Could Axis aircraft catch the Mosquito in Dec 1941?

[Edgar Brooks]

Mosquitoes were built with ordinary furniture factory casein glue, which was mixed fresh every day, and heated to the required temperature (don't know what it was, but it was close to boiling.) The glue was liberally brushed on, and the two surfaces mated, then clamped with furniture "cramps." Occasional holes were left in the outer surfaces, for the glue to squeeze out, which was then wiped off while the parts cooled.
The extreme heat of the tropics brought the glue back to its working temperature, allowing the parts to separate. The problem was solved by a chemicals expert, Andrew Oliver, who devised a completely new material; annoyingly I worked in the same company as Mr. Oliver, for about 5 years, and never knew his claim to fame.

 

[Freebird]

And we shouldn't forget that ordinary (metal based) aircraft would have trouble in the tropics too, the combination of heat salt water means that corrosion becomes more problematic

freebird can just need to see if this is the right tactic for evade. if climb higher probly go slower and generally Mosquito I is not fastest of F-4 and if is a Z is surely in the wrong element in high altitude

Hi Vincenzo, I was also considering the situation in the Pacific, if the Mosquito had been used in early 1942 instead of 1943, the Japanese would have trouble tyring to intercept, the IJN fighters were slower than the German ones at that point AFAIK

 

[davebender]

Sounds like an ideal aircraft for WWII Australia to build as it doesn't require aluminum and it has long range. Australia could import Packard built Merlin engines just like Britain did. Arm it with a pair of reliable 18" Mark XII torpedoes and you've got a world class maritime attack aircraft. Something desperately needed in the Pacific during 1942.

 

[parsifal]

Australia made a decision to build the Mosquito from early 1942. There were problems in securing industrial quantities of Canadian Spruce.......shipping space mostly. It took time to develop an alternate laninate from locally supplied timber. This was eventually achieved and the first locally produced mossie rolled off the lines in july 1943 9i think it was july).

Why would we import Merlins if we were going to mass produce the Mossie????. Why wouldnt we just install locally produced merlins, as we did for our Mustangs. You never listen do you. i dont know how many times you have tried to spruke this rubbish about Australia not producingh engines, and how many times I have corrected you, how many imes you have been forced to slink away with your tail between your legs on this issue. do i need to re-educate you yet again????

 

[Freebird]

Australia made a decision to build the Mosquito from early 1942. There were problems in securing industrial quantities of Canadian Spruce.......shipping space mostly. It took time to develop an alternate laninate from locally supplied timber. This was eventually achieved and the first locally produced mossie rolled off the lines in july 1943 9i think it was july).

I wonder why the delay in deciding to produce them?
IIRC there were about a 1,000 or so ordered in mid 1941, that would be a good time to start the ball rolling in Oz as well...

 

[Edgar Brooks]

Arm it with a pair of reliable 18" Mark XII torpedoes and you've got a world class maritime attack aircraft. Something desperately needed in the Pacific during 1942.

Arm it where? The torpedo was too long to fit in the bomb bay, and you certainly couldn't fit them under the wings. Anyway, Coastal Command already had a perfectly usable dedicated torpedo delivery system, in the Beaufort, which has been largely forgotten/passed over in the intervening years. It's easy, now, to say that something was desperately needed in the Pacific, but that wasn't the view of Admiral King, who considered the Pacific to be his patch, and everyone else keep out.

 

[wuzak]

http://1000aircraftphotos.com/Contributions/PippinBill/5593.jpg

 

[yulzari]

Perhaps the simplest answer to the original question is did anything catch them?

Does anyone have access to period Mosquito intercepts as well as losses?

 

[wuzak]

Some data about the Mosquito PR.Is (all ten of them):

W4051 PRI SOC 22.6.45
W4054 PRI Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 28.3.43
W4055 PRI Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 4.12.41
W4056 PRI Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 2.4.42
W4058 PRI Missing from PR mission to Oslo 17.10.42
W4059 PRI SOC 20.9.44
W4060 PRI Missing from PR mission to Bergen 20.2.43
W4061 PRI Engine cut on take-off and wing hit ground nosed over Dyea 22.2.44 DBR
W4062 PRI Damaged by flak Pantellaria engine cut stalled on approach and wing hit ground Luqa 13.1.42
W4063 PRI Damaged by Bf109s and crashlanded at Luqa 31.3.42

What it doesn't say is how many missions they did before they met their fate. (SOC = Struck Off Charge, ie retired)

 

[parsifal]

In 1941 we DID have an engine supply problem, largely avoidable, but courtesy of HM govt in londons ban on the export of aero engine techs and aero engines. Exceptions were made for the existing engine factories in canada, but for australia, there was a critical delay 1939-41. What is all the more galling is that our intention to licence produce US designed engines (principally the WASP and double WASP) were thwarted (deliberately IMO) by British spin and promises as they promised us access to thei engine techs and engines, and then failed to deliver.

If these obstructive practices had not occurred, it was australia's intention to produce the Beafort from 1940, and the CA-4 Woomera from late 1941. The beafort was a very capable aircraft, and the Woomera even better. unlike the mossie, both were designd as torpedo bombers. The Woomera was also designed as a divebomber. It was not the Mosquito, but at that time, the Mossie was not really sen as a strike aircraft, and was somewhat anachronistically viewed. There was considerable hostility toward it as a concept, not least in the Australian mililtary.

 

[Shortround6]

A couple of points;

First, Australian aircraft engine production:

Aero Engine Production - The Lidcombe Engine Plant

It takes time to establish an engine factory even in the US or Britain. Not just the building but the machine tools have to come from somewhere as do the raw materials and/or subcontracted parts. Even Allison only made about 1/3 of the engine "in house" with about 1/3 of the engine specific parts (connecting rods, camshafts and others) contracted out and the other 1/3 being things like nuts, bolts, studs and such. The nut, bolt and stud makers also had many other manufactures of equipment demanding their product so the pre-war nut, bolt and stud makers had to expand their facilities also. Just because and nation built a certain product in 1945/46 does not mean they could make it in 1942.

AS for another posters idea that you can just take an axe out to the back wood lot and chop down any assortment of trees to make airplanes out of, well, I think we all know how preposterous that is. ALL wood is not the same and only certain types of wood can be used in certain applications with any hope of success. This was well known in boat building going back hundreds of years (if not a thousand) and some countries used to import certain wood/s for ship building even in the 1700s.

 

[parsifal]

Thanks for the link SR, provides a pretty good summary of the Australian aero engine situation during and immediately after the war.

However.....


"When the Beaufort project was launched, if was decided that facilities should be established for the production in Australia of suitable engines. When the supply of Taurus engines from England became impossible because of war conditions, the aircraft was redesigned to take the more powerful twin row Wasp, and the Australian engine factory was consequently planned to produce that type".


whilst true, is an understatement of what was happening. "Wartime conditions" is a polite way of saying we were scr*wed by the British govt, when they placed their ban on the export of engines, and the export of techs to build them. Moreover, our plans to build US designed engines go back to before 1938. It was what wackett wanted to do from a very early point. I suspect he knew something, though I cannot prove that. Whatever the truth, for nearly two years his wishes were overruled, largely because of empty promises given by the British. We could have been producing more US engines earlier, instead we were asked to wait by the british, which we did, and then were bitterly disappointed by their decision to embargo us. Its a sad issue, seldom talked about and largely forgotten, and it really stilted our aircraft industry at a critical moment.....

 

[Freebird]

It's easy, now, to say that something was desperately needed in the Pacific, but that wasn't the view of Admiral King, who considered the Pacific to be his patch, and everyone else keep out.

King wasn't in charge of the US Fleet until after Pearl, and wasn't CNO until Mr 42.
He also wasn't in charge of operations in the SE Pacific area, as that was ABDA command in early 1942.

If Britain the CW decided to put a responsible effort into the theater in 1941/1942, King has no authority or reason to dictate anything

 

[parsifal]

King wasn't in charge of the US Fleet until after Pearl, and wasn't CNO until Mr 42.
He also wasn't in charge of operations in the SE Pacific area, as that was ABDA command in early 1942.

If Britain the CW decided to put a responsible effort into the theater in 1941/1942, King has no authority or reason to dictate anything

The british and CW response was a calculated risk that went horribly wrong. With two major powers to fight largely alone in the ETO, and having suffered a series of costly defeats, Britiain had no choice but to cut force levels in the Far east to dangerously low levels.

I think the high point of bad decisions, however was the decision to deploy the PoW and Repulse so far forward and so badly protected. By late '41, it was very clear that Captital ships should not and could not operate in a hostile air environment where the enemy was effective in the aeronaval role. ive read that the British appraised the Japanese as being somewhere below the italians in terms of proficiency. Thats a totally unforgivable assumption IMO.

With regard to airpower, my opinion is that the British should have invested in the aircraft producing infrastructure of Australia 9and perhaps india) in the period 1936-41 instead of doing their very best to stymie its development. if they had done that, Australia might well have been producing Merlins in 1942, and Double Wasps from 1940, which would have given us the capability to build Beaforts, Woomeras and Boomerangs from before the outbreak of hostilities. money spent on fielding the Buffaloes, manning obsolete types in malaya, could instead have been poured into establish an aero industry in the far east (India and Australia) That way we would have gone to war with more modern types, and more aircraft overall.

The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war.

 

[buffnut453]

But force levels were INCREASED in the Far East, not cut during 1941. Indeed one of the biggest challenges was the milking of experienced personnel from established Indian Army units in order to create new units (ie to increase force levels). This problem hit home really hard in Malaya where Indian Army units lacked the experience, training and cohesion to cope against the Japanese attacks.

Now it can be argued that force levels in the Far East weren't built up as much as the should have been and that the theatre received the arse-end of supplies and, in some respects, personnel, but they certainly weren't reduced.

 

[buffnut453]

ive read that the British appraised the Japanese as being somewhere below the italians in terms of proficiency. Thats a totally unforgivable assumption IMO.

Not an assumption but based on observations of Japanese air activities in China. The common racist view was that the Japanese ought to have beaten the Chinese very easily but they didn't, hence the Japanese would have real difficulties when confronted with a first-class adversary. Unfortunately, Allied forces in the Far East (ie Malaya/Singapore, Burma, the Philippines) weren't first-class by any means. They were under-resourced, poorly trained and often poorly led.

 

[buffnut453]

The other thing that stands out for me is that having accepted the risk of undermanning their forward defences, why did the British continue to make assurances they could not keep, and knew they could not keep throughout 1940-41. If they had been honest about the situation, the nations affected, like Australia, could have made more realistic preprations for war.

Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.

 

[parsifal]

But force levels were INCREASED in the Far East, not cut during 1941. Indeed one of the biggest challenges was the milking of experienced personnel from established Indian Army units in order to create new units (ie to increase force levels). This problem hit home really hard in Malaya where Indian Army units lacked the experience, training and cohesion to cope against the Japanese attacks.

Now it can be argued that force levels in the Far East weren't built up as much as the should have been and that the theatre received the arse-end of supplies and, in some respects, personnel, but they certainly weren't reduced.

True, but the way military resourcing was managed it ended up that britsain got less out of its military expenditures than it should have. The Brits steadfastly resisted, and mismanaged, their imperial resources in this theatre in the years leading up to the war.

In the case of Australia, we entered the war in 1939 with 12 air squadrons, all obsolete. Plans weree wel underway to expand the force to 40 squadrons (from memnory) or about 1500 a/c, using locally produced and US imported aircraft. All of that was stymied by the british leadership. We were asked to scrap our local training initiatives and contribute to the EATS scheme instead. We were promised aircraft and production capability that in the end, the british worked as hard as they could to deny. We diverted highly trained troops....the best in the world at that time....out of the TO on the promise that the malay barrier could be adequately defended, a promise repeated well after the british High command knew was impossible.

 

[buffnut453]

I don't think British High Command knew the defence of the Malay barrier was impossible until it was too late. I do, however, subscribe to the view that they hoped it was possible. Unfortunately, the Japanese proved them wrong. I can't comment on your other assertions because I don't know enough about the situation in Oz at the time. The one point I will make is that no sensible person would countenance building up forces in an area where there was no fighting when other theatres were under attack. Perhaps the hindsight goggles are clouding our view of the difficult decisions that had to be made, without foreknowledge, at the time?

 

[pbfoot]

I guess they should have stood up to the Brits after all they were a sovereign nation