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And what I'm looking for is a commander who could foresee and counter the tactical and strategic brilliance of Gen Yamashita and Col Tsuji. Anything less is simply rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic, no matter how much kit you dedicate to the task. Even the latest and greatest Spits came up short against A6Ms and Ki43s when they met.What I'm looking for is to break the revolving door of commanders in Malaya. Instead let's an established general staff from 1938-42. Maybe that's Dobie.
Not so much hindsight. I don't know that Dobie wasn't a fine commander in Malaya. What I'm looking for is to break the revolving door of commanders in Malaya. Instead let's an established general staff from 1938-42. Maybe that's Dobie.
Might as well try to shift Gibraltar Rock.Are you now trying to entirely change the way the British military operates?
I'm trying to consider if not having an entirely new general staff arrive in 1941 but instead one that's had some years of working together might make a difference. How can we make that happen within SOPs?Are you now trying to entirely change the way the British military operates?
The Wiki article on Dobie has a couple of quotes from his correspondence with the War Office about the defence of Singapore going back to 1936. At that time Percival was his Chief of Staff. They both clearly recognised where the danger to Singapore and its naval base would come from in the event of Japanese aggression.Not so much hindsight. I don't know that Dobie wasn't a fine commander in Malaya. What I'm looking for is to break the revolving door of commanders in Malaya. Instead let's an established general staff from 1938-42. Maybe that's Dobie.
Well, by winter 1939 it will be clear that the Royal Navy is not coming. In early 1940 nearly the entirety of the RN in Malaya had been withdrawn to waters closer to home, including the submarine flotillas, cruisers and destroyers, and even the monitor HMS Terror. If we have steady command from 1939 to 1942, our Malaya Command's general staff will have no notion that the RN will protect them.Going this far back to bring about a better defence of Malaya/Singapore is dealing with the current plan at that time, namely the Singapore strategy head on! You won't need a strong defence, the royal Navy will protect you!
Not the same thing.patrol boats or MTGBs
Well, by winter 1939 it will be clear that the Royal Navy is not coming. In early 1940 nearly the entirety of the RN in Malaya had been withdrawn to waters closer to home, including the submarine flotillas, cruisers and destroyers, and even the monitor HMS Terror.
Though I do wonder what our local Admiral in command at Malaya will be doing from 1939-1941. I'd like to think he's trying to get some patrol boats or MTGBs whipped up from someplace. Could India or Oz contrive such vessels?
I imagine Air Vice Marshall Pulford, having arrived in May 1941 to take up his command as C/O RAF must have wondered why he had rough strip airfields all across the territory but only a few aircraft and few resources for their maintenance or defence. Just maybe, having the new RAF C/O and overall CNC Malaya arrive in 1939 rather than 1941 might help produce a more sensible dispersion of airfields, for example.Which was partly why they got into such an unholy mess about building airfields in locations that were hard to defend.
Similar to the Wargames in the 30s that showed Pearl Harbor's vulnerability. In Pear Harbor's case the easiest defense was to leave the Fleet in San Diego and Long Beach.The Wiki article on Dobie has a couple of quotes from his correspondence with the War Office about the defence of Singapore going back to 1936. At that time Percival was his Chief of Staff. They both clearly recognised where the danger to Singapore and its naval base would come from in the event of Japanese aggression.
- I can't help feeling that the security of the Fortress might be better served by having a stronger force in being outside it … I consequently feel that the answers to the possible threat (of Japanese landing and establishing an advanced base on the mainland) is primarily to be found in suitable mobile forces in being in the Malay Peninsula … – Dobbie's letter as GOC (Malaya), to the War Office on 17 March 1936.
Dobbie's hypothesis regarding the capture of Singapore
In 1936, Dobbie, then General Officer Commanding (Malaya) stationed in Singapore, made an inquiry to find out if more forces were required on mainland Malaya to prevent the Japanese landing and capturing forward bases to attack Singapore. Percival, then his Chief Staff Officer, was assigned the task of drawing up a tactical appreciation on how the Japanese were most likely to attack. Percival's report in late 1937 did confirm that north Malaya could serve as a base for the conquest of Singapore and Borneo.[36] Both Dobbie and Percival made it clear that Singapore could no longer be seen as a self-contained naval base, and that its survival rested on the defence of mainland Malaya. So in May 1938, Dobbie wrote to the Chief of Staff:
"It is an attack from the northward that I regard as the greatest potential danger to the Fortress (Singapore). Such an attack could be carried out in the northeast monsoon. The jungle is not in most places, impassable for infantry."[37]
War Office Doc Number W106/2441
So it seems that there were a lot of minds that needed changing back in London at the War Office as well as amongst the political establishment in Malaya & Singapore itself that wasn't prepared to cough up the necessary monies to carry out the defence that Dobie envisaged as far back as 1936.
Against that kind of background and then a war forcing difficult choices to be made about the allocation of resources around the world, it is difficult to see just who you would appoint to achieve your aims.