There was a German raider shed its bombs on London . Churchill ordered a raid on Berlin in reprisal. Adolph insisted that no bombs be dropped on London without his permission, so he gave permission.
This is a bit of a myth. The first significant attack on London came on the 15th August when the Luftwaffe mounted a planned attack on an airfield in Croydon (they hit Croydon airport rather than Kenley, but both were in Croydon). 60 civilians were killed when bombs hit civilian buildings outside the airfield.
The next day the Luftwaffe attacked more targets in London, killing 15 civilians in Wimbledon.
A few days after that the Luftwaffe started bombing London at night. As Richard Overy puts it:
The raids on Berlin were in reality retaliation for the persistent bombing of British conurbations and the high level of British casualties that resulted. In July 258 civilians had been killed, in August 1075; the figures included 136 children and 392 women. During the last half of August, as German bombers moved progressively farther inland, bombs began to fall on the outskirts of London. On the night of the 18/19, bombs fell on Wimbledon, Croydon and the Maldens. On the night of the 22/23 the first bombs fell on central London in attacks described by observers as "extensive" and for which no warning was given; on the night of 24/25 August bombs fell in Slough, Richmond and Dulwich. On the night the RAF first raided Berlin, bombs fell on Banstead, Croydon, Lewisham, Uxbridge, Harrow and Hayes. On the night of the next raid on Berlin, on 28/29 August, German aircraft bombed the following London areas: Finchley, St Pancaras, Wembley, Wood Green, Southgate, Crayford, Old Kent Road, Mill Hill, Illford, Hendon, Chigwell. London was under red warning for 7 hours 5 minutes. The bombing of London began almost 2 weeks before Hitler's speech on 4 September, and well before the first raid on Berlin
I agree with Dave, the biggest was the switch from military to civilian targets. This allowed the RAF to rebuild.
Operational strength on 13 August, the day the Luftwaffe launched their offensive:
Jagdwaffe (Bf 109) - 853
ZG (Bf 110) - 189
Stukas (JU 87) - 286
KG (level bombers) - 1,008
RAF
Spitfires and Hurricanes - 579
BF 109 pilots fit for duty - 869 (1st August)
Fighter Command pilots and aircrew - 1,396 (10 August)
On 7 September, the day the Luftwaffe began all out attacks on London:
Jagdwaffe (Bf 109) - 658
ZG (Bf 110) - 112
Stukas (JU 87) - 133
KG (level bombers) - 798
RAF
Spitfires and Hurricanes - 621
BF 109 pilots fit for duty - 735 (1 September)
Fighter Command pilots and aircrew - 1,381
It wasn't the RAF that needed rebuilding. Fighter Command had pretty much maintained strength throughout the worst period of the battle. It was the Luftwaffe that desperately needed a change of tactics.
Pretty simplistic view, though, Milosh, considering the USAAF was targeting specific targets within the cities, not just the cities themselves - they didn't just swan over and attack Cologne for the hell of it to achieve victory
Sometimes they did. The USAAF began area bombing of German cities in the summer of 1943. Sometimes an area attack was the plan before takeoff, more often an area attack was the secondary target if the primary target was covered with cloud. Richard G Davis, the official historian of the USAF, says the 8th AF carried out more than 1 area attack a week throughout 1944 and 1945.
Id say the turning point came about 1938 or so. Germany's decision to focus on tactical support made the LW unsuited to sustained air operations, in which direct support of the armies was not the focus. The things the LW did well were related to support of the army, whether that be CAS, air superiority over the battlefield or tacair ops just behind the front.
The most numerous bomber in the Luftwaffe at the start of the war was the He111. The He111 had a range of around 1,400 miles. That's not a tactical bomber. The Luftwaffe had 780 of them in service at the start of the war. That's a strategic bombing force that dwarfed any other in the world at the time.
At the start of the war Bomber Command had 8 squadrons of Wellingtons, 6 of Whitleys, 8 of Hampdens, with about 12 aircraft per squadron, that's about 260 bombers roughly comparable to the He111.
They did come close to defeating Fighter Command and particularly 11 Group. This despite their inept waging of the campaign.
I've seen nothing to suggest either FC or 11 Group were "close to defeat". At the meeting on 7th September, hours before the Luftwaffe switched to London, Dowding talked of "preparing to go down hill". He also talked of his changes to squadron organisation creating enough pilots to "meet wastage greater than any incurred so far". Just before that meeting Park, commander of 11 Group, told his chief controller:
"I've been looking at these casualty figures and I've come to the conclusion that at our present rate of losses we can just afford it. And I'm damned certain the Boche can't. If we hang on as we are going, we shall win in the end"
These are not the views of commanders facing defeat. And that's despite the fact they greatly overestimated German strength.
There's no doubt the Luftwaffe was beginning to hurt Fighter Command, but that's not the same as bringing them close to defeat. At all times the Luftwaffe was much closer to defeat, although the RAF did not know it at the time.
I'm trying to help my daughter with her homework which has asked her for crucial turning points during the Battle of Britain.
Now I have a fair idea of how the battle flowed but I'm not really sure that I can locate the crucial points when the British won and the Axis lost.
Probably the only decisive "point" of the BoB came on 15 May, long before the battle began. Dowding opposed sending any more fighter squadrons to France, and the war cabinet agreed. If that decision had gone the other way Britain may have had too few aircraft and pilots left to defeat the Luftwaffe in August and September.