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Blenheims attack the Japanese carriers - 8 April 1942
Around 10:25, nine unescorted Blenheims from 11 Squadron RAF attacked Nagumo's force. They were not detected inbound by the combat air patrol (CAP). Hiryū spotted the aircraft but failed to relay a warning to the other ships. As a result, the attack achieved total surprise. The bombers unloaded at 11,000 feet (3,353 m) on Akagi; the bombs fell close to the target with no hits. Four bombers were shot down over the carriers by CAP A6M2 Zeroes, and another by Japanese aircraft returning from the strike on Hermes. In return, a Zero was shot down near the carriers and another in the returning strike. This was the first time a Japanese carrier force had faced a concerted air attack.
Let's give the RAF some luck this day, with Akagi being hit by two or three 500 lb. bombs, setting the aircraft in the hangar on fire. That's but one carrier damaged, but do the Japanese gain any insight on better CAP as they prepare for Coral Sea? And how does Akagi get home?
Somerville's carriers actually had a pretty good shot at sinking/crippling Hiryu and Soryu (Cardiv 2) on the late afternoon, evening of 5 April 1942. Cardiv 2 became detached from the main body of the KB and had Somerville flown off a strike towards their last reported position, then ~40 Albacores would have encountered Cardiv 2 just after sunset.Blenheims attack the Japanese carriers - 8 April 1942
Around 10:25, nine unescorted Blenheims from 11 Squadron RAF attacked Nagumo's force. They were not detected inbound by the combat air patrol (CAP). Hiryū spotted the aircraft but failed to relay a warning to the other ships. As a result, the attack achieved total surprise. The bombers unloaded at 11,000 feet (3,353 m) on Akagi; the bombs fell close to the target with no hits. Four bombers were shot down over the carriers by CAP A6M2 Zeroes, and another by Japanese aircraft returning from the strike on Hermes. In return, a Zero was shot down near the carriers and another in the returning strike. This was the first time a Japanese carrier force had faced a concerted air attack.
Let's give the RAF some luck this day, with Akagi being hit by two or three 500 lb. bombs, setting the aircraft in the hangar on fire. That's but one carrier damaged, but do the Japanese gain any insight on better CAP as they prepare for Coral Sea? And how does Akagi get home?
I'd like to think that Nagumo would be replaced, but the IJN kept him in charge of the surviving CVs even after Midway.I doubt it. They got caught with their pants down and made little if any changes OTL.
If Hiryu and Soryu are destroyed on April 5th I don't expect Akagi would be hit by the Blenheims on April 9th, but imagine three IJN CVs sunk. That makes Coral Sea a different campaign for the IJN.Somerville's carriers actually had a pretty good shot at sinking/crippling Hiryu and Soryu
If Hiryu and Soryu are destroyed on April 5th I don't expect Akagi would be hit by the Blenheims on April 9th, but imagine three IJN CVs sunk. That makes Coral Sea a different campaign for the IJN.
Meaning USS Lexington and Yorktown remain intact into June 1942. Also, with the IJN down on CVs, Sommerville's armoured fleet carriers HMS Formidable and Indomitable (does Hermes survive?) can now present an increased threat to Japan's flank. I'd love to see Sommerville meet with Nimitz and/or Fletcher in Australia or elsewhere to fight as one.In those circumstances I don't think Coral Sea happens in 1942.
The RN still needs to undertake IRONCLAD and escort convoys through to Malta, so no longer term deployment of RN carriers in the IO.Meaning USS Lexington and Yorktown remain intact into June 1942. Also, with the IJN down on CVs, Sommerville's armoured fleet carriers HMS Formidable and Indomitable (does Hermes survive?) can now present an increased threat to Japan's flank. I'd love to see Sommerville meet with Nimitz and/or Fletcher in Australia or elsewhere to fight as one.
If Hermes does survive she's of little use in the PTO and should go the MTO or home waters for convoy work.
Good point. And the RN can keep possession of HMS Victorious (USS Robin) for a stronger ATO and MTO presence.The RN still needs to undertake IRONCLAD and escort convoys through to Malta, so no longer term deployment of RN carriers in the IO.
Somerville wasn't willing to risk launching a search/strike mission. He was under orders to not risk his forces against even a comparable force,Somerville's carriers actually had a pretty good shot at sinking/crippling Hiryu and Soryu (Cardiv 2) on the late afternoon, evening of 5 April 1942. Cardiv 2 became detached from the main body of the KB and had Somerville flown off a strike towards their last reported position, then ~40 Albacores would have encountered Cardiv 2 just after sunset.
Sources for that?Somerville wasn't willing to risk launching a search/strike mission. He was under orders to not risk his forces against even a comparable force,
He had enough radar equipped aircraft that he could have launched a search/strike mission. The only risk would have been operational losses from bad landings. At best he could find the IJN, at worst he could write off a couple of Albacores or Swordfish and burn some a gas. American commanders launched strikes on less data than Somerville had.Sources for that?
Somerville's Report of Proceeding for 5 April 1942:
..."37. A destroyer was detached to search but was recalled when at 1655 a reconnaissance aircraft from Force A reported an enemy force of 5 "unknowns" in position 3-38N, 78-18E at 1600. There was then no indication of the course of speed of this unknown force, but it could be either;
(a). a new force previously unreported, or
(b). the force previously and last reported at 1004.
38. It is unfortunately necessary that no relief shadowers were sent off by the Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers as soon as this report was received and that I omitted to obtain confirmation from Rear Admiral Aircraft Carriers that relief shadowers had been sent. (n.b. in text "shadows" pen and ink corrected to "shadowers" in both cases.) At 1700 I received a report from Colombo that there were indications of enemy aircraft carriers steering 230 degrees at 24 knots from an unknown position at 1400.
39. This was thought to be subsequent to the attack on the cruisers and my deductions from this enemy move was as follows.
40. If he held on this course he would be at 0400 in a position to deliver a night air attack on Addu Atoll. This seemed quite a possible course of action. In any case it was necessary for Force A to keep clear to the southward and for Force B (estimated to be 135 miles astern in position 0-12N, 75-15E at 1700) to steer southward so that Forces A and B could close for supporting action at daylight the following morning (6th April). It as also necessary for Force B to steer to southward to keep clear of the enemy carrier force should it be proceeding to attack Addu.
41. At 1726, therefore Force A altered course to 210 degrees at 18 knots and a signal was made to Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command and to DORSETSHIRE to steer south, though by this time I entertained grave fears concerning the fate of the two 8" cruisers. As I had received no signal from them that they were being attacked I felt it was possible they had escaped and were maintaining W/T silence.
42. At 1800 I received a signal from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, stating that reconnaissance aircraft reported the estimated enemy's position 20 degrees 120 miles at 1710. This position was very close to the previously reported 1600 signal. The enemy's course had not been given in either of these reports, but the positions fitted in well with the course received in paragraph 38.
43. At 1817 a further signal was received from Rear Admiral, Aircraft Carriers, adjusting the 1600 position of the enemy force, amplifying it to include 2 carriers and 3 unknown vessels and giving the course as northwest. This was the first indication I had of an enemy course to the northwest.
44. I immediately ordered Force A to alter course to 315 degrees and instructed Vice Admiral, 2nd in Command to conform. These movements had the object of keeping Force A within night air striking distance of the enemy force, trusting to an A.S.V. search to locate the enemy, and to being Force B within supporting distance should it be necessary to retire in that direction. A dawn rendezvous was arranged with Force B in approximate position 3N, 75E.
45. As no news had been received of DORSETSHIRE and CORNWALL, the presumption was that they had been sunk.
46. At 1930 a night search with A.S.V. aircraft commenced to cover the section 345 degrees to 030 degrees to a depth of 180 miles. Nothing was located by this search."...
"Somerville wasn't willing to risk launching a search/strike mission. He was under orders to not risk his forces against even a comparable force,"
He had enough radar equipped aircraft that he could have launched a search/strike mission. The only risk would have been operational losses from bad landings. At best he could find the IJN, at worst he could write off a couple of Albacores or Swordfish and burn some a gas. American commanders launched strikes on less data than Somerville had.