Could Axis aircraft catch the Mosquito in Dec 1941?

buffnut453 said:

Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.

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They didnt know because they chose not to find out. There were ample reports and information on Japanese capability available to the british high command that were simply ignored....not because they were not believed, but because it was an inconvenient truth that they could not bear to face.

Saying the Japanese were only ever comfronted by inferior troops is clearly an apology for a poorly thought out battle plan. The Japanese resisted effectively against the very best troops in the world, and the very best airforces as well long after the flush of their initial offensives. True, the initial offensives were the periods that Japan was mostly on the attack, but it is misleading, and wrong to suggest they were only ever resisted by second rate troops, or that they only ever defeated second rate troops. What defeated the Japanese, was not the poor qulaity of their troops or aircraft. It was a combination of numbers and poor logistics mostly

buffnut453 said:

Because they didn't know. Senior leaders believed their own twisted logic and failed to grasp just how woefully ill-prepared forces in the Far East were. My previous post touches on this, too.

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It is a well documented fact that military appraisals handed to the british high command by the Australians (at least, ther were many many others that did the same) clearly showed the Malayan barrier (and Singas) to be indefensible, and that it was at risk from a landward assault. The British response was completely unsatisfactory. they responded to this threat by sending an unbalanced, out gunned task group to defend the landward approaches by seaborne interdiction. The British suspected Singapore to be indefensible since at least 1921. They were openly worried about it from 1938, and knew they couldnt (or at least had information that conclusively showed it to be indefensible) from the middle of 1940. it is inexcusable that they ignored these appraisals and deliberately misled their allies

wuzak said:

Some data about the Mosquito PR.Is (all ten of them):

W4051 PRI SOC 22.6.45
W4054 PRI Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 28.3.43
W4055 PRI Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 4.12.41
W4056 PRI Missing from PR mission to Trondheim 2.4.42
W4058 PRI Missing from PR mission to Oslo 17.10.42
W4059 PRI SOC 20.9.44
W4060 PRI Missing from PR mission to Bergen 20.2.43
W4061 PRI Engine cut on take-off and wing hit ground nosed over Dyea 22.2.44 DBR
W4062 PRI Damaged by flak Pantellaria engine cut stalled on approach and wing hit ground Luqa 13.1.42
W4063 PRI Damaged by Bf109s and crashlanded at Luqa 31.3.42

What it doesn't say is how many missions they did before they met their fate. (SOC = Struck Off Charge, ie retired)

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We don't know ow many missions they undertook but I admit to being impressed as to how long they stayed in front line service before their loss. Not many front line aircraft in 1941 would be in front line service in 1943/4

Parsifal,

We're way off topic here...but I'll continue just one more round.

I'm making no apologies for the messy, poorly-implemented defence that was undertaken in Malaya and Singapore. Nor am I excusing the deplorable lack of leadership in certain quarters that failed to identify and practice correct tactics (the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders were the only unit who truly trained for the defence of the road through Malaya, although Bennett did implement a cracking ambush...once), or to implement adequate denial measures. However, the fact remains that the majority of Commonwealth troops in the front line on 8 Dec 41 were, by any measure, sub-standard in terms of experience, training, morale and equipment. Putting green soldiers who can hardly shoot a rifle in the path of tanks (a machine they've never seen before) is a recipe for disaster. Should they have been better prepared? Absolutely.

As to your other point about accurate intelligence being ignored by commanders, well there's ample proof of that occurring. Essentially there are 2 schools of thought, one that intelligence failed completely and the other that intelligence was accurate but commanders ignored it. To en extent, both are correct. The victor in battle takes the glory, the loser blames his intelligence officer. As I inferred earlier, the Far East in 1941 was often a dumping ground for less-able commanding officers who did not train or prepare their formations for the fight that took place...and we can clearly see now the result of that folly.

Finally, where do you get the idea that I ever suggested the Japanese only faced inferior troops? I was referring specifically to the Indian troops in Malaya...and that's not because the troops themselves were poor but because of incredible dilution of experience due to massive and rapid force expansion. Those aren't just excuses - it was the reality in 1941. However, there were other issues including the political angle - Crosby's almost hysterical telegram on the eve of the Japanese invasion demanding that no British soldier should enter Thailand and Far East Command's focus on trying to locate the ships instead of looking for other intelligence indicators like the arrival of IJAAF fighter aircraft in French Indo-China are examples. There was no single issue that resulted in the rout that occurred in Malaya and Singapore - the causes were several and intertwined, many dating back years.

In response to Post #62 (for some reason the quote function isn't working on my machine), Malaya was far from indefensible. As to the risk of landward assault, it was Percival serving under GOC Malaya, Dobbie, in the late-30s who first identified that threat and took measures to deal with it.

Malaya was entirely defensible but the key to the whole region was the port at Singora. If that had been held or denied to the Japanese, there's no way they could have taken the rest of the Malay peninsula because there were no other ports capable of supporting the Japanese Army's logistics chain.

Poorly thought-out strategy, an unwillingness to be seen as the aggressor into Thailand (and hence upsetting the Americans) all militated against the British defence of Singora.

Per my last post...the reasons for failure were complex.

pbfoot said:

I guess they should have stood up to the Brits after all they were a sovereign nation

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No, they were not. We gained theoretical control over our foreign policy in 1931, but that did not include indendance on national borrowings and finances. That remained under the control of the british treasury until 1942.

Despite our theoretical independance in our foreign policy from 1931, in practice we had no real independance until Curtins declaration in march 1942. often attributed to the fall of Singapore, it was more complex than that, and stretched back to the repeated failures by the britis (in Australian eyes) to the multiple threats challenging the mpire at that time.

Our break with the british began in 1918, and gradually picked up speed through the 30's. the final straw being the fall of Singapore.

Glider said:

We don't know ow many missions they undertook but I admit to being impressed as to how long they stayed in front line service before their loss. Not many front line aircraft in 1941 would be in front line service in 1943/4

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W4051 was, in fact, the prototype PR Mosquito, started operations in September 1945, and was struck off charge at the end of the war. Haveto wonder if it remained operational for that period.

W4055 seems to have gone pretty quickly. A few of them (4) were lost during 1942, 3 of them in the early months. So they didn't last too long.

wuzak said:

W4051 was, in fact, the prototype PR Mosquito, started operations in September 1945, and was struck off charge at the end of the war. Haveto wonder if it remained operational for that period.

W4055 seems to have gone pretty quickly. A few of them (4) were lost during 1942, 3 of them in the early months. So they didn't last too long.

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Staistically the USAAF suffered around 18% attrition of its forces per annum, though this is a very rough number that tended to decrease as the war progressed. Overwhelmingly, losses were due to non-operational causes.

Luftwaffe losses need to be split between those operating on the eastern front and north Africa, and those operating at home and western europe. Consistently Luftwaffe losses in the east ran at between 30 and 50% depending on the weatherand the state of the airfields. Loss rates for continental formations were about 30% or less until 1944, when the loss rates slid off the chart, so to speak.

If we assume British attrition rates are somewhere between what the germans were losing at home and what the Americans in the ETO were losing in that period 1942-4 we arrive at a figure of about 25% lost per annum most not due to any activities by the enemy. They just fell out of the sky with no help from the enmy mostly.

In the sample that we have, we have 10 airframes, if the statisitical assumption i have made is correct, we should get 2.5 Mosquitoes lost in every 12 months of the war. assuming the service entry was 7/41, 2.5 Mossies should crash in the 1st year of service. Instead we lose 4. in the second year of operations, losses amounted to another 3. In the third year losses dropped to only lost 1. in the fourth year, losses were down to 2, and in the 5th year, we had 1 survivor. Overall, however, the losses to those 10 prototypes was the same as the assumed attrition rate for all the RAF....about 25% of airframes every year.

What we need to make a meanigful comparison, are the o9verall loss rates of the RAF expressed as a percentage, for the 12 month periods, beginning 7/41 to 7/42 and progressing from their on a per annum basis....

Some more information on the December 1941 loss of W4055 reveals that it was shot down by Unteroffizier Rudolf Fenten of I/JG77 at 15:20 hrs near Stavanger at map reference Lg 49 433, 35km W of Feistein.

Unfortunately, I haven't been able to narrow down what aircraft Unteroffizier Fenten was flying. In late 1941, I/JG 77 apparently flew a motley collection of Bf-109 E-1s, E-3s, E-7s, T-2s shock:!) and F-4s.

So, in answer to the original question: yes, it was possible for Axis aircraft to catch the Mosquito in Dec-1941. Otherwise, W4055 wouldn't of been shot down.

Now, what we don't have are the circumstances of the shoot down.

Ok, did a little more research.

The loss of W4055 PR Mk I appears to be the first Luftwaffe fighter claim against a Mosquito, as well as the only Mosquito claim made by the Luftwaffe in 1941. It is also the only Mosquito loss registered with the RAF in 1941.

The next claim against a Mosquito didn't occur until April 1942 and then there were seven Luftwaffe claims in July 1942 - a rate of claims not met again until April 1943.

There were a total of 23 fighter claims against Mosquitos by the Luftwaffe in 1942, as well as a single flak claim. The RAF gives 71 Mosquito losses for 1942, most of the losses are either 'missing' or crashed on take-off/landing, quite often because of over or undershoots (maybe understandable given night operations). I was also surprised at how many were written off after flying into things: trees, houses, Hudsons, Beafighters even ships and buses!

Lots of the Luftwaffe's 1942 claims register the height at which the claim was made. First is at 5800 m (19,000 ft), then there are four between 8000 m (26,200 ft) and 9200 m (32,200 ft). There there is another at 5,000 m (16,400 ft) and one at 6,000 m (19,700 ft). There is also a sole claim at 5 m (16 ft), which must have been hairy!

Yes, possible, but difficult.

The first operational sortie by a Mosquito was made by a PR Mk I, W4055, on 17 September 1941; during this sortie the unarmed Mosquito PR.I evaded three Messerschmitt Bf 109s at 23,000 feet (7,000 m).[

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de Havilland Mosquito - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia


10 is also a very small statistical sample. And surely loss per sortie basis would be better? It's all very well to say there is a general 25% loss of aircraft per year, but if one lot is doing 100 sorties per year and another 300 is it a fair comparison?

no yopur right, im assuming a similar sortie rate per annum for each aircraft. Adding sortie rates just increases the complexity however

davebender said:

Sounds like the He-162. Except the war ended before Heinkel could fix their glue problem.

Any idea how long it took de Havilland to get on top of the glue problem?

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Some Info here
This is the company Goldschmit that made the Tego film now calle Evonik. It was an excellent plywood, certainly it would not have rotted like the Mosquitos primitive Caesin (milk) based product, however some lucky bombing put the plant out of action and the substitute was inferior (corroded the wood) this effected both the Ta 154 and He 162 program.

Evonik Industries - Specialty Chemicals you can find info under corporate history server portal.

Aeroplanes and Veneers (Tego)
The glue film from Th. Goldschmidt AG was undoubtedly a surprise
success. After a patent had been applied for in 1929, it advanced to
become the most important product for the company in just a few
years.


Th. Goldschmidt AG had acquired its initial know-how in glue
production from its involvement in the Kempen electrochemical factory,
which produced leather glues. However, production of these glues was
problematic. The wet glues that had been used up to then in many
applications were based on plant and animal proteins - casein, for
example - which were extremely perishable. Also, mixing up the glue
before it was used was laborious and prone to error.


As the wood processing industry was experiencing similar problems, Dr.
Josef Weber, member of the board at Goldschmidt AG and a chemist with
the company since 1892 encouraged the search for a dry glue for
manufacturing plywood and chipboard. The result of three years of
research was the Tego glue film which was also distributed
successfully outside of Germany. It was made out of phenol resins and
soda pulp paper to carry the glue and was placed in thin layers
between the layers of wood. Under high pressure and heat, the glue
film and the wood combined perfectly. Goldschmidt AG entrusted Dr.
Wilhelm Luethy with selling the new product - a difficult task,
because potential customers had to invest in special presses before
they could use the Tego glue film.


The advantages of the new processes were obvious however and became
even more apparent under the National Socialists' four-year plan. The
glue film was made out of "home grown" raw materials which reduced the
import of casein. Moreover, the innovative glue was a highly
successful export which earned the German Reich foreign currency. In
addition, it had an unlimited shelf-life and applications were of
consistent quality.


Accordingly, the glue film business expanded rapidly from 1936. As it
was indispensable for aircraft production, Th. Goldschmidt AG was
classified as strategically important to the war effort. The quantity
produced rose from 22 million m2 in 1937 to 72 Mio m2 in 1943, an
increase of 327%.


Glue Film advertising 1951
Even after WWII, the glue film, which Th. Goldschmidt AG produced in a
branch factory in Schöppenstedt, continued to play an important role
for some time, particularly in the furniture industry. However,
increasing competition from new kinds of synthetic glues affected
sales more and more. In 1955, Goldschmidt launched Tego-Tex, a new and
very successful glue film especially geared to furniture veneers. At
the beginning of 1984, Goldschmidt AG sold the glue film and Tego-Tex
production to Casco-Nobel

Casein glue is not a milk-based item, it is a protein, extracted from curdled skimmed milk, dissolved in an aqueous alkyd. Far from being "primitive," some formulae were still secret in the 1920s. It did not rot, either, but attracted mould spores and termites, who enjoyed the naturalness of the ingredients. Oliver started work in 1940, and was involved in the production of W4050, but the problem with the glue did not manifest itself until some early aircraft went out to the Far East, so I'm still unable to give you a clear date. If the product had been prone to rot, every chair, made in this town since the early 1900s, would have fallen apart very quickly in the U.K.'s rainy atmosphere; as it is, when you try to knock some of the older items apart, with a mallet, the wood fails before the glue.

I admit that my maths isn't great, so am not even going to try to do my own. Also I could easily be wrong but would be surprised if you took 10 aircraft (of any type, in any airforce) put them in a front line squadron, operated them for 12 months and only lost two which approximates to the 18% loss ratio you mention for the USAAF.

Then figure that three years later some of them are still in the front line, not replaced by more modern versions, not written off in accidents, converted to hanger queens or transferred to other roles.

I still find it pretty impressive

My friends plywood fly fishing boat is held together with cascamite we had better stop using it quick its over 40 years old it must be on the point of falling apart.

When you consider the Chinese were using casein as a glue 2,000 years ago and its still a commonly used glue ingredient for waterproof plywood its not bad for a primitive glue.

As I understand it the problem wasnt the glue but the way it was applied in one of the factories in the UK.

freebird said:

King wasn't in charge of the US Fleet until after Pearl, and wasn't CNO until Mr 42.
He also wasn't in charge of operations in the SE Pacific area, as that was ABDA command in early 1942.

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When the only nation under attack was the Chinese.

If Britain the CW decided to put a responsible effort into the theater in 1941/1942, King has no authority or reason to dictate anything

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For what purpose? How could the government justify withdrawing troops from the U.K., which was still anticipating a German invasion when there was nobody to fight? (Easy to say, now, that the incursion into Russia made that impossible, but the advance didn't stall for quite a long time, and there was always fear that Hitler still had enough resources to come here again.) King might have had no reason, but he was vehemently opposed to American ships being used to protect U.K.-bound convoys, reasoning that everything should be thrown against the Japanese.

Yes, Standard Motors.

As posted in another thread, two of the first four Mossies in the CBI had formaldehyde glue.

Glider said:

I admit that my maths isn't great, so am not even going to try to do my own. Also I could easily be wrong but would be surprised if you took 10 aircraft (of any type, in any airforce) put them in a front line squadron, operated them for 12 months and only lost two which approximates to the 18% loss ratio you mention for the USAAF.

Then figure that three years later some of them are still in the front line, not replaced by more modern versions, not written off in accidents, converted to hanger queens or transferred to other roles.

I still find it pretty impressive

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It is impressive, but also not completely true.

Although a Prototype aircraft, W4051 (together with W4054 and W4060) was e,ployed on PR.1 acceptance trials at the A&AEE, Boscombe Down, being used for radio tests as well as an evaluation of camera and cabin temperatures. W4051 later flew operationally with No 1 PRU (as 'LY-U') from Benson and Leuchars, and in September 1942 was fitted with a long range-fuel tank. This aircraft was later allocated to 521 (Meteorological) and 540 Squadrons before transfer to 8 OTU in August 1943. Damaged on 19 April 1944, it was due for repair but was recategorised as a write-off on 17 May 1945.

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Ian Thirsk, de Havilland Mosquito, An Illustrated History, Volume 2.

So, W4051, though struck off charge in 1945, lay around for more than a year before it was written off. Befoe that it spent the best part of a year at an Operational Training Unit, so its front line service was actually only 2 years.

Some OTUs, particularly heavy bomber Units, did fly operational missions so it's possible that W4051 did undertake front-line ops during its last 2 years of usage. However, I'd agree most of it's time in an OTU would have been spent over the UK.