Defeating Japan without South West Pacific campaign and Douglas MacArthur

[VBF-13]

You know, I am just having a bit of trouble picturing the B-17s doing a torpedo attack.

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And just what is the speed of a B-17 at sea level? Could it even hit 250mph? Same throttle settings (and fuel consumption) that gave 258mph at 25,000ft gave 214mph at sea level. Drag at 25,000ft is less than 1/2 that sea level so the speed difference is not going to stay constant.

B17s are going to get hit every time coming into the broadside guns, as they're too big a target, too low, and can't get up and away fast enough.

 

[gjs238]

You know, I am just having a bit of trouble picturing the B-17s doing a torpedo attack.
And just what is the speed of a B-17 at sea level? Could it even hit 250mph? Same throttle settings (and fuel consumption) that gave 258mph at 25,000ft gave 214mph at sea level. Drag at 25,000ft is less than 1/2 that sea level so the speed difference is not going to stay constant.

B17s are going to get hit every time coming into the broadside guns, as they're too big a target, too low, and can't get up and away fast enough.

Might be interesting if a heavy bomber could launch a Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo.
Sort of like an aquatic cruise missile.

Of course, the Allies had no such torpedo and the Japanese Type 93 had issues of its own.
Still, medium and heavy bombers needed a weapon with better standoff capability.

I don't think anyone would design and use heavy bomber torpedo capability like a Devastator or Avenger...
You would need a very long range weapon with great standoff capability.

 

[syscom3]

Here's some rambling musings.

The politics of 1942 dictated that MacArthur was going to get enough men and materials to hold the line in NG. And Guadalcanal was going to happen to protect the sea lanes to Australia. But lets look at how things pan out in 1943 if the allies are held in place due to lack of M&M to go on the offensive.

The atolls of the Gilberts, Marshalls and Carolines are fairly small. No matter how many men Japan has at its disposal, there is a limit on how many can be stationed on each island. Pack to many of them together and they become a group target. And the more men you have, the more the supply issues.

Beginning in Q4 of 1943, the allies were deploying 2nd generation aircraft and weapons. Japan was still stuck with what they had at the start of the war. More ominously, the allies had generation 3 weapons under preparation for 1945.

The size of the USN and its capabilities beginning in 1944 were such that it could roll over any Japanese island in the Central Pacific no matter what the IJN and IJA could do. All it takes is an atoll and airfield every 500 miles and the whole Japanese defense plan falls apart.

If the IJN fleet comes out of Truk to give battle, it will be sunk. Just like what happened in the Solomons.

A scenario I would see happening is for the USN to take Tarawa, Kwajelein and Eniwetok, just like happened historically. But then I see a fork in the road. One continues to the Mariana's and the other to Palau, where the Japanese forces in NG and Solomons are bypassed and impotent.

The Mariana's are the islands where the Japanese can build up with ots of men, and defend in depth. That's where the bloodbath will occur.

Fewer US forces in the SW Pacific means fewer shipping needs for them. That means more men and material for use in the central pacific.

US subs were useless until the torpedo and leadership issues were resolved. Count them out of the game until Q4 of 1943.

 

[davebender]

StrategyPage.com - Combat Information Center analysis, facts and figures about military conflicts and leaders

On November 27, 1941, President Roosevelt met with Army Chief-of-Staff George C. Marshall and Chief of Naval Operations Harold K. Stark to discuss the rising tensions in the western Pacific. They decided to alert senior officials and commanders in the Pacific of the imminent threat of war. The two service chiefs dispatched messages with such phrases as "This is to be considered a war warning", "move by Japan is expected within the next few days", and "hostile action possible at any moment".

Naturally the U.S. High Commissioner for the Philippines, Francis B. Sayre, was on the distribution list for these messages. When they arrived, he promptly called a meeting of the two senior officers in the Archipelago, Lt. Gen. Douglas MacArthur, commander of U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, and Adm. Thomas Hart, commander of the Asiatic Fleet.

Hart proposed the immediate implementation of planned defensive measures. MacArthur demurred.

As Sayre later wrote, the general "paced back and forth, smoking a black cigar and assuring Admiral Hart and myself in reassuring terms that there would be no Japanese attack before Spring".

The Japanese struck nine days later

Almost every new tidbit I learn about Big Mac serves to increase my opinion that WWII in the Pacific could be won just fine without his participation.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"....Almost every new tidbit I learn about Big Mac serves to increase my opinion that WWII in the Pacific could be won just fine without his participation ...."

I concur. The man's ego allowed no room for "intelligence" ... no matter how hard-fought for, right up to Korea.

Yet I and many others grant that his "performance" after the war as ShoGun of occupied Japan more than redeems all his shortcomings elsewhere.
But I am beginning to think he doesn't derserve as much credit as we're prepared to grant. The transformation of Japanese society after the two atomic bombs is one of the great, successful, social achievements of the 20th century. But as I mature my view recognizes the Japanese people themselves ..... MacArthur had the willingness and social discipline of the Japanese people working for him.

Max Hastings tears Mac a new one in his Pacific campaign analysis "Nemesis".

 

[Shinpachi]

Good point, MM.

MacArthur disbanded IJA and IJN successfully but had left Japan's bureaucratic organization to use it as his governing tool in the occupied Japan. In my view living over 60 years in this country, Japan's bureaucratic organization has inherited prewar value as it is and become an obstacle to realize true democracy. Not a few politicians in the postwar tried to disband it to reorganize but failed as people working for it are tough elites unlike newly born Japan Self Defense Forces. IJA and IJN disappeared but they would recreate such organizations with the same spirit in the future if necessary. I think this is what MacArthur did not expect. Wrong tripod had to be removed altogether.

 

[Hansie Bloeckmann]

Yep...stab deep into the middle of Japanese territory and have the full brunt of the Japanese close shut on Allied forces like a bear trap...

Brilliant.

Grey Ghost, you are 100% correct here- "Big Mac" should have studied the mistakes Hitler made with his two attempts to invade Russia and seize the Oil fields in Baku--The two biggest "Achilles heels" of a BlitzKreig attack are, IMO: (1) you outrun your communication and supply lines, and (2) A long datum line of approach leaves your flanks vulnerable.

The other factor, in planning against the Japanese, was the Bushido code of "No surrender", and any infantry plans for either any of the Pacific Islands, let alone the mainland of Japan, should have considered that aspect of the Japanese soldiers and their commanders.

 

[Hoosier Hot Shot]

The effort in the Sw Pacific was important but MacArthur was not the really vital key; in my humble opinion, he was a disaster.​