Could the Kriegsmarine IJN neutralize the US War Effort with a combined attack? (1 Viewer)

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Glider the problem is that the British were hard pressed to keep the convoy escorts in the North Atlantic in 1942, the USA had very little available to help with this job, they could not introduce convoys even if they wanted to. Remember it takes not only ships, (DD, DE, sloops etc) but they needed ASW equipment (Sonar, Hedgehog) and trained crew. Even after Adm. King finally agreed to put in convoys, it still took a few more months to put it all in place. And we are only talking US East Coast Caribbean here. Imagine if the Allies had to do this on the US West coast, the S. Pacific, Indian Ocean, African, Australian ports as well. The alternative is that all the ships would be stuck in port because there is no escort available. (which is what actually happened in summer 1942 on the US East coast)



For example if the last two months of 1941 the Allies lose 4 - 5 million tons worldwide. In January the Allied governments go into crisis mode, but what can they do? The US must continue to supply Hawaii, Australia the outposts at Midway, American Samoa, Tonga, NZ, etc. The British must continue to send supplies to Egypt, Malta, India, Burma, Malaya, Australia others. The US UK might lose another 4 - 5 million tons in the first quarter of 1942.

The "British Import Crisis" in March 1943 resulted after the British lost 5.1 million tons in the first 15 months after Pearl Harbour, but they built only 2.2 million tons in that time. Nevertheless, losing less than 3 million net put us into crisis mode

HyperWar: British War Economy [Chapter XIV]

British Import Crisis

I'm afraid that the loss of so much tonnage would mean abandoning the Far East (Malaya Burma), or Egypt, or even both. With the USA losing so much of its fleet, it would be in no position to help out, as it did historically in 1943

I don't disagree with this and have no doubt that we might have had to give up the far east. The Med no. However in the long run the allies would have won due to their increased production. The USA could have and I believe would have put convoys at the top of their priority. The USN had a large number of destroyers that were used exclusively for 'Fleet' operations and I believe would have been used for convoys.
 
Glider,

Regarding the Type XXI, it could like I said have been sent into service by late 1943 to early 1944. As it was the boat was already being constructed in 1943.
I am sorry but it couldn't have been in service that fast. The design was completed in June 1943 and authorisation to proceed given on August 1943. Production went straight away without a prototype and it couldn't have gone ahead any faster. The minimum planned building time was 6 months and obviously the building yards need to time to prepare and the first Type XXI was commissioned in June 1944.

Technical resources ? Like what ?

The ASW technology available to the Allies and their production ability.

I strongly believe they could've won the Pacific, esp. with the Japanese employing German U-boat tactics, and with the help of the KM U-boats the USN wouldn't stand much chance. There'd litterally be swarming with subs in the Pacific and the IJN would make sure the airspace was clear.
For every sub on station at least another four are in support, one on the way to the station, one on the way back from the station, one being maintained and another being worked up. The headline numbers should take this into account

Also I think that a close co-operation in the Pacific would've lead to larger exchanges of technology between the two nations, something which would've undoubtedly been of large benefit to Japan. If the Japanese had started building AFV's a/c like the Germans it would've been all over for the Allies.

There is no doubt that the axis forces would have caused significant additional losses if they had co operated. Would they have won? who knows
 
To begin with the Japanese doctrine with subs was that they were to operate with the fleet not to sink merchant ships. There were a number of I boats outside of Pearl Harbor during the sneak attack and they sank nothing. If the IJN had 63 ocean going subs it is preposterous to think they could all be on station at once. Probably less than half if every sub they had was taken away from the fleet. The Jap admirals were not about to turn loose of their subs. However, to think that 30 or so subs could have a significant impact on shipping in the Pacific seems implausible. To begin with, the merchant shipping in the Pacific was never as profuse as in the Atlantic and spread over a much larger area. The amount of time an I boat could stay on station off the US west coast would be severely limited because of the distance involved. The U-boat threat was pretty much over with by mid 1942 anyway. Doenitz by concentrating his boats off the American coast in early 1942 may have resulted in a lot of easy sinkings but it gave an invaluable relief to the North Atlantic convoys and from that time on the issue was never in doubt. Once the US was in the war, the issue as far as who would win was settled. It was just a matter of how long before it was over.
 
To begin with the Japanese doctrine with subs was that they were to operate with the fleet not to sink merchant ships. There were a number of I boats outside of Pearl Harbor during the sneak attack and they sank nothing. If the IJN had 63 ocean going subs it is preposterous to think they could all be on station at once. The Jap admirals were not about to turn loose of their subs.

Well I said as part of the scenario "what if" the IJN had taken Germany's advice and used their subs against shipping. So the Admirals would be told to do so whether they agreed or not.

They could certainly have all of their boats ready on station outside Allied ports right after "Pearl". After the first patrol they could probably keep half of their subs on station at any one time.

However, to think that 30 or so subs could have a significant impact on shipping in the Pacific seems implausible. To begin with, the merchant shipping in the Pacific was never as profuse as in the Atlantic and spread over a much larger area.

Why implausible? The Germans created havoc on the US East coast with no more than a dozen or two boats. The shipping routes all converge on the harbours, where there will be more than enough targets.

he amount of time an I boat could stay on station off the US west coast would be severely limited because of the distance involved.

The distance from Tarawa Marshall Islands to San Fransisco or Los Angeles is about 4,000 miles, compared to the 4,500 miles that German U-boats traveled to attack shipping in the Caribbean or US Gulf Coast, and the Japanese boats had longer range than the Germans

The U-boat threat was pretty much over with by mid 1942 anyway.
Actually the worst period for the Allies was from May-Nov 1942 when the German Italian subs sank an average of 600,000 tons/month

Once the US was in the war, the issue as far as who would win was settled. It was just a matter of how long before it was over.

Pehaps, but not guaranteed. If the Axis had seriously disrupted shipments to Russia won in N. Africa, Germany had a chance of beating the Soviets. Also if the Axis had prevented the British from defending Burma, India Persia the whole course of the war could be different.
 
Can't agree with that comment.

I'd say once the US had the atomic bomb, it was only a question on who was going to get nuked first.

In 1944, the US had the industrial and logistics capabilities to do pretty much what it wanted to do (except for a direct invasion of Europe, where the Brits would be needed).
 
I have questions about the US strategy, for Renrich Syscom (or anyone else).

Suppose that the Japanese had captured or occupied Tahiti, Cook Islands American Samoa right after "Pearl Harbour" at the same time as they occupied Tarawa. {area on map "Possible Japanese Expansion"} Would the U.S. still support the "ABDA" plan, to try to prevent Japan from taking Java, Sumatra New Guinea? Or would they concentrate everything on the Western Pacific Hawaii/Tahiti axis?

Assume that the USA is pursuing a "Pacific First" policy, so they have all 4 remaining fleet carriers available in the Pacific. The British could contribute 2 fleet carriers to "ABDA", + adequate supporting elements (BB's, DD's, CA's etc)

Do you think it would be best to attack the Japanese perimiter from 2 directions, (SW NE) to split the defence, or to concentrate all in one group?

{see map}
 

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I'd say once the US had the atomic bomb, it was only a question on who was going to get nuked first.

In 1944, the US had the industrial and logistics capabilities to do pretty much what it wanted to do (except for a direct invasion of Europe, where the Brits would be needed).


I would agree with the nuke comment, but when they entered the war in 41 they did not have a nuke. So to "assume" the war was over just b/c USA had entered the war is not a fair statement. Not to mention it was a race to see who made the first nuke, just happen to be the USA.

The second part of your comment:

I would agree that they had more industrial power then any single nation had, but that does not make them the winner in any war, not to mention WW2. As I am sure you would agree. The next comment I would say is that, while the USA had the biggest industrial base, but did they have the will to fight and lose millions of dead (if other Allied powers did not do the dirty ground work) or did the American people of the will to nuke and kill millions of innocent people (none soldiers)?

It's one thing to say I could kill you, it's another if you actually have the will to drop the bomb......over and over and over again killing millions.

But I could also be just reading into your last comment too far, perhaps your comment that "they could do just about anything they wanted" was too general and I read more into it then you meant. If so ignore the last 75% of this post. :lol:
 
I would agree with the nuke comment, but when they entered the war in 41 they did not have a nuke. So to "assume" the war was over just b/c USA had entered the war is not a fair statement. Not to mention it was a race to see who made the first nuke, just happen to be the USA.

The second part of your comment:

I would agree that they had more industrial power then any single nation had, but that does not make them the winner in any war, not to mention WW2. As I am sure you would agree. The next comment I would say is that, while the USA had the biggest industrial base, but did they have the will to fight and lose millions of dead (if other Allied powers did not do the dirty ground work) or did the American people of the will to nuke and kill millions of innocent people (none soldiers)?

It's one thing to say I could kill you, it's another if you actually have the will to drop the bomb......over and over and over again killing millions.

But I could also be just reading into your last comment too far, perhaps your comment that "they could do just about anything they wanted" was too general and I read more into it then you meant. If so ignore the last 75% of this post. :lol:

In 1944, the USN and AAF was so overwhelmingly dominat in the Pacific, that the Japanese were just being swept aside with minimal effort (as compared to the casualties taken in battles with the Germans).

There was nothing the IJN and IJA could do to stop the US war machine in 1944, even if they had a fully intact navy as they had at the start of the war.

As for killing "innocent" people with a nuke? No problem. We had no compunture to do it on the Japanese, and no problem doing it to the Germans.
 
In 1944, the USN and AAF was so overwhelmingly dominat in the Pacific, that the Japanese were just being swept aside with minimal effort (as compared to the casualties taken in battles with the Germans).

There was nothing the IJN and IJA could do to stop the US war machine in 1944, even if they had a fully intact navy as they had at the start of the war.

As for killing "innocent" people with a nuke? No problem. We had no compunture to do it on the Japanese, and no problem doing it to the Germans.

Agree in 44 USA did have "little problems" with Japanese.

USA did not kill millions in Japan and they looked at the Japanese as almost less then human......nuking them was not as hard. But I still question would of the American people killed millions of Japanese.

But agree defeating Japanese does not mean you would of won the war. Not to mention if things would of happened just a little different the war might of ended very differently. What I am saying is, just b/c USA entered the war in 41 does not make it a lock for the Allies to win. It just helped a great deal.

The war in ETO was different then the PTO......it was more civilized then PTO. Not so sure American people would of been so quick nuking German, Italian, Russian, etc cities. Many Americans had strong ties to families in Europe, not sure they would quick to nuke them one after the other. That makes getting dirty and fighting on the ground.......again America has never had strong will to take heavy causalities in war.

Would she of been willing take so many causalities (on the level as Germany or Russia) to win the war? Or would of she instead sued for peace getting the best agreement she could. I think she would of sued for peace and would of gotten fairly good agreement in her favor instead of suffering causalities in the millions.
 
......it was more civilized then PTO. Not so sure American people would of been so quick nuking German, Italian, Russian, etc cities. Many Americans had strong ties to families in Europe, not sure they would quick to nuke them one after the other. That makes getting dirty and fighting on the ground.......again America has never had strong will to take heavy causalities in war.

Would she of been willing take so many causalities (on the level as Germany or Russia) to win the war? Or would of she instead sued for peace getting the best agreement she could. I think she would of sued for peace and would of gotten fairly good agreement in her favor instead of suffering causalities in the millions.

There was very little "love" for the Germans in those years. Given the choice between taking lots of allied casualties and inflicting punishment on the Germans that would have forced them to surrender, then the US people would have supported it completely.

As for civilized? I dont think so. Only difference between the war in the two theaters, was surrendering was an option in which you could be reasonably sure you wouldnt be executed on the spot.
 
We were reading the japanese messages sent back and forth to the subs, so the ones on station would eventually be found and sunk.

If this scenario were to have actually have happened, the IJN sub force would had a spectacular but short career.
 
We were reading the japanese messages sent back and forth to the subs, so the ones on station would eventually be found and sunk.

If this scenario were to have actually have happened, the IJN sub force would had a spectacular but short career.
??

We were reading the German transmissions too for all the good it did in early '42.

The USN had U-boats off the East Coast but could not sink any until April 1942. They did not institute convoys until May/June '42, because of a lack of escorts capable of ASW, and finally began ASW operations with the help of experienced Royal Navy ASW corvettes. How would the US deal with sinkings on the US West Coast when they were unable to deal with it on the East Coast? I don't doubt that the US would sink some Japanese subs, but very few in the first 6 months or so, meanwhile the shipping would have taken a heavy hit.

And you are correct, by 1944 the US production will be huge. The question would be could the Japanese buy enough time in '42-'43 to consolidate gains.
When you talk about the massive US shipbuilding, remember that at maximum capacity it can build about 1.1 million tons/month. Even so the US was short on shipping capacity right up until 1945. So losing an extra 4 - 6 million tons in 1942 will have an impact for the next two years.
 
The first warship sunk by a US sub in WW2 was a Japanese sub ambushed near Midway.

The USN intel people deduced its projected location because the IJN was too "chatty".

Theres no reason to believe that things would have been different in your scenario.
 
It is certainly an interesting scenario, and there definately would be increased losses of merchant shipping. As I said before though, it is a hard job to maintain a constant blockade - it always has been. The Allies would have a tough time at first but the German and Japanese boats would be sunk and that would mean that Germany and Japan would have to maintain production of their boats to keep pressure. Would Japan be able to maintain a submarine fleet like Germany did ?

If there was a serious loss of merchant shipping through the Indian Ocean the British could have abandoned Burma in '41 (like they did) and hold up in India without reinforcement as the Japanese did not have the supply line to attack India with any real force. In the emergency the British would have to rely on Indian industry and manpower (which was producing arms and soldiers albeit of lesser quality).
Without sending reinforcements to the Far East the 8th Army would have taken North Africa before Rommel arrived, they came close in reality but they took men away for Greece then again for the Far East.

It's too easy to say what they could have done, or should have done. We'll never know what they would have done. But for me I would have not reinforced the Far East and ordered a general retreat behind the Indian border and aimed to take North Africa before the Germans were involved. That would have forced the Vichy French in N.Africa to collapse, and the Germans would have to attempt a forced landing in Africa - something they would not look forward to doing. As the Japanese would not have to supply in Burma to attack India they would be held to stalemate. And once the war on the Eastern Front was fully underway it could free up British troops in N.Africa - but it would have the effect of giving the Germans a reserve of 300,000 men for Russia, which they lost in Tunisia.
 
It is certainly an interesting scenario,

Thanks :D

and there definately would be increased losses of merchant shipping. As I said before though, it is a hard job to maintain a constant blockade - it always has been. The Allies would have a tough time at first but the German and Japanese boats would be sunk and that would mean that Germany and Japan would have to maintain production of their boats to keep pressure. Would Japan be able to maintain a submarine fleet like Germany did ?

Unfortunatley the extra work is mostly with the surface fleet. For example, 6 - 8 or so Japanese subs spread out from Cape Town - Aden (Red Sea entrance) on the East coast of Africa along the Egypt India supply route would face very little ASW opposition. After a few dozen sinkings, the British would have to institute convoys with whatever DD's CL's they could scrape up. Even if there were a couple of weeks when the Japanese subs are absent (returning to re-supply) the Royal Navy will still have to run the convoys because they can't be sure where the subs are.

I think the Japanese could have concentrated on building subs, instead of wasting time with mini-subs, hybrid BB/CV's or other projects.

If there was a serious loss of merchant shipping through the Indian Ocean the British could have abandoned Burma in '41 (like they did) and hold up in India without reinforcement as the Japanese did not have the supply line to attack India with any real force. In the emergency the British would have to rely on Indian industry and manpower (which was producing arms and soldiers albeit of lesser quality).

I agree with you to some extent, I might try to stiffen up Singapore if possible, but if it fell I agree its best not to stay in Burma. Of course there was pressure from the US for an offensive to re-gain acess to the Burma Road. The Burma front was such a drain on resources manpower, especially from disease.

It's too easy to say what they could have done, or should have done. We'll never know what they would have done. But for me I would have not reinforced the Far East and ordered a general retreat behind the Indian border and aimed to take North Africa before the Germans were involved.

The Rommel Africa Korps are in Africa from Feb of 1941. However the offensive "Crusader" occurs from mid Nov - early Dec 1941, leaving the British in control of the eastern half of Libya and Rommel retreating due to lack of fuel supplies. The British have about 6 weeks before Rommel has built up to attack again. This would be the time to push the Axis back to Tripoli, except they lost their re-inforcements to Malaya/Burma as you said.

The real concern is to prevent the Japanese from isolating Australia India. At the time a Japanese invasion of Australia was feared a real possibility, especially in Canberra, even though it was not seriously considered in Tokyo.

What do you think of a combined US/UK Naval offensive against the Japanese? As it was the Allies outnumbered them, but though poor planning we allowed Japan to sink our ships in small groups.

The Japanese Navy in Nov 1941 is
6 CV's,
4 or 5 CVE's,
6 BB's (2 modern Nagato's, 4 older Ise Fuso class)
4 BC's (older Kongo's),
18 CA's
20 CL's
84 DD's

After Pearl Harbour, (assuming that the US loses 3 carriers, are pursuing King's idea "Pacific first") The US Navy is:

4 CV
2 CVE
10 BB's
{2 modern N.Carolina class + 8 older Penn, N.M., N.Y., Ark. class}
18 CA's
19 CL's
140 DD's
(70 fairly modern + 70 older "flush deck")

The British (with Aust. Dutch) had available for the Far East
2 CV's (Indomitable Formidable)
1 CVE (Hermes)
6 BB's (2 modern + 4 "Royal Sovereign class)
7 CA's
20 CL's
30 DD's


So the Allies could put up a force about 150% of the Japanese, except for carriers in which they were about equal. (the Japanese CVE's were not available for fleet actions for the first few months, they were supporting
operations in South China Sea transporting aircraft)

If the Allies had had better strategy could they have done better with "ABDA"?

1st: The sea lanes to Australia were vital and had to be defended at all cost.
2nd: Preserve the carrier forces to defend Hawaii and go on attack as an opportunity arose.
3rd: Contain the Japanese forces at Rabaul
4th: As heavy bombers become available to the AAF, begin systematically attacking the oil refineries of the NEI.

And this is how it did unfold, except for #4.

Consider if the Japanese had advanced to the SE right after "Pearl Harbour" to occupy Samoa Tahiti {see my map in post #27}, and cut off Australia's supply line from America, how will the US react? Would it be better to combine all the Allied assets? Or have one fleet advance from Hawaii and another from Australia?
 
The Royal Navy and USN would have to be able to work together to keep India and Australia alive; in the event of losing Singapore the most important areas of the time [in the Far East] are Australia and India. The question would really be a matter of command - would the U.S be able to provide someone who able to work with the British and the same applies to the U.K, only vice versa.
 
It is inconcievable that the US would have pursued a Japan first strategy but if they had they would have been impelled to try to relieve the PI. I believe they already had a plan for that, Plan Orange. That plan would have had to be revisited after Pearl Harbor(thank goodness) Actually Yammamoto did us a huge favor by attacking PH. He put paid to the primacy of the BBs, demonstrated the efficacy of the CV and of course aroused the US. Never underestimate the ferocity of the English speaking peoples, especially the US, once they are aroused.
 
The Royal Navy and USN would have to be able to work together to keep India and Australia alive; in the event of losing Singapore the most important areas of the time [in the Far East] are Australia and India.

Agreed, if the US follows MacArthur's plan to attack northwards from Australia it would work. I think it would have been more effective than the raids done in early '42 in countering Japanese moves. It's ususally best to defend what you already have.

But for me I would have not reinforced the Far East and ordered a general retreat behind the Indian border and aimed to take North Africa

I would assume in this scenario that the British have completed the rail link to across Africa, otherwise they would probably lose Egypt in early '42. As it was the British were pushed back from Jan - May '42, if they weren't getting supplies (because of Japanese subs in East Africa) I don't think they could have stopped Rommel before he reached the Canal. He had the fuel supplies to do it in early '42 because the Luftwaffe had almost neutralized Malta. When the spring offensive began in Russia in 1942, the LW was withdrawn from the Med, and so the RAF from Malta began to seriously interfere with Rommels supply.
 

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