Day or night strategic bombing?

[J.A.W.]

Interesting that Hiroshima was specially selected for atomic destruction, having been deliberately spared the razing of Le May's B-29 conventional fire-bombing attacks that had laid waste to most Japanese cities, [ I give credit to the USN, for hitting clearly defined military/industrial targets] ,but mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow...

 

[mhuxt]

* sigh *

... ban me now ...

 

[J.A.W.]

Is that a Hirohito quote, " ban-me-now" ? L.O.L.[ he got off scot free..]

 

[stona]

Albert Speer said the exact opposite, he said that he was thankful that the British continued their stupid and pointless terror bombings of cities instead of attacking industrial bottlenecks.

So don't misquote him.

I haven't. From his 1945 bebrief,talking about the Hamburg raid.

"We were of the opinion that a rapid repetition of this type of attack upon another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armament manufacture and war production. It was I who first verbally reported to the Fuehrer at that time that a continuation of these attacks might bring about a rapid end to the war."

You might want to at least make a cursory check of the facts. Can you provide a quote of him saying the exact opposite?

Adolph Galland also expressed an opinion.

"A wave of terror radiated from the suffering city and spread through Germany. Appalling details of the great fire were recounted. A stream of haggard, terrified refugees flowed into the neighbouring provinces. In every large town people said: "What happened to Hamburg yesterday can happen to us tomorrow". After Hamburg in the wide circle of the political and the military command could be heard the words: "The war is lost"."

A more ordinary person,Willhelm Johnen who had attempted to defend Hamburg in his nightfighter.

"This devastating raid on Hamburg had the effect of a red light on all the big German cities and on the whole German people. Everyone felt it was now high time to capitulate before any further damage was done. But the High Command insisted that the 'total war' should proceed. Hamburg was merely the first link in a long chain of pitiless air attacks made by the Allies on the German civilian population."

The raid had a profound physical and psychological effect on Hamburg and the German people at large. There are plenty of reports from the various police authorities and internal intelligence agencies who support the contention,illustrated by the quotes above,that civilian morale was badly shaken. Defeatism became quite widespread throughout German society.

Steve

 

[Tante Ju]

I haven't. From his 1945 bebrief,talking about the Hamburg raid.

"We were of the opinion that a rapid repetition of this type of attack upon another six German towns would inevitably cripple the will to sustain armament manufacture and war production. It was I who first verbally reported to the Fuehrer at that time that a continuation of these attacks might bring about a rapid end to the war."

You might want to at least make a cursory check of the facts. Can you provide a quote of him saying the exact opposite?[/QUOTE]

You are quoting Speer selectively. Speer's note of 'this type of attack' was said in the context of this scale - the same scale of Hamburg firestorm. Mass destruction of six major German cities on the scale of Hamburg with tenthousends laying dead would have very seriously effected German production no doubt, but the RAF was incapable of such regular attacks, general area bombing was another matter. And it was unwilling to

Speer:

After these experiences I wondered once again why our LuftwaflFe with its by now reduced forces, did not launch similar pinpoint attacks whose effects could be devastating. At the end of May 1943, two weeks after the British raid, I reminded Hitler of my idea of April 11 that a group of experts might pinpoint the key industrial targets in the enemy camp. But as so often, Hitler proved irresolute. *Tm afraid that the General Staff of the air force will not want to take advice from your industrial associates. I too have broached such a plan to General Jeschonnek several times. "But," he concluded in rather a resigned tone, "you speak to him about it sometime." Evidently Hitler was not going to do anything about this; he lacked any sense of the decisive importance of such operations. There is no question that once before he had thrown away his chance—between
1939 and 1941 when he directed our air raids against England's cities instead of coordinating them with the U-boat campaigns and, for example, attacking the English ports which were in any case sometimes strained beyond their capacity by the convoy system. Now he once again failed to see his opportunity. And the British, for their part, thoughtlessly copied this irrational conduct—aside from their single attack on the dams.

[...]

Planning on July 29 1 pointed out: "If the air raids continue on the present scale, within three months we shall be relieved of a number of questions we are at present discussing. We shall simply be coasting downhill, smoothly and relatively swiftly. . . . We might just as well hold the final meeting of Central Planning, in that case." Three days later I informed Hitler that armaments production was collapsing and threw in the further warning that a series of attacks of this sort, extended to six more major cities, would bring Germany's armaments production to a total halt. "You'll straighten all that out again," he merely said.

In fact Hitler was right. We straightened it out again—not because of our Central Planning organization, which with the best will in the world could issue only general instructions, but by the determined efforts of those directly concerned, first and foremost the workers themselves. Fortunately for us, a series of Hamburg-type raids was not repeated on such a scale against other cities. Thus the enemy once again allowed us to adjust ourselves to his strategy.

We barely escaped a further catastrophic blow on August 17, 1943, only two weeks after the Hamburg bombings. The American air force launched its first strategic raid. It was directed against Schweinfurt where large factories of the ball-bearing industry were concentrated. Ball bearings had in any case already become a bottleneck in our efforts to increase armaments production. But in this very first attack the other side committed a crucial mistake.
Instead of concentrating on the ball-bearing plants, the sizable force of three hundred seventy-six Flying Fortresses divided up. One hundred and forty-six of the planes successfully attacked an airplane assembly plant inRegensburg, but with only minor consequences. Meanwhile, the British air force continued its indiscriminate attacks upon our cities.

After this attack the production of ball bearings dropped by 38 percent. 12 Despite the peril to Schweinfurt we had to patch up our facilities there, for to attempt to relocate our ball-bearing industry would have held up production entirely for three or four months. In the light of our desperate needs we could also do nothing about the ball-bearing factories in Berlin-Erkner, Cannstatt, or Steyr, although the enemy must have been aware of their location.

In June 1946 the General Staff of the Royal Air Force asked me what would have been the results of concerted attacks on the ball-bearing industry.
I replied:
Armaments production would have been crucially weakened after two months and after four months would have been brought completely to a standstill.
This, to be sure, would have meant:
One: All our ball-bearing factories (in Schweinfurt, Steyr, Erkner, Cannstatt,
and in France and Italy) had been attacked simultaneously.
Two: These attacks had been repeated three or four times, every two
weeks, no matter what the pictures of the target area showed.
Three: Any attempt at rebuilding these factories had

After this first blow we were forced back on the ball-bearing stocks stored by the armed forces for use as repair parts. We soon consumed these, as well as whatever had been accumulated in the factories for current production. After these reserves were used up—they lasted for six to eight weeks—the sparse production was carried daily from the factories to the assembly plants, often in knapsacks. In those days we anxiouslyasked ourselves how soon the enemy would realize that he could paralyze the production of thousands of armaments plants merely by destroying five or six relatively small targets.

The second serious blow, however, did not come until two months later. On October 14, 1943, 1 was at the East Prussian headquarters discussing armaments questions with Hitler when Adjutant Schaub interrupted us: "The Reich Marshal urgently wishes to speak to you," he said to Hitler. "This time he has pleasant news."

Hitler came back from the telephone in good spirits. A new daylight raid on Schweinfurt had ended with a great victory for our defenses, he said.14 The countryside was strewn with downed American bombers. Uneasy, I asked for a short recess in our conference, since I wanted to telephone Schweinfurt myself. But all communications were shattered; I could not reach any of the factories. Finally, by enlisting the police, I managed to talk to the foreman of a ball-bearing factory. All the factories had been hard hit, he informed me. The oil baths for the bearings had caused serious fires in the machinery workshops; the damage was far worse than after the first attack. This time we had lost 67 percent of our ball-bearing production.

My first measure after this second air raid was to appoint my most vigorous associate, General Manager Kessler, as special commissioner for ball-bearing production. Our reserves had been consumed; efforts to import ball bearings from Sweden and Switzerland had met with only slight success. Nevertheless, we were able to avoid total disaster by substituting slide bearings for ball bearings wherever possible.15 But what really saved us was the fact that from this time on the enemy to our astonishment once again ceased his attacks on the ball-bearing industry.16

On December 23, the Erkner plant was heavily hit, but we were not sure whether this was a deliberate attack, since Berlin was being bombed in widely scattered areas. The picture did not change again until February 1944. Then, within four days, Schweinfurt, Steyr, and Cannstatt were each subjected to two successive heavy attacks. Then followed raids on Erkner, Schweinfurt, and again Steyr. After only six weeks our production of bearings (above 6.3 centimeters in diameter) had been reduced to 29 percent of what it had been before the air raids.17

At the beginning of April 1944, however, the attacks on the ball-bearing industry ceased abruptly. Thus, the Allies threw away success when it was already in their hands. Had they continued the attacks of March and April with the same energy, we would quickly have been at our last gasp.* As it was, not a tank, plane, or other piece of weaponry failed to be produced because of lack of ball bearings, even though such production had been increased by 19 percent from July 1943 to April 1944. 18 As far as
armaments were concerned, Hitler s credo that the impossible could be made possible and that all forecasts and fears were too pessimistic, seemed to have proved itself true.

continued...

 

[Tante Ju]

continued...

Not until after the war did I learn the reason for the enemy's error.

The air staffs assumed that in Hitler's authoritarian state the important factories would be quickly shifted from the imperiled cities. On December 20, 1943, Sir Arthur Harris declared his conviction that "at this stage of the war the Germans have long since made every possible effort to decentralize the manufacture of so vital a product [as ball bearings]." He considerably overestimated the strengths of the authoritarian system, which to the outside observer appeared so tightly knit.

As early as December 19, 1942, eight months before the first air raid on Schweinfurt, I had sent a directive to the entire armaments industry stating: "The mounting intensity of the enemy air attacks compels accelerated preparations for shifting manufactures important for armaments production." But there was resistance on all sides. The Gauleiters did not want new factories in their districts for fear that the almost peacetime quiet of their small towns would be disturbed. My band of directors, for their part, did not want to expose themselves to political infighting. The result was that hardly anything was done.

After the second heavy raid on Schweinfurt on October 14, 1943, we again decided to decentralize. Some of the facilities were to be distributed among the surrounding villages, others placed in small and as yet unendangeredtowns in eastern Germany.* This policy of dispersal was meant to provide for the future; but the plan encountered a great deal of opposition. As late as January 1944 ^e shifting of ball-bearing production tocave factories was still being discussed,19 and in August 1944 my representative to the ball-bearing industry complained that he was having difficulties "pushing through the construction work for the shift of ball-bearing production."20 Instead of paralyzing vital segments of industry, the Royal Air Force began an air offensive against Berlin. I was having a conference in my private office on November 22, 1943, when the air-raid alarm sounded. ...

So yes, Hamburg erupted a smaller panic crisis in Nazi leadership, fearful that attacks on such scale devasting cities may continue. Niether them, nor BC could predict the weather conditions that allowed for the Hamburg firestorm, nor BC could repeat it. The initial panic quickly elapsed, and Speer was very much more concerned about USAAF style hitting of industrial bottlenecks, namely ball bearing plants. His overall conclusion was damning to British area attacks, which he believed were attacking the wrong targets, was simply wasteful. It was not until Harris was dealt a bloody nose in the battle of berlin when BC was forced to - at least temporarily - switch to the right targets, by unsustainable losses and pressure from the USAAF.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow..."

Right J.A.W. - the tens of thousands of Allied troops and Japanese civilians that would have died in a land battle to "take" Japan is just a figment of President Truman (and my) imagination.

Note to Mods: We have "Like" and "Share" options on this Forum -- time to introduce a "Disagree" option. Actions may be convincing when logic isn't.

MM

 

[drgondog]

Interesting that Hiroshima was specially selected for atomic destruction, having been deliberately spared the razing of Le May's B-29 conventional fire-bombing attacks that had laid waste to most Japanese cities, [ I give credit to the USN, for hitting clearly defined military/industrial targets] ,but mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow...

I suppose that the lessons of Okinawa, during which the Japanese Military and civilian force did not not surrender despite impossible odds, does not stimulate the imagination of the carnage a subsequent assault on Japan on a 50:! scale or resisting forces and impact on the survival of the Japanese people?

Pray tell, what is your vision of the conclusion of the war had Japan not had a way out while saving face?

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Interesting that Hiroshima was specially selected for atomic destruction, having been deliberately spared the razing of Le May's B-29 conventional fire-bombing attacks that had laid waste to most Japanese cities, [ I give credit to the USN, for hitting clearly defined military/industrial targets] ,but mine-laying by B-29s USN submarines in eliminating the island nation's merchant marine - had placed finite/short-time limits on Japan's capacity to wage modern war, so the A-bomb was really a bit of a [callous] research/watch this Stalin, stunt anyhow...

Read Dave Jablownski's book "Wings of Fire." A million man army was defending the mainland and Japan still had about 8000 aircraft available to them. The Japanese were not going to surrender conventionally and the war would have lasted at least another 2 or 3 years. Well documented by allied and Japanese sources. Japan would have starved while Chinese and Korean civilians were continually slaughtered…

There are some of us in the US who had family members on their way over to the South Pacific when the atomic bombs were dropped and some of us probably won't be here today if your so-called "callous research/watch this Stalin, stunt" wasn't carried out. Please think about things and seperate opinion from fact before you spew.

Now with that said, I'm saying it again, if this becomes political, I'm closing this thread. If anyone wants to be a smart@ss, your free ticket into cyberspace will be issued accordingly.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Note to Mods: We have "Like" and "Share" options on this Forum -- time to introduce a "Disagree" option. Actions may be convincing when logic isn't.

MM

Point taken, and below the "Disagree" option, I would also add "STUPID."

 

[michaelmaltby]

Now. Now, FBJ ... no hurtin' words,

 

[Tante Ju]

AFAIK the Japanese leadership was seriously discussing surrender at the very time the A-bombs were dropped. Now, how much that tipped the scales will be debated forever, but I have no doubt that an actual landing in Japan, should it have been necessary would be an awfully bloody business... also, not going after the Emperor was probably the wisest decision of the whole war.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... the Japanese leadership was seriously discussing surrender at the very time the A-bombs were dropped"

I know, Auntie, I know .... and there were serious men talking about blowing up Hitler, too. Tell me - were these talking Japanese talking with the Japanese Emperor-God .... or were those talks yet to be negotiated.

Where I come from we say: "if wishes were horses the beggars would ride"

MM

 

[Tante Ju]

Here you can read on the subject. Surrender of Japan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Yes they did discuss the matter with the "emperor-god". In fact, Japan was seeking some sort of peace terms since February 1945, and in fact, it was the Empror himself who had tipped the balance of the deadlocked inner council after the dropping of the A-bombs.

The Japanese leaders were not mindless fanatics, some of them were of course, but I doubt they could be considered a bigger nutjob/fanatic than McArthur...

 

[airminded88]

Potsdam Declaration - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Seems to me the Allies were very serious when demanded the empire to 'Surrender or face prompt and utter destruction'.
Japanese peace talks under the table, on the other hand, were not serious enough to wrap up between July 26th and August 6th, 1945.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Here you can read on the subject. Surrender of Japan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Yes they did discuss the matter with the "emperor-god". In fact, Japan was seeking some sort of peace terms since February 1945, and in fact, it was the Empror himself who had tipped the balance of the deadlocked inner council after the dropping of the A-bombs.

And some of his loyal military actually plotted a coup against him because they didn't want to surrender...
Ky

The Japanese leaders were not mindless fanatics, some of them were of course, but I doubt they could be considered a bigger nutjob/fanatic than McArthur...

I take that's your opinion - personally I never held the man in high regard, my kid's great grandfather served under him. Egomaniac? Yes. Nutjob? No way. My opinion. Now with that said..

Day or night strategic bombing?

This thread gets back on subject or I lock it. LAST WARNING!

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... but I doubt they could be considered a bigger nutjob/fanatic than McArthur..."

Auntie, you mean the man to whom The Emperor owed his official existence after the surrender of his Kingdom-Emperorship?
That McArthur ....?

MM

 

[airminded88]

Given the statistics kindly posted by Readie on his post #28, I would say a combination of the both in the ETO.
IMO destruction is destruction whether it's endured by an urban area or industrial complex and puts further strain on the German war effort.
Efficient, maybe, maybe not. Effective, proved by events to follow.

 

[Readie]

Strategic bombing during World War II - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I think this link sums up the bombing campaign rather well.
No one in their right mind would rejoice in the destruction wrought but, needs must when the devil drives.

Night or day?

The most important part is too bomb targets 24/7, someone had to fly in daylight and someone had to fly at night.
The allied heavies were quite diverse.Luckily the B17 was more able to take on the LW in daylight than the Lancaster.That whole role was crucial to the outcome of WW2. The Lancaster had a bigger bomb load / variety of bomb sizes so, it was able to target dams, hit concrete bunkers etc with specialist bombs.

Overall it was a fantastic, if costly achievement by all who flew.

Cheers
John

 

[J.A.W.]

Actually, it is clear, that unless the defenses [fighter interception in WW2] can be neutralised [by fighter escort for USAAF ground force invasion of France for RAF], then slow heavy bombers by themselves [even B-29s], whether by day or night, flown by any airforce, will suffer such attrition as to be untenable..or ineffective, simply resource wasteful terror weapons [such as the Steinbok/Baby Blitz LW offensive in `44].