Perhaps instead of hunting Nagumo go hunt Ozawa. Apart from the need to have the aircraft in theatre the British discover that the two IJN forces are too far away from each other to give support, the convoy raid and bombardment plans and that Nagumo clearly out matches the RN forces available. The RN carriers land their air groups in suitable locations, the eastern fleet goes west and the idea is to defeat Ozawa in detail once his force splits up. A 1 to 1 swap off, 1 light carrier, 2 heavy cruisers and a couple of destroyers would be an allied win. Super allied bonus, damaged IJN ships gives Nagumo the problem of lingering in support or abandoning them.
One extra squadron of anything is unlikely to do much to the Kido Butai, landing the 5 to 6 squadrons from the RN carriers in the right location would have been the better option.
Setting up an aircraft reassembly line,
Takoradi, population around 40,000, Columbo around 285,000
Takoradi, advanced party depart UK 4 July 1940, arrive 14 July, 9 officers and 15 other ranks
7 August a Bellman hangar arrived, offloaded by 10th,
21 August main party arrived, 28 officers, 329 other ranks.
2 September first air movement, 16 officers and 2 other ranks from Middle East on way to UK,
5 September first freighter arrives, 6 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane
6 September HMS Argus with 30 Hurricanes on their undercarriages plus another 69 other ranks,
7 September freighter docks with stores and equipment for the base.
13 September first Hurricane flight at 16:15 hours
17 September first Blenheim flight at 16:00 hours
18 September runway unserviceable for a time. Guardhouse completed.
19 September second hangar construction commenced
20 September first ferry flight, 1 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane, first arrivals at Abu Sueir Egypt on 27 September.
22 September first hangar construction completed.
25 September second ferry flight, 1 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane, first 2 other ranks dormitory blocks finished
30 September third ferry flight, 1 Blenheim, 6 Hurricane
October saw 3 more ferry flights, on the 10th, 15th and 29th, total 3 Blenheim, 16 Hurricane.
24? October first Fulmar arrive, first fly out 7 November
25 October first Maryland arrive, first air test 12 December, practice flights needed before ferrying, the February shipment arrived 8th, first air test 27th, many difficulties since a Maryland "had never been completely erected." Plan is case to air test in 10 days. First Maryland fly outs on 10th, delayed at Lagos to flush fuel and oil systems and then load correct fuel and oil.
Total aircraft sent to Middle East by end November, 8 Blenheim, 56 Hurricane, 5 Fulmar
17 December first Mohawk arrive, 27 December first air test resulting in a fatal crash, 17 January 1941 RAF order grounding Mohawk.
30 January first Tomahawk arrival, but were missing equipment, 100 Tomahawk from USA on 8 February, first fly out 13 March,
January list of aircraft shipping complaints for a group of Blenheim, careless crating, lack of anti corrosion treatment, indifferent disassembly with many parts damaged, major parts missing and a greater than usual missing rate for smaller parts.
Vought Chesapeake, 2 lost at sea, 48 arrivals in UK May to November 1941.
From the end of WWI to the mid 1930's the RAF plans assumed an attack from across the channel, the reality of aircraft performance, the reality of the French Air Force was the only one in Western Europe able to challenge the RAF. You only have to look at where the airbases were mostly located.
In theory pre war as each better type was introduced it became the main bomber for strategic operations. Pre war the RAF really wanted strategic bombing to be its main offensive task. In this it was helped as even in early 1938 the army was not thinking in terms of sending any force onto the continent, later they upgraded the expeditionary force to 2 divisions. In mid 1939 came the idea of sending an army sized unit, but British Army preparedness then went backwards as conscription was introduced.
The army and air force did not try and create a common doctrine, the RAF created the battlefield and beyond tactical reconnaissance units in the numbers required for an army sized expedition force while being adamant that strike aircraft would stay away from the battlefield, unless in exceptional circumstances, however they would be available for interdiction, strike decisions made by the RAF. The army wanted lots of battlefield strikes plus interdiction, strike decisions made by the army. Everyone overestimated bomb damage. With limited evidence from WWI to go on both sides dug in. The WWII experience showed interdiction needed to be systematic, battlefield strikes needed a lot of skill and needed to part of an army operation, not just bomb dropping, while strategic air operations pushed the enemy air force away from the battlefield, making air operations there more effective with lower losses, over and above damage caused by the strategic raids.
Something similar was going on RAF versus RN, not extending so much into anti submarine warfare or reconnaissance but more about the number of bomb or torpedo hits likely, their effect and the number of attacking aircraft likely shot down by naval AA.
Lots of senior Luftwaffe commanders came through the army and the Luftwaffe chief had a lot of political power, much less chance of an army or navy take over.
In September 1939 Army Co-Operation command came to 13 squadrons, Bomber Command 39 squadrons, Fighter Command 36 squadrons and Coastal Command 19 squadrons. The 13 Army Co-Operation squadrons
1, 73, 85, 87 Hurricane
2, 4, 13, 16, 26, 614, Lysander
613 Hind/Hector
53, 59 Blenheim
Obviously 613 squadron was not front line. The Blenheims were meant as longer range reconnaissance.
2 squadron received Lysanders in July 1938, 4 squadron went to Lysanders in December 1938, 13 squadron received Lysanders in January 1939, 16 squadron received Lysanders in May 1938, 26 squadron, Lysanders in February 1939, and 614 squadron, Lysanders in July 1939.
So essentially the RAF was actually ahead of the army in providing basic reconnaissance airpower, but well behind in terms of firepower.
Comparing RAF in France 1939 to 1944, in 1940 there were 7 reconnaissance squadrons, in 1944 there were 8, with another 9 very short range reconnaissance squadrons who had a main purpose of artillery fire control, but clearly were useful observers. In 1940 and 1944 there were 12 bomber squadrons. Of course the role of front line support had been moved from bomber to fighter aircraft so there really should be more bomber squadrons in 1940 to match the 1944 force mix.
Wellington torpedo bombers began arriving in the Middle East late 1941 or early 1942, first torpedo drops around March. Useful range for when RAF strike aircraft were bombed out of Malta.
Comedy relief time,
They had ~70-75 Mohawks in India in early 1942, in various stages of preparation and conversion.
From what source? That wonderful early 1942 period returns, UK exports to India were 24 in 1941, 40 January to April 1942, then 21 May and June 1942. So to get to 75 in India requires the May shipment to arrive.
Those 200 Tomahawks were needed in Russia. But some of the ones sent to England were not needed or really much used (several tactical recon squadrons) .
Britain imported 461 Tomahawk, including 140 non combat worthy mark I, exported 199 to end 1941, difference 122. Given the problems the Lysander had in 1940 and the prospect of Sea Lion II in 1941 getting modern types into the Army Co-Operation units had a priority, also everyone had agreed army-air systems needed changes, better aircraft had to be part of the solution, halve the numbers available for units to allow for reserves.
Sometimes these things had to be done. The early Marylands used for recon had the backward throttles.
So how many still had French throttles and more importantly metric instruments? Takoradi lists 4 of its earliest Maryland aircraft by their Martin Construction numbers, they received RAF serials after arriving in the Middle East.
Sometimes isolated destroyers, especially the older WW I vintage / 1920s ones were killed by skip / mast-head bombers around New Guinea / Solomons zone. A few Axis ships in the Med were as well, but the losses start going up when this approach is tried against warships.
So what does few mean, both in absolute terms and percentage of losses?
The big victory at the Battle of the Bismark Sea was largely because the Japanese got very stretched out in their column, isolating the slow transports and even the relatively few warships escorting them, and the Allies came with a huge number of aircraft, (about 120 bombers and 50 fighters) having gradually built up the logistics and coordination methods, and mustered an impressive air armada for the raid. The fighter protection was substantial and the Japanese were having some trouble with their long range combat air patrols... and a lot of the Allied raiders like the A-20s and the Beaufighters were fast planes down low.
Everyone agrees the morning strike against the formed convoy caused the formation loss, 4 out of 8 destroyers, escort of 1 destroyer per transport, with fighter cover. Isolated air strikes on anything that can shoot back increases losses.
I know from the war histories that aircraft were assembled from these infamous crates in worse conditions than what would be available in Colombo.
So provide the details and the crucial bits, what size aircraft, how long did it take and what equipment was available? The movie Flight of the Phoenix does not count, even if it did have Jimmy Stewart.
Torch landed in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and but we both know that the US had no specific interests in any of these three places, or in seizing French assets, and in fact that the entire goal of that vast military operation was the same purpose as the US giving England the aircraft and tanks used to win in 2nd El Alamein - to save their North African and middle eastern Colonial assets, and protect their threatened supply lines, as we both know perfectly well.
Even as Time Goes By Humphrey Bogart would disagree. The Torch supply lines angle was opening up the Mediterranean, like US to China, by 1942 the area had little to do with British supply lines, beyond the military presence, since from 1939 the British had moved to North American supply where ever possible to save shipping, the Australians subsequently unloaded their 1940 wool clip on Japan. Torch was also the biggest operation the allies could do against the axis in Europe with what they had at the time. It relieved political pressure coming from Moscow and gave the US Army and Air Force important combat experience, plus further tested out amphibious warfare doctrine. Does anyone think Normandy would have gone as well using 1942 tactics?
I won't blame this obviously intentional misrepresentation of truth (here and in your previous two attempts up above) and your apparent 'ethically challenged' status due to your presumed nation of origin, as you have mine, I don't want to paint your countrymen with the same brush. But you personally come across as disingenuous and pretentious, which is not a flattering combination.
Mirrors are back and selectively polished.
The original shipment of 50 P-40s were actually heading to Colombo in Ceylon. And would have arrived in time. You are just babbling trying to derail that basic fact.
You can see from the Takoradi data above what times are required, Langley was an aircraft transport in 1942, arrival in Colombo on 5 March, then a few more days to Karachi, using the Takoradi Hurricanes as an example you have a squadron's worth about a month later. As for Colombo allow at least a month extra to create and equip the assembly force. It was a problem to fly things like the mobile cranes needed to hold say the fuselage in place while the bits containing the undercarriage were fitted, or just moving the heavy items. Finally what trained aircrew and mechanics were with the shipments?
