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I agree completely, and thats from someone who wished that they at least tried to fly the P.1154
I agree Adler. But with a caveat. Wait for F-35 to establish itself before retiring F-16. But keep the production lines open for foreign sales. But keep the A-10 in the C configuration and use F-35 as mini-AWACS to feed them. I see the A-10 as one of our more pertinent platforms in these changing times.
I do tooI agree. I think the F-16 is eventually replaceable, but I think the A-10 is perfectly suited for today's environments and battlefield.
but I think the A-10 is perfectly suited for today's environments and battlefield.
Yep...When you are chasing around some dudes in the mountains...
It's more costly to fix an F-35 in that comparison but not that much...Another point about the A10 versus the F35. A bullet through the A-10 is a patch job. A bullet through the F35 (if it gets that low, low enough to intimidate) is probably a several million dollar fix job.
I wonder why it is that almost every independant observer/internet expert etc thinks, as I do, that we would be better off buying the F-35C, except for the MoD who are adamant that we buy the shorter ranged, more expensive and less capable version?
So in a nutshell, cut social programs.
The decommisioning of the Ark Royal wasn't a mistake. I was on her for a short time in 1974 and she was pretty well clapped out then. The mistake was losing her capability.
The Ark Royal would have deterred an attack for a number of reasons including:-
1) she had the ability to strike against the mainland
2) AEW aircraft were on board
3) The F4 would have dominated the airspace.
There is one caviet and its a big one. All Argentina needed to do was wait for the Ark to go say three months into a major refit and then attack.
It seems to me When it comes to defense cuts it's always OK unless the project is located in your district, then it's important to keep those jobs.
Wheels
Apart from shutting down the training camps, none of this can be done by the armed forces. It has to be done at home, every day, every where. That means social spending. Social spending aimed at preventing radicalisation isn't a luxury nor a fault of our welfare state. It's a vital weapon and we need to keep using it.
For Britain, her number one priorities have to be :
1) Protection of British sovereignty and territory
2) Protectiion of British seaborne trade and maritime interests
3) Force projection and intervention capability on the continent
4) Contribution to international obligations such as Iraq and Afhanistan
5) Internal security and protection from terrorist threats and civil unrest
....in roughly that order
The nuclear threats are a success and a good investment for precisely the reasons they are being attacked now. They succeed in their primary mission if they are never used. People often forget that.
The maintenance of the carrier capability are essential (still) to achieving objectives 2, 3, and 4, and probably serve as a deterrent against possible incursion (objective 1). If history teaches us anything, its that apparent periods of peace and stability can transform very rapidly. It would not take much, for example, for the Russians to go feral and impose a "blockade" on Britain to achieve or support some political agenda they might have. It would not be difficult to see the US retreating to n isolationist standpoint if therir economy keeps copping it the way that it has....if the US suffers a nuclear strike from a terrorist group with demands along the lines...."retreat to your own country" a weak administration might just do that.
I believe that Britains force structure should identify its missions and craft its force capabilities to be well rounded cadres as has always been British policy. In terms of strategic deterrents, and for the capabilities like naval power that require long lead times, the Brits have to maintain a ready use capability....they cannot afford to let those capabilities slip away
Now we are talking. You don't have to agree with Parsifal's conclusions, but his methodologies make resounding sense. Strategic planning is imperative in establishing defence budgetary priorities.
Jim: It's a bluff, I probably wouldn't use it.
Sir Humphrey: Yes but they don't know that you probably wouldn't.
Jim: They probably do.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, they probably know you probably wouldn't but they can't be certain.
Jim: They probably, certainly know that I probably wouldn't.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, but even though they're probably certain you know you probably wouldn't they don't certainly know that although you probably wouldn't, there is no probability that you certainly would.
Jim: What?
... perhaps a rogue nation state with a weapon of mass destructino, perhaps an current EU partner who becomes panicked with it's economic state or perhaps a well secured EU partner who is fed up with those in the union who refuse to balance their budgets. I don't profess to be a world defense analyst by any stretch, but I would never vote to give up my nations one strategic deterent that puts the fear of god in my rational enemies.