Churchill agrees to RAF reinforcements to Malaya. What to send?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Thoughts on the Curtiss-Wright CW-21? What's the Demon? When I search online for combat aircraft called Demon I get the Hawker Demon fighter produced to 1937 and the postwar McDonnell F3H Demon.
I agree, more Blenheims would be ideal, both fighter and bomber variants. Though the "fighter" version is still a lumbering beast, as shown below.



Curtiss Wright Demon, R-1820, small, light, fast climbing.
 
CW-21B

1586259244564.png


1586259278844.png
 
Thoughts on the Curtiss-Wright CW-21? What's the Demon?

If I recall, the CW-21 was sometimes called the Demon.

There were scads of problems with the defense of Malaya. Not all of them could be solved by adding hardware; the wetware of some of the senior leadership was also problematic, as was the level of training of some of the ground forces.
 
If I recall, the CW-21 was sometimes called the Demon.
I see that now, I feel a little silly there, asking what's the Demon and about the CW-21. The tail looks like it would twist and fail in any high g maneuvers.

It's too bad that a quick/cheaper to build empire fighter wasn't built pre-war. The Dutch built the Fokker D.XXI for their empire defence. With the largest empire in world history, Britain should have built something, like the Miles M.20 made in Canada, Australia or even India, using whatever inline or radial engine could be had. The M.20 is as fast as the Ki-43 and much heavier armed, with robust, fixed undercarriage. It seems to be the ideal empire fighter, though we'd want to confirm that it is actually cheaper, easier and faster to build than Hurricanes or Spitfires.
 
I see that now, I feel a little silly there, asking what's the Demon and about the CW-21. The tail looks like it would twist and fail in any high g maneuvers.

It's too bad that a quick/cheaper to build empire fighter wasn't built pre-war. The Dutch built the Fokker D.XXI for their empire defence. With the largest empire in world history, Britain should have built something, like the Miles M.20 made in Canada, Australia or even India, using whatever inline or radial engine could be had. The M.20 is as fast as the Ki-43 and much heavier armed, with robust, fixed undercarriage. It seems to be the ideal empire fighter, though we'd want to confirm that it is actually cheaper, easier and faster to build than Hurricanes or Spitfires.

I'm not convinced that more kit would help without a change of strategy and lots of money. The distances involved in the Asia-Pacific theatre are huge. They make the Eastern Front look like a walk in the park. To me, IMO what are needed are fortress islands to retreat too and then await reinforcement. Also, one mother fucking huge navy that can overwhelm the IJN in all theatres.
 
I'm not convinced that more kit would help without a change of strategy and lots of money. The distances involved in the Asia-Pacific theatre are huge. They make the Eastern Front look like a walk in the park. To me, IMO what are needed are fortress islands to retreat too and then await reinforcement. Also, one mother fucking huge navy that can overwhelm the IJN in all theatres.
Initiative would help too. As a Brit-Canuck and imperial history fan it often seems incredible that Britain built an empire at all, being so timid about flexing its muscles. In Sept 1940, Japan invaded FIC, for starters it should have been Britain invading FIC as soon as France surrendered, same as Britain attacked the French navy and invaded French North Africa and Madagascar. But assuming the Japanese invasion of FIC was a surprise, from that moment onward Japan's aims on Malaya and DEI should have been clear. It was to the Dutch, seeing how they deployed many of their best submarines and warships and much of their Air Force to DEI, even when the Netherlands were under threat of German invasion.

From autumn 1941, with the Germans busy in Russia, RN submarines should have been deployed, and MTBs produced in Indian, ANZ or local yards. Stop the IJA amphibous landings along with execute Operation Matador to neutralize Thailand and Japan will face some real challenges. And preparation and war exercises FFS! General Bond accurately predicted how the Japanese would invade, but no one made any preparations or exercises to counter that exact and accurate prediction.

In 2019 I stood on the north shore of both Singapore and Hong Kong. The latter was a lost cause, but in both cases I imaged it must have been terrifying to know that the Japanese were on the other side of that thin strip of water and no one is coming to help you. The men and women looking across, not caring that Britain was stressed in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and North Africa, must have asked what's the point of having the largest, most powerful empire the world has seen?
 
Initiative would help too. As a Brit-Canuck and imperial history fan it often seems incredible that Britain built an empire at all, being so timid about flexing its muscles. In Sept 1940, Japan invaded FIC, for starters it should have been Britain invading FIC as soon as France surrendered, same as Britain attacked the French navy and invaded French North Africa and Madagascar. But assuming the Japanese invasion of FIC was a surprise, from that moment onward Japan's aims on Malaya and DEI should have been clear. It was to the Dutch, seeing how they deployed many of their best submarines and warships and much of their Air Force to DEI, even when the Netherlands were under threat of German invasion.

From autumn 1941, with the Germans busy in Russia, RN submarines should have been deployed, and MTBs produced in Indian, ANZ or local yards. Stop the IJA amphibous landings along with execute Operation Matador to neutralize Thailand and Japan will face some real challenges. And preparation and war exercises FFS! General Bond accurately predicted how the Japanese would invade, but no one made any preparations or exercises to counter that exact and accurate prediction.

In 2019 I stood on the north shore of both Singapore and Hong Kong. The latter was a lost cause, but in both cases I imaged it must have been terrifying to know that the Japanese were on the other side of that thin strip of water and no one is coming to help you. The men and women looking across, not caring that Britain was stressed in the North Atlantic, Mediterranean and North Africa, must have asked what's the point of having the largest, most powerful empire the world has seen?

The British Empire, like all the other modern empires, was built by invading and conquering people who couldn't fight back effectively. When Germany tried that twice and Japan, once, in the 20th Century, they got their collective heads handed to them.
 
The British Empire, like all the other modern empires, was built by invading and conquering people who couldn't fight back effectively. When Germany tried that twice and Japan, once, in the 20th Century, they got their collective heads handed to them.
True, but Britain threatened Russia with war in 1885 and France in 1898. Crimean War aside, 19th century Britain wasn't timid about threatening other Great Powers, always in the goal of coercing a diplomatic resolution. 19th century Britain just seemed diplomatically smarter, more agile and of course willing to wave its sword.

Yes, 20th century Britain is terrified and focused on Germany, but pre-war, in April 1939 when Britain made the commitment to send the BEF to France, Japan was already on the frontier of FIC. Britain should have made a requirement that a small BEF be also sent to FIC, likely two Indian divisions, just as a deterrent to Japanese moves, allowing for an earlier Operation Masterdom in case France falls.
 
True, but Britain threatened Russia with war in 1885 and France in 1898. Crimean War aside, 19th century Britain wasn't timid about threatening other Great Powers, always in the goal of coercing a diplomatic resolution. 19th century Britain just seemed diplomatically smarter, more agile and of course willing to wave its sword.

Yes, 20th century Britain is terrified and focused on Germany, but pre-war, in April 1939 when Britain made the commitment to send the BEF to France, Japan was already on the frontier of FIC. Britain should have made a requirement that a small BEF be also sent to FIC, likely two Indian divisions, just as a deterrent to Japanese moves.

Terrified is not the right word. There was fear of carnage similar to that in the Great War and Germany, in the mid/late 1930s was perceived as the principle threat to the status quo. However, we must also be careful of applying the retrospectroscope. In 1939, Japan was NOT a threat. Yes, the international community was unhappy about Japan's expeditions in China but that wasn't deemed important enough to generate a military response. There were various efforts to create an "International Air Force" to operate in China but it was small beans and did little to deter further aggression.

In order to disrupt Japanese was plans, the UK had to have the foresight to know what those plans were....and the problem is even the Japanese leaders didn't know what the war plans were (other than victory in China). I'd recommend reading "Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences" translated and edited by Nobutaka Ike. It's not a light read, comprising primarily the minutes of Japanese policy meetings in Tokyo. Those records make it abundantly clear that the decision to move southward to attack the NEI was taken very late in 1941. Prior to that, there were several options discussed including aggression against the USSR. It's hard to divine an adversary's intentions when the adversary himself doesn't know what his intention is.
 
If Curtiss can make lots of planes in 1940/41 then why can't Republic? The Vanguard with a two stage Twin Wasp did 358 mph, now that may have been useful. Don't know

People seem to think that all US factories/aircraft companies in 1940-41 were huge and ready to go.

Curtiss was one of the largest Aircraft companies in the US in 1939 and had made quite a number of airplanes during the 20s and 30s. They had an existing plant and work force.
The fighter production figures for 1940 tell part of the story

Bell...................24 planes, including 11 YFMs
Curtiss............1259 planes, Hawk 75s and 81s
Curtiss S.L......27 planes (CW-21s)
NA....................6 planes
Republic........104 planes, most EP-1s for Sweden
Lockheed......1 plane
Brewster.........160 planes
Grumman.......103 planes.

Now some companies were building other types of aircraft, but for some, like Bell, the 1940 production was the majority of the aircraft they had built in their history. NA had a large trainer program going, Lockheed was building Hudsons. Republic/Seversky had only built a few prototypes/racers and the initial P-35 order. it had taken Seversky 15 months to deliver 76 aircraft in 1937-38, that is from first delivery to last , not start of work. perhaps another 2 dozen 2 seat aircraft?
President Roosevelt had called for a 50,000 plane airforce in the middle of 1940, it was going to take a while to get going. See plans for Packard production of Merlins, Ford produciton of R-2800s, Studebaker production of R-1820s and all of the rest of it. You are simply not going to get many more planes built in the year between the summer of 1940 and summer of 1941 than were built historically no matter what you do. While the Flying Tiger Airplanes had a particularly hard trip the were put on board ship in June of 1941 and went into combat in late Dec. 1941. By the time any US (or British) planes are shipped, unloaded, assembled, test flown and ground and air crew given even a modest amount of training it is going to be 5-6 months.

The only way we're going to get decent equipment in the Far East in 1941 is if its manufactured locally, which means Wirraways, maybe even Super Wirraways with the Twin Wasp Junior,

Local production requires machinery that either doesn't exist locally or is already committed to other programs. Any machinery will have to be imported. Britian is already walking a tight rope for machinery. They were importing machine tools from germany during the mid to late 1930s. The Huge US expansion strained the machine tool industry. At one point Allison was short over 800 machine tools and they had an A1A priority rating.

It's too bad that a quick/cheaper to build empire fighter wasn't built pre-war. The Dutch built the Fokker D.XXI for their empire defence. With the largest empire in world history, Britain should have built something, like the Miles M.20 made in Canada, Australia or even India, using whatever inline or radial engine could be had. The M.20 is as fast as the Ki-43 and much heavier armed, with robust, fixed undercarriage. It seems to be the ideal empire fighter, though we'd want to confirm that it is actually cheaper, easier and faster to build than Hurricanes or Spitfires.

The whole "cheap empire fighter" thing is an illusion, 2nd rate fighters are only cheap if your opponent is also using cheap/obsolete fighters. Once your opponent shows up with 1st class equipement your "cheap" equipment becomes very expensive target practice supplied to you opponent.

The Western powers underestimated the Japanese and thought that small numbers of 2nd rate (or 3rd rate) equipement would be enough. It wasn't.

I have no idea why people think the M-20 was "cheap". It used a Merlin XX engine, the best and most complicated Merlin of the time, it used a constant speed prop, best and most expensive fighter prop in England at the time. It used the same armament as a Hurricane or Spitfire, no savings there, it used the same radios and instruments. Only savings is the lack of retracting landing gear and possibly the airframe being made of wood. Cost of airframe depends on the woods used and the time needed to assemble the wooden pieces. Wood needs a lot of careful selection for aircraft use, each board/piece of wood needs careful inspection. Scrap rate/rejection is going to be higher than a metal airframe, If you don't have enough aluminum it is one thing. But it may not be as "cheap" as some people think. yes, wood may not require the investment in tools to work it. Or tools suitable for working with wood may be in greater supply in some areas/colonies.
In any case, why the M 20 is considered cheaper or better than a Hurricane II using the same engine, prop, guns, radio and instruments is a mystery to me.
 
With the largest empire in world history, Britain should have built something, like the Miles M.20 made in Canada, Australia or even India, using whatever inline or radial engine could be had. The M.20 is as fast as the Ki-43 and much heavier armed, with robust, fixed undercarriage. It seems to be the ideal empire fighter, though we'd want to confirm that it is actually cheaper, easier and faster to build than Hurricanes or Spitfires.

Australia was trying to develop some aircraft manufacturing capability, but most of the dominions -- even the white dominions -- were fighting against a long-standing imperial policy to restrict industrial development in the colonies: Britain wanted to sell stuff made in Britain to the colonies, not have them compete with production in the home islands. Some Canadian industry existed because of US manufacturers locating factories there; some existed because of shipbuilding for the trade on the Great Lakes; none existed because of policies in London. Indeed, the colonial administration worked hard to destroy local manufacturing, e.g., cotton fabric, in India. They were not going to change directions and encourage industrialization in the dominions, especially the non-white dominions, even at the hazard of risking the ability of those same dominions to resist invasion by Japan. Britain was defeated in Malaya and Singapore at least partly because Britain didn't want India, especially, or Australia to be self-sufficient in defense; they could not serve as sources of supply of much more than bodies.

Had London actively encouraged industry in the dominions, including the non-white dominions, it's possible that a) the RN and RAF would have a much larger pool of manpower to pull from, reducing the stress on the home islands b) support of the RAF and RN would be more evenly distributed, reducing dependence on a few major bases, such as Singapore, and vulnerable transport from the UK and c) the production of ships and aircraft would make local defense much easier. It may even weaken the independence movement in India by raising local standards of living and the feelings of deliberate impoverishment and intellectual and economic suppression.
 
Last edited:
...It may even weaken the independence movement in India by raising local standards of living and the feelings of deliberate impoverishment and intellectual and economic suppression.
I agree, India should have been modernized and industrialized. and made a partner in the empire. There were definitely chances for Britain to turn about the independence movement in India. Addressing the Bengal Famine is top of my list. I've read that both Canada and Australia advised Churchill that they had an abundance of grain that could immediately be sent, but Britain refused it and denied Indians use of their own sterling reserves and ships to obtain food.

"Viscount Archibald began a series of exasperated demands to the War Cabinet for very large quantities of grain. His requests were again repeatedly denied, causing him to decry the current crisis as "one of the greatest disasters that has befallen any people under British rule, and [the] damage to our reputation both among Indians and foreigners in India is incalculable."

This is where the British Empire was so deeply flawed, and demonstrably flung together by Rhodes-like businessmen and the East India Company with only after the fact attempts at central control from London. Compare it to the Roman Empire, where yes there were slaves, but many of those in the conquered territories were granted Roman citizenship.
 
I agree, India should have been modernized and industrialized. and made a partner in the empire. There were definitely chances for Britain to turn about the independence movement in India. Addressing the Bengal Famine is top of my list. I've read that both Canada and Australia advised Churchill that they had an abundance of grain that could immediately be sent, but Britain refused it and denied Indians use of their own sterling reserves and ships to obtain food.

"Viscount Archibald began a series of exasperated demands to the War Cabinet for very large quantities of grain. His requests were again repeatedly denied, causing him to decry the current crisis as "one of the greatest disasters that has befallen any people under British rule, and [the] damage to our reputation both among Indians and foreigners in India is incalculable."

This is where the British Empire was so deeply flawed, and demonstrably flung together by Rhodes-like businessmen and the East India Company with only after the fact attempts at central control from London. Compare it to the Roman Empire, where yes there were slaves, but many of those in the conquered territories were granted Roman citizenship.

In other words, the British treated India's Bengal Famine much as they treated Ireland's famine (the Gorta Mor) in the 1840s. When part of the imperial doctrine -- and this was completely integral to imperialism -- is that other peoples are inferior, it's a small step to letting them die if it's too inconvenient to keep them alive.
 
In other words, the British treated India's Bengal Famine much as they treated Ireland's famine (the Gorta Mor) in the 1840s. When part of the imperial doctrine -- and this was completely integral to imperialism -- is that other peoples are inferior, it's a small step to letting them die if it's too inconvenient to keep them alive.
It's a bit like BoJo's herd immunity idea. The word Kharma springs to mind.
 
In other words, the British treated India's Bengal Famine much as they treated Ireland's famine (the Gorta Mor) in the 1840s. When part of the imperial doctrine -- and this was completely integral to imperialism -- is that other peoples are inferior, it's a small step to letting them die if it's too inconvenient to keep them alive.

However, let's take a step back and recognize that in the 1930s and 1940s India was a net importer of rice with most of the additional supplies coming from...you guessed it, China, Burma and, to a lesser extent, Malaya. While the buck stopped with Britain for not doing enough to address the shortfall, it's equally clear that there weren't many options available on the table. After all, global trade as it was understood in pre-war days, had effectively ended. Where was the additional rice going to come from when your pre-war supply countries are occupied?

It's all to easy to blame the Brits and put a racist overtone to every decision. I'm not saying most Brits weren't racist, nor am I saying that they didn't have "grades" of foreigners. However, it's equally certain that Britain was well aware of the issues if they failed to provide food for India. There was already signficant unrest and a thriving independence movement (including an Indian unit within the Imperial Japanese Army). However, it's tough to see what more could have been done under the circumstances.
 
However, let's take a step back and recognize that in the 1930s and 1940s India was a net importer of rice with most of the additional supplies coming from...you guessed it, China, Burma and, to a lesser extent, Malaya. While the buck stopped with Britain for not doing enough to address the shortfall, it's equally clear that there weren't many options available on the table. After all, global trade as it was understood in pre-war days, had effectively ended. Where was the additional rice going to come from when your pre-war supply countries are occupied?

It's all to easy to blame the Brits and put a racist overtone to every decision. I'm not saying most Brits weren't racist, nor am I saying that they didn't have "grades" of foreigners. However, it's equally certain that Britain was well aware of the issues if they failed to provide food for India. There was already signficant unrest and a thriving independence movement (including an Indian unit within the Imperial Japanese Army). However, it's tough to see what more could have been done under the circumstances.

The question unasked is why was India a net importer of rice? Was this a result of imperial policy and encouraged or enforced production of cash crops, such as cotton?
 
However, let's take a step back and recognize that in the 1930s and 1940s India was a net importer of rice with most of the additional supplies coming from...you guessed it, China, Burma and, to a lesser extent, Malaya.
I know it would have been a huge project (just changing gauge will be a good issue) in competition with maritime trade, but you have to wonder if a rail link could have been made from India to Burma, and then if Britain either seized or negotiated access with a link to Malaya. Something I wrote about here (be careful with that site, they're a sensitive lot in the politics section).
However, it's equally certain that Britain was well aware of the issues if they failed to provide food for India. There was already signficant unrest and a thriving independence movement (including an Indian unit within the Imperial Japanese Army). However, it's tough to see what more could have been done under the circumstances.
In 1943 when the famine began there was a large surplus of grain in both Australia and Canada, and both could have diverted this to India. By 1943 the Japanese army was ground to a halt in Burma. AIUI there were ships available to bring the rice, as these same ships were booked to transport the unneeded grain to Britain.
 
The question unasked is why was India a net importer of rice? Was this a result of imperial policy and encouraged or enforced production of cash crops, such as cotton?

Crop production across India grew only slightly during the interwar years. That's not an indicator of cash crop-vs-food issues, rather of a lack of investment on the scale needed. Again, we can ascribe racial overtones to that but the UK was bankrupt at the end of WW1 (the final Great War debt payment was made in the 1990s!). Also, the UK was a net importer of food as were (and are) many nations.
 
I know it would have been a huge project (just changing gauge will be a good issue) in competition with maritime trade, but you have to wonder if a rail link could have been made from India to Burma, and then if Britain either seized or negotiated access with a link to Malaya. Something I wrote about here (be careful with that site, they're a sensitive lot in the politics section). In 1943 when the famine began there was a large surplus of grain in both Australia and Canada, and both could have diverted this to India. By 1943 the Japanese army was ground to a halt in Burma. AIUI there were ships available to bring the rice, as these same ships were booked to transport the unneeded grain to Britain.

There's no way the Japanese would allow any food from their captured territories to make it to the Allies. They needed the food for themselves (again, Japan was not self-sufficient in food).

Shipping grain to India seems plausible at face value but the area of the famine was Bengal which was right up against occupied territory. Those unarmed transport vessels would have to traverse a broad area of ocean in which Japan held sway. There was even a German naval base at Penang off the coast of Malaya. Axis naval forces levied a heavy toll on Allied shipping in the Indian Ocean with Allies achieving precious few losses. I suspect the odds of sufficient food making it to Bengal were slim at best.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back