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Hi Parsifal,
Yep, 'tis indeed a little bit of fantasy, not least since Australia didn't have the organic shipping to move all these forces and the impact on the current operational theatres hasn't been quantified.
The Japanese invasion of today's Malaysia Singapore, along with invasion of today's Thailand Indonesia have subjected UK/Commonwealth armed forces to some dire defeats. If you were main commander of British armed forces there, how would you've prepared to the invasion and battles unfolding from Dec 1941? You assume the position at March 1st 1941. The realistic (in a what if) choice of equipment and deployment, please.
Good points Buffnut, but the US Fleet the Thailand defence aren't really options as the Thais wanted to try to avoid conflict with japan, they were hoping to remain neutral and didn't trust the Allies in any event.Hindsight being a wonderful thing, here are a few thoughts:
3. Abandoned defence of Kota Bharu airfield as entirely impractical and focussed air assets on the west coast airfields that could be more easily defended.
3. Offer to work with Thailand to defend Singora and develop that defence, including prepared positions, assigned roles, practice deployments etc. well in advance of the Japanese assault.
Buffnut, I would add the following:
Churchill needed to get rid of every colonial administrator and replace them with competent cadres who knew a fight was coming, knew they had to prepare, and who didnt care a bit about how things are done in a peacetime setting.
As for #4 at the bottom, the USN already had refused to send any ships to Singapore as they were needed for the defense of the PI.
my view for the australian contribution is that once it became clear that the UK was not able to meet its imperial defence obligations in the far east, australia would have to act unilaterally. This means, in the context of this scenario
1) recall of the AIF (6, 7, 8 7 9 Divs)
2) recall of all RAAF personel, and if possible their equipment. I couldnt tell you how many squadrons exactly, but probably in the vicinity of 20 sqdns by mid 1941.
3) recall of the RAN units serving in ETO. This roughly amounts to the entire N class destroyers, the scrap iron flotlla and from memory two cruisers. with the air force returned, we should avoid losing the Sydney, because of increase air patrols in the region
4) Development of fortified bases at Darwin and/or Port Moresby. Darwin will require the construction of a Road south, which would be achieved using militia labour .
6) concentration of the far eastern british fleet at trincomallee, including the Pow and repulse. shipment of air group for hermes, and reinforcement by at least one more carrier by january.
7) At least 10 fast transports from the ETO to serve as the nucleas of an Amphibious TG. Can use the returned AIF formations as the ground force. Upon putbrealk of hostilites, should relocate to base at darwin for commencement of counterattack operations into southeast asia. There are no IJN carrier presence until march, shoulod be able to recapture most of the oilfields the Japs were counting on properly garrisoned and protected by significant air defence assets. Might be able to provide relief to corregodor force or singapre garrisons.
alittle bit of fantasy never hurt anyone i guess
If you were main commander of British armed forces there, how would you've prepared to the invasion and battles unfolding from Dec 1941? You assume the position at March 1st 1941. The realistic (in a what if) choice of equipment and deployment, please.
There is actually no shortage of fighters or pilots in 1941, only the awful logistics and poor preparations. However I'll get into the air situation later, for now I'll concentrate on the ground situation.given the shortage of fighters, in march 1941,
hi buffnut
this sort of unilateral action was never going to happen until the japanese actually attacked, whereupon the curtin govt jumped its colonial traces and threw its lots and destiny in with the americans. A major step for a country that until 1931 could not even set its own foreign policy. I also agree that there was too much uncertainty about japanese intentions and the assets were more urgently and immediately needed in the ETO.
However that was not the brief. We are simply being asked about feasibility. Ive put the political realities to one side for a minute, and considered what might be possible from a purely military standpoint.
Despite the Cabinet approval of the plan to have at least 36 battalions and 566 modern aircraft (let alone Percival's 48 batts), on Dec 8 1941 there were only about 28 or 29 on hand, and 188 mostly obsolete aircraft. Worse yet, many of the Indian troops were untrained, unmotivated poorly equipped.1.) No significant reduction of troops, ships or aircraft from any active theater of war unless you can replace them with something else.
2.) Shipping should be taken into account.
3.) Any action should take into account political strategic considerations, and make sense from the PoV at that time.
One solution to consider is what might have happened if the Commonwealth had not involved itself in th Greece and crete affairs. Certainly no major losses, which yields at least a full Army tank brigade, and the new Zealanders as well a the 6 Aus and elements of the 7th as well. A major chunk of the RN would also be afloat as well
Moreover, if O'Connor had been allowed to complete his offensive instead of having his forces stripped out like they were, there would have been no North African front to worry about
At the conclusion of the eyhiopian camapign, the british had access to two fully trained Colonial Divs which would have performed far better than the Indian levies sent to Malaya in 1941. why not send the Indian raw recruits to Abysinnia (for ocupation duties, to replace the East and West Africans, who languished there until 1943, when they were sent to the CBI)? Another source of trained manpower are the indian forces used in Iraq in 1941. These forces, which by the end of the year were approaching Corps strength (PaIForce???) had combat expeerience and some experienced officers, and were fully equipped.
Truth is there are no legit reasons why none of this didnt happen. It goes to the level of importance the brits gave to the far East, and their miscalculation as to how Japan was going to react. They thought that a paper tiger deterrent would be enough to scare the japanese into submission....big mistake.....
Assign a competent ground forces commander. You've got 9 months to train the infantry, which is plenty. Properly trained infantry will defeat the relatively small IJA invasion force without too much trouble. You can hold out indefinately even if the Japanese establish a naval blockade.
The Azores was a major topic of discussion at the Trident Conference (May 10th - 25th) from which Churchill had just returned. Both Churchill and Roosevelt agreed that it was critical for the Allies to seize the Azores themselves (Operation Lifebelt) unless the Portuguese government could be persuaded to grant the Allies the use of bases on the islands
Wiki {Although troops were urgently needed in Iraq}, the British armed forces in the Middle East and eastern Mediterranean area, already heavily committed with fighting in Libya, in East Africa, and in Greece, suggested the only forces they would be able to use against Iraq was a single battalion of infantry, based within Palestine, and the aircraft already based within Iraq.
Amery contacted General Auchinleck and Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, the same day, inquiring what troops might be sent. One brigade group, that was due to set sail for Malaya on 10 April, was diverted to Iraq
These are all excellent points FB, but need to always consider what or how the Japanese may have responded to this increased defence status....was it possible for them to increase their attack formations to counter this level of defence???? I think that ther still was SOME spare capacity in the japanese war machine to counter this British build up
Assign a competent ground forces commander.
Perhaps so but there should be a British contingency plan in place to send an army corps to Malaya. If XXX Indian Corps arrives in Malaya properly trained they should be able to defeat the invading IJA.idea that ANY forces can be sent in March/April 1941 is just an absolute non-starter
Perhaps so but there should be a British contingency plan in place to send an army corps to Malaya.
Indian Corps arrives in Malaya properly trained they should be able to defeat the invading IJA.
Wiki said:The defending {US Filipino} forces outnumbered the Japanese invaders by 3 to 2, but were poorly trained and equipped, while the Japanese used their best first-line troops at the outset of the campaign
If Britain cannot provide properly trained ground forces they have no hope to defeat the well trained Japanese Army.
That leaves only one option. The RN must sink IJA troop transports before the Japanese troops can come ashore.
Thats a very difficult ask for the RN in 1941. With a concentration of carriers, it might be possible, particulalry if the brits can deliver a night air strike. Inflicting losses is one thing, but stopping a full invasion would be difficult