Chain of Command: Aviation Assets in WWII

[Zipper730]

I'm pretty sure this will sound stupid, but the USN & USAAF seemed to have different command structures for aviation assets.

From what it appeared in the USAAF (and feel free to point out any errors), there was the head of the USAAF at the top, then there were the numbered AF units, and then below that there were Combat Wings & Air Divisions, and then Air-Groups; below that were squadrons.

How was the USN set up?

I remember watching a documentary on the Franklin (it was a carrier that got two bombs in a mast-head attack that set some of the most spectacular blazes on an aircraft carrier that didn't sink -- it also killed 700-800 people), and there was a mention of an Admiral who was the head of Naval Aviation in the pacific

 

[fliger747]

I'll miss some here since this is via memory:

Of course at the top of the chain is the CNO or COMINCH, which was Ernie King. Bureau of Aeronautics mostly was in charge of Aircraft issues such as design and procurements. BuPers (Previously Bureau of Navigation) shuffled folks around. There would be a theater commander, for Example CINPAC Chester Nimitz. Below this level in the pacific JH Towers was Commander of Naval Air Forces pacific under Nimitz. Below this level JS McCain was AIRSOLS at Noumea during the Solomons campaign. However fleet based aircraft were generally under a group squadron command under a CAG, or Commander Air Group. The squadrons would each be such as Fighter, Torpedo or Scout/Bomber. The CAG was at the time under command of the ships Captain, who would be under the direction of an admiral in command of the task group or sub group.

A little complicated and subject to change as personnel and chairs shuffled during the war. Originally a carrier's air grope was assigned to that ship but as the war wore on and new ships and groups were formed and replacement groups rotated in and out this no longer held.

Briefly; On shipboard the task group commander, ships Captain, CAG, then squadron commanders.

More studied answers welcome! Cheers: Tom

 

[Zipper730]

Of course at the top of the chain is the CNO or COMINCH, which was Ernie King.

Ironically the title was CINCUS but it was objected to because it would read as "Sink us". I'm surprised they didn't go with CINCNAV.

There would be a theater commander, for Example CINPAC Chester Nimitz. Below this level in the pacific JH Towers was Commander of Naval Air Forces pacific under Nimitz.

But there was no Commander Naval Air Forces?

Below this level JS McCain was AIRSOLS at Noumea during the Solomons campaign.

What's AIRSOLS stand for?

fleet based aircraft were generally under a group squadron command under a CAG, or Commander Air Group. The squadrons would each be such as Fighter, Torpedo or Scout/Bomber. The CAG was at the time under command of the ships Captain, who would be under the direction of an admiral in command of the task group or sub group.

That part I actually know... the issue is what happened above the air-group level, basically.

Originally a carrier's air grope was assigned to that ship but as the war wore on and new ships and groups were formed and replacement groups rotated in and out this no longer held.

That's interesting, modern day usually an air-wing is assigned to a ship...

 

[fliger747]

The Naval Aviators were in effect under the tactical command of whatever units they were assigned to work with. I think this ensured better harmony of purpose and utilization. For instance the Navy Pilots on Guadalcanal were under Roy Geiger, USMC. The upper levels of the shore based command structure were mostly administrative.

AIRSOLS was command of the air forces in the Solomons, Hdqrs based in Noumea under John S (Slew) McCain.

Stolen from Wiki:

Allied Pacific Ocean Areas Command AirSols was a joint command for Allied air units in the Solomon Islands campaign of World War II , from April 1943 to June 1944. It was subordinate to the Allied Pacific Ocean Areas POA Command. AirSols superseded and absorbed Cactus Air Force , which controlled Allied air units in the Solomons during 1942–43.

The CAG of a carrier air group in WWII was usually a full Commander, who might actually lead the group into action. An Example was the Navu's leading Ace, David McCampbell. Today the CAG is a full captain and commands the Airgroup independently of the floating airfield which it operates from. Much like a wing commander and base commander have different spheres of influence. Usually with a carrier group the overall command and employment is via an admiral.

 

[Zipper730]

The Naval Aviators were in effect under the tactical command of whatever units they were assigned to work with. I think this ensured better harmony of purpose and utilization. For instance the Navy Pilots on Guadalcanal were under Roy Geiger, USMC. The upper levels of the shore based command structure were mostly administrative.

That's actually interesting, though I suppose when you consider they started out as scouting planes on battleships, it kind of makes sense that if that idea was followed, you'd have a decentralized set-up.

After WWII, was there are more centralized layout, or did it remain decentralized like this?

I would speculate that the administrative areas involved moving aircrew around?

AIRSOLS was command of the air forces in the Solomons, Hdqrs based in Noumea under John S (Slew) McCain

Okay, AIR SOLomanS...

The CAG of a carrier air group in WWII was usually a full Commander, who might actually lead the group into action. An Example was the Navu's leading Ace, David McCampbell.

Until 1986... I'm not sure why they set things up like they did: It seemed a bad idea.

I'm curious how
1. the command structure differs from the USAAF/USAF's base and air-wing commanders over a CAG & CO?
2. the Royal Navy FAA compared to the Navy?

 

[XBe02Drvr]

That's interesting, modern day usually an air-wing is assigned to a ship.

On a per deployment basis. The air wing doesn't "belong" permanently to the ship. It is assigned there for a deployment, and often for several consecutive deployments. Between deployments the air wing "dissolves" and the various squadrons disperse to their "home" naval air stations to train for the next deployment while the ship undergoes maintenance and refit at its home port.

But there was no Commander Naval Air Forces?

Generally there was a theatre or regional Commander Naval Air, such as COMNAVAIRLANT and then something like (don't know the exact title) Vice CNO for Air. This chain of command would be responsible for training, procurement, support, and administration functions, while operational tactical command would be through task force, regional, and theatre commands. (COMTF38 -> COMFAIRSOLS -> COMFAIRPAC -> CINCPAC -> CNO.
Alphabet soup. Got it?
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Zipper730]

On a per deployment basis.

No, I already got that -- what I meant is that CVW-11 for example is not forever tied to CVN-65 (if I recall this arrangement was in 1986 -- somebody made some patches that had "Mobile Chernobyl" on it -- boy, the top brass had *no* sense of humor about that...).

Generally there was a theatre or regional Commander Naval Air, such as COMNAVAIRLANT and then something like (don't know the exact title) Vice CNO for Air.

So, VCNO (Air) is like the quivalent of Commanding General of the Army Air Corps, essentially?

 

[soulezoo]

Glad I was in the Air Force... much simpler. We used crayons. LOL

 

[XBe02Drvr]

So, VCNO (Air) is like the quivalent of Commanding General of the Army Air Corps, essentially?

Yeah, something like that. I'm not sure of the title (WAY, WAY above my pay grade). Maybe something like COMNAVBUAER?
In any case there were two separate chains of command, administrative and tactical.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[swampyankee]

On a per deployment basis. The air wing doesn't "belong" permanently to the ship. It is assigned there for a deployment, and often for several consecutive deployments. Between deployments the air wing "dissolves" and the various squadrons disperse to their "home" naval air stations to train for the next deployment while the ship undergoes maintenance and refit at its home port.


Generally there was a theatre or regional Commander Naval Air, such as COMNAVAIRLANT and then something like (don't know the exact title) Vice CNO for Air. This chain of command would be responsible for training, procurement, support, and administration functions, while operational tactical command would be through task force, regional, and theatre commands. (COMTF38 -> COMFAIRSOLS -> COMFAIRPAC -> CINCPAC -> CNO.
Alphabet soup. Got it?
Cheers,
Wes

That sounds an awful lot like martrix management in industry. It also sounds a lot like how [I understand] the USN organizes its ships: squadrons are administrative but not tactical; operations are in task units of various sizes where ships are assigned from squadrons.

The USAAF probably understood this dual path; their leadership may have had philosophical reasons for a more centralized command structure, but the strategic bombing campaign was a very large operation with no need to coordinate with other operational commands. I suspect the reason the USAAF ended up eschewing maritime operations was the need to coordinate at a tactical level with naval forces in a way that interfered with "the unity of air power," possibly in the same what that effective CAS required such coordination.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

It sounds a lot like how the USN organizes its ships: squadrons are administrative but not tactical; operations are in task units of various sizes where ships are assigned from squadrons.

Except in aviation the administrative and tactical chains of command converge at the squadron/air wing level. When the squadron is fragged (tasked) with a mission, the Squadron CO selects the A/Cs and crews that will go, and often will lead the mission if their A/C type is tasked with strike leadership.

I suspect the reason the USAAF ended up eschewing maritime operations was the need to coordinate at a tactical level with naval forces in a way that interfered with "the unity of air power," possibly in the same what that effective CAS required such coordination.

No commander likes to cede operational control of any portion of his/her assets to another service with different priorities and methods, especially if they perceive a history of abuse of their prerogatives. ("Effing ground pounders just don't understand aviation! Never have, never will!")
USN/USMC, with their tradition of embedding trained aviators with the troops as FACs, are somewhat less susceptible to this sort of culture clash. But everybody (Army, Navy, Marines) hates being under USAF control. ("Effing high 'n mighty zoomies are too effing big for their britches!")
This from 3 1/2 years on a base that was 34% USN, 32% USAF, 26% Army, and 8% USMC, and the AF wanted to take over and make an AFB.
Cheers,
Wes

 

[Shortround6]

I suspect the reason the USAAF ended up eschewing maritime operations was the need to coordinate at a tactical level with naval forces in a way that interfered with "the unity of air power," possibly in the same what that effective CAS required such coordination.

In part they got out of the maritime operations (sub hunting basicly) because they viewed it as a side line at the time. It was also part of a deal where they swapped an AAF manufacturing asset for an Navy manufacturing plant (Boeing Renton) that was going to build large flying boats.

and got it to build B-29s instead. The navy also got many of the contracts for the Lockheed Ventura swapped over.

Up until that time the navy had been prohibited from using land based aircraft for maritime patrol, which helps explain the number of seaplanes/flying boats

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Up until that time the navy had been prohibited from using land based aircraft for maritime patrol

How dumb is that!

 

[Shortround6]

How dumb is that!

Depends on your point of view

In the late 1930s the goal of the USAAF was not to defend the country but to split off from the army and become an independent and equal armed force (if not superior) to the army or navy. To do this they needed to show congress that they were performing jobs the Army and navy weren't doing.
The whole rational behind the B-17(or other large bombers), as put out to congress (and public) was defending America's shores far out to sea (bombing invasion fleets) , not bombing foreign lands. Now there was an element (or more than one) of deception here.
There was also duplication of effort as the Navy spent a lot of money and effort getting around this restriction.
See the variety of flying boats the Navy ordered all during the 30s like

first flying at the end of 1937. over 200 of the later versions were built.

 

[BiffF15]

Except in aviation the administrative and tactical chains of command converge at the squadron/air wing level. When the squadron is fragged (tasked) with a mission, the Squadron CO selects the A/Cs and crews that will go, and often will lead the mission if their A/C type is tasked with strike leadership.

No commander likes to cede operational control of any portion of his/her assets to another service with different priorities and methods, especially if they perceive a history of abuse of their prerogatives. ("Effing ground pounders just don't understand aviation! Never have, never will!")
USN/USMC, with their tradition of embedding trained aviators with the troops as FACs, are somewhat less susceptible to this sort of culture clash. But everybody (Army, Navy, Marines) hates being under USAF control. ("Effing high 'n mighty zoomies are too effing big for their britches!")
This from 3 1/2 years on a base that was 34% USN, 32% USAF, 26% Army, and 8% USMC, and the AF wanted to take over and make an AFB.
Cheers,
Wes

Wes,

When an airwar is to be executed the USAF will run it, it's part and parcel of our core competencies. The entire airspace structure, air refueling tracks, targeting, deconfliction of air and ground assets (artillery), asset protection, ETC. The USN / USMC contribute without a doubt, but are very small portion of an entire airwar (asset percentage plays for one branch). Also realize that the JFACC (Joint Force Air Component Commander) could be USAF, USN, USMC. The structure is set up and ran by the boys in blue regardless of who runs it.

Cheers,
Biff

 

[Zipper730]

How dumb is that!

I would say it's pretty stupid -- frankly: I think flying boats have their uses. That said, I can't say that land-based aircraft don't have their uses: They often out-performed their seaplane counterparts as they could carry weapons internally using straight-forward arrangements.

I'd definitely value a flying boat for the following jobs: Rescue, Sub-Hunting, Merchant-Raiding, and missions that require the ability to operate at a fast tempo (able to refuel and re-arm at sea); if I was planning on hammering targets close to land bases, and bombardment of land based targets -- I'd take the land-planes.

Depends on your point of view

In the late 1930s the goal of the USAAF was not to defend the country but to split off from the army and become an independent and equal armed force (if not superior) to the army or navy. . . . The whole rational behind the B-17(or other large bombers), as put out to congress (and public) was defending America's shores far out to sea (bombing invasion fleets) , not bombing foreign lands.

Of course, and that was basically nonsense: The entire goal was to attack targets that supported war-effort (airfields, harbors & docks, railway yards, and oil-refineries, power-generation, etc) and the civilian population and where they resided.

When an airwar is to be executed the USAF will run it, it's part and parcel of our core competencies. The entire airspace structure, air refueling tracks, targeting, deconfliction of air and ground assets (artillery), asset protection, ETC.

The goal of independent air arms usually was to control everything that flew, but often exemptions either existed or were made for various reasons

• Royal Air Force: They pretty much got everything, except (maybe) scouting used on battleships initially. It didn't work well as Coastal Command (despite the obvious importance to an island nation) didn't appear to be well funded, and the Fleet Air Arm was restricted by the Washington Naval Treaty, which limited the size and number of aircraft carriers (and this in turn reduced the demand for large numbers of carrier-based aircraft, and the R&D needed). While the USN and IJNAS were limited by this as well, both had the advantage of funding their own air-arms, which gives a natural desire to see it well funded and equipped (think of it this way, if you had to fund two places: One was your house, and the other was some guy you don't even get along with all that well -- you'll probably first take care of your stuff first; then take care of his stuff next), and the USN also managed to get the USMC to agree to procure (largely) naval aircraft, which basically drove up the supply and demand. In the late 1930's, they regained control of carrier based (and possibly other ship-based) aviation
• Royal Canadian Air Force: Apparently artillery spotting aircraft were procured for the Army's artillery spotting duties.
• Luftwaffe: It seemed they got everything except scout-planes used on Naval Warships. The history of Germany's re-armament was quite fascinating as it was largely a cloak and dagger affair until they kind of let it all hang out in 1935. They actually developed an aircraft carrier (Graf Zeppelin), and were at least in the process of navalizing several aircraft to this effect. Unfortunately Goring wanted to pretty much control everything that flew and the Kriegsmarine didn't seem to agree with that kind of thing.

There was also the USAF: Aimed initially to pretty much absorb all USN aircraft and sink all the carriers and relegate the rest of the USN into a glorified coast-guard and submarine-service, it was beaten back through some creative methods. The USAAF basically became the USAF excepting some transports and observation planes, which the Army got to keep until 1967. Helicopters were relatively new, and the USAF initially gave them weight limitations they could work with, and the US Army eventually managed to wiggle out of such restrictions and started arming their helicopters.

With one of the AF's roles being CAS: There were shitloads of problems involved that involved both services. In Korea, the decision-making authority to launch air-strikes was placed fairly high up in the Army's chain of command (under the belief that it was the best way to coordinate resources to the maximum effect), and might very well have produces sluggish response times. The USAF's coordination with the Army was quite poor at the time. After the Korean War, the development of smaller nuclear weapons and the New Look resulted in a decision to develop interceptors, bombers, and nuclear-strike capability, but CAS operations were poorly funded as part of national policy, and the fact that the bomber generals got a lock on the budget. It got so bad, that the US Army wanted to take over the CAS mission entirely (the sad part is, I'm not entirely sure that would have been a bad thing) and, while they lost, they would attempt this again by procuring the A4D-2N for this role, and the N-156F as some kind of scouting aircraft (which strikes me as a secret way of developing fighters), and were ultimately defeated as a result of this. Ultimately in 1967, it would appear that the USAF took control of most all fixed wing aircraft in exchange for the US Army being allowed to arm it's helos without restriction.

The US Army, USAF in particular, but also the USN, had issues with the use of land-based and sea-based missiles. There seemed to be no dispute that land-based aircraft were the preserve of the USAF, except when it came to the CAS issue, otherwise the problems were enormous. The USAF wanted to control ballistic and cruise missiles, seeing them as extensions of bombers, and SAM's, seeing them as extensions of interceptors. The Army saw SAM's as part of their role of AAA, with some cruise and ballistic missiles being an extension of offensive artillery. By in large, the US Army largely won this round: By 1956, the Secretary of Defense decided that missiles with ranges over 200 nm were the USAF's territory, and those under were Army territory -- after Sputnik -- the requirement was lifted, and they pretty much got control of all ABM development (ironically the Sprint missile looked almost like a dead-ringer to Project Wizard, which was the USAF's ABM project of choice): I'd say it worked out pretty well as Project Sentinel/Safeguard (I forgot which one was last) came in on time, and to cost (not something one can say about most military projects of any military service branch), and they got a national defense mission that didn't just include holding the population down in the event of the expected nuclear war that would see lots of awesome fireballs and spectacular bon-fires. That said the USAF managed some wins, including the "F-99" BOMARC, by adopting a policy of designating missiles as fighters (SAM and AAM) and bombers (ASM and SSM), under the creative idea that if they classify them as unmanned fighters, they get control over them (names have power).

Yes, I assume that you'll probably arrive at the inevitable conclusion that brevity is not my strong suit (and if you did -- you'd be right)

 

[Shortround6]

Of course, and that was basically nonsense: The entire goal was to attack targets that supported war-effort (airfields, harbors & docks, railway yards, and oil-refineries, power-generation, etc) and the civilian population and where they resided.

You are forgetting the times (basicly the 1930s) and the capabilities of aircraft in those times. The Air Corp had dreamed of being independent since the WW I But until just before ( or at the start) of WW I the geographic position of the United States meant that no plane of time had any possibility of reaching a potential enemy, dropping any sort of bomb and returning to the US. With the US position of isolationism and neutrality telling congress you wanted money to build an Air Force that could bomb Europe (the only source of potential enemies in the 20s) or Japan in the mid/late 30s wouldn't have gone over well.

What planes could do in 1943 and later was different, people may have dreamed of those capabilities in the 20s and 30s but they weren't close to reality. Congress was pretty tight fisted in those days and wasn't going to pay for a bunch of pie in the sky dreams. By Framing the bomber as coastal defence they (the flyboys) could go after the money spent on coastal fortifications. They could push the boundaries of what was actually possible. Even B-29s couldn't bomb Europe from the US and the possibility of building the B-29 in 1938 didn't exist, as shown by the B-19. The Navy was also jealously guarding it's roles.


See Interception of the Rex - Wikipedia

for something of an overview of what was going on at the time.

I would say it's pretty stupid -- frankly: I think flying boats have their uses. That said, I can't say that land-based aircraft don't have their uses: They often out-performed their seaplane counterparts as they could carry weapons internally using straight-forward arrangements.

I'd definitely value a flying boat for the following jobs: Rescue, Sub-Hunting, Merchant-Raiding, and missions that require the ability to operate at a fast tempo (able to refuel and re-arm at sea); if I was planning on hammering targets close to land bases, and bombardment of land based targets -- I'd take the land-planes.

The seaplane was/is something of an illusion in many of those roles. Too much depends on the state of the seas making any plans to conduct such operations too weather dependent.

Some oceans/seas are calmer than others but seaplanes most often operated from sheltered waters. Seaplanes in the interwar period had the big advantage of essentially unlimited runway length, if it took a big seaplane close to a mile to take-off, well many areas near their bases had a mile of sheltered water. Nearly mile long runways on land didn't exist at the time. However during the war long runways were built close to many existing seaplane bases and in areas with no seas/lakes/rivers and the seaplane/flying boat days were over.

Refueling and especially rearming in open ocean is pretty much a stunt.

 

[GrauGeist]

Luftwaffe: It seemed they got everything except scout-planes used on Naval Warships.

ALL aircraft in Germany (and land-based flak) was under control of the Luftwaffe.

The scouting aircraft stationed aboard Capitol ships were all attached to Bordfliegergruppe 196 (BFGr. 196).

The other naval aviation units of the Luftwaffe were:
Küstenfliegergruppe (KüFlGr) - coastal recon and anti-shipping.
Minensuchgruppe (MSGr) - mine sweeping.
Seeaufklärungsgruppe (SAGr) - maritime recon.
Trägergruppe (TrGr) - carrier operations.

 

[nuuumannn]

Depends on your point of view

Absolutely. The RAF was in control of maritime patrol assets after 1918 and it wasn't until 1936 and the introduction of the Avro Anson I that the RAF got a land based maritime patrol asset. Obviously the Sunderland soldiered on for many years after its entry into service before WW2, but Coastal Command acquired many different land based aircraft for its needs, including Wellingtons, Warwicks, Whitleys, Fortresses and the most suited for the long range role, the LB.30 Liberator. The Sundy remained in service post war for many years (The RNZAF being the last user, retiring its MR.Vs in 1969 for P-3s) and was supplimented by Neptunes in the 50s RAF.

 

[LarryJ]

Regarding the original thought about the Army Air Forces aligned under a single HQ, that didn't hold true in the theaters of operation for tactical air power. The theater commanders were in charge of the day to day operations of the air units in his theater. When the B-29s came into the fracus, Gen Arnold wanted them to be used only for Strategic Bombing and kept control of them in the 20th AF, essentially based in Washington DC, later the 20th HQ was moved to Guam. MacArthur wanted the B-29s for tactical missions, but Arnold refused. Gen George Kenney held several roles in the Pacific airwar and was the Commander of the Allied Air Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) (and other duty titles) and worked for MacArthur.