to get Carriers back into the Pacific and functional around a battle group after he'd destoryed the main US base and such Carriers as were available in the Pacific. With the Carriers goin and Pearl Harbor destroyed, it would set the US back to the point the Japanese would have a free hand on their advance in the far east. For him the math was about him having 10 or so Fleet Carriers to the US 3 Fleet Carriers and strength in the battle line. I am not so sure the industrial capacity really got into it. As it was, the US took two years to get the next Essex types out to the Pacific.

Also, he knew his pilots and crews had seen combat, the US did not. That accounted for something.

On another note, while the US had a great advantage in bases on Allied soil in the begining of the Pacific war, it also forced the US to fight to protect those bases. Australia, for instance, was a great base for McArthur's drive in SWPA. Airpower, Subs and Logistics were centered there in the begining of the war. However, it also had to be defended which drew troops there in the first place. Those troops later went into NG and fought in places such as Buna.

But when you think about it, it may be a chicken and egg arguement with a tempering of "well, ya' gotta fight somewhere" and became a spring board on the way back to Japan.

 

[syscom3]

On another note, while the US had a great advantage in bases on Allied soil in the begining of the Pacific war, it also forced the US to fight to protect those bases. Australia, for instance, was a great base for McArthur's drive in SWPA. Airpower, Subs and Logistics were centered there in the begining of the war. However, it also had to be defended which drew troops there in the first place. Those troops later went into NG and fought in places such as Buna.

All of those bases had to eb developed. NG was a small backwater town that had to be turned into a mjor base of operations. And that was it. Nothing else.

While many of the naval bases (Somoa and Fiji) in the pacific were being upgraded towards the end of 1941, there was still a lot of work to be done to make them capable of handling the strains of war.

 

[diddyriddick]

Yamamoto did say that he could only win for the first six months - an estimate that proved eerily accurate as events unfolded at Midway. The only prospect for Japanese victory was to smash the US fighting capability, grab all the bits of SE Asia they needed to acheive autarky, and then get to the table and agree favourable terms. IMHO, if the US hadn't been backing the Allied Nations and gunning for revenge, they might have got away with it. But Yamamoto was under no illusions about the need to win a quick victory. His main mistake seems to have been in misjudging just how far the US was willing to go to seetle the account...

EDIT: Diiddy, you read my mind mate

Great minds, man. What can I say?

By all accounts, Japan had to win big and win early. What even Yamamoto realized was that a protracted war meant defeat.

 

[wheelsup_cavu]

I remember reading that before the battle of Midway the Japanese played wargames using dice to simulate different scenarios.
No matter what the dice roll said would happen a referee/judge/admiral would overule the dice roll and the Japanese fleet would come out victorius.

Dice roll says no surprise at Midway-overruled by referee. Now fleet achieves total surprise and victory.
Multiple Carriers sunk-overruled no carries sunk and again total victory.

When I read the article it didn't seem that the Japanese were too worried about the outcome of the battle ahead.
The attack was going to happen and nothing was going to stop them.


Wheelsup

 

[syscom3]

I remember reading that before the battle of Midway the Japanese played wargames using dice to simulate different scenarios.
No matter what the dice roll said would happen a referee/judge/admiral would overule the dice roll and the Japanese fleet would come out victorius.

Dice roll says no surprise at Midway-overruled by referee. Now fleet achieves total surprise and victory.
Multiple Carriers sunk-overruled no carries sunk and again total victory.

When I read the article it didn't seem that the Japanese were too worried about the outcome of the battle ahead.
The attack was going to happen and nothing was going to stop them.


Wheelsup

Very true. The book "Shattered Sword" looks at that incident as well.

 

[BombTaxi]

The Japanese certainly did make up wargame outcomes to suit themselves. But one must remember that the timing of the critical strike at Midway, catching the Japanese as they refuelled, was so fortutitous that no die roll could ever simulate it. I'm no statistician, but the odds on the sequence of events leading up to those bombs hitting would be very, very high. Given their progress up to that time, the Japanese could build a sound case that the carrier battle at Midway would actually go their way. They had been lucky up to that point, and at Midway, luck fell decisively to the Americans...

 

[diddyriddick]

Miracle at Midway also covers the fixed Japanese wargames.

 

[syscom3]

The Japanese certainly did make up wargame outcomes to suit themselves. But one must remember that the timing of the critical strike at Midway, catching the Japanese as they refuelled, was so fortutitous that no die roll could ever simulate it. I'm no statistician, but the odds on the sequence of events leading up to those bombs hitting would be very, very high. Given their progress up to that time, the Japanese could build a sound case that the carrier battle at Midway would actually go their way. They had been lucky up to that point, and at Midway, luck fell decisively to the Americans...

Read the book "Shattered Sword". The Japanese operations on June 4th reminded me of a boxer (the US) who keeps jabbing at his opponent (the IJN) and never allows him to throw a punch, and then finally decks him as he is worn down.

Some Japanese sources say the Midway battle was Japans best planned defeat.

 

[BombTaxi]

The Americans certainly showed a tenacity and determination that the Japaneres would have done well to emulate. But I firmly believe that had it not been for the incredibly fortuitous timing of the US dive bomber strike, the Japanese would have escaped with much less damage inflicted. Time and again in war, luck counts for even more than planning or equipment - Samar strikes me as a another engagement where Lady Luck really smiled upon the US Navy.

I should really read up a bit more on Midway though - the only monograph I have read on the battle is Walter Lord's Incredible Victory. I think the title does much to sum up the luck the USN had against statistically and militarily superior forces.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

The Americans certainly showed a tenacity and determination that the Japaneres would have done well to emulate. But I firmly believe that had it not been for the incredibly fortuitous timing of the US dive bomber strike, the Japanese would have escaped with much less damage inflicted. Time and again in war, luck counts for even more than planning or equipment - Samar strikes me as a another engagement where Lady Luck really smiled upon the US Navy.

I should really read up a bit more on Midway though - the only monograph I have read on the battle is Walter Lord's Incredible Victory. I think the title does much to sum up the luck the USN had against statistically and militarily superior forces.

Well, I'm reading Shattered Swords right now, and I'm up to the part where the dive bombers attack. The Yortown's squadrons were the only ones able to coordinate an attack. I think Bombing 3 attacked around the same time Torpedo 3 went in, Vt-3 at Hiryu, and VB-3 at Soryu. I will agree though, a little luck played in, though I think the Japanese CAP was stretched too far, and during the previous attacks, the CAP would converge on a single attack. If I'm reading the book correctly, the CAP was ill suited to counter multiple attacks from the Americans.

 

[syscom3]

.....If I'm reading the book correctly, the CAP was ill suited to counter multiple attacks from the Americans.

Yes, and I will also mention that the IJN had essentially no radio coverage or doctrine to allow coordinated defenses to be made.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

Yes, from what I've read, the escorts would fire shells or emit smoke to alert the CAP fighters. I also think the IJN was too focused on torpedo attacks, and had target fixation on the US torpedo squadrons.

 

[BombTaxi]

The luck, as I see it, was in the dive bombers attacking at exactly the time the Japanese were re-arming planes. Loads of combustibles sitting around just waiting to be hit by a bomb. Half an hour either way, and the Japanese might have left Midway with damaged carriers instead of sunk ones.

The target fixation on torpedo bombers is perhaps understandable - iunder normal circumstances the torpedo is deadlier than the bomb, and fleets had compliocated anti-torpedo measures in place well before WWI. At Jutland, the Grand Fleet battle line totally disengaged to avoid a torpedo attacck, so you can see how important torpedo defense was, and no doubt the Japanese felt the same.

 

[syscom3]

The luck, as I see it, was in the dive bombers attacking at exactly the time the Japanese were re-arming planes. Loads of combustibles sitting around just waiting to be hit by a bomb. .....

One other thing ...... the Japanese carriers had fully enclosed hanger decks. The 1000 pound bombs going off in them were amplified in the confined spaces.

 

[timshatz]

The luck, as I see it, was in the dive bombers attacking at exactly the time the Japanese were re-arming planes. Loads of combustibles sitting around just waiting to be hit by a bomb. Half an hour either way, and the Japanese might have left Midway with damaged carriers instead of sunk ones.

The target fixation on torpedo bombers is perhaps understandable - iunder normal circumstances the torpedo is deadlier than the bomb, and fleets had compliocated anti-torpedo measures in place well before WWI. At Jutland, the Grand Fleet battle line totally disengaged to avoid a torpedo attacck, so you can see how important torpedo defense was, and no doubt the Japanese felt the same.

In "Shattered Sword", the author makes a point of pointing out the difference between the Japanese fighter direction and the US fighter direction. The Japanese was organic, meaning the fighters flowed to the point at which the attack was coming. Very much like white blood cells attack an infection in the body. Swarming defense. Very effective if you are being attacked from one direction. Not very good against an attack from multiple directions (intentional or not).

Whereas the US had radar directed interception, with some methodologies copied from the Brits. While it was in it's infancy and not very advanced, it was better than the Japanese method. Later in the war, refinements made it pretty effective. But at Midway, it gave the US the ability to locate an incoming raid furhter out than AAA range. That made a huge difference.

 

[Vassili Zaitzev]

I found something pretty interesting reading Shattered Sword. R Leonard's father was in Midway, correct? Because I found a passage that mentions a Lt. Bill Leonard. Here, I'll paraphrase it. It's taken when Tomonagas Kate's launched their attack on CV-5.

"Here, though, he had found another Grumman coming at him head-on, firing. Damaged, the Kanko jettisioned its fish and turned for a suicide run against the carrier. But the Wildcat, piloted by Lt. Bill Leonard, stuck to his tail, firing from below and setting the torpedo plane on fire. In the end, Leonard brought the kanko down, crashing it off Yorktown's port bow.

 

[Butters]

If you're going to play this game, you ought'a include the improved USN submarine tactics and torpedoes. You know, like the ones that sank the vaunted Shinano before it ever entered service...

JL