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Glider the problem is that the British were hard pressed to keep the convoy escorts in the North Atlantic in 1942, the USA had very little available to help with this job, they could not introduce convoys even if they wanted to. Remember it takes not only ships, (DD, DE, sloops etc) but they needed ASW equipment (Sonar, Hedgehog) and trained crew. Even after Adm. King finally agreed to put in convoys, it still took a few more months to put it all in place. And we are only talking US East Coast Caribbean here. Imagine if the Allies had to do this on the US West coast, the S. Pacific, Indian Ocean, African, Australian ports as well. The alternative is that all the ships would be stuck in port because there is no escort available. (which is what actually happened in summer 1942 on the US East coast)
For example if the last two months of 1941 the Allies lose 4 - 5 million tons worldwide. In January the Allied governments go into crisis mode, but what can they do? The US must continue to supply Hawaii, Australia the outposts at Midway, American Samoa, Tonga, NZ, etc. The British must continue to send supplies to Egypt, Malta, India, Burma, Malaya, Australia others. The US UK might lose another 4 - 5 million tons in the first quarter of 1942.
The "British Import Crisis" in March 1943 resulted after the British lost 5.1 million tons in the first 15 months after Pearl Harbour, but they built only 2.2 million tons in that time. Nevertheless, losing less than 3 million net put us into crisis mode
HyperWar: British War Economy [Chapter XIV]
British Import Crisis
I'm afraid that the loss of so much tonnage would mean abandoning the Far East (Malaya Burma), or Egypt, or even both. With the USA losing so much of its fleet, it would be in no position to help out, as it did historically in 1943
I am sorry but it couldn't have been in service that fast. The design was completed in June 1943 and authorisation to proceed given on August 1943. Production went straight away without a prototype and it couldn't have gone ahead any faster. The minimum planned building time was 6 months and obviously the building yards need to time to prepare and the first Type XXI was commissioned in June 1944.Glider,
Regarding the Type XXI, it could like I said have been sent into service by late 1943 to early 1944. As it was the boat was already being constructed in 1943.
Technical resources ? Like what ?
For every sub on station at least another four are in support, one on the way to the station, one on the way back from the station, one being maintained and another being worked up. The headline numbers should take this into accountI strongly believe they could've won the Pacific, esp. with the Japanese employing German U-boat tactics, and with the help of the KM U-boats the USN wouldn't stand much chance. There'd litterally be swarming with subs in the Pacific and the IJN would make sure the airspace was clear.
Also I think that a close co-operation in the Pacific would've lead to larger exchanges of technology between the two nations, something which would've undoubtedly been of large benefit to Japan. If the Japanese had started building AFV's a/c like the Germans it would've been all over for the Allies.
To begin with the Japanese doctrine with subs was that they were to operate with the fleet not to sink merchant ships. There were a number of I boats outside of Pearl Harbor during the sneak attack and they sank nothing. If the IJN had 63 ocean going subs it is preposterous to think they could all be on station at once. The Jap admirals were not about to turn loose of their subs.
However, to think that 30 or so subs could have a significant impact on shipping in the Pacific seems implausible. To begin with, the merchant shipping in the Pacific was never as profuse as in the Atlantic and spread over a much larger area.
he amount of time an I boat could stay on station off the US west coast would be severely limited because of the distance involved.
Actually the worst period for the Allies was from May-Nov 1942 when the German Italian subs sank an average of 600,000 tons/monthThe U-boat threat was pretty much over with by mid 1942 anyway.
Once the US was in the war, the issue as far as who would win was settled. It was just a matter of how long before it was over.
Once the US was in the war, the issue as far as who would win was settled. It was just a matter of how long before it was over.
Can't agree with that comment.
I'd say once the US had the atomic bomb, it was only a question on who was going to get nuked first.
In 1944, the US had the industrial and logistics capabilities to do pretty much what it wanted to do (except for a direct invasion of Europe, where the Brits would be needed).
I would agree with the nuke comment, but when they entered the war in 41 they did not have a nuke. So to "assume" the war was over just b/c USA had entered the war is not a fair statement. Not to mention it was a race to see who made the first nuke, just happen to be the USA.
The second part of your comment:
I would agree that they had more industrial power then any single nation had, but that does not make them the winner in any war, not to mention WW2. As I am sure you would agree. The next comment I would say is that, while the USA had the biggest industrial base, but did they have the will to fight and lose millions of dead (if other Allied powers did not do the dirty ground work) or did the American people of the will to nuke and kill millions of innocent people (none soldiers)?
It's one thing to say I could kill you, it's another if you actually have the will to drop the bomb......over and over and over again killing millions.
But I could also be just reading into your last comment too far, perhaps your comment that "they could do just about anything they wanted" was too general and I read more into it then you meant. If so ignore the last 75% of this post.
In 1944, the USN and AAF was so overwhelmingly dominat in the Pacific, that the Japanese were just being swept aside with minimal effort (as compared to the casualties taken in battles with the Germans).
There was nothing the IJN and IJA could do to stop the US war machine in 1944, even if they had a fully intact navy as they had at the start of the war.
As for killing "innocent" people with a nuke? No problem. We had no compunture to do it on the Japanese, and no problem doing it to the Germans.
......it was more civilized then PTO. Not so sure American people would of been so quick nuking German, Italian, Russian, etc cities. Many Americans had strong ties to families in Europe, not sure they would quick to nuke them one after the other. That makes getting dirty and fighting on the ground.......again America has never had strong will to take heavy causalities in war.
Would she of been willing take so many causalities (on the level as Germany or Russia) to win the war? Or would of she instead sued for peace getting the best agreement she could. I think she would of sued for peace and would of gotten fairly good agreement in her favor instead of suffering causalities in the millions.
??We were reading the japanese messages sent back and forth to the subs, so the ones on station would eventually be found and sunk.
If this scenario were to have actually have happened, the IJN sub force would had a spectacular but short career.
It is certainly an interesting scenario,
and there definately would be increased losses of merchant shipping. As I said before though, it is a hard job to maintain a constant blockade - it always has been. The Allies would have a tough time at first but the German and Japanese boats would be sunk and that would mean that Germany and Japan would have to maintain production of their boats to keep pressure. Would Japan be able to maintain a submarine fleet like Germany did ?
If there was a serious loss of merchant shipping through the Indian Ocean the British could have abandoned Burma in '41 (like they did) and hold up in India without reinforcement as the Japanese did not have the supply line to attack India with any real force. In the emergency the British would have to rely on Indian industry and manpower (which was producing arms and soldiers albeit of lesser quality).
It's too easy to say what they could have done, or should have done. We'll never know what they would have done. But for me I would have not reinforced the Far East and ordered a general retreat behind the Indian border and aimed to take North Africa before the Germans were involved.
1st: The sea lanes to Australia were vital and had to be defended at all cost.
2nd: Preserve the carrier forces to defend Hawaii and go on attack as an opportunity arose.
3rd: Contain the Japanese forces at Rabaul
4th: As heavy bombers become available to the AAF, begin systematically attacking the oil refineries of the NEI.
And this is how it did unfold, except for #4.
The Royal Navy and USN would have to be able to work together to keep India and Australia alive; in the event of losing Singapore the most important areas of the time [in the Far East] are Australia and India.
But for me I would have not reinforced the Far East and ordered a general retreat behind the Indian border and aimed to take North Africa