Dive bombers to Ceylon 1942

[Shortround6]

Weren't the rest of the Dive Bombers SBDs?

Yes and here reality intrudes.
The first attack was 6 Dauntless and 6 Vindicators that attacked as separate groups, no hits.
Followed by eight B-17s that attacked in two groups of four, 39 bombs dropped, not hits but we know that high altitude bombing doesn't work on moving ships,,,,,now.
the Next day the Hornet Air group showed up with 28 Dauntesses supported by eight F4Fs. They scored about 1/2 dozen hits? or over claiming?
This is followed by the Enterprise air group with 31 SBDs, 12 F4Fs, plus 3 TBDs and they get 5 more hits.
This is followed by a 2nd Hornet strike with 23 SBDs
The damaged Mogami escaped, to be patched up at Truk and then sent to Japan for 8 months of repairs/rebuilding.
Fires aboard the Mikuma had reached the torpedo storage before the last Hornet Strike but even with the damage from the last strike it still took several hours for the Mikuma to sink
although there was no hope of saving her. The SBDs also managed to hit the destroyer Arashio once.

The Mikuma had been damaged due to collision before all of this started and top speed reached at any point during this episode was 20 knots.
There were 94 (?) dive bomber sorties. The F4Fs flew strafing missions (AA suppression?) against the two destroyers, I don't know if they tried to strafe the Cruisers or not.

I'm not sure Mikuma had all those guns at Midway or not. Original air defense was the 5 inch guns and four 40mm Bofors.

She did, and all those guns is not much. The 40mm guns listed by Wiki are actually old WW I British 2pdr Pom Pom guns not Bofors guns and the 25mm guns replaced them.

That may be the case but I think Skuas sunk a couple of warships with these bombs, right?

They sank one largish warship, the 6000 ton Königsberg which is under 1/2 the tonnage of the Japanese Cruisers. Germans tried too hard with these ships and tried to put 800ml in a 500ml bottle. Many of their between the wars training cruises were interrupted by major hull repairs in foreign shipyards before they could return home. There might have been a 2nd warship sunk by Skua's but it might have been an under 1000 ton ship. Königsberg had been damaged by 8.3in shore battery guns the days before.

The Skua's and their crews did a very remarkable thing but thinking that even 2-3 dozen dive bombers could really do much off of Ceylon in the spring of 1942 without a lot of help needs very careful examination.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Convoy MS5 arrived at Colombo on 5th March 1942. You are assuming that the facilities existed in Ceylon to assemble and make them ready in time for Operation C.

I know from the war histories that aircraft were assembled from these infamous crates in worse conditions than what would be available in Colombo.

Having looked through the list of RAF MUs in existence in the Indian region in March 1942, I can't find any based in Ceylon.

They could be flown over easily enough.

There was a number of MUs in the Karachi area. Some 30 Hurricanes were landed there in crates on 3rd Feb 1942. 8 were then flown down to Ceylon after assembly and testing arriving 23rd Feb. The other source of Hurricanes on the island were flown in from Indomitable.Hurricane from Africa.

Why not just land and assemble those Hurricanes at Colombo if the facilities existed? Sounds to me that aircraft were being landed at Karachi because that is where the necessary facilities were and therefore why the 51st FG was taken there. The only alternative would be for the 51st to assemble their own aircraft AFTER the personnel had been unloaded and set up camp somewhere and using their own equipment and whatever else they could find.

Maybe because Karachi was the first stop in range of flying in, and it was a lot easier to fly them from there than to keep shipping them in crates.

The US was NOT protecting Burma by late 1941. The AVG was not USAAF and was still in training and were bound for China not India.

The AVG was 100% a tool / proxy of the US, it may not have been USAAF but it was certainly made up of US military personnel given special dispensation to take on the mission, and was operating at the sufferance (and with the robust support) of the US government.

FDR refused to send a fleet to be based at Singapore.

Wasn't that before hostilities?

The best he was prepared to do was to take on an increased burden in the Atlantic to release RN ships for the Far East.

There were many reasons behind Torch none of which involved an "operation into British ....Colonial territories". French yes. Not British. Look at a map. Torch was NOT a US operation. It was a Joint Anglo-American operation. And by the time it was carried out the Axis were not in a position to wreck Allied supply lines. El Alamein was in progress with Rommel already in retreat by the time Torch was carried out.

Torch landed in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and but we both know that the US had no specific interests in any of these three places, or in seizing French assets, and in fact that the entire goal of that vast military operation was the same purpose as the US giving England the aircraft and tanks used to win in 2nd El Alamein - to save their North African and middle eastern Colonial assets, and protect their threatened supply lines, as we both know perfectly well. Not because the US wanted to protect British colonies, they didn't and I agree with their position on that, but because it was necessary to the overall war effort against the Axis and specifically Germany. Again, as we all know.

I won't blame this obviously intentional misrepresentation of truth (here and in your previous two attempts up above) and your apparent 'ethically challenged' status due to your presumed nation of origin, as you have mine, I don't want to paint your countrymen with the same brush. But you personally come across as disingenuous and pretentious, which is not a flattering combination.

I don't think you can conclude that the US had plenty of fighters.at all. They were thinly stretched from places like Iceland, the DEI, Australia, South Pacific etc. They had yet to arrive in Britain. As I noted the 51st might have arrived in March but did not become operational in India and then China until Sept / Oct 1942 after monsoon season and after it moved across India to Dinjan.

The original shipment of 50 P-40s were actually heading to Colombo in Ceylon. And would have arrived in time. You are just babbling trying to derail that basic fact.

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Yes and here reality intrudes.
The first attack was 6 Dauntless and 6 Vindicators that attacked as separate groups, no hits.
Followed by eight B-17s that attacked in two groups of four, 39 bombs dropped, not hits but we know that high altitude bombing doesn't work on moving ships,,,,,now.
the Next day the Hornet Air group showed up with 28 Dauntesses supported by eight F4Fs. They scored about 1/2 dozen hits? or over claiming?

Aircraft carriers being bigger than cruisers were easier to hit. Six hits from 28 bombers is a good score, and even if they only got 3, that's probably enough right there to put the carrier out of commission.

This is followed by the Enterprise air group with 31 SBDs, 12 F4Fs, plus 3 TBDs and they get 5 more hits.
This is followed by a 2nd Hornet strike with 23 SBDs
The damaged Mogami escaped, to be patched up at Truk and then sent to Japan for 8 months of repairs/rebuilding.
Fires aboard the Mikuma had reached the torpedo storage before the last Hornet Strike but even with the damage from the last strike it still took several hours for the Mikuma to sink
although there was no hope of saving her. The SBDs also managed to hit the destroyer Arashio once.

The Mikuma had been damaged due to collision before all of this started and top speed reached at any point during this episode was 20 knots.
There were 94 (?) dive bomber sorties. The F4Fs flew strafing missions (AA suppression?) against the two destroyers, I don't know if they tried to strafe the Cruisers or not.

There is no evidence that 94 sorties were needed here. But if you had 1 or 2 dive bomber squadrons they could attack repeatedly, especially if escorted by fighters, so you may get to that total fairly quickly.

She did, and all those guns is not much. The 40mm guns listed by Wiki are actually old WW I British 2pdr Pom Pom guns not Bofors guns and the 25mm guns replaced them.

They sank one largish warship, the 6000 ton Königsberg which is under 1/2 the tonnage of the Japanese Cruisers. Germans tried too hard with these ships and tried to put 800ml in a 500ml bottle. Many of their between the wars training cruises were interrupted by major hull repairs in foreign shipyards before they could return home. There might have been a 2nd warship sunk by Skua's but it might have been an under 1000 ton ship. Königsberg had been damaged by 8.3in shore battery guns the days before.

The fact is, Skuas sunk it with 500 lbs British bombs

The Skua's and their crews did a very remarkable thing but thinking that even 2-3 dozen dive bombers could really do much off of Ceylon in the spring of 1942 without a lot of help needs very careful examination.

All they need to do is land one or two bombs on the flight deck, and the raid would be over at least for the time being. They don't have to sink it (thought it's perfectly possible that they could)

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Dive bombers are a specific and great danger to aircraft carriers, particularly the unarmored variety. 2 500-lb bombs put IJN Zuiho out of the Battle of Santa Cruz -- those bombs from a two-plane patrol element and not a full strike -- one hit and one near-miss iirc. So yes, especially against an enemy not equipped with radar, DBs were dangerous to flattops even with lighter munitions.

The real question is whether Skuas or Battles could hit KdB hard at Op C. I'm skeptical. At Coral Sea SBDs were in on the kill against Shoho, to be sure, and planted at least two 1000-lbers on Shokaku ... and of course the pounding they delivered at Midway. The thing is is that with Shoho, the air attack was fairly coordinated and so both DBs and TBs helped each other to better odds.

With just about every other USN aerial attack in 1942, that coordination was not attained, and in only one did the DBs deliver the hurt -- at Midway, when IJN CAP was overwhelmed and drawn off to the northeast.

So my point, or question, is that without RAF/FAA torpedo bombers based on Ceylon allowing for the splitting of KdB defenses, would IJN CAP for Op C be so ineffective as at Midway, or would British DBs be so ineffective as at Santa Cruz?

About the characteristics of DBs in general, I like what E EwenS has laid out, because I don't think dive-bombing is hard-and-fast; it's a continuum. Of course you want to make your textbook dive for a given airframe, but circumstances often demand otherwise. Also, I seem to remember that F4U Corsair extension of landing-gear was not extemporization, but a design feature.

 

[Admiral Beez]

The real question is whether Skuas or Battles could hit KdB hard at Op C. I'm skeptical.

I'm lost. When did we introduce Battles? I'm still on Chesapeakes and Skuas.

 

[Shortround6]

I am getting a little confused here as to what Japanese carrier we are trying to set our trap for.

Aircraft carriers being bigger than cruisers were easier to hit

This depends on the carrier. And the Cruiser/s.

But if you had 1 or 2 dive bomber squadrons they could attack repeatedly, especially if escorted by fighters, so you may get to that total fairly quickly.

That depends on distance from base and time of day.
And how good the British recon is.

The fact is, Skuas sunk it with 500 lbs British bombs

It is a fact but the circumstances are also important.

All they need to do is land one or two bombs on the flight deck, and the raid would be over at least for the time being

And here is where I am getting confused. The Akagi was the carrier attacked by the Blenhiems. But the Akagi was not operating alone. The Japanese had 6 carriers in the Indian Ocean at the time. The Akagi was part of carrier division 5 with the Shōkaku and Zuikaku and they were operating together with carrier division 2 consisting of the Sōryū and Hiryū. This was the main force. The small carrier Ryūjō was operating in a separate force with 6 cruisers and 4 destroyers and it was this force that did most (all?) of the commerce raiding in the Bay of Bengal.
It was the 5 carrier force that was raiding Ceylon. Damaging a single carrier was unlikely to end the raid. The Japanese were looking for the British Fleet.
But this was on the 4th day of battle/raid. The Hermes was attacked about 10 minutes after the the Japanese started attacking the Hermes.
Perhaps damage to the Akagi would have made the Japanese pull back, of course they might also being running low on fuel and bombs by this time.

 

[Shortround6]

I'm lost. When did we introduce Battles? I'm still on Chesapeakes and Skuas.

Most of us have skipped past them when they were not viable players. The Skuas were viable planes in the Spring of 1940, But in the Spring of 1942 they are old and worn out. Shipping them 1/2 around the world when shipping space was scarce was not a good use of shipping space. Chesapeakes were under powered and lacking in spare parts.
At least the British had hundreds of Battles (or well over 1000 even in 1942) and lots of parts.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I'm lost. When did we introduce Battles? I'm still on Chesapeakes and Skuas.

S Shortround6 's post #69, and the following conversation he is having with S Steamed_Banana .

 

[Steamed_Banana]

I am getting a little confused here as to what Japanese carrier we are trying to set our trap for.

This depends on the carrier. And the Cruiser/s.

That depends on distance from base and time of day.
And how good the British recon is.

It is a fact but the circumstances are also important.

And here is where I am getting confused. The Akagi was the carrier attacked by the Blenhiems. But the Akagi was not operating alone. The Japanese had 6 carriers in the Indian Ocean at the time. The Akagi was part of carrier division 5 with the Shōkaku and Zuikaku and they were operating together with carrier division 2 consisting of the Sōryū and Hiryū. This was the main force. The small carrier Ryūjō was operating in a separate force with 6 cruisers and 4 destroyers and it was this force that did most (all?) of the commerce raiding in the Bay of Bengal.
It was the 5 carrier force that was raiding Ceylon. Damaging a single carrier was unlikely to end the raid. The Japanese were looking for the British Fleet.
But this was on the 4th day of battle/raid. The Hermes was attacked about 10 minutes after the the Japanese started attacking the Hermes.
Perhaps damage to the Akagi would have made the Japanese pull back, of course they might also being running low on fuel and bombs by this time.

Good point, I forgot the whole fleet was out there...

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Most of us have skipped past them when they were not viable players. The Skuas were viable planes in the Spring of 1940, But in the Spring of 1942 they are old and worn out. Shipping them 1/2 around the world when shipping space was scarce was not a good use of shipping space. Chesapeakes were under powered and lacking in spare parts.
At least the British had hundreds of Battles (or well over 1000 even in 1942) and lots of parts.

I wonder if there was some kind of refurbishment program possible. Convert them into Fulmars?

 

[Steamed_Banana]

Dive bombers are a specific and great danger to aircraft carriers, particularly the unarmored variety. 2 500-lb bombs put IJN Zuiho out of the Battle of Santa Cruz -- those bombs from a two-plane patrol element and not a full strike -- one hit and one near-miss iirc. So yes, especially against an enemy not equipped with radar, DBs were dangerous to flattops even with lighter munitions.

The real question is whether Skuas or Battles could hit KdB hard at Op C. I'm skeptical. At Coral Sea SBDs were in on the kill against Shoho, to be sure, and planted at least two 1000-lbers on Shokaku ... and of course the pounding they delivered at Midway. The thing is is that with Shoho, the air attack was fairly coordinated and so both DBs and TBs helped each other to better odds.

With just about every other USN aerial attack in 1942, that coordination was not attained, and in only one did the DBs deliver the hurt -- at Midway, when IJN CAP was overwhelmed and drawn off to the northeast.

So my point, or question, is that without RAF/FAA torpedo bombers based on Ceylon allowing for the splitting of KdB defenses, would IJN CAP for Op C be so ineffective as at Midway, or would British DBs be so ineffective as at Santa Cruz?

About the characteristics of DBs in general, I like what E EwenS has laid out, because I don't think dive-bombing is hard-and-fast; it's a continuum. Of course you want to make your textbook dive for a given airframe, but circumstances often demand otherwise. Also, I seem to remember that F4U Corsair extension of landing-gear was not extemporization, but a design feature.

SBDs did hit and sink Japanese ships many times after Midway, the carrier Ryujo and one cruiser and nine transports at the second battle of Guadalcanal for example. They were still using them at Leyte Gulf two years later.

But I do agree with your premise that it's doubtful Battles, Skuas and Vindicators etc. are sufficient to put a dent in that fleet.

One interesting thing I've seen discussed on here before, is that Swordfish could be fitted with radar, and therefore could go out at night and in bad weather and drop torpedoes. British torpedoes were a lot better than American ones. Only problem is their very short range. You'd have to be one seriously bold British carrier captain to approach five IJN carriers with what they had available.

Wellingtons though, couldn't they also carry ASV radar? And Wellingtons had a very long range. Night time torpedo strikes with some Wellingtons? I know they had some in the area - 215 Sqn flew their first combat mission from Calcutta in April 1942. 99 Sqn was also in country.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

I wonder if there was some kind of refurbishment program possible. Convert them into Fulmars?

I don't see that as useful for Ceylon. 1) the time for this modification program is probably going to see them late anyway, and 2) even if these modified-into-fighters could be delivered in time, how useful might they be? The Zero has all the cards -- turn, roll, climb, and perhaps top speed (?)

SBDs did hit and sink Japanese ships many times after Midway, the carrier Ryujo and one cruiser and nine transports at the second battle of Guadalcanal for example. They were still using them at Leyte Gulf two years later.

Even in their obsolescence they were dangerous airplanes. To be fair, the same could be said of other planes as well. I think the Stuka aged worst, the Val close behind but still useful into 1943. The pathetic fact is that this mishandled SB2C program meant that SBDs flew well into 1944 for the USN, and with the USMC for the duration. I loves me some Dauntlii. Kinda like the B-17, a leftover from an earlier era, but hung tough and still capable, in good hands.

[...] One interesting thing I've seen discussed on here before, is that Swordfish could be fitted with radar, and therefore could go out at night and in bad weather and drop torpedoes. British torpedoes were a lot better than American ones. Only problem is their very short range. You'd have to be one seriously bold British carrier captain to approach five IJN carriers with what they had available.

I am under the impression that Swordies did carry radar and used it in night and low-vis situations. Albs too. E EwenS made mention of Rob Stuart, whose work I've read over at Combined Fleet. He writes about how Somerville contemplated a night-strike.

Wellingtons though, couldn't they also carry ASV radar? And Wellingtons had a very long range. Night time torpedo strikes with some Wellingtons? I know they had some in the area - 215 Sqn flew their first combat mission from Calcutta in April 1942. 99 Sqn was also in country.

I know virtually nothing about Wellington maritime operations except for reading about some Med operations. I'd love to hear more.

 

[MikeMeech]

I wonder if there was some kind of refurbishment program possible. Convert them into Fulmars?

Hi
Convert Battles into Fulmars? What magic will be used they are totally different aircraft.

Mike

 

[EwenS]

Swordfish began to carry ASV.II radar from early 1941. During the Bismarck chase the flight leaders' aircraft of 825 squadron on Victorious had it. Most, if not all Illustrious Swordfish had it when she arrived in the IO in April 1942 (her maintenance personnel even fitted it to some replacement aircraft picked up at Freetown while she was en route south).

ASV.II on the Albacores carried by Indomitable and Formidable in early 1942 is a more difficult question. There were technical problems getting it to work on this aircraft that were not resolved until late 1941. Indomitable's aircraft mostly came off the production line prior to her completion in Oct 1941. Formidable's came from later production and she didn't leave Britain until Feb 1942.

We do know Formidable had some ASV equipped Albacores but not how many. We also know that in late April there was an unexplained shuffling of Albacore airframes between the squadrons on the two carriers. My educated guess is that that was designed to spread whatever radar equipped aircraft there were more equally between the various squadrons and the two carriers.

But as we have discussed before not every aircraft requires radar to carry out a night torpedo attack. The RN and the RAF had developed techniques to use flares to backlight ships being attacked and for the torpedo carriers to come in from the dark side. It required training and co-ordination but it did work.

As for the Wellington, in the ME the first squadron was switched to the TB role from Dec 1941, flying its first operation in Jan 1942 after the crews had undergone the necessary training, with which IIRC, FAA personnel assisted. Their initial aircraft were converted bombers which required modification to be able to carry up to two torpedoes and that included modifications to the bomb bay, particularly at the aft end (see the photo below) to accommodate the MAT, fitting torpedo sights in front of the cockpit amongst others. This was only done because of a shortage of Beauforts. But they were operating at night. Too risky to use them in daylight. And they were not radar equipped at least in the early days. A second squadron sent out from Britain became operational in the role in March 1942.

But these aircraft were flying a mix of operations - shipping recce, ASW as well as torpedo dropping in the anti shipping role.

Given the nature of the IO, the flying boat proved to be far more effective in the former two roles. The number of Catalinas available increased as 1942 went on. The pre-FE war detachment from 205 on Ceylon being augmented by arrivals from 413, the first aircraft from which were available in April 1942, and 240 squadron from July as well as the survivors from the Dutch which expanded to form 321 squadron in Aug. These aircraft were able to fly from a string of flying boat bases established on the island chains running down the centre of the IO, curving through the Seychelles to Madagascar and southern Africa.

The ground echelons of both 99 & 215 Wellington squadrons both left Britain on 16 Feb 1942 on ships of convoy WS16 which arrived at Bombay on 8th April 1942

215 was formed on 9 Dec 1941 for service overseas, but it was 21st Feb 1942 before the air echelon formed. After training it left for India via the ME at the end of March. It was able to come together at Pandaveswar, NW of Calcutta, on 17th April from where many of its early operations were supply drops in support of the retreat from Burma. Other jobs followed and it was March 1943 before it undertook any bombing operations AIUI.

After its arrival, the ground echelon of 99 seems to have been split up temporarily (reasons unknown), only coming together again on 6 June at Ambala, NW India. It was Sept before it began flying operations out of Pandaveswar over Burma.

It is interesting to note that after Operation C there was no need for torpedo bombers in the IO. This was because there were no targets to be found worth a torpedo. The two Beaufort squadrons (once fully equipped with the Type in early 1943) sat at Ceylon, re-equipping with Beaufighter X in mid-1944. 22 joined the campaign in Burma late in the year, but 217 remained on Ceylon until the end of the war, it's move to the Cocos Islands cancelled by that event.

Even the FAA Barracuda & Avenger squadrons restricted themselves to bombs. No torpedoes were available to the Avengers in May 1945 when the IJN cruiser Haguro was sunk.

The nearest a threat worth a torpedo emerged was in Jan / Feb 1944 when the IJN moved a substantial part of their fleet including carriers, down to Singapore area. Initially it was thought to be another Operation C in the making but it turned out they just wanted to be nearer their oil supplies. But it did see 2 Avenger and 4 Barracuda squadrons as well as 2 Hellcat and 2 Corsair squadrons dispatched from Britain to Southern India / Ceylon just in case. This was only one of a number of movements of ships and aircraft around the IO just in case.

March 1944, the IJN dispatched 3 cruisers on a two week antishipping sweep into the IO. Illustrious was sent to give chase but didn't catch up before they returned to Batavia after sinking just one ship. They never came anywhere near the Indian coastline.

 

[yulzari]

With the overload tank in the navigator's position and the TAG left behind a fully loaded Swordfish, with torpedo or bombs, had a range of 1,000 miles.

Swordfish were being fitted with ASV MkII radar by the time of the Japanese raid on Ceylon. Whether there were enough ASV MkIIs to fit out squadrons in Ceylon as well as Fleet use in Europe and Africa is another matter.

Torpedos let in water so are more likely to do serious or terminal damage than 250lb or x3 500lb bombs

Fairey Albacores can do the same job with more ease or a bomb load of x4 500lb bombs.

To derail our train of thought further, how about the Handley Page Hampdens? 1,700 mile range, 4,000lb bomb load or, if given the standard TB conversion, an 18 inch torpedo. Exists in the time frame and carries an effective weapon load. Faster cruising speed than a Skua and 4 times greater bomb load. 70% greater range than a Battle. No less likely to survive a Japanese CAP interception than anything else available.

We would do well to remember the strategic picture. The raid was to examine the freedom of the Japanese navy to operate freely in the Indian Ocean. The action over Ceylon was to deter the Royal Navy from bringing an effective naval force into the Indian Ocean. That was understood and prompted the Commonwealth invasion of Madagascar and the six month fighting against the French as a spoiling action against potential Japanese use of Madagascar and a threat to the whole Indian Ocean and the vital shipping routes around South Africa. An effective aerial engagement by British bombers would demonstrate that the Japanese navy could not operate in the Indian Ocean with impunity. The crucial purpose of British actions against the Japanese raiding force was deterrence as long as it located the raiding force and engaged it. Engaging it with effective damage was a benefit but the mere attempt demonstrated both the risk and the potential hazard they faced. Our anti Fleet air action is better served by aeroplanes with a good range and an airborne radar. Ideally with ship killing torpedoes, but bombs, as large as possible, are still useful. The Japanese sought a dominance in the Indian Ocean. The British sought a demonstration of deterrence.

 

[Shortround6]

Hi
Convert Battles into Fulmars? What magic will be used they are totally different aircraft.

Mike

.................................Battle............................Fulmar
Wing span........54 ft 0 in....................46 ft 4.25 in
Wing area.........422 sq ft....................342 sq ft
Length................42 ft 4 in....................40 ft 2 in

2-3 fitters, some hacksaws and rivet gun or 2?
we won't bother to fit the folding wing hinges

 

[EwenS]

Now found some more on Wellington TB.

They operated the TB in conjunction with bombers to draw the attention of enemy gunners. The first TB sortie by 38 squadron was on the night of 22/23 Feb 1942. 6 bombers and 2 TB (Which they referred to as Fishingtons). Only 1 bomber found the target and the torpedoes were returned to base. It was into March before they were able to carry out a successful attack. Things improved from March because ASV.II equipped Wellington Mk.VIII began to arrive, first with 221 & then 38.

As for the Hampden, I'm sure I've covered this before. Another stand in due to a lack of Beauforts, this time at home. Two squadrons planned for Beauforts received these in early 1942 with 2 ex Bomber Command squadrons added in April. But again it took some time to get the aircraft converted to the TB role and longer to retrain the Bomber Command crews.

Modifications were required around the rear of the bomb bay and the lower gunner's position to allow carriage of the Mk.XII torpedo fitted with its MAT.

 

[Shortround6]

Dive bombers are a specific and great danger to aircraft carriers, particularly the unarmored variety. 2 500-lb bombs put IJN Zuiho out of the Battle of Santa Cruz -- those bombs from a two-plane patrol element and not a full strike -- one hit and one near-miss iirc. So yes, especially against an enemy not equipped with radar, DBs were dangerous to flattops even with lighter munitions.

I know I get a little detail orientated at times.
In this case the Zuiho was a converted submarine tender and was about the size of an Independence class carrier, except without any left over cruiser armor or the sub-division of the cruiser. As noted a number of time, US bombs were about 50% HE, British GP bombs were 27-31% with the 250lb being 27 and a 1000lb (if you could find one in early 1942) at 31%.

Near misses are iffy. Very close can spring hull plates and cause flooding. The US bombs were more likely to do this given the same distance from the hull or would do the same damage hitting further from the hull than a British bomb of the same weight.
US 1000lb bombs get very dangerous, their HE charge is in the same catagory as an 18" torpedo, a bit bigger than most 18" torpedoes. Trying to aim a little bit off to get a near miss on purpose was foolish.
Not all ships used the same thickness of hull plating (or even the same steel) and not all ships used the same framing or spacing.

Dive bombers were very useful during the early part of the war, things got more difficult as time went on. Using the Zuiho as an example again, at Santa Cruz she had eight 5in guns in four twin mounts. Japanese 5in AA guns fired about 2/3rds as fast as the US 5in (everybodies heavy AA fired slower than the US 5in) and she had eight 25mm guns in four twin mounts.
At some point in 1943 the 25mm count went to 48 guns and at some point in 1944 she got another 20 guns (total 68?) and 6 rocket launchers. The Japanese (French) 25mm was a really crappy gun for a number of reasons but diving on a ship that had 68 of them compared to 8?
British and Americans were adding light AA as fast as the factories could make the guns and mounts all during the war. Diving bombing a 1943 British or American ship could be a terrifying experience. And they didn't stop in 1943.

Unknown to the Allies the Japanese damage control sucked and their handling of gasoline fumes also sucked so their carriers were often lost to damage that was survivable by western carriers.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Perhaps instead of hunting Nagumo go hunt Ozawa. Apart from the need to have the aircraft in theatre the British discover that the two IJN forces are too far away from each other to give support, the convoy raid and bombardment plans and that Nagumo clearly out matches the RN forces available. The RN carriers land their air groups in suitable locations, the eastern fleet goes west and the idea is to defeat Ozawa in detail once his force splits up. A 1 to 1 swap off, 1 light carrier, 2 heavy cruisers and a couple of destroyers would be an allied win. Super allied bonus, damaged IJN ships gives Nagumo the problem of lingering in support or abandoning them.

One extra squadron of anything is unlikely to do much to the Kido Butai, landing the 5 to 6 squadrons from the RN carriers in the right location would have been the better option.

Setting up an aircraft reassembly line,
Takoradi, population around 40,000, Columbo around 285,000

Takoradi, advanced party depart UK 4 July 1940, arrive 14 July, 9 officers and 15 other ranks
7 August a Bellman hangar arrived, offloaded by 10th,
21 August main party arrived, 28 officers, 329 other ranks.

2 September first air movement, 16 officers and 2 other ranks from Middle East on way to UK,
5 September first freighter arrives, 6 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane
6 September HMS Argus with 30 Hurricanes on their undercarriages plus another 69 other ranks,
7 September freighter docks with stores and equipment for the base.
13 September first Hurricane flight at 16:15 hours
17 September first Blenheim flight at 16:00 hours
18 September runway unserviceable for a time. Guardhouse completed.
19 September second hangar construction commenced
20 September first ferry flight, 1 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane, first arrivals at Abu Sueir Egypt on 27 September.
22 September first hangar construction completed.
25 September second ferry flight, 1 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane, first 2 other ranks dormitory blocks finished
30 September third ferry flight, 1 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane

October saw 3 more ferry flights, on the 10th, 15th and 29th, total 3 Blenheim, 16 Hurricane.

24? October first Fulmar arrive, first fly out 7 November
25 October first Maryland arrive, first air test 12 December, practice flights needed before ferrying, the February shipment arrived 8th, first air test 27th, many difficulties since a Maryland "had never been completely erected." Plan is case to air test in 10 days. First Maryland fly outs on 10th, delayed at Lagos to flush fuel and oil systems and then load correct fuel and oil.

Total aircraft sent to Middle East by end November, 8 Blenheim, 56 Hurricane, 5 Fulmar
17 December first Mohawk arrive, 27 December first air test resulting in a fatal crash, 17 January 1941 RAF order grounding Mohawk.
30 January first Tomahawk arrival, but were missing equipment, 100 Tomahawk from USA on 8 February, first fly out 13 March,

January list of aircraft shipping complaints for a group of Blenheim, careless crating, lack of anti corrosion treatment, indifferent disassembly with many parts damaged, major parts missing and a greater than usual missing rate for smaller parts.

Vought Chesapeake, 2 lost at sea, 48 arrivals in UK May to November 1941.

From the end of WWI to the mid 1930's the RAF plans assumed an attack from across the channel, the reality of aircraft performance, the reality of the French Air Force was the only one in Western Europe able to challenge the RAF. You only have to look at where the airbases were mostly located.

In theory pre war as each better type was introduced it became the main bomber for strategic operations. Pre war the RAF really wanted strategic bombing to be its main offensive task. In this it was helped as even in early 1938 the army was not thinking in terms of sending any force onto the continent, later they upgraded the expeditionary force to 2 divisions. In mid 1939 came the idea of sending an army sized unit, but British Army preparedness then went backwards as conscription was introduced.

The army and air force did not try and create a common doctrine, the RAF created the battlefield and beyond tactical reconnaissance units in the numbers required for an army sized expedition force while being adamant that strike aircraft would stay away from the battlefield, unless in exceptional circumstances, however they would be available for interdiction, strike decisions made by the RAF. The army wanted lots of battlefield strikes plus interdiction, strike decisions made by the army. Everyone overestimated bomb damage. With limited evidence from WWI to go on both sides dug in. The WWII experience showed interdiction needed to be systematic, battlefield strikes needed a lot of skill and needed to part of an army operation, not just bomb dropping, while strategic air operations pushed the enemy air force away from the battlefield, making air operations there more effective with lower losses, over and above damage caused by the strategic raids.

Something similar was going on RAF versus RN, not extending so much into anti submarine warfare or reconnaissance but more about the number of bomb or torpedo hits likely, their effect and the number of attacking aircraft likely shot down by naval AA.

Lots of senior Luftwaffe commanders came through the army and the Luftwaffe chief had a lot of political power, much less chance of an army or navy take over.

In September 1939 Army Co-Operation command came to 13 squadrons, Bomber Command 39 squadrons, Fighter Command 36 squadrons and Coastal Command 19 squadrons. The 13 Army Co-Operation squadrons

1, 73, 85, 87 Hurricane
2, 4, 13, 16, 26, 614, Lysander
613 Hind/Hector
53, 59 Blenheim

Obviously 613 squadron was not front line. The Blenheims were meant as longer range reconnaissance.

2 squadron received Lysanders in July 1938, 4 squadron went to Lysanders in December 1938, 13 squadron received Lysanders in January 1939, 16 squadron received Lysanders in May 1938, 26 squadron, Lysanders in February 1939, and 614 squadron, Lysanders in July 1939.

So essentially the RAF was actually ahead of the army in providing basic reconnaissance airpower, but well behind in terms of firepower.

Comparing RAF in France 1939 to 1944, in 1940 there were 7 reconnaissance squadrons, in 1944 there were 8, with another 9 very short range reconnaissance squadrons who had a main purpose of artillery fire control, but clearly were useful observers. In 1940 and 1944 there were 12 bomber squadrons. Of course the role of front line support had been moved from bomber to fighter aircraft so there really should be more bomber squadrons in 1940 to match the 1944 force mix.

Wellington torpedo bombers began arriving in the Middle East late 1941 or early 1942, first torpedo drops around March. Useful range for when RAF strike aircraft were bombed out of Malta.

Comedy relief time,

They had ~70-75 Mohawks in India in early 1942, in various stages of preparation and conversion.

From what source? That wonderful early 1942 period returns, UK exports to India were 24 in 1941, 40 January to April 1942, then 21 May and June 1942. So to get to 75 in India requires the May shipment to arrive.

Those 200 Tomahawks were needed in Russia. But some of the ones sent to England were not needed or really much used (several tactical recon squadrons) .

Britain imported 461 Tomahawk, including 140 non combat worthy mark I, exported 199 to end 1941, difference 122. Given the problems the Lysander had in 1940 and the prospect of Sea Lion II in 1941 getting modern types into the Army Co-Operation units had a priority, also everyone had agreed army-air systems needed changes, better aircraft had to be part of the solution, halve the numbers available for units to allow for reserves.

Sometimes these things had to be done. The early Marylands used for recon had the backward throttles.

So how many still had French throttles and more importantly metric instruments? Takoradi lists 4 of its earliest Maryland aircraft by their Martin Construction numbers, they received RAF serials after arriving in the Middle East.

Sometimes isolated destroyers, especially the older WW I vintage / 1920s ones were killed by skip / mast-head bombers around New Guinea / Solomons zone. A few Axis ships in the Med were as well, but the losses start going up when this approach is tried against warships.

So what does few mean, both in absolute terms and percentage of losses?

The big victory at the Battle of the Bismark Sea was largely because the Japanese got very stretched out in their column, isolating the slow transports and even the relatively few warships escorting them, and the Allies came with a huge number of aircraft, (about 120 bombers and 50 fighters) having gradually built up the logistics and coordination methods, and mustered an impressive air armada for the raid. The fighter protection was substantial and the Japanese were having some trouble with their long range combat air patrols... and a lot of the Allied raiders like the A-20s and the Beaufighters were fast planes down low.

Everyone agrees the morning strike against the formed convoy caused the formation loss, 4 out of 8 destroyers, escort of 1 destroyer per transport, with fighter cover. Isolated air strikes on anything that can shoot back increases losses.

I know from the war histories that aircraft were assembled from these infamous crates in worse conditions than what would be available in Colombo.

So provide the details and the crucial bits, what size aircraft, how long did it take and what equipment was available? The movie Flight of the Phoenix does not count, even if it did have Jimmy Stewart.

Torch landed in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and but we both know that the US had no specific interests in any of these three places, or in seizing French assets, and in fact that the entire goal of that vast military operation was the same purpose as the US giving England the aircraft and tanks used to win in 2nd El Alamein - to save their North African and middle eastern Colonial assets, and protect their threatened supply lines, as we both know perfectly well.

Even as Time Goes By Humphrey Bogart would disagree. The Torch supply lines angle was opening up the Mediterranean, like US to China, by 1942 the area had little to do with British supply lines, beyond the military presence, since from 1939 the British had moved to North American supply where ever possible to save shipping, the Australians subsequently unloaded their 1940 wool clip on Japan. Torch was also the biggest operation the allies could do against the axis in Europe with what they had at the time. It relieved political pressure coming from Moscow and gave the US Army and Air Force important combat experience, plus further tested out amphibious warfare doctrine. Does anyone think Normandy would have gone as well using 1942 tactics?

I won't blame this obviously intentional misrepresentation of truth (here and in your previous two attempts up above) and your apparent 'ethically challenged' status due to your presumed nation of origin, as you have mine, I don't want to paint your countrymen with the same brush. But you personally come across as disingenuous and pretentious, which is not a flattering combination.

Mirrors are back and selectively polished.

The original shipment of 50 P-40s were actually heading to Colombo in Ceylon. And would have arrived in time. You are just babbling trying to derail that basic fact.

You can see from the Takoradi data above what times are required, Langley was an aircraft transport in 1942, arrival in Colombo on 5 March, then a few more days to Karachi, using the Takoradi Hurricanes as an example you have a squadron's worth about a month later. As for Colombo allow at least a month extra to create and equip the assembly force. It was a problem to fly things like the mobile cranes needed to hold say the fuselage in place while the bits containing the undercarriage were fitted, or just moving the heavy items. Finally what trained aircrew and mechanics were with the shipments?

 

[EwenS]

We would do well to remember the strategic picture. The raid was to examine the freedom of the Japanese navy to operate freely in the Indian Ocean. The action over Ceylon was to deter the Royal Navy from bringing an effective naval force into the Indian Ocean. That was understood and prompted the invasion of Madagascar and the six month fighting against the French as a spoiling action against potential Japanese use of Madagascar and a threat to the whole Indian Ocean and the vital shipping routes around South Africa. An effective aerial engagement by British bombers would demonstrate that the Japanese navy could not operate in the Indian Ocean with impunity. The crucial purpose of British actions against the Japanese raiding force was deterrence as long as it located the raiding force and engaged it. Engaging it with effective damage was a benefit but the mere attempt demonstrated both the risk and the potential hazard they faced. Our anti Fleet air action is better served by aeroplanes with a good range and an airborne radar. Ideally with ship killing torpedoes, but bombs, as large as possible, are still useful. The Japanese sought a dominance in the Indian Ocean. The British sought a demonstration of deterrence.

In fact the invasion of Madagascar was being planned at least as far back as Nov 1941. The perceived threat was that Vichy France would be lent on to allow Germany to use Madagascar as a U-boat base. It was shelved just before Japan attacked. Then the Germans with the encouragement of the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin tried in early 1942 to get the IJA & IJN to invade it to provide such a base. They refused to bite. As it turned out Japan had no interest in acquiring a base in Madagascar.

But the potential threat of such a base meant that the subject came up again in early 1942, with Gen Smuts, the South African Prime Minister being a keen proponent and applying pressure to Churchill.

The final decision to mount Operation Ironclad was taken in London in early March 1942. The necessary amphibious trained troops were hastily assembled in Britain and were to be augmented by elements from 5th Division which was already due to be sent East that month. They all sailed from Britain on convoy WS17 on 23 March 1942 with an escort that included the carrier Illustrious. That was 3 days before the Kido Butai sailed from Staring Bay, Celebes to embark on Operation C. The whole thing was a bit rushed with detailed planning only starting when both army and naval forces reached Freetown on the 6th April, the day after the KB hit Colombo. The Ironclad element of the convoy was given priority for replenishment and sailed again on the 9th April, the day the KB struck Trincomalee.

This operation was effectively run from London not Ceylon. Overall command of Ironclad was placed in the hands of Rear Admiral Syfret commanding Force H and not Somerville the CinC Eastern Fleet. Ultimately the Eastern Fleet played a supporting role and provided Indomitable (in place of Hermes as originally planned) and a couple of destroyers to the landing forces with the major part providing a distant cover in case of IJN intervention, which never came except in the form of some sub activity. The other naval forces participating in the landings came from home or the Med.

The final "go" order was not issued until a couple of days before the landing at Diego Saurez on 5th May. By that time however all the assault convoys were at sea from Durban, en route to Madagascar.

In the orders issued by the IJN from 9th March onwards the main objective of Operation C was clearly stated to be:-

"Destruction of the enemy fleet on the island of Ceylon by raid attack".

Note destruction not deterrence. Somerville however appreciated the need not to allow his fleet to be destroyed so that it remained a "fleet in being" to protect the vital shipping routes in the western IO supplying the ME and FE campaigns.

The fleets came close to meeting on the night of 5/6 April. The Albacore TB were sitting on the flight decks of Indomitable & Formidable fully armed, fuelled and crewed just waiting for the enemy to be located with enough accuracy to launch. Somerville's plan was to get close enough to launch a night strike, recover his aircraft and be sufficiently distant by daylight to avoid any retaliatory strike by the KB from any surviving carriers. Whether it was the right thing to do or not and whether it would have succeeded or not is a question that has been hotly debated ever since.