Crucial points of the Battle of Britain?

Hello Njaco
there is something odd in your info. 111 Sqn was based at Debden on 1 Sept 40 with 11 combat ready and 5 u/s Hurricanes and 19 pilots at 09.00 hrs. (sources Mason and Bungay and Robinson's RAF Fighter Squadrons confirmed the base and more or less the strength saying they were operating with 9 Hurries instead of the normal 12. 151 had at the same time 9 combat ready and 4 u/s Hurricanes and 17 pilots was withdrawn to Digby later on that day.
North Weald's other Hurri sqn, 151 was the other, the 56th had 9 combat ready and 5 u/s Hurricanes and 18 pilots and moved to Boscombe Down later on that day. In the evening NW's Hurri sqns were 46 and 249, both had 15 combat ready Hurricanes and 20 and 18 pilots.


It had been a hard fight but LW had also taken hard beating and in its all important Jagdwaffe was wearing down maybe even more alarming rate than the FC

The establishment of pilots for a Fighter Command squadron in 1940 was 26 operational pilots. 19 isn't bad (if they were all operational) as some 11 Group squadrons' pilot numbers, which had preference to keep the numbers up, fell to single figures. The whole point of the stabilisation system was to strip operational pilots from squadrons in other Groups and feed them into 11 Group's squadrons due to the overall shortage of operational pilots. This in turn meant that many squadrons outside 11 Group had almost no operational pilots at all, leading to the creation of 'C' class squadrons.
Some of the 'C' class squadrons had as many as 16 of their pilots as non-operational, which obviously renders these squadrons useless in any combat sense. The problem is that people uncritically look at total pilot numbers and total aircraft strength and assume that Fighter Command was as strong or stronger in October 1940 than it was in July when this is not the case. I get bored repeating it, but by the beginning of October, just one month after the introduction of the stabilisation system, about one in three Fighter Command pilots was non-operational, in terms of fighting the Luftwaffe they might as well not have existed.

The Luftwaffe had a similar problem because neither side had planned for or anticipated the losses that they would sustain through the Battles of France and Britain. At he end of the day Britain and Germany (particularly Britain in 1940) could produce aeroplanes MUCH faster than they could produce fully trained pilots to fly them.

Small margins make a difference. An RAF pilot who escaped uninjured from being shot down over southern England could quickly return to his unit (no counselling and recuperation in those days and PTSS hadn't been invented). His Luftwaffe counterpart could not.

Cheers

Steve

Hello Stona
I agree with most but IMHO the idea of "C" class sqns was that they were somewhat like OTUs with an active Flight or two which could protect convoys, attack LW intruders and recon planes if needed using the band of sqn's combat ready pilots but were mainly used to train pilots straight from the flying schools or from OTUs crash courses. Of course not all pilots straight from the battle were good teachers but i.g Johnnie Johnson got good training at 616 Sqn in Sept 40 and it began immediately after his and his 2 comrades' arrival.
But yes, pure numbers can be misleading, 56th was in practice leaderless after the loss of F/Lt Weaver on 31 Aug 40 so it had to be transferred to a more peaceful station on 1.9.40.

While most of the green pilots were liabilities not all were, in FiAF i.g. Lampi shot down 2½ bombers (those were real kills) during his first combat sortie on 25.6.1941 during VVS massive opening attacks even if he had not yet done his air-to-air gunnery training. In fact his flight CO had on previous day noticed that he still lacked that exercise for qualified combat pilot and had asked a target towing for Lampi on 25 June butt VVS bombers arrived first. After the combat the senior NCO persuaded the flight CO to cancel the target towing and accept Lampi's kills as accepted results for the air-to-air gunnery exercise. L/Cpl Kirjonen was another example of a very green pilot achieving excellent results in FiAF, he was promoted to sergeant after 2 months of combat after 5 confirmed kills (of which at least 3 fighters and 2 x ½ bombers were real).

'C' class squadrons were not like OTUs at all. It was RAF practice to post pilots to operational squadrons after they left an OTU to finish their training 'on the job'. Before the war nearly every squadron therefore had a handful of pilots being trained in its establishment.
The problem was that during the battle of Britain squadrons in 11 Group simply could not continue this practice. They barely had enough pilots as it was, despite their operational man power being a Fighter Command priority. They could not afford to carry non-operational pilots to make up the numbers. Their replacements were, after the establishment of the stabilisation system, fully trained and operational pilots from squadrons in other Groups. This, combined with the shortening of the various training courses, including those at OTUs, led to the squadrons who had unwillingly given up their best pilots being manned by a preponderance of barely trained young men. Many could hardly fly the Spitfire and Hurricane, let alone fight them. Some had only fired their guns on a handful of occasions. Whatever the intended use of a 'C' class squadron Dowding didn't think that they were capable of attacking even 'unescorted bombers'.
Of the 440 non-operational pilots in Fighter Command's squadrons at the beginning of October 1940 there were bound to be some naturally talented young men who could perform well. It would be stranger if there weren't some. They do not however represent the vast majority. Most were more like the young Luftwaffe pilot described in a post above.

Incidentally the transfer of No.56 Sqn. predates the stabilisation system by exactly one week. A week later it would have been more likely that an experienced officer (and other replacements) would have been brought in, the squadron remaining at 11 Group. This was precisely the practice that reduced the operational efficiency of the 'donor' squadrons.

Cheers

Steve

Whatever the intended use of a 'C' class squadron Dowding didn't think that they were capable of attacking even 'unescorted bombers'.

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C squadrons were supposed to have 5 or 6 experienced pilots. In Dowding's own words:

The remaining squadrons of the Command, which would be stripped of their operational pilots, for the benefit of the A squadrons, down to a level of 5 or 6. These C squadrons could devote their main energies to the training of new pilots, and, although they would not be fit to meet German Fighters, they would be quite capable of defending their Sectors against unescorted Bombers, which would be all that they would be likely to encounter.

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And later he said that they were incapable of intercepting even unescorted bombers. This in a rebuttal of the contention in the BoB pamphlet that Fighter Command was stronger in October than July. I can't remember if he made the comment during the war, whilst in the US, or post war and I'm not at home to check.

If a 'C' class squadron had 16 non operational pilots and 6 experienced hands it would have an establishment of 21 which was well above the average for any squadrons in Fighter Command at this time.

Most 'C' class squadrons were simply not operational in any meaningful way.

Cheers

Steve

I accept that, but what did they need to become operational. Basic facts are, the RAF began offensive sweeps over France from the beginning of March 1941, in a concerted way I mean. LW was still encamped in strength in North western France until the middle of May. What emboldened the british to switch from defensive posture to offensive posture in that 4 month interlude. Obviously a decrease in the tempo of operations and the loss rates, but this applied equally to the LW as well. The arrival of mass production pilots from about November possibly also. The early offensive moves were more successful exchange rates than the later ones, from July onward, when RAF losses became very one sided against them. Not many losses to the german fighters (suggesting that the surviving German fighter pilots were the best of the best) but losses forr "other" types did mount in these early sweeps. Not until an effective flak defence was put into place were the RAF losses really starting to rampo up, although losses to fighters (even though in July there were a lot less of them) were not insubstantial.

All this suggests to me that both sides fought themselves more or less to the point of exhaustion, but the RAF seems to have possessed better powers of recovery. Daylight operations over Britain tapered right away, though they still did happen. night time operations continued until early May, after which operations against Britain were almost exclusively mining and anti shipping ops by the two remaining KGs, with some rather furtive and fitful recon operations undertaken occasionally by fighters mostly. In comparison, the RAF, whilst suffering one sided losses felt strong enough to mount a sustained offensive over France, before June 1941, this was mostly to make that part of the world unpleasant for the LW and KM, thereby making invasion harder mostly. after July there was a political imperative added...do whatever was possible to assist the Russian (tghis was unsuccessful, niot a single formation was recalled from Russia to Northwest France, and the RAF paid a heavy price in these operations).

So, clearly the RAF picked itself up from the canvas quicker than the LW. Judging simply by the tempo of operations, FC was able to commence offensive operations before the LW fighter groups felt they had recovedered enough to firstl;y recommence offensive operations, and secondly, to mount a strong air denial campaign to the British incursions over their airspace in daylight. So, it seems to me that these "C" squadrons whilst not combat worthy in October, had to have recovered and acquired combat readiness by aboiut January. What happened to change this status.

The beginning...the middle...the end.

Ascent said:

I'm trying to help my daughter with her homework which has asked her for crucial turning points during the Battle of Britain.

Now I have a fair idea of how the battle flowed but I'm not really sure that I can locate the crucial points when the British won and the Axis lost.

What would you say are the standout points in the battle?

Would you say the poor assesment of British losses could be one? It meant the Germans believed they were causing much more damage then they were?

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Simply read Stephen Bungay's book' Most dangerous Enemy'. It explains everything. The why, the who, the how. ... And debunks quote a few myths, like the nonsense about " if they hadn't started to attack London they would have won".

Basically the most powerful offensive air force in the World at the time came up against the most powerful air defence system in the World.

Noting that the 'Dowding System' is the gold standard air defence system that everyone in the World has copied since then.


But, saying that the British could have lost it all in one day. All systems require good people to run and operate it. Dowding created the system, but give an idiot the best system in the World and they will stuff it up.

In that Keith Park was brilliant, how he handled his forces day after day, week after week, month after month was magnificent (and the BoB has been wargamed by just about every airforce in the World to all heck for decades and no one, ever, has ever done better than Park did).

His political enemy Leigh Mallory did a Bob exercise in 42 .. and lost in a day, for example .. yes he was an idiot ... and played political games during the Bob, like sending his worst squadrons to 11 group as Dowding rotated them through. He was trusted to be a military professional ... and acted like a political animal. Dowding, after he was fired, was horrified when he found out what Mallory did.
Another one of those "I'd rather win my internal political games than actually win the war" people that the World is full of.

So get the book.

What justification was there for firing Dowding after the BoB, beyond mear political games, was there a real military reason?

parsifal said:

Iwouldnt describe the LWs opposition before the BoB as "mainly Biplanes" or inneffective. During the Polish campaign, the LW did enjoy a clear technical and numerical advantage, but still managed to lose more than 500 aircraft during the campaign. I would put that down to the exceptionally well trained Polish aircrew. Even during the phoney war, LW losses were running almost at the replacement rate.....

The battles in norway were pretty small scale, but losses to the Dutch, Belgian and french Air Arms were actually very heavy. Its a common misunderstanding that the Germans won these air campaigns cheaply and easily. In fact its far more accurate to describe these campaigns as the Germans winning them, despite having sustained heavy losses, not that they won cheap and easy victories. Losses over France, for example, in 6 weeks were approaching 1500 a/c to all causes. Thats a savage loss rate by any standard. French pilots were again well trained and effective, and had fought well, but the FAF was heavily outnumbered, and (like the whole French Army really) quite unable to cope with the fast changing front lines and fluid nature of the campaign. French command structures were poor, dividing air strength up in penny packets along the front such that there was no decisive point at which they could bring decisive strength to bear (the Russians made the same mistake a year later). This was probably the stand out for the British effort over Britain. Radar, and a centralised and highly organised command structure allowed them to distribute their fighters as they thought most appropriate. the British chose to string out their fighters in penny packets, much as the french had, why, because they wanted every bomber strike parried. i think that had its reasons....good ones, but it also meant British losses were heavier than they needed to be as every fight for FC was a fight they were fighting at long odds. they might have been better to concentrate on a few of the strikes and let a few through that were less damaging. Maybe.

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Negative. Park never used 'penny packets'. You have been watching too much Bader stuff and reading nonsense.

Park's tactics were clear: stop the bombers bombing (duh), cause continual attrition on them before and after.

Strip away fighter escorts (sometimes the Luftwaffe did 5 escorts to 1 bomber), then hammer the bombers.
Never risk all your fighters at one time.

As such he never did (which Mallory wanted and Galland*, stupidly, forgetting all his exprerience did later) waste time with forming up large numbers of clumsy, easy to see, easy to attack fighter formations.

Park sent up squadrons, sometimes as pairs, to attack, then other.. then others, then others. So there was never a moment the Luftwaffe was not under attack.
He carefully stripped away their escorts (something the Germans never did against the escorted US bombers, though it would have been easy to do, except they were ... stupid, an air force full of 'Leigh Mallory's).

Though it was frightening for the pilots, say 12 planes against hundreds of bombers and their escorts. But they were small, hard to see, fast and could (and did) get in, kill and get out again.
What each of them didn't see, was that was happening all the time, with repeated attacks by different, small groups, from all different directions.... all the time.

And Park, always pushed, long before the Germans ever thought about it, frontal attacks. To break the bomber formations up.


*Galland, serious prat... 'major throat ache' ... and with the strategic and tactical skills of a wet hamster. Should have been left at Squadron Leader level (like Bader).
When the US escorts saw the big 'gaggles' forming up to attack they had a field day.... as did Galland himself against Bader's 'big wings' on both the Bob and the later, disasterous RAF attacks in France...hmm not the brightest boy on the block.Then again if he had been smart he would never have been promoted (he hated radios in the BoB by the way, despite his later 'recant' in his book).

Has anyone come across a weekly RAF fighter status report for the BoB?

I have only seen parts of of the report (scanned and posted).

Supposedly it is 11" x 17" in size.

It is titled:

Statement Showing Establishment and .......
Aircraft Issued to Squadrons plus Air....... C.R.O (Repair)

I don't know what your definition of 'penny packet' is Old Skeptic but my says what you describe is 'penny packet'.

Milosh said:

I don't know what your definition of 'penny packet' is Old Skeptic but my says what you describe is 'penny packet'.

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Nope it is called coordinated multi-dimensional constant attack... unless you think air war is like a bunch of calvary boofheads fronting up to each other showing each their pretty flowered hats....????

Do you think stealth attacks are a modern invention? Air to air war is like creeping up to someone and shoving a stillotoe onto their liver. Or coming in so fast that they hit you and are gone.

When, under Galland no less, the Germans tried to emulate the 'boofhead lets all spend an hour forming up' nonsense the Mustangs had a field day....

The US was lucky they faced idiots like Galland rather than a Park .. who I suspect would have stopped the US bombing campaign real quick, and the UK night one if he had been in charge.

In fact, despite their incompetence, the Germans won both of the late 43 US and late 43/early 44 UK bombing campaigns. The 8th and Bomber Command went back to lick their, incredible, wounds...And, then saved, were ordered to help out on the build to what really mattered ... invasion.

beitou said:

What justification was there for firing Dowding after the BoB, beyond mear political games, was there a real military reason?

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He'd been due to retire for a number of years prior to the Battle of Britain in any case. Portal, Chief of Air Staff from October 1940, was no less than 11 years younger.

The lack of night defence also didn't work in his favour.

The historian John Ray argues that the failures with night fighting were "crucial" in the decision to replace Dowding. He points out that in September, with the Luftwaffe flying over 6,000 night bomber sorties, and over 6,000 civilians killed by bombing, the RAF managed to shoot down only 4 German bombers at night.

Sir John Salmond (former head of the RAF) was appointed to head an inquiry into night fighting. Dowding objected to most of the recommendations in his report. Salmond wrote to Churchill that he believed it was "imperative" Dowding was replaced, and that most (if not all) of the Air Council agreed with him.

There's no doubt Dowding's opponents used the failures in night fighting as a stick to beat him with, but there's no doubt either that there was a general feeling Dowding was incapable of dealing with the night offensive.

In another thread there was mention of the statistics of flak vs. fighter losses of US UK bombers over Europe.
In that context, the flak over the UK during the BOB seems weak.

Hop said:

The historian John Ray argues that the failures with night fighting were "crucial" in the decision to replace Dowding.

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I would agree.

I'm not at home and can't access the material (substantial) which I have on Dowding and I'm not going to enter a full scale discussion without it, however the failure to counter act the Luftwaffe night offensive was used as the hammer to nail the lid on Dowding's coffin.
In fact nobody could have done any better than Dowding as the technical means to achieve any successful night time interceptions did not exist. This was no more Dowding's fault than any one else's at the Air Ministry or in the RAF.

It must be pointed out that though crucial this represented the culmination of a campaign to remove Dowding which predated the BoB. It was round three or four of the campaign

Cheers

Steve

Negative. Park never used 'penny packets'. You have been watching too much Bader stuff and reading nonsense.

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Sorry, but I dont watch "Bader stuff", and I dont read nonsense. Oh, and i do try and be a bit respectful of other members if i can help it, just a friendly piece of advice.

Park did use penny packets but later in the fight he increased the strength of his interceptions to one and two squadron sized interceptions.

As his biography states"Although he considered the Big Wing approach impracticable in the circumstances confronting his group, Park did employ two-squadron formations where possible later in the battle. His superior, Air Marshal Hugh Dowding, agreed with Park's approach, later noting that 'If the policy of big formations had been attempted at this time in No. 11 Group, many more German bombers would have reached their objective without opposition.' With benefit of experience in later commands, Park was convinced that 'we would have lost the Battle of Britain if I had adopted the "withholding" tactics of No. 12 Group'.. So, implicit in Dowdings comments is that early on park DID use small sized formations to interecept every strike, primarily to prevent any German strike from passing through unparried. Precisely what my statement was, in other words....it wasnt some grandiose scheme to destroy the German fighter groups, and statistically it impossible for all German strikes to be intercepted and all German strikes to outnumber the bombers by 5 to 1. There were simply too many bombers airborne for that to ever happen except in isolated occasions.

im not suggesting a mallory style big wing, but I am interested to explore whether swinging to a squadron to two squadron sized interception might not have better from an earlier point, rather than a later one

Park's tactics were clear: stop the bombers bombing (duh), cause continual attrition on them before and after.

Strip away fighter escorts (sometimes the Luftwaffe did 5 escorts to 1 bomber), then hammer the bombers.
Never risk all your fighters at one time.

As such he never did (which Mallory wanted and Galland*, stupidly, forgetting all his exprerience did later) waste time with forming up large numbers of clumsy, easy to see, easy to attack fighter formations.

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But according to his own biography he did exactly that. Not in the hundred, but he did adopt larger formations as soon as he could.

Park sent up squadrons, sometimes as pairs, to attack, then other.. then others, then others. So there was never a moment the Luftwaffe was not under attack.
He carefully stripped away their escorts (something the Germans never did against the escorted US bombers, though it would have been easy to do, except they were ... stupid, an air force full of 'Leigh Mallory's).

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Boy, do you have an attitude problem, or what. The Germans in 1944 were NOT stupid. Leigh Mallory in 1940 was wrong, but he was NOT stupid. The only stupid person, is the post war strategist who thinks the enemy is stupid. Im not much of a German fan, but I would never call them stupid or incompetent. If they were stupid, what does that make us, who lost to them many times

Leigh Mallory wanted to use interception forces that were too big and cumbersome, but even park wanted to increase the size of his CAP before it was over.

And even Parks defence, great as it was, is not above criticism. There is NO evidence that Parks tactics were any more cost effective than hanging back and delivering a more concentrated attack a few minutes later. Attacking continuously does have benefits, but it also means the attackers are outcumbered, and are exposed and closer to the 109s than was perhaps wise . I think Park eventually got that, and changed his approach somewhat as a result. Precisely what im suggesting incidentally, only a little earlier

Though it was frightening for the pilots, say 12 planes against hundreds of bombers and their escorts. But they were small, hard to see, fast and could (and did) get in, kill and get out again.
What each of them didn't see, was that was happening all the time, with repeated attacks by different, small groups, from all different directions.... all the time.

And Park, always pushed, long before the Germans ever thought about it, frontal attacks. To break the bomber formations up.


*Galland, serious prat... 'major throat ache' ... and with the strategic and tactical skills of a wet hamster. Should have been left at Squadron Leader level (like Bader).

When the US escorts saw the big 'gaggles' forming up to attack they had a field day.... as did Galland himself against Bader's 'big wings' on both the Bob and the later, disasterous RAF attacks in France...hmm not the brightest boy on the block.Then again if he had been smart he would never have been promoted (he hated radios in the BoB by the way, despite his later 'recant' in his book).

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im speechless. You do realize that people might actually take you seriously if you were a little more respectful of these men. Each of these men, Galland, Bader I respect them both. oh, and by the way, the RAFs greatest losses when they commenced operations over France wasnt so much the big wing circuses as the isolated small scale affairs. the Germans tended to avoid the really big circuses because they were outnumbered too badly, but when they could catch 20 or 30 isolated fighters, they would pounce, in "big wings" and slaughter the RAF. My source for that, incidentally is Foreman, oh but then I read rubbish, dont I....

OldSkeptic said:

...
He carefully stripped away their escorts (something the Germans never did against the escorted US bombers, though it would have been easy to do, except they were ... stupid, an air force full of 'Leigh Mallory's).
...

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Parsifal covered the rest.
I have a question re. quoted excerpt: just when the Germans are to start stripping the 8th AF bombers from escorts? They cannot do that west of the Continent (RAF will not allow that). They cannot do that between N. Sea and Ruhr (in 1944, the often-downplayed P-47 is a threat above 25000 ft). Once above Germany proper, it is too late. In case the LW throws all of its resources above Belgium/Netherlands/Saar, they will be outnumbered and outperformed = destroyed, and the P-51s will have even a better field day killing trainers and strafing at will.