I must be missing something here. Are we saying that the US carriers were sunk at PH also?
Yes, I put a hypothetical forward if the US had lost 3 carriers at Pearl.
Freebird, the aircraft capacity of the Japanese carriers you quoted, is of the design specs from the mid 1930's. The actual capacity of the carriers in 1942 (with larger sized aircraft as compared to the mid 30's) at Midway were:
Kaga: 72, Soryu: 57, Hiryu: 59, Akagi: 63. Light Carriers were : Zuiho: 18, Ryujo: 30, Junyo: 33.
Where did you get your figures from?
I used HazeGray, almost all of the figures listed were from 1939-1940, not mid 30's.
World Aircraft Carriers List: Japanese Aircraft Carriers
Both of the
Shokaku class are listed as 84 aircraft (max), both completed in 1941.
Both
Kaga Akagi had an initial capacity of 60, with 90 or 91 aircraft max after reconstruction, Kaga's reconstruction completed in 1935, Akagi's in the Sept of '38.
Soryu Hiryu are listed as 71 73 aircraft max, with Soryu first in commision beginning 1938, Hiryu completed summer 1939.
Zuiho Shoho are listed as carrying 30 aircraft, with Zuiho in service Dec 1940, Shoho Jan '42.
So all of the stats are Fall '38 or later, except for the Kaga. The Nakajima "Kate" B5N1 was in service on Japanese carriers starting 1937-1938, while before the "Val" D3A (47' wingspan, 33.5' length) they used the B4Y1 (50' x 33') and the Aichi D1A (37' x 30.5') but the D1A was a biplane, I don't think it had folding wings.
In any event, the 6 carriers were more than enought to do the job at Pearl.
As for your submarines, while its probable that they could have all 60 or so subs active at the start, maintaining full strength over a period of months would be very hard to do. even 2/3rds strength only leaves you with 40 or so subs, covering an immense area of the world. And that doesn't account for force reductions due to ships being damaged, sunk or in transit.
I agree, the Japanese would have to put building subs as a priority, to replace losses after the first few months. It does not take very many subs sinkings to force the Allies into a much more cautious shipping policy in the Pacific, which will hamper the Sout Pacific build-up.
Saying you will put your subs near the major ports leaves you vulnerable to counter attack by ASW. Even if your subs are not sunk outright by ASW attack, just being forced away from a ship or convoy is success.
Yes you are correct, but the ASW capability in the first 4 - 6 months is negligable, even after that it is very limited for the first year or so. The German U-boats used this tactic to lurk outside US East coast ports, yet the none were sunk off the US East Coast until April 1942, and the convoys were not instituted until May, where in the Atlantic the US had some very effective assistance of well trained British/Canadian ASW crews. US Naval Command had some expectation that they would have to defend against U-boats (in the lead up to war 1940-1941), whereas there was virtually no preparation in the Pacific against Japanese subs.
As for attacking deep into the central pacific, just what would you really accomplish? You have to do lasting and irrepairable damage to knock Samoa, Playmra, Johnston or Fiji out of the war. And that takes lots of aircraft and multiple raids. In addition, Your carriers would need to be massed into a task force to accomplish anything of military value, thus putting a strain on the fleet supply.
I'm not contemplating raids, I think the Japanese could occupy Samoa outright, and establish a squadron or two there. In the fall of 1941 it is defended by a single US Marine defence battalion. I don't think they would attack Fiji, it is a little more strongly defended. The US would still have troops on Johnson Palmyra.
The point would be to have the US waste months building up to re-occupy Samoa, and to use scarce troop assets to re-inforce US bases in Johnson, Palmyra, Christmas, Midway island etc. The Free French garrison in Tahiti is poorly equipped, I think the Japanese would then only use the air naval bases, while allowing/helping the Vichy French to re-occupy and defend Tahiti. Remember that the Vichy Army offered minimal if any resistance to Axis forces, yet they stubbornly fought against the Allies in every instance when the Allies attempted to occupy Vichy territory, even when defending against heavy odds. (Morocco, Algeria, Syria, Madegascar, Dakar)
And as events proved in Guadalcanal and New Guinea, the P39's and P40's (that the AAF had available in Hawaii and the line islands in 1942) were adequate against IJN aircraft at the low altitudes, where they would have to fight. Attrition would cripple your air groups in a hurry.
It would take many months for the US to be able to bring planes troops supplies to the forward bases to be able to offer resistance. For example, the delays to re-take Samoa re-establish communications would seriously hamper US Australian resistance in the Solomons N. Guinea. With the greater threat from Japanese subs, it would also take a few or many extra months to arrange convoys to bring the vital supplies forward.